Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition

Essays Presented to John Whittaker

Edited by
Mark Joyal



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Preface

Few scholars have made so substantial and original a contribution as John Whittaker to our detailed understanding of that vast area of thought called the Platonic tradition. The idea to produce a volume which focussed on this and related subjects, both to commemorate John's retirement and to provide a token of esteem and admiration, was therefore a natural one. Indeed, it is especially appropriate that the production of this book should have taken place at Memorial University, where John has served with exemplary dedication for over thirty years. He arrived in 1964, ultimately attained the highest academic distinction which this University awards when in 1989 he was named University Research Professor, was Chair of his Department for fifteen years, and in the process won the enduring respect of colleagues and generations of students. I take the opportunity to join the contributors to this volume in wishing John a long, happy, and productive retirement.

Several people have helped in this book's production. Both John Smedley and Ruth Peters at Variorum showed great patience in the face of my failures to meet deadlines and provided abundant advice at every stage. The secretary of the Department of Classics, Cathy Kieley, provided expert help with word processing, and my wife Joyce assisted me with proofreading. From the book's inception until its completion the contributors have given much welcome encouragement and offered many excellent suggestions.

Abbreviations of ancient works are generally those given in LSJ, in the *OLD*, and in Lampe; where departures from the systems presented in these works have been admitted, the authors and I have sought to ensure clarity and consistency within individual contributions.

Mark Joyal



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I

PLATO

1

IS THE IDEA OF THE GOOD IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* BEYOND BEING?

MATTHIAS BALTES

In a famous passage of his *Republic*, Plato introduces Socrates speaking about the Idea of the Good:

> 'But examine the similitude of it still further in this way'.
> 'How?'
> 'The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to the visibles the power of visibility but also their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation'.
> 'Of course not'.
> 'In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and power'. (*R.* 509a9–b10, trans. after P. Shorey)

This passage, which comes almost at the end of the 'simile of the sun', is very often understood as maintaining that the Idea of the Good transcends every kind of being, that is to say, that it is itself no longer being at all. As one example among many, I quote Jens Halfwassen, *Aufstieg zum Einen* 221f.[1]: 'The simile of the sun culminates in the "most sublime paradox" that the absolute principle, the One and Good itself, "is not being but even beyond being", οὐκ οὐσίας

[1] J. Halfwassen, *Der Aufstieg zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin* (*Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 9) (Stuttgart 1992); cf. also 222 n. 6; 223ff., 244, 245 n. 73; 257ff., 261ff.; *id.*, 'Speusipp und die Unendlichkeit des Einen', *AGPh* 74 (1992) 46, 50, 71; *id.*, 'Das Eine als Einheit und Dreiheit', *RhM* 139 (1996) 55.

ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (509b8–9); thereby the transcendence of the absolute beyond being is expressed ... decisively for the first time in the history of philosophy; on the basis of the Eleatic distinction between being and the phenomenal world, the simile of the sun describes it as a double transcendence, thereby defining the twofold transcending from the phenomena to being and from being as a whole to the absolute as the law of motion in Platonic ... metaphysics'.[2]

If one maintains, as Halfwassen and others do,[3] that this interpretation goes back to the Old Academy and Speusippus, one may be right, but that cannot be proved. The only thing that seems to be certain to me is that in the Old Academy there existed speculations about the One and the Good beyond being. However, it is completely uncertain whether there had been any references to Plato's *Republic* in this connection.[4] It is in Plotinus and his followers

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[2] 'Das Sonnengleichnis gipfelt in der "erhabensten Paradoxie", daß nämlich das absolute Prinzip, das Eine und Gute selbst, "nicht Sein ist, sondern noch jenseits des Seins": οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (509b8–9); damit ist die Seinstranszendenz des Absoluten zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Philosophie ... maßgebend ausgesprochen; das Sonnengleichnis beschreibt sie auf der Grundlage der eleatischen Unterscheidung von Sein und Erscheinungswelt als doppelte Transzendenz und legt damit den zweifachen Überstieg über die Erscheinung zum Seienden und über das Seiende im ganzen zum Absoluten als Bewegungsgesetz der Platonischen ... Metaphysik fest'.

Similarly H.J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1959) 398f., 541ff.; *id.*, ''Επέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας', *AGPh* 51 (1969) 1ff.; K. Kremer, 'Die Anschauung der Ammonios (Hermeiou)-Schule über den Wirklichkeitscharakter des Intelligiblen', *PhJ* 69 (1961) 54; cf. also C. de Vogel, *Rethinking Plato and Platonism* (Leiden 1986) 45ff.; R. Ferber, *Platos Idee des Guten* (St. Augustin[2] 1989) 11: 'Die Idee des Guten ist das Dritte zwischen und über Denken und Sein'; *op. cit.* 68ff., esp. 69: 'Als Trans-seiendes ist die Idee des Guten auch nicht *immer* seiend, sondern jenseits des *immer* Seienden'; 132: 'Die Idee des Guten als *epékeina tês ousias* kann aber auch grundsätzlich nicht unmittelbar realisiert werden, da sie gar nicht real ist'; 141: 'Wenn also die Ontologie des Parmenides Metaphysik ist, dann die Ontologie Platos hier [in the simile of the cave] Metaontologie oder Metametaphysik'; 142: 'Jenes "höchste Seiende" ist für Plato kein Seiendes ... Es ist vielmehr *der* Unterschied zwischen Plato und Aristoteles, daß Aristoteles jene "höchste und erste Ursache" in etwas Göttlichem und Seiendem, Plato aber in etwas *Trans*göttlichem und -seiendem sieht'.

[3] E.g. Krämer, ''Επέκεινα ...' (above, n. 2) 4ff., 11ff.

[4] Differently Halfwassen, *Aufstieg* (above, n. 1) 224: 'Schon Platon und nicht erst Plotin denkt somit das Absolute als absolute Transzendenz ...' Cf. Ferber (above, n. 2) 151: 'Sie [the Idea of the Good] ist nicht nur nicht seiend, sondern auch nicht erkennbar: Wenn auch erst der Neu-

at the earliest that we can find evidence for this kind of interpretation of the famous passage in the *Republic.*[5] But is it also a correct one? I believe that this interpretation is untenable for the following reasons:

1. First of all, it is remarkable that Plato repeatedly calls the Idea of the Good ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (*R.* 505a2, 508e2f., 517b8f., 534b9f.); he even calls it παράδειγμα (540a9)—just like the other ideas. Is an *idea* that transcends being conceivable at all?[6]

2. In addition, Plato characterizes the Idea of the Good as 'the brightest part of being' (τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον, 518c9),[7] 'the most blessed part of being' (τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος, 526e3f.), and 'what is best among being things' (τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, 532c5f.). Consequently, the Idea of the Good must still belong to the realm of being.

3. Furthermore, Plato tells us that anyone ascending to the Idea of the Good and not desisting, 'until he *apprehends by thought itself* that which *is* the Good itself, arrives at *the limit of the intelligible itself*' (ὅταν τις ... μὴ ἀποστῇ, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, 532a5ff.). Elsewhere he calls the Idea of the Good 'the last one in the realm of the known' (ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία, 517b8f.), the realm of the known (γνωστά) coinciding with the realm of the intelligibles (νοητά, 510a9, 477a, 479d). Therefore, the Idea of the Good must still belong to the intelligibles, though as their summit (τέλος). But even so, it is apprehended by thought.[8]

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platonismus letztere Konsequenz hinsichtlich des Guten ... gezogen hat ..., so ist sie doch schon im Sonnengleichnis implizit enthalten'.

[5] Cf. in particular Plotinus I.3 [20] 5.7f.; II.4 [12] 16.25; III.9 [13] 9.1f.; V.5 [32] 6.11; VI.2 [43] 17.22f.; VI.6 [34] 5.36f.; VI.7 [38] 16.22ff.; VI.8 [39] 9.28 and numerous other passages.

[6] That would be even more remarkable, since the Idea of the Good (αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν) in *R.* 507b5 is labelled as an idea side by side with the idea of the Beautiful (αὐτὸ καλόν) and other ideas. For the label 'idea' in connection with the Idea of the Good cf. also G. Sillitti, 'Al di là della sostanza. Ancora su *Resp.* VI 509 B', *Elenchos* 1 (1980) 237f.

[7] Cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Lux intelligibilis. Untersuchung zur Lichtmetaphysik der Griechen* (Diss. Munich 1957) 65: 'Diese präzise Aussage über das ἀγαθόν zeigt die wesensmäßige Verfassung des Seins und seine Stufen an. Alles Seiende ist in dem Maße Licht, als es seiend ist ... Das ἀγαθόν nun ist das Licht in der Fülle, es steht allem Leuchtenden voran, weil es das vollkommenste Sein ist'.

[8] Similar ideas are expressed in passages such as *R.* 534b8ff., e2ff., 540a7ff.

4. Moreover, Plato calls the Idea of the Good a μάθημα, or more exactly τὸ μέγιστον μάθημα (504d2f., e4f., 505a2, 519c9f.). Although it does not belong to the other μέγιστα μαθήματα—the ideas of justice, of moderation, of courage, and of wisdom (503e3ff.)—and is an even greater μάθημα than these (504c9ff.), there is nevertheless no difference in principle between these kinds of μαθήματα, since both 'can be acquired'.

5. At the beginning of the simile of the sun (508b12ff.), Plato emphasizes that there exists an analogy between the Idea of the Good and the sun.[9] For 'just as the Good is to reason and the objects of reason *in the intelligible realm* (ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ), so this (*sc.* the sun) is to vision and the objects of vision in the visible world (ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ)'. This means that just as the sun belongs to the realm of the visibles, so the Idea of the Good belongs to the realm of the intelligibles. Hence neither the sun nor the Idea of the Good transcends its realm. This is confirmed by a later passage in which it is stressed that the Idea of the Good belongs to the realm of being (526e1ff.).[10]

6. Correspondingly, it is stated at the end of the simile of the sun (509d1ff.) that both the Idea of the Good and the sun rule like kings, the former over the class and realm of the intelligibles, the latter over the class and realm of the visibles. Just as the sun—in spite of its kingship—belongs to the visible things, so the Idea of the Good belongs to the intelligible things, in spite of its kingship.

7. With regard to the sun Plato declares that it is the cause of ὄψις, so that this can see the sun (508b9f.). By analogy, one has to say that the Idea of the Good is the cause of νοῦς so that this can recognize (νοεῖν) it (517c4).[11]

8. The simile of the line (509d6ff.) represents reality as a whole. On this line there are only four sections (τμήματα): (1) the shadows and reflections, (2) the concrete visible objects, (3) the objects of mathematics, and (4) the ideas proper. Hence there are only three

[9] With regard to the exactness of this analogy Plato writes in *R.* 506e3f. that the sun is an offspring of the Idea of the Good and therefore *very similar to it* (ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ).

[10] Similarly *R.* 532b6ff., c5ff.

[11] What T. Ebert states about the sun (*Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie Platons* [Berlin/New York 1974] 164) is by analogy valid for the Idea of the Good: 'Sie ist keine Bedingung, die dem, wofür sie Bedingung ist, uneinholbar vorausliegt, sondern sie kann selbst noch Gegenstand jener Akte werden, deren Bedingung sie ist ...'

possibilities of passing over from one reality to another, that is, of transcending. This means that there is no way of transcending the realm of the ideas. Accordingly, on the occasion of the ascension to the ἀνυπόθετος τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχή (511b3ff.) there is no mention of a jump or a stepping over from the realm of the ideas to that of the ἀρχή, but only of a uniform ascent to and an equally uniform descent from this origin (510b5ff., 511b5ff., 533c7ff.).[12] The ideas following immediately after this ἀρχή are said to be *connected* with it (τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, 511b8), which means that between them and the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή there exists a continuum. In any case, the ascent takes place in the section of the intelligibles, as Plato tells us (511b3f.). Hence one begins to understand Plato's statement that the Idea of the Good 'is the last one in the realm of the known' (ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα) and that—though with some effort—it can nonetheless be seen (517b7ff., esp. c1, c5, 518c10, 519c10ff., 526e4, 532c5f., 540a8f.).[13]

9. The simile of the cave (514aff.) comprises the same four sections as the simile of the line[14]: (1) the reflections in the cave, (2) the artefacts raised above the wall and the fire behind it, (3) the reflections and shadows in the upper world, and (4) the concrete things on the earth and in the sky there. Admittedly, among the things outside the cave (516a5ff.), Plato distinguishes two levels—objects on the earth and in the sky—yet both belong to one and the same reality of τὰ ἄνω (516a5), the reality of the upper world, which is graded in the same way as the realm of the ideas in the simile of the line. The same is true for the sun outside the cave: although—like the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή—it can only be looked at last, it nevertheless belongs to this upper world.

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[12] Cf. the opposition of ἐπ' ἀρχήν and ἐπὶ τελευτήν (510b5f., 511b6ff.). Here ἀρχή and τελευτή are thought of as points or parts *on the line*. Cf. also *R.* 533c8ff.

[13] In this respect the Idea of the Good corresponds with the τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέα of Plato's *Sophistes* (254a8ff.).

[14] As for the correctness of drawing a parallel between the simile of the line and the simile of the cave cf. *R.* 517a8–c5, 532a1–d1; Procl. *in R.* I.287, 20ff. Kroll; Beierwaltes (above, n. 7) 59f., 70f; H.J. Krämer, 'Über den Zusammenhang von Prinzipienlehre und Dialektik bei Platon', *Philologus* 110 (1966) 38 n. 1 = J. Wippern, ed., *Das Problem der ungeschriebenen Lehre Platons* (*Wege der Forschung*, 186) (Darmstadt 1972) 398 n. 10; H. Dörrie-M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, IV (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1996) 336f., 354. For a different view cf. Ferber (above, n. 2) 117ff. Cf. also the survey in Ebert (above, n. 11) 156ff.

10. In 534b3ff.[15] Plato declares that the dialectician is distinguished by being able to give an account of the essence (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) of all things. Therefore, we are told, he must also be able to give a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας of the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good, we are informed, can be defined accurately by this λόγος (διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ) by distinguishing and abstracting it from all other things (ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελών), that is, by keeping it distinct or isolating it from all other ideas. Usually this is achieved by way of διαίρεσις. But since διαίρεσις always proceeds from higher generic terms, and a higher generic term for the ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός cannot be found, the definition of the Idea of the Good can only be achieved by the opposite of διαίρεσις, that is, by σύνοψις.[16] But it is also possible to think of a differentiation like that of the ὄν from the other μέγιστα γένη in the *Sophistes.*[17] At any rate, it becomes clear by this process what αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν is (534c4). Hence the Idea of the Good is in possession of an οὐσία, which can be defined by a λόγος (a definition, or at least a circumscription).

All these passages indicate that the Idea of the Good does not transcend the realm of being, but that it still belongs to it. Therefore it becomes even more urgent to examine the context in which our initial quotation is set.

Immediately subsequent to the passage referred to under #5 above, we find the following consideration (508c3ff.): when our eyes are directed upon objects on which the sun shines down, they have a clear sight. Correspondingly, our soul has reason and knowledge, when it is firmly fixed on that reality on which truth and being shine down. Here all statements in d1–6 are completely parallel, especially the two relative clauses ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει and οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν. This means that, since the sun is the analogue of the Idea of the Good, the Idea of the Good *is* ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν ('truth and being').[18] It is as such—the text continues (508e1ff.)—that it is able to give to the objects of knowledge *their* truth and to the knower *his* power of knowing (τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκο-

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[15] For this passage cf. Krämer (above, n. 14) 35ff./394ff.

[16] Cf. 537c1–7 and H.J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam 1964) 358; *id.* (above, n. 14) 42/405, 44f./407f., 49/415, 51ff./418ff., 61ff./432ff.; Ferber (above, n. 2) 101ff., 107f.

[17] The ὄν of the μέγιστα γένη is παρὰ ταῦτα and ἐκτὸς τούτων (*Sph.* 250b7, d2).

[18] Is αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθὲς (533a3) perhaps intended to mean the Idea of the Good itself?

μένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν)[19]; for it is the cause of knowledge and of truth *in so far as it is known* (αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνωσκομένης), and as such it is different and something still fairer than knowledge and truth (γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον), which for their part are not 'the Good' (ἀγαθόν), but only 'like the Good' or 'boniform' (ἀγαθοειδῆ). It exceeds them in beauty (αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν).

Is this not a contradiction? On the one hand, the Idea of the Good is said to be 'truth and being' (ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, 508d5); on the other hand, it is declared to transcend 'knowledge and truth' (γνῶσίς τε καὶ ἀλήθεια, 508e5). How is this contradiction to be solved?

Being the cause of truth, the Idea of the Good *is* truth in itself,[20] whereas the things on which it 'shines down' only *possess* truth, namely truth bestowed upon them. That is to say, the Idea of the Good *is* that truth which it passes on (παρέχειν, 508e1, 509a7) to the things, which, for their part, only *partake* of it or *have* it. The truth which the things *possess* is always some particular (sort of) truth (τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 508e1), not truth purely and simply (ἀλήθεια); moreover, it is only that sort of truth which emerges in the process of cognition (τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις, e1f.), truth as recognized truth (ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνωσκομένης, e4). Truth on the level of the things, therefore, is always knowledge *and* truth (ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια, γνῶσίς τε καὶ ἀλήθεια, ἀλήθεια καὶ νοῦς, e3f., e5, e6f., 509a6f., 517c4). It is *these two*—and only these—that are said to be not 'the Good' (ἀγαθόν), but only 'like the Good' or 'boniform' (ἀγαθοειδῆ, 508e6ff.). To sum up, it can be said that the Idea of the Good can only grant what it possesses itself. Or, more precisely, it can only grant that which it *is* itself. Being the cause of truth it *is* truth, and at the same time it is *above* that (sort of) truth which it confers upon the objects, namely

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[19] For an excellent interpretation of this passage cf. Beierwaltes (above, n. 7) 66. According to K. Philipp, *Zeugung als Denkform in Platons geschriebener Lehre* (Zürich 1980) 69, the difference between using γεννᾶν/τίκτειν and παρέχειν lies in the fact 'dass die biologischen Metaphern γεννᾶν und τίκτειν Prozesse bezeichnen, die vom einen ontologischen Bereich in den andern führen, wogegen παρέχειν für Vorgänge steht, die sich innerhalb ein und des selben Seinsbereichs abspielen'.

[20] If in the simile of the line truth increases from below to the top (*R.* 510a8f.; compare 511e2f. with 509dff.), then in the Idea of the Good truth must exist in the highest degree—just as light, which is the counterpart of truth, is in the sun. The same rule applies to the following consideration: if being increases from below upwards (cf. *R.* 515d3: μᾶλλον ὄντα), then the Idea of the Good must be the highest and purest form of being.

the truth which is recognized in the process of cognition (508e5f.).[21] It is also in this sense that it is beyond 'knowledge and truth' (ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια, 509a6f.) or beyond 'truth and reason' (ἀλήθεια καὶ νοῦς, 517c4).[22]

After these considerations our initial passage (509a9–b10) becomes clearer. There it was declared that the sun furnishes to the visible things not only the power of visibility, but also their generation (γένεσις), growth and nurture, though it is not itself generation (γένεσις).

What is the exact meaning of this statement? In fact all depends on the word γένεσις. To say that, according to Plato, the sun does not belong to the realm of γένεσις would be nonsense, for it is generated by the Idea of the Good (508b12f., 517c3), it belongs to the realm of ὁρατά, and is perceived by ὄψις, as Plato himself tells us (508b10). Besides, it is subject to locomotion and therefore not wholly unchangeable. But the sun is not itself γένεσις of the same kind as that which it furnishes to the visible things. Hence it does belong to γένεσις, and yet it is not like the visible things of which it is the cause[23].

By analogy with the sun, the Idea of the Good is said to be not only the cause of cognition of the objects of knowledge, but also the cause of their existence and their essence (τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, 509b6–8),[24] though the Idea of the Good is not itself essence, but is rather beyond essence, transcending it in dignity and power.

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[21] Likewise it *is* that light which it imparts to the ideas (540a8: τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον); therefore Plato calls it τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον (518c9); cf. Beierwaltes (above, n. 7) 73f.

[22] If the passage mentioned last is taken seriously, then the Idea of the Good, being the cause of νοῦς, must itself be something like νοῦς. Then, however, its identification with the creator of the ideas in book 10 (597b2ff.) of Plato's *Republic* is not far-fetched. One may recall that Aristotle also knew of the doctrine that god is perhaps κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης ... <καὶ νοῦ> or ἐπέκεινά τι τοῦ νοῦ (*EE* Θ 2, 1248^{a}28f.; Περὶ εὐχῆς fr. 1 Ross = fr. 67.1 Gigon). Cf. also Speusippus, fr. 58 Tarán = fr. 89 Isnardi Parente: Σπεύσιππος τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ. For the history of the doctrine that the highest principle is beyond being cf. below pp. 16ff.; Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 2.46; Plu. *De gen.* 22 (*Mor.* 591b: Μονάς being beyond Νοῦς) and J. Whittaker, ''Επέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας', *VChr* 23 (1969) 102 = *Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought* (London 1984) Nr. XIII.

[23] Similarly already J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, II (Cambridge^2 1963) 62.

[24] More than that: it not only grants being to the ideas, but is also the cause of everything that is right and beautiful within the realm of

How are we to interpret this passage? A first hint for a correct exegesis is given by the fact that it is exactly parallel to the passage interpreted immediately before (509b2–4). Just as the sun, being the cause of generation, surpasses all generation and yet belongs to the realm of generation, so also the Idea of the Good surpasses all kind of being that is caused by it, yet nevertheless belongs to the realm of being. That this is the correct way of understanding the passage is confirmed by the following observations:

1. The existence and essence which the Idea of the Good grants is always the existence and the essence of a single thing (τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, b7f.).

2. This existence and this essence are always *granted*, virtually coming from outside (ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, b8).

3. It is remarkable that the 'transcendence' of the Idea of the Good is being qualified. The Idea of the Good does not transcend the οὐσία as such, but only in respect of its dignity and power. This recalls strikingly the statement already quoted that the Idea of the Good rules like a king in the realm of being. For just as a king exceeds ordinary men and yet belongs to them, so the Idea of the Good, being the cause of existence and essence of the other ideas, transcends both of them and yet belongs to them. That is to say, it is not οὐσία *in the same sense as the* οὐσία *caused by it*,[25] just as the sun was not γένεσις in the same sense as the γένεσις caused by it.

All this points to the fact that the Idea of the Good does not transcend being (τὸ ὄν).[26] But then the question arises: what position does it actually hold? From Plato's indications which we have mentioned so far, we may perhaps infer the following: the Idea of the Good is a νοητόν, and as such it is an ὄν.[27] However, it is the highest

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the visibles; cf. *R.* 516b9ff., 517c2.

[25] Cf. Ebert (above, n. 11) 171: 'Die οὐσία, von der hier also die Rede ist, ist die οὐσία der γιγνωσκόμενα, das *Wesen* des je Erkannten ... Den Sinn von Sokrates' Worten in 509b6–10 können wir demnach so umschreiben: Das Gute ist die Ursache für das Wesen der γιγνωσκόμενα, ohne doch selber Wesen zu sein'.

[26] *Pace* Krämer ("Ἐπέκεινα ...' [above, n. 2] 10), Plato does *not* say that the Idea of the Good is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Cf. Philipp (above, n. 19) 74f.

[27] Cf. Beierwaltes (above, n. 7) 46: 'Dieses "jenseits des Seins" ist nicht so zu verstehen, als käme dem ἀγαθόν kein Sein zu. Wie wäre dies möglich, wo doch das ἀγαθόν den übrigen Ideen Quelle des Seins ist? ἐπέκεινα bedeutet "jenseits", alles, was unter ihm ist, ausschließend. οὐσία meint hier das Ideenreich und nicht schlechthin "Sein" ...'; 51: 'Wir

of all νοητά—the summit of the intelligible (τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλος)—and consequently of all ὄντα. As such, it is being in its purest and simplest form—τὸ ὄν *per se* (508d5). Moreover, it is the cause of the other ideas, of their being and their being known. That is to say, it imparts to them their being and their being intelligible, and consequently their truth, which lights up in the process of cognition. As the cause of being, intelligibility, and truth, it must itself possess all these; not in the way of the things caused by it, but in the way of cause. That is to say, whatever the ideas possess only by participation, the Idea of the Good possesses through itself.[28] For that reason it alone is ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή, 'unconditioned principle, origin or source', the absolute beginning. For while all things depend on it (cf. τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, 511b8), it does not depend on anything. This, however, implies that its essence (οὐσία) is different from that of the other ideas of which it is the cause.[29] In this sense then it is οὐκ οὐσία ('not essence') and ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας ('beyond any particular essence'), and in this sense it 'transcends' (this kind of) essence 'in dignity and power', for it has the dignity (πρεσβεία) of origin and cause, which preserves everything through its power (δύναμις, 509b8–10; cf. 516b9–c2).[30]

That this interpretation cannot be totally mistaken is demonstrated by the numerous exegeses by pre-Plotinian Platonists that we know of. In his very important paper ''Ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας' J. Whittaker has lucidly presented how they understood the Idea of the Good. In order to point out what seems important to me, I will select some of the examples he puts forward and add some more:

1. In Plutarch the Idea of the Good is an ὄν ἀεί, that is, something being.[31]

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haben jetzt das Wesen des ἀγαθόν im Umriß betrachtet und gezeigt, daß es das vollkommenste Sein ... ist'.

[28] From the fact that the Idea of the Good grants light, Beierwaltes (above, n. 7) 52, infers in a similar way: 'Das ἀγαθόν *ist* Licht ...'

[29] Similar is the argumentation of D. Luban, 'The Form of the Good in the *Republic*', *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 12 (1978) 162.

[30] The Idea of the Good comes very close to what Plato in the *Phaedrus* (247e2) calls τὸ ὅ ἐστιν ὄν ὄντως, in which the ideas exist, that is, which comprises and preserves the ideas; this ὄν ὄντως is at the same time being called truth (247c5f., d3f., 248b6). In a very similar way Plato declares in the *Timaeus* (29c2ff.) that τὸ νοητὸν ζῷον contains all the other ideas relevant for the cosmos. Cf. Luban (above, n. 29) 165, who comes to the conclusion 'that the Good *is* the world of the Forms, seen as a unified whole'.

[31] Plu. *De def. or.* 42 (*Mor.* 433e) = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **107**.1,

2. According to the Platonist whose doctrines are related by Iustinus Martyr, the Idea of the Good is an ὄν which, as the cause of all νοητά, is at the same time ἐπέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας, being neither utterable nor communicable in words (οὔτε ῥητὸν οὔτε ἀγορευτόν). It is perceived by the eye of the soul and appears there all of a sudden because of the soul's affinity with it and its longing (ἔρως) for seeing it (Iustinus, *Dialogus* 4.1).

3. According to Celsus the Idea of the Good is identical with the highest god.[32] Being the cause of reason and knowledge, of the existence of all intelligibles, of truth, and even of οὐσία, it is indeed 'beyond everything' (πάντων ἐπέκεινα), but even so it is intelligible, though intelligible only by an ineffable power (ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ δυνάμει νοητός).[33] That is to say, it can be beheld by νοῦς, 'the eye of the soul',[34] that is, by way of σύνθεσις, ἀνάλυσις and ἀναλογία.[35]

4. In Numenius the Idea of the Good (αὐτοάγαθον, ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα)[36] is identical with the first νοῦς and the first god, who for his part is the cause and principle of οὐσία and of the idea.[37] In accordance with that are Numenius' words that, being the cause, the first god is ἐποχούμενον ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ.[38] Nevertheless, this god is at the same time περὶ

line 8; the same idea also prevails in Plutarch's work *De Is. et Os.*; cf. C. Schoppe, *Plutarchs Interpretation der Ideenlehre Platons.* Münsteraner Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 2 (Münster/Hamburg 1994) 51 with n. 33; 72ff., 155, 161, 216 n. 154. Very closely related is also Plu. *De E* 20 (*Mor.* 393b), where Apollon—who in *De def. or.* 42 (*Mor.* 433de) = Dörrie-Baltes *op. cit.* **107**.1 is identical with the Idea of the Good—is identified with the One and Being. Possibly this conception can also be found in Seneca; cf. Dörrie-Baltes *op. cit.* 311f.

32 Plato never calls the Idea of the Good 'god', yet this designation seems well-founded; cf. Beierwaltes (above, n. 7) 47ff.

33 Celsus *ap.* Origenes, *Cels.* 7.45 = Ἀληθὴς λόγος 7.45 Bader = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **107**.3.

34 Celsus *ap.* Origenes, *Cels.* 7.36. 39 = Ἀληθὴς λόγος 7.36. 39 Bader.

35 Celsus *ap.* Origenes, *Cels.* 7.42 = Ἀληθὴς λόγος 7.42 Bader. The findings are interpreted correctly by H. Dörrie, *Platonica minora* (Munich 1976) 254: 'Kelsos ist der erste Platoniker, der dies ἐπέκεινα Platons einigermaßen adäquat nachvollzieht: Das Höchste Wesen ist dem Sein noch nicht völlig entrückt, aber es nimmt eine Seinsstufe ein, die höher ist als die aller anderen Wesen'.

36 Numenius, fr. 20 des Places.

37 Numenius, fr. 16 des Places.

38 Numenius, fr. 2 des Places.

τὰ νοητά[39] and σύμφυτος τῇ οὐσίᾳ,[40] or even more than that: he is 'being itself' (αὐτοόν)[41] and as such he is even οὐσία.[42]

5. Just as in Numenius, so also in Alcinous/Albinus the Idea of the Good is identical with the first νοῦς or the first god.[43] But unlike Numenius, Alcinous/Albinus holds that the first god at the same time coincides with the demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus.*[44] Just like the Idea of the Good, the first god generates the other ideas. Since he is νοῦς, he does it by thinking (νοεῖν).[45] Moreover, he grants reason (νόησις) to *the soul*, and to the intelligibles *in the soul* he imparts their being known, causing truth to light up upon them.[46] But since he is the *cause* of everything,[47] all that of which he is the cause—for example the good, the beautiful, the true—cannot be predicated of him properly. And since he is the cause of *all* things, *nothing* can be predicated of him properly. He transcends all categories of thinking and speaking and is, essentially and strictly speaking, ineffable.[48] At best one may say that he is all that in the way of absolute unity which the things caused by him are in the way of differentiation.[49] Therefore he cannot be properly communicated by speech, but can only be apprehended by an act of reason that exceeds all discursive thinking (ἄρρητος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νῷ μόνῳ ληπτός).[50] Being the cause of all

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[39] Numenius, fr. 15 des Places.

[40] Numenius, fr. 16 des Places.

[41] Numenius, fr. 17 des Places.

[42] Numenius, fr. 16 des Places; cf. F. Ferrari, *Dio, idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea* (Naples 1995) 254ff.

[43] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (164.21ff., 165.30ff. Whittaker-Louis), 27 (179.35ff. Whittaker-Louis).

[44] The identification of the Idea of the Good with the demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus* probably goes back to Xenocrates. It can also be found in Theophrastus, Φυσικῶν δόξαι, fr. 9 (*Dox. Gr.* 484.19ff.) = fr. 230 Fortenbaugh-Huby-Sharples-Gutas = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **119**.1.

[45] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 9 (163.32ff. Whittaker-Louis), 10 (164. 27ff. Whittaker-Louis).

[46] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (165.26ff. Whittaker-Louis); cf. also *Did.* 10 (164.19ff. Whittaker-Louis).

[47] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 9 (163.13f. Whittaker-Louis), 10 (164.40 Whittaker-Louis).

[48] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (165.5ff. Whittaker-Louis).

[49] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (164.34ff. Whittaker-Louis). Very closely related is Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.82.1; cf. Whittaker (above, n. 22) 94.

[50] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (165.5; cf.164.31 Whittaker-Louis).

ideas, which he produces and which are perfect, he is not simply perfect, but more than that, namely: 'self-perfect', 'ever-perfect', 'all-perfect' (αὐτοτελής, ἀειτελής, παντελής),[51] and being the cause of the essence (οὐσία) of the ideas,[52] he is not himself essence,[53] but essentiality (οὐσιότης).[54] When he is nonetheless called 'truth, commensurability, good' (ἀλήθεια, συμμετρία, ἀγαθόν),[55] this can only be meant in the sense of his being the cause of these. That is to say that everything that is predicated of him in a positive sense can only be done so by way of analogy or pre-eminence (*via analogiae–via eminentiae*).[56]

6. In Atticus, too, the Idea of the Good coincides with the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, who, for his part, is νοῦς.[57]

The passages listed so far display the difficulties the Platonists had in understanding Plato's statements about the Idea of the Good. None of them dared to take the decisive step of maintaining that Plato actually meant the Idea of the Good to be ἀνούσιος or ὑπερούσιος,[58] or even to claim that according to Plato it is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. They all lifted it to the summit of being without denying its being. For them the Idea of the Good as the cause of being is being *par excellence*.[59]

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[51] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (164.32f. Whittaker-Louis).

[52] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 9 (163.17 Whittaker-Louis).

[53] Alcinous/Albinus calls him neither οὐσία nor ὄν/ὤν.

[54] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (164.34 Whittaker-Louis).

[55] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (164.34 Whittaker-Louis).

[56] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (165.20ff. Whittaker-Louis).

[57] Atticus, fr. 12 des Places; Atticus *ap.* Procl. *in Ti.* I 359.22ff. Diehl.

[58] Alcinous/Albinus, *Did.* 10 (164.21 Whittaker-Louis), does not contradict this statement. For this passage, objectionable both in linguistic terms (ἄν with the perfect indicative) as well as in factual terms (such an entity has no room in the philosophical system of Alcinous/Albinus) seems to be a marginal note which intruded into the text.

[59] Cf. already Aetius 1.7.31 (*Dox. Gr.* 304a1ff./b23ff.): (Τίς ἐστιν ὁ θεός;) Πλάτων τὸ ἕν, τὸ μονοφυές, τὸ μοναδικόν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τἀγαθόν· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸν νοῦν σπεύδει· νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεός, χωριστὸν εἶδος. In a similar way Aetius 1.7.18 (*Dox. Gr.* 302a6ff./b17ff.) says about Pythagoras: Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μονάδα θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς; for this passage cf. Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) 441; Ferrari (above, n. 42) 250ff. Origenes, *Cels.* 6.64, expresses this idea as follows: ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὐσίας μετέχει ὁ θεός· μετέχεται γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ μετέχει, continuing shortly after that: πολὺς δ' ὁ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος καὶ δυσθεώρητος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν ἡ κυρίως οὐσία ἡ ἑστῶσα καὶ ἀσώματος ᾖ, ἵν' εὑρεθῇ, πότερον ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἐστὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὁ θεὸς μεταδιδοὺς οὐσίας, οἷς μεταδίδωσι κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον καὶ αὐτῷ λόγῳ, ἢ καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν

This conclusion is valid not only for the Middle Platonists just mentioned, but also for Apuleius,[60] Maximus of Tyre,[61] Taurus[62] and, as far as we know, for all Platonists before Plotinus.[63] For although we have no statements by them about this problem, we can nevertheless argue that in their philosophical systems there is no room for an ἀγαθόν beyond being. Plotinus seems to be the first Platonist who declared the Idea of the Good to be ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος.[64] In doing so he may have been influenced by tentative efforts that had started long before at raising the highest principle beyond being.

Within this context, those speculations, in particular, which had their origin in the Old Academy about the One as the highest principle were effective, perhaps with reference to the First Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*. For Proclus tells us that it was already Speusippus, who taught that 'the ancients'—Pythagoreans and Plato, I suppose[65]—held the One, as the cause of being, to be higher

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οὐσία ... ζητητέον δὲ καὶ εἰ οὐσίαν μὲν οὐσιῶν λεκτέον καὶ ἰδέαν ἰδεῶν καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸν μονογενῆ καὶ πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, ἐπέκεινα δὲ πάντων τούτων τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ θεόν.

[60] Cf. Apuleius, *De dog. Plat.* 2.1.220: *prima bona esse deum summum mentemque illam, quam* νοῦν *idem vocat.* Here *deus summus* and *mens* seem to be on the same level. *De dog. Plat.* 2.2.221: *bonum primum est verum et divinum illud, optimum et amabile et concupiscendum, cuius pulchritudinem rationabiliter adpetunt mentes natura duce instinctae ad[em] eius ardorem.* Here, too, there is no hint of the *primum bonum* transcending being. Cf. also *Apol.* 64, where the highest god is called *totius rerum naturae causa **et ratio** et **origo rationabilis**.*

[61] Cf. *Or.* 11.171-191 Trapp = 11.148-165 Koniaris = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **106**.2.

[62] In Taurus the highest god is the Platonic demiurge of the *Timaeus*; cf. Taurus *ap.* Ioh. Philoponus, *De aet. mundi* 6.8 p. 147.19ff. Rabe = fr. 22b, line 56f. Lakmann = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **124**.2 and p. 526.

[63] Differing from Whittaker (above, n. 22) 92, and J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 404, I take Calcidius, *Comm.* 176 p. 204.5ff. Waszink, not to be Middle Platonic. Like P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I (Paris 1968) 458f., 460 n. 1, and J.H. Waszink, *Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Chalcidius*, I. Philosophia Antiqua 12 (Leiden 1964) 20f., I think this doctrine is Porphyrian.

[64] Cf. above p. 5, n. 5. But even after Plotinus there was not always consistency in this respect; for example, Marius Victorinus, *Ad Candidum Arianum* 4, 12.24f. Locher, speaks about god as *quod supra omnia, quae sunt, est **esse***, although he maintains at the same time: *deus igitur est totum*προόν (2, 12.6 Locher).

[65] The term *antiqui* derives from Proclus or his source, not from Speusippus. Therefore it can easily imply not only Pythagoreans but also Plato.

than being, that is, beyond being (*le unum enim melius ente putantes et a quo le ens*),[66] a doctrine which Speusippus probably accepted himself.[67] In addition to the One, Speusippus continues (fr. 48 Tarán = fr. 62 Isnardi Parente), the ancients, however, introduced the *interminabilis dualitas* (ἀόριστος δυάς) as a second principle.[68] That this passage refers to the Idea of the Good in Plato's *Republic* cannot be proved.

The doctrine of the two highest principles, the One and the Undefinite Dyad, which in Plato are also the principles of the ideas,[69] had a lasting effect in Neopythagoreanism. But when looking for clear statements (1) about these principles as beyond being and (2) about their relation to the Idea of the Good in Plato's *Republic*, one is disappointed. Certainly, Syrianus tells us that the Pythagorean Brotinus taught that the cause of unity (ἡ ἑνιαία αἰτία) 'transcends all kinds of reason and essence in power and dignity' (ὡς νοῦ παντὸς

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[66] = τὸ γὰρ ἓν κρεῖττον τοῦ ὄντος ὑπολαμβάνοντες καὶ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ὄν, Speusippus, fr. 48 Tarán = fr. 62 Isnardi Parente.

[67] Speusippus, fr. 43 Tarán = fr. 57 Isnardi Parente. For an interpretation of these two fragments, cf. apart from Tarán, *Speusippus* 336ff., 350ff. and Isnardi Parente, *Speusippo* 276ff., 283ff., in particular, Krämer (above, n. 2) 4f., 11ff.; *id.* (above, n. 16) 352f.; J. Dillon, 'The Transcendence of God in Philo: Some Possible Sources', in *Center for Hermeneutical Studies. Protocol of the 16th Colloquy* 16 (1975) 1f., 7f. = *The Golden Chain* (Aldershot/Brookfield 1990) Nr. IX; *id.* in G.R. Morrow-J.M. Dillon, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's* Parmenides (Princeton 1987) 485f. Probably Iamblichus, *Comm. Math.* 4, 15.7ff. Festa, also derives from Speusippus: τὸ ἕν, ὅπερ δὴ οὐδὲ ὄν πω δεῖ καλεῖν διὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀρχὴν μὲν ὑπάρχειν τῶν ὄντων, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν μηδέπω εἶναι τοιαύτην οἷα ἐκεῖνα ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχή.

[68] The first principle is said to be the cause of being, it is true, but at the same time it is emphasized that it is unrelated to this being: *et ab ea que secundum principium habitudine ipsum liberaverunt* = καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν σχέσεως αὐτὸ ἀπήλλαξαν. William of Moerbeke, who is the author of the Latin translation, always renders the Greek word σχέσις as *habitudo*, whereas he always translates ἕξις with *habitus*. In this respect most of the modern translations of the text prove to be wrong, as is the retranslation into Greek by R. Klibansky in R. Klibansky et C. Labowsky, eds., *Parmenides usque ad finem primae hypothesis nec non Procli commentarium in Parmenidem.* Plato Latinus III (London 1953) 86.

[69] Cf., e.g., Arist. *Metaph.* A, 988^{a}7ff.; Alex. Aphr. *in Metaph.* 59.28ff. Hayduck = Arist. *De bono* fr. 30 Rose = fr. 4 Ross = fr. 87 Gigon; Alex. Aphr. *ap.* Simplicius, *in Phys.* 151.6ff. Diels = Arist. *De bono* fr. 28 Rose = fr. 2 Ross = fr. 92 Gigon = Speusippus, test. 45 Tarán = fr. 29 Isnardi Parente = Xenocrates, fr. 27 Heinze = fr. 98 Isnardi Parente (all testimonies in Dörrie-Baltes [above, n. 14] **120**.1–2).

καὶ οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ ὑπερέχει).[70] However, this is nothing but an almost literal paraphrase of our inital passage from Plato's *Republic*, intended to demonstrate Plato's dependence on this Pythagorean.[71] In other words, this testimony cannot tell us more than Plato's text itself, though Syrianus sees things differently.[72]

The Brotinus testimony is connected in Syrianus' context to statements about doctrines of the Pythagoreans Philolaus and Archaenetus. According to Syrianus all these men taught 'that the principles of essences must themselves be beyond being' (τὰς ... τῶν οὐσίων ἀρχὰς ὑπερουσίους εἶναι χρή). In this sense, Syrianus says, the 'opposite principles' (ἀντικείμεναι ἀρχαί) taught by the Pythagoreans are also not-being, that is, in the sense of beyond being (ἀνούσια ... κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον). Yet above these opposite principles, we are told, the Pythagoreans assumed an ἑνιαία αἰτία as a further principle, called 'god' by Philolaus and 'cause above cause' (αἰτία πρὸ αἰτίας) by Archaenetus.[73] All this is nothing but an inference by Syrianus from apparently poor Pythagorean statements and cannot be confirmed by other independent testimonies. But what is most striking is that not even Syrianus pretends that the aforementioned persons taught that the first principle was κρεῖττον τοῦ ὄντος (although it was perhaps his real intention to say exactly this), but only ἀνούσιον in the sense of κρεῖττον οὐσίας.[74]

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[70] Syrianus, *in Metaph.* 165.3, 5f. Kroll; Syrianus summarizes this doctrine in the following way (183.1f.): ἔστι μὲν ὑπερούσιον παρά τε τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ παρὰ Βροτίνῳ τῷ Πυθαγορείῳ. For this text cf. Whittaker (above, n. 22) 95.

[71] This is confirmed by two further testimonies, the one allegedly by Brotinus and the other reported to be by Archytas. Both of them are obviously intended to prove that Plato not only in his simile of the sun, but also in his simile of the line, is dependent on Pythagoreans; cf. Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) 344ff.

[72] The same seems to be true of ps.-Alex. Aphr., who writes *in Metaph.* 821.33ff. Hayduck = Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts* 56.1ff.: τούτων (*sc.* τῶν τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας λεγόντων) οἱ μέν, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων καὶ Βροτῖνος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, φασὶν ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν ἐστι καὶ οὐσίωται ἐν τῷ ἓν εἶναι. *Pace* Whittaker (above, n. 22) 95, I cannot detect any influence of the Platonic *Parmenides* in this testimony. But even if there were, that would be nothing but a *Neoplatonic* interpretation of statements by ps.-Brotinus, however these may originally have been meant.

[73] Syrianus, *in Metaph.* 165.31ff. Kroll; for this passage cf. Dillon, 'The Transcendence ...' (above, n. 67) 3.

[74] It seems to me that the observation in Ioh. Lydus, *Mens.* 2.6 (22.5ff. Wuensch), according to which Pythagoras called the Monad 'Hyperionis', because the Monad by its essence is above all things (διὰ τὸ πάντων ὑπερεῖναι τῇ οὐσίᾳ), is also a Neoplatonic interpretation. By analogy, the

If one looks more closely at the other testimonies on Neopythagoreanism, there is only one more Pythagorean declaring, like ps.-Brotinus, that the highest principle is beyond νοῦς, namely ps.-Archytas. In his work *De principiis*[75] he asserts that there is a highest cause called god, which is beyond all other causes (καθυπερτάτα ... τᾶν ἀλλᾶν), particularly beyond μορφώ. This highest cause, it is said, cannot be νοῦς only, but must be something greater than νοῦς (τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον εἶμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόω τι κρέσσον). In other words, the cause which is beyond all other causes is also beyond all ideas (μορφώ), it is true, but nevertheless it is something like νοῦς (οὐ ... μόνον), although it is at the same time greater than νοῦς (νόω τι κρέσσον). So here, too, we have no clear statement about the transcendence of the highest principle, and least of all a hint at its transcending being (κρεῖττον τοῦ ὄντος).

Surprisingly, such a statement is also missing in the much-discussed testimony by Eudorus on the Pythagorean theory of principles.[76] Although this testimony clearly states that the highest One—the highest god (ὁ ὑπεράνω θεός), who is even beyond μονάς and ἀόριστος δυάς—is the cause of all things (ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων), so that even matter and all beings have been generated out of it, here it is not clear either what is meant by τὰ ὄντα.[77] Above all, however, it is not claimed that this One is beyond being.

The other testimonies on Pythagoreanism in which there appears a highest principle beyond the first pair of opposites do not give any hints either that the highest principle is beyond being, or not-being.[78]

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intelligible sun (ὁ νοητὸς Ἥλιος), which has its existence above the being things (ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα ἔχων τὸ εἶναι), is called 'Hyperionides'. Even so, we are not told that the Monad or the intelligible Helios is not-being. At most one could infer that it is the father of the intelligible Helios, Hyperion, who is not-being—provided that in (ps.) Pythagoras there existed a father of the intelligible Helios, Hyperion, at all.

[75] In Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts* 19.24ff. = Stobaeus I.279.15ff. W-H; cf. Whittaker (above, n. 22) 102f.; Dillon, 'The Transcendence ...' (above, n. 67) 2f.

[76] Eudorus *ap.* Simpl., *in Phys.* 181.10ff. Diels = fr. 3–5 Mazzarelli = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **122**.1, line 7ff.; Procl. *in Ti.* I.176.9ff. Diehl; cf. Whittaker (above, n. 22) 97f.; Dillon, 'The Transcendence ...' (above, n. 67) 4.

[77] The fact that they are being grouped together with matter could be an indication that the visible things are meant.

[78] Alexander Polyhistor *ap.* Diog. Laert. 8.25; Pythagoreans in Numenius, fr. 52.15ff. des Places = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **121**.2, line 18ff.; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 10.261f.

However, this seems to be clearly the case with another Pythagorean, Moderatus of Gades, who, according to a testimony by Porphyry, taught that there is a First One, which is beyond being and all essence, followed by a Second One, which is real being and intelligible, i.e., the ideas (τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητόν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι).[79] Here it seems to be absolutely clear that the First One is raised above all kinds of being. It is beyond being in every sense. It has long been observed that Moderatus in his interpretation is heavily indebted to Plato's *Parmenides*.[80] What perhaps recalls the Platonic *Republic* is only the expression ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν,[81] but it remains doubtful whether Moderatus is thinking of the *Republic* at all, even more so since the First One is not being identified with the Good which according to Moderatus obviously appears at a lower level[82]—just as in Speusippus.[83]

Thus neither in Neopythagoreanism can there be found a reliable testimony about the Idea of the Good transcending being.

Searching further, one detects passages in Hermetic writings which at first sight are interesting, but which at a closer examination turn out to be rather ambiguous. When, for example, in *Corp. Herm.* 2.14 we read 'God, therefore, is not reason, but the cause of the existence of reason', it is—apart from the uncertain date of the work—'unclear ... whether a transcendent Nus is meant'[84]; for in the following context this god is identified with the ὕπαρξις πάντων τῶν ὄντων, καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων (2.15). On the other hand, we read in the same work (2.5) that if place (τόπος) is a deity (θεός), then god is without essence (ἀνουσίαστος). At the same time, however, god is said to be intelligible (νοητός) only for mankind, 'for

[79] Porphyry *ap.* Simpl. *in Phys.* 230.34ff. Diels = fr. 236 Smith = Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) **122**.2, line 6ff.; for this passage cf. Whittaker (above, n. 22) 96f.; Dörrie-Baltes *op. cit.* 477ff.

[80] E.R. Dodds, 'The *Parmenides* of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One"', *CQ* 22 (1928) 129ff.; Dörrie-Baltes (above, n. 14) 478ff.

[81] Whittaker (above, n. 22) 97.

[82] ... δι' ἃ καὶ κακὸν δοκεῖ ἡ ὕλη ὡς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀποφεύγουσα. καὶ καταλαμβάνεται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κτλ. (231.21f. Diels = fr. 236 Smith = Dörrie-Baltes [above, n. 14] **122**.2, line 38f.). Since the Good takes hold of matter, this Good cannot be the absolute and transcendent One. Cf. Dörrie-Baltes, *op. cit.* 484.

[83] Cf., e.g., Krämer (above, n. 16) 352f., 355ff.

[84] Krämer (above, n. 16) 262 n. 255, with reference to *Corp. Herm.* 2.5f.

the intelligible falls under the sense-perception for him who perceives it by reason' (τὸ γὰρ νοητὸν τῷ νοοῦντι αἰσθήσει ὑποπίπτει). Similarly ambiguous are other statements in the *Corpus Hermeticum* which speak about god's οὐσία and which doubt whether he has an οὐσία at all (εἴγε οὐσίαν ἔχει 6.4; εἴ γέ τις ἔστιν οὐσία θεοῦ 12.1).[85] Thus from the Hermetic literature there is nothing to be gained for the solution of our problem.

Origenes the Christian is also totally uncertain about the question, 'whether god is beyond being in dignity and power, giving part of essence to those things, to which he gives part ... or if he is himself essence' (πότερον ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἐστὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὁ θεὸς μεταδιδοὺς οὐσίας οἷς μεταδίδωσι ... ἢ καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν οὐσία),[86] as the passages collected by Whittaker show.[87] That Origenes does not call god ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος is probably due to the fact that the Septuagint had called him ὁ ὤν. But perhaps there is still another reason for his indecision in calling god οὐσία or not-οὐσία.

Like Plotinus and Origenes the pagan, Origenes the Christian was a pupil of Ammonius Saccas. In his school the problem of the existence of a highest principle seems to have been discussed particularly in connection with Plato's *Republic* and the so-called First Hypothesis of his *Parmenides*.[88] While Plotinus identified the

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[85] When the Gnostics call their highest god ἀνούσιος they obviously do so in sharp contrast to the god of the Old Testament, who is ὁ ὤν, as Whittaker (above, n. 22) 100, rightly remarks; cf. the passages cited there, and Hippolytus, *Haer.* 6.42.4. There seem to be no connections with Plato's *Republic*.

[86] Origenes, *Cels.* 6.64.

[87] Whittaker (above, n. 22) 92f. Whittaker quotes the following passages: *Cels.* 6.64, 7.38; *Comm. in Ioh.* 19.6, p. 305.14ff.; 13.21, p. 244.29ff.; 13.26, p. 249.26ff. Preuschen. Cf. also F. Ricken, 'Origenes über Sprache und Transzendenz', in L. Honnefelder, W. Schüßler, eds., *Transzendenz. Zu einem Grundwort der klassischen Metaphysik* (Paderborn etc. 1992) 82ff. In Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7.2.2f., the Son of God is introduced as ἄναρχος ἀρχή τε καὶ ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ὄντων, whereas the Father is called τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον, ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων. Similarly Clement's teacher Pantaenus speaks about God as being ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα (Clement of Alexandria, fr. 7.48 Stählin-Früchtel; Whittaker [above, n. 22] 93). But in neither case is the conclusion drawn that the Father is beyond being, or not-being. That was obviously forbidden by Exodus 3.14; cf. Whittaker, *op. cit.* 94. According to Pantaenus God is 'beyond being' (ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα) as he is beyond the expressions of his will. For he recognizes all being things as expressions of his will (ὡς ἴδια θελήματα γινώσκειν αὐτὸν τὰ ὄντα φαμέν).

[88] Cf. M. Baltes, *RLAC*, Suppl. 1 (1985) 327ff., *s.v.* Ammonios Sakkas; H.-R. Schwyzer, 'Proklos über den Platoniker Origenes', in G. Boss, G.

not-being One of the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* with the Good of the *Republic*, Origenes[89] the pagan declared that the One of the First Hypothesis had no existence whatsoever (παντελῶς ἀνύπαρκτον τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀνυπόστατον).[90] According to him, therefore, it is of no real use for an interpretation of the ἀγαθὸν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. The first principle, he maintains, is neither beyond being[91] nor beyond νοῦς, but it is itself νοῦς (εἰς τὸν νοῦν τελευτᾷ καὶ τὸ πρώτιστον ὄν, τὸ δὲ ἓν τὸ παντὸς νοῦ καὶ παντὸς ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος ἀφίησι ... τὸ ἄριστον ὁ νοῦς καὶ ... ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ τὸ πρώτως ἕν).[92] Proclus tells us that a considerable number of Platonists supported this position, which he calls a doctrine 'full of Peripatetic innovations' (Περιπατητικῆς ἀναπέπληστα καινοτομίας). He, too, cannot name any Platonist before Plotinus or Porphyry who defended the theory of the Good beyond being.

As a result of all this we may therefore state: all Platonists before Plotinus confirm the outcome of our preceding inquiry that Plato's Idea of the Good is not ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. For according to all these interpreters of Plato's philosophy, the Idea of the Good is something like the highest being, τὸ ὂν αὐτό, which bestows upon all other things their being.

Seel, eds., *Proclus et son influence. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel* (Zürich 1987) 45ff.; *id.*, 'Amonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins', *Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Vorträge G 260 (Opladen 1983) 72ff.; and in connection with this, M. Baltes, *Gnomon* 56 (1984) 206f.

89 Origenes *ap.* Procl. *Theol. Plat.* II 4 p. 31.8ff. Saffrey-Westerink = fr. 7 Weber; cf. also H.D. Saffrey-L.G. Westerink, *Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne. Texte établi et traduit*, II (Paris 1974) Xff.; Schwyzer, *Proklos* ... (above, n. 88) 50ff.

90 Cf. also Origenes *ap.* Procl. *in Prm.* 1065.3ff. Cousin: καὶ οὐχ, ὥσπερ ὑπέλαβόν τινες, ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστι τοῦτο <τὸ> μόνως ἓν (*hoc quod solummodo unum*, Moerbeke) καὶ ἀδύνατα (*impossibilia*, Moerbeke) συνάγει ἡ ὑπόθεσις; Procl. *in Prm.* 64.1f. Klibansky-Labowsky = II.515.66ff. Steel: *quidam quidem igitur hinc moti dixerunt impossibilia concludere primam ypothesim et propter hoc et le unum anypostaton esse*; *op. cit.* 36.19ff. Klibansky-Labowsky = II.499.17ff. Steel, and in connection with this Saffrey-Westerink (above, n. 89) XIIff.

91 Cf. Procl. *in Prm.* 64.7ff. Klibansky-Labowsky = II.515.73ff. Steel: *et ipsi dicebant non esse aliquid imparticipabile ab essentia unum, non <igitur differre ab ente le> unum neque ab uno ente; tot modis enim esse le unum, quot modis et le ens, et le superessentiale unum nomen esse solum*; cf. Saffrey-Westerink (above, n. 89) XV f.

92 Procl. *Theol. Plat.* II 4 p. 31.3ff., 19ff. Saffrey-Westerink = Origenes, fr. 7 Weber.

Plotinus, no doubt, would have replied to the preceding study: φιλόλογος μὲν εἶ, ὦ φίλε Βάλτες, φιλόσοφος δ' οὐδαμῶς,[93] but with this I must live and I can live.

[93] Cf. Porph. *VP* 14.19f.

2

The Riddle of the *Timaeus*: Is Plato Sowing Clues?

John Dillon

I

This is, I suppose, a deliberately provocative title for what is, indeed, intended as a controversial, rather than an authoritative, essay, on a subject that has been gone over many times before, but not, so far as I know, from quite this angle.[1] Specifically, what I would like to explore on this occasion is whether what one may term the 'central myth' of Plato's *Timaeus*, the account of the creation of the physical world by the Demiurge at a point in time, on the model of a

[1] Since writing this, I have had a chance to read the excellent paper of Matthias Baltes, 'Γέγονεν (Platon, *Tim.* 28B7): Ist die Welt real entstanden oder nicht?', recently published in the Festschrift for Jaap Mansfeld (K.A. Algra *et al.*, eds., *Polyhistor* [Leiden 1996] 76–96), but first delivered at the Symposium Platonicum in Granada in August 1995—at which event I had actually planned to deliver a version of this, but was prevented by illness. Baltes in fact anticipates a good deal of what I have to say, but fortunately leaves me a few points to make—of whatever value they may be. I am glad to be able to dedicate this now to a scholar and friend, who has himself done so much to elucidate the *Nachleben* of the *Timaeus*.

My speculations here stem ultimately from discussions occurring in seminars I have given on the *Timaeus*, both at the University of California, Berkeley in the late 1970s, and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the Fall semester of 1984. On the former occasion I had the benefit of the formidable presence of Gregory Vlastos as a focus of (benign) opposition to my views, and at the latter the stimulating figure of Richard Mohr. To both I am most grateful, despite disagreeing with them, as I am to the graduate students who participated on both occasions.

Paradigm external (and logically prior) to himself, is intended by Plato to be taken by his readers (or hearers) *au pied de la lettre* or not; and whether, furthermore, Plato himself has left us, in the course of the narrative, with certain deliberate incoherences which are intended to alert us to his intentions.

On the first question I do not propose to spend much time (especially since the case for the non-literal interpretation has now been restated so thoroughly and so well by Matthias Baltes). Despite the resistance of certain distinguished contemporary (or recently dead) scholars, such as Gregory Vlastos, Tom Robinson, Jean Pépin, and Richard Mohr, the conclusion seems to me inescapable that Plato did not in fact intend the account of the creation of the world which he puts into the mouth of the Pythagorean Timaeus to be taken literally. Any attempt to maintain this, such as those made by the scholars above-mentioned, cannot avoid imputing to Plato incoherences and inconsequentialities which, however much these authors try to excuse them, are really unworthy of a first-class philosophic mind. I realise that it is quite acceptable, especially in Anglo-American circles, to take a rather patronizing attitude to Plato, especially in regard to his mastery of the subtleties of modern logic, and this enables scholars who profess admiration for him at the same time to tolerate quite a degree of inconsequentiality on his part. I would certainly not wish to maintain that Plato is never guilty of logical fallacies or inconsistencies, but I find it impossible to believe that he could have involved himself in the morass of confusion that must be imputed to him if we decide to take the *Timaeus* literally.[2] So I propose to take the basic position in favour of a non-literal reading of the dialogue as established, and turn to what I find the more interesting question of trying to identify the chief clues which Plato has sown for us throughout the work, indicating how he wishes us to take it. This will in turn lead to some reflections on how Plato intended his dialogues in general to be taken, and what role he wished them to have in the deliberations of the school—another very speculative topic, certainly, but one on which one cannot, I think, excuse oneself from having some views.

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[2] This applies equally well, I would maintain, to the myth of the more or less contemporary *Statesman*. I have discussed this question in a contribution to the third Symposium Platonicum at Bristol in 1993, 'The Neoplatonic Exegesis of the *Statesman* Myth', now published in its Proceedings: C.J. Rowe, ed., *Reading the Statesman*. International Plato Studies 4 (Berlin 1994) 364–374.

Another principle that I would advance which is widely ignored, or sidestepped, in modern scholarship on this question is the issue of a reasonable degree of consistency in Plato's thought, at least as between dialogues which may be taken as belonging to the same period of his development. I am not an advocate of 'the unity of Plato's thought', either in a Neoplatonic sense or even in that of Paul Shorey, but I do feel that, as between such dialogues as the *Statesman*, the *Timaeus*, and the *Philebus* (and I would even include the *Phaedrus* in this line-up), it is reasonable to seek for consistency on major questions, such as the temporal creation of the world, or the role of soul as the single cause of motion in the universe, and that it is legitimate to worry about any apparent contradictions on such topics that may appear. I would take it that these dialogues, in the order *Phdr.-Plt.-Ti.-Phlb.*, were composed within a period of approximately ten years, and that Plato's views on basic issues (except perhaps on the precise nature of the Forms, and their mode of projecting themselves upon the physical world) changed very little during that time. I therefore feel that interpreters of the myth of the *Statesman* and of Timaeus' account in the *Timaeus* cannot refuse to confront the conclusions they come to about the doctrines being presented in those two works with the metaphysical scheme set out in the *Philebus*. I shall return to that question in due course.

That said, then, let us turn to our chosen task. The features of the work on which I would like to concentrate on this occasion are the following: first of all, the concept of the demiurge, and his relation on the one hand to the paradigm, and on the other to soul (of which, of course, he is, in Timaeus' account, the creator); secondly, the notion of pre-cosmic chaos, and the disorderly motion associated with it; and third, the status of the world soul itself. All these topics are interconnected, and it is not easy to decide which to pick on first, but since the Demiurge appears first in Timaeus' account, and since he is undoubtedly the key to the mechanics of the Timaean universe, we may begin with him.

II

Centuries of later Platonist exegesis have conferred upon the figure of the Demiurge a sort of spurious familiarity—he even survives, strangely, in the exegeses of those Platonists for whom the non-literal interpretation of the dialogue is an accepted fact (such as Numenius and the Neoplatonists)—but in truth he is a bizarre figure, and introduced in a bizarre manner. It has been frequently noted, of course, that his introduction into the dialogue is strangely

abrupt, but the full oddity of this has not, I think, been sufficiently dwelt on. Let us consider how he first comes in. He is brought in, to all appearances, at 28a6, to illustrate what Timaeus has to say about two modes of creation, that on the basis of an eternal model, and that on the basis of a generated one. However, I think that it is important to recognise that this first reference to a δημιουργός in the dialogue does not necessarily concern a divine or cosmic figure at all, but simply your average craftsman. Cornford, remarkably, translates this passage as it should be translated, but then goes on in his commentary to refer to it as describing the actions of 'a divine Craftsman'.[3] I give his version:

> Now whenever the maker of anything (δημιουργός) looks to that which is always unchanging and uses a model of that description in fashioning the form and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good. If he looks to something that has come to be and uses a generated model, it will not be good.

I think that 'the maker of anything' is an excellent rendering of ὁ δημιουργός here.[4] Surely the natural meaning of such a term, since this is the first we have heard of it, is simply 'any craftsman', not 'the Craftsman'. Plato is making a point such as he made back in the *Cratylus* (389a–b) when he is describing what a good craftsman does who wants to make a new shuttle in place of an old one which has broken. He takes as his model, not that broken shuttle, nor even any other unbroken physical shuttle, but rather fixes in his mind *what it is to be a shuttle*, which in Platonic terms comes out as the eternal and unchanging Form of Shuttle, and models his replacement shuttle on that. If he does that, he will make a good shuttle; if, as a poor or inexperienced craftsman might do, he tries to imitate a particular shuttle, whether the broken one or another, he will make, in Plato's view, a bad shuttle. That is Plato's position in the *Cratylus* (let us leave aside the question of whether it is rubbish or not), and that, I submit, is the point that he is making, on a more general level, now.

This is not to deny that Plato had in other dialogues before this referred to God as a δημιουργός (notably at *R.* 530a and *Sph.* 265b).[5]

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[3] F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London 1937) 25 (hereafter 'Cornford, *PC*').

[4] It could be argued, I suppose, that Plato might have said δημιουργός τις if he wished to make an indefinite reference of this sort, but in fact the definite article can perfectly well be used in this way.

[5] Also at *Phlb.* 27b1 (τὸ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν), but I regard the

What I would claim is that in these other passages the reference to 'god' is perfectly plain, and here it is not; indeed, the natural meaning of the passage invokes no thought of God—though it may, I suppose, imply Plato's Theory of Forms.[6]

Whatever about the introductory reference to the craftsman, however, there is no doubt that, when the figure is reintroduced shortly afterwards, at 29a3, the reference is to a cosmic creator figure. The text is as follows: 'Now if this world is good and its maker (δημιουργός) is good, clearly he looked to the eternal (model); on the contrary supposition (which it is blasphemous even to utter), he looked to that which has come to be'. Now one might well say that there is here a clear reference back to 28a, especially in the matter of looking to a generated model. And so no doubt there is; but it is just here, I would claim, that Plato is dropping us a hint that all is not straightforward.

What has happened, I would suggest, is that what started out as an image has, to all appearances, just a short time later become a reality. If this is so, then it is not the only time that Plato does this to us. As an analogy (though it is, I must admit, not an exact analogy), I would adduce his manoeuvre in Book II of the *Republic* (375a–376b), where he wants to introduce the notion of the Guardian Class. He starts with the image of the guard dog, as being a beast of 'philosophic' disposition, since it welcomes what it knows (and thus is a 'lover of wisdom', or *philosophos*), and is hostile to what it does not know. We accept this provisionally *as an image* (though feeling a little uncomfortable, I think, about the whimsicality of the point about the philosophic nature of the dog); but then we find, to our alarm, a little further on (416a), that it has become a *fact*. There are, it seems, guard-dog-like natures in society, and in a well-ordered state they should be given the role of guardian. A real feature of society is thus introduced by means of a rather whimsical image.

Philebus as a later dialogue.

[6] Indeed, those who take this as a reference to a divine Demiurge are at something of a loss to explain what the 'generated model' that is presented as his alternative to the eternal one could possibly be. (One of Matthias Baltes' less fortunate suggestions, I note, is that it might be a reference to the disorderly state of affairs in the Receptacle, thought of as γένεσις) In general, it has to be supposed that we are faced with one of those Greek 'polar expressions', where the second alternative has no real reference. On the present interpretation, on the other hand, it has an easily comprehensible reference to using another physical particular as a model.

But that, you might say, undermines my position. Plato's claim is that there really are guard-dog-like natures in society, and that they should be properly harnessed. Similarly here, it may be true that when the δημιουργός is originally introduced he is just an image, but Plato's claim is that there really is a demiurgic figure in the universe, and that he does the sort of things, on a cosmic scale, that a craftsman does in society. But I would not wish to deny that Plato intends there to be a demiurgic *element* in the universe, even as he intends there to be a guardian element in the state. The question is, though, exactly how much of the original image is to be preserved.[7]

If we are to be guided by the testimony of his immediate followers Speusippus and Xenocrates, we may conclude that what Plato really wishes to convey is that, besides the paradigmatic function of the system of forms, there is also an efficient, or creative, function inherent in them, which brings about the (continual) imposition on the 'material'[8] substratum of projections of the forms, in the mode of geometrical (or quasi-geometrical) figures—the basic triangles and their combinations.[9] This creative function needs, for purposes of clarity of exposition (διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα), to be dramatized as a distinct divine figure, who contemplates the world of forms as a pre-existent model, and uses it in his fashioning of the physical world. This creative function is certainly to be regarded as an intellect (νοῦς), but not as an intellect separate from the world of forms, and certainly not as an

[7] In this connection, we should pay proper attention to the famous remark in 28c, to the effect that 'the maker and father of this universe is a hard task to find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind'. If that is so, then it seems strange that the following account of the demiurge and his activities should be so relatively perspicuous and straightforward—unless it is not to be taken literally, and the truth lies hidden beneath.

[8] I put this term in inverted commas, since I recognise that the Receptacle of the *Timaeus* is not properly matter in the Aristotelian sense—though later Platonists had no difficulty in recognising it as such (beginning with Aristotle himself, cf. *Ph.* IV.2, 209^{b}12).

[9] It is odd, in this connection, that one of Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's system is that he neglects the efficient cause, and recognises only the formal and the material ones (*Met.* A 6, 988^{a}7ff.). One might ask him what he takes the Demiurge to be. I think the answer to this puzzle is that Aristotle, despite his polemical stance, which is to criticise the *Timaeus* on the assumption that it is to be taken literally, knows perfectly well that it is not intended literally, and that the Demiurge is only a figment, being no more than the active aspect of the forms; and this Aristotle does not accept (I think, however, unreasonably) as a sufficiently distinct active cause in the sense he requires.

intellect which decides to take action, or a series of actions,[10] at a certain point in time.

Indeed, there is at least one point in the first part of Timaeus's exposition (29d–47e) where Plato, with apparent carelessness, drops for a moment the figure of the Demiurge, and speaks simply of νοῦς. That is at 39e8ff., where the Demiurge is described as concerned to make the copy yet more like its model by adding to it all the kinds of living creature: 'So according as Intellect discerns the forms inherent in the Essential Living Being, such and so many it reckoned that this being too should possess'.[11] This is actually a rather troublesome sentence syntactically. Most translators, Cornford and Rivaud among them, unhesitatingly make the subject of διενοήθη the Demiurge, leaving it vague what relation he has to the νοῦς which is the subject of καθορᾷ in the first part of the sentence. But Plato does not make clear any change of subject, and it seems best, consequently, to assume that νοῦς is doing the discerning as well as the reckoning. Of course, any degree of reflection will persuade us that the Demiurge must be an intellect (he is constantly being spoken of as 'thinking' and 'devising', e.g. 30a5, b1, 34a8, 37c5), but he has not hitherto been explicitly described as such, and even here the identification is very much *en passant.* However, in fact, not only must the Demiurge be possessed of intellect, he must actually *be* an intellect; otherwise he would become liable to the principle laid down back in 30b, to the effect that 'it is impossible for intellect to be present to anything without soul'—and, on the mythical level,[12] he is the creator of soul (34bff.), so he could not very well be possessed of one himself. Only if he is pure intellect does this provision not apply. But if he is pure intellect, it seems inevitable that he should be engaged in thought,

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[10] It is inevitable, within the economy of the myth, that the Demiurge should have to do one thing after another, but we should be put on our guard particularly, I think, when we are told at 37c that 'when the father who had begotten (the world) saw it set in motion and alive ... he rejoiced and, being well pleased, he took thought to make it yet more like its pattern'. A well-organised Demiurge does not have afterthoughts. Even the most determined proponents of a literal interpretation cannot, I would have thought, accept this as a literal account of his thought-processes.

[11] ᾗπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον, οἷαί τε ἔνεισι καὶ ὅσαι, καθορᾷ, τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας διενοήθη δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν. Taylor notes here (*Comm.* 222): 'A formal identification of the Creator with νοῦς, and his model with τὰ νοητά'—but makes nothing much of it.

[12] And indeed, on the non-mythical level, the divine intellect is the generator of soul—though not temporally.

and furthermore that the contents of his thought should be none other than the whole system of forms. A demythologized Demiurge, then, becomes essentially an intellect contemplating its own contents, and projecting them, according to mathematical ratios, on the receptacle of space. I have therefore never been able to work up much steam about the mystery of the origin of the doctrine of 'the Ideas as Thoughts of God', which has exercised many scholars down the years. It is very possible that Plato himself, proceeding deviously as he did, never quite spelled it out, but once Xenocrates, for example, had firmly declared the *Timaeus* account to be non-literal, the conclusion that the system of forms is the contents of the demiurgic mind follows necessarily, it seems to me.

However that may be, we may note here a preliminary intimation that the mythical paraphernalia of the Demiurge may be set aside when the exigencies of exposition no longer require them. Intellect as such, however, only really comes into its own at the beginning of the second section of Timaeus's account (47eff.), when he recapitulates the first part. Now there is no further mention of the Demiurge, but only of Intellect (νοῦς). It turns out that since 29d we have been hearing of 'the things crafted by Intellect' (τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα). Admittedly, at the outset (47e3), the Demiurge still maintains a shadowy existence in verbal form, and the preposition governing νοῦς is not ὑπό, which would be more proper to an agent, but διά, which is more proper to an instrument, but nonetheless it is now νοῦς that is established as the active principle of the universe, over against which is pitted the negative force of 'necessity' (ἀνάγκη), representing that irreducible element of randomness and imperfection that Intellect can only minimise the effects of, but never entirely eradicate.

So the Demiurge as an independent entity is at this point tacitly dropped. He emerges again, of course, as required—initially at 53b, and then throughout the third part of Timaeus's account[13]—but

[13] Though there, we may note, he pops up inappositely at various points where the talk should be of the 'young gods', his helpers in the formation of the human body (*Ti.* 73bff.—at 74c7 he is even referred to as ἡμῶν ... ὁ κηροπλάστης; 75d; 76b2: τὸ θεῖον; 78bff.; 90b1: τὸ θεῖον; 92a3). This is not just inadvertence on Plato's part, I think; it is just one more sign that these distinctions do not greatly matter. The initial reason for postulating the 'young gods' was to free the Demiurge from responsibility for creating the 'mortal' elements in the human being, but this distinction is really part of the trappings of the mythic account, and is ultimately unreal. In fact, the divine intellect is responsible for all aspects of creation, though it is worth making a distinction between mortal and immortal creations 'for purposes of exposition'.

before that something even more remarkable emerges. At 48e, Plato proposes to make a new, more complete division of the chief features (he uses the term εἴδη) of the universe, by way of introducing a *third* basic principle, the 'receptacle of what comes to be' (γενέσεως ὑποδοχή). What, then, are the first two, with which we have hitherto been operating? 'For our earlier discourse the two were sufficient: one postulated as model (παράδειγμα), intelligible and always unchangingly real; second, a copy of this model, which comes into being and is visible'.[14]

What, then, has become of the Demiurge? Was he not a basic *eidos* of the universe? All we have now is the intelligible world of Forms, and the physical world which is its copy—no indication of how the latter was produced from the former. It could indeed have been just such a passage that gave Aristotle a basis for his remarkable claim that Plato ignores the efficient cause. And perhaps to a certain extent he is right. The Demiurge, as active principle, seems here to have been collapsed back into the realm of Intellect as a whole, and the reason for that is, perhaps, that he was not, after all, a basic principle in his own right, but simply the creative function of the primary principle.

III

One could, I think, pursue the inconsistencies in the presentation of the Demiurge somewhat further than this,[15] but enough has been said, I hope, to indicate that Plato, by indulging in apparent inadvertencies and inconsistencies, is warning us to be on our guard. The

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[14] This is picked up still more forcefully at 52d2ff.: 'Let this, then, be given as the tale summed according to my judgement: that there are Being, Space, Becoming (ὄν, χώρα, γένεσις)—three distinct things—even before the heaven came into being' (Cornford's trans.). This last remark, that there is *genesis* πρὶν καὶ οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, has caused much trouble to advocates of a literal interpretation, starting from Plutarch (*Mor.* 1024bff. [*Proc. An.*]). Plutarch even wants to see in γένεσις a reference to the pre-cosmic irrational soul. I can only take it as one of those deliberate incoherences designed to make us think.

[15] For example, the problem of just how far the Demiurge leaves off his work of creation as regards man, entrusting it to the 'young gods', could be explored in more detail, as also the business of his creation of human souls from the 'seconds and thirds'—presumably *pressings*, as in an olive harvest—left over from his creation of the world soul (41d); and the question of the creation of *woman*. But all these matters have been well dealt with, in fact, by Matthias Baltes, in the article mentioned in n. 1.

task of finding the 'father and maker of the universe' is *not,* after all, an easy one.

Let us look now, more briefly, first at the pre-cosmic chaos, and then at the world-soul. Are there any hints dropped, first of all, that the concept of pre-cosmic chaos is an incoherent one?

We must consider what the Receptacle of Becoming turns out to be, when we come to closer grips with it at 49aff. When we hear of it first, at 30a, it is described, very oddly, as 'all that is *visible*, not at rest, but in discordant and disorderly motion'.[16] All we can deduce from this, if we take the epithet 'visible' seriously, is that 'everything', before the Demiurge sets to work on it, comprises material elements of some sort, and presumably some form of the four elements which are about to be identified just below, in 31b–32b. At 31b, after all, we are told that 'that which comes to be must be bodily, and so visible and tangible; and nothing can be visible without fire, or tangible without something solid'. Now, strictly speaking, the pre-cosmic All has only been described as 'visible', not 'tangible', but no one, I think, has ever suggested that it is made up just of disorderly particles of fire. No, the suggestion is that the Demiurge is faced with a disorderly swirl of elementary particles which in some way constitutes the raw material of fire, earth, air and water.

It is here, however, that the incoherence arises. After all, on the basis of the information with which we are provided later, at 49aff., it appears that the Receptacle itself is just a field of force, one might say, which imposes a random and disorderly motion on what is projected upon it. It is *not*, we are incessantly reminded by modern commentators, to be identified with Aristotelian matter (although ancient commentators had no difficulty with such an identification), just because it is not a material *out of which* (ἐξ οὗ) things are made, but a space *in which* (ἐν ᾧ) they come to be. At 50cff., we learn that the Receptacle has no qualities of its own, 'just like the base which the makers of scented ointments skilfully contrive to start with' (50e6–7). Furthermore, we are told at considerable length how the four elements of popular belief are actually constructed (by the Demiurge) out of combinations of basic triangles (55dff.), so that the *contents* of the Receptacle, as opposed to the Receptacle itself, derive in their entirety from the intelligible world. There is simply nothing left to be 'visible, and in discordant and disorderly motion', before the Demiurge sets its hand to it. And yet Plato is prepared to speak at 52d, of something which he calls γένεσις, 'becoming', which, like

[16] πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως.

Being (ὄν), which is the intelligible Paradigm, and Space (χώρα), which is the Receptacle, existed 'even before the heaven came into being'—that is to say, before the Demiurge created the world. It emerges just below that this γένεσις consists of some sort of 'traces' (ἴχνη, 53b2) of the four elements, milling about in no sort of order. Even odder, these traces show signs of tending to sort themselves out into denser and heavier, and rarer and lighter (53a1–2), as a result of the 'winnowing motion' set up in the Receptacle by their presence in it, but without ever succeeding in resolving themselves into anything orderly.

Now this scenario will simply not do. Many commentators try to 'save the appearances', and salvage Plato from incoherence, by postulating pre-cosmic foreshadowings or 'raw materials' of the elements in the Receptacle,[17] but, as can be readily seen, there is really no room for such entities in Plato's scheme. The so-called 'elements' are nothing else but combinations of triangles, and these triangles, and the formulae for their combination, come down from 'above'; there is nothing left to inhabit the pre-cosmic chaos. If Plato talks at 52dff. of the elements entering into the receptacle, setting it in disorderly motion, and being shaken about by it in turn, then he is deliberately setting us a conundrum—which all too many commentators, it would seem, have failed to solve satisfactorily.

All problems are resolved, after all, if one views the situation as Plato intends us to view it, as the permanent situation facing the Demiurge, or rather Intellect, in its work of projecting form on the

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[17] Cornford will do well as an example, especially as he accepts the non-literal interpretation of the cosmology: 'We must not imagine the qualities here described as existing in particles of any shape, regular or otherwise. There is nothing yet but a flux of shifting qualities, appearing and vanishing in a permanent Receptacle' (*PC* 181). Quite so: but Cornford does not go on to point out the incoherence of this position. First of all, Plato does not speak of qualities (ποιότητες); he speaks of 'shapes' (μορφαί, 52d6) and 'traces' (ἴχνη, 53b2). And secondly, he is right not to do so; one cannot have 'qualities' floating about without anything for them to qualify. What Cornford translates as 'quality' (at 49e5, 7) is simply 'such' (τοιοῦτον), meaning that we have something *such as* fire, for example, but which then becomes something else before one has time to characterise it as such. It is a sort of indefinite and transitory *substance*, not a quality; and it is that which I declare to be a deliberately incoherent concept.

Friedrich Solmsen, we may note, in *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (Ithaca 1960) 49f., wishes to maintain that the pre-cosmic chaos is a remnant of Presocratic thinking in Plato, but there is no reason, I feel, to saddle him with this kind of primitivism. C.J. De Vogel is good on this, in her *Rethinking Plato and Platonism* (Leiden 1988) 206–212.

substratum. The substratum, by its very nature, produces a certain degree of distortion in the combinations of the elemental bodies which Intellect cannot entirely overcome, and that is what produces our imperfect world. All talk of the state of things before the Demiurge imposes order must be simply διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα, 'for purposes of exposition'. Indeed, as the exposition unfolds (49bff.), it becomes increasingly obvious that what is being described is not a pre-cosmic chaotic situation at all, but simply a rather Heraclitean view of the physical world as it is (at least, as Plato's quondam mentor Cratylus would have presented it), with elements changing into each other so unceasingly that an observer has no time to name them accurately.

Why, then, is Plato so concerned to describe the movement of elements in a state of chaos, or at least in the absence of teleological guidance? And why, in particular, does he allow himself to fall into what seems to me, at least (though here I find myself at odds with many colleagues whose views I respect), to be a serious illogicality? At 52eff., he presents a description of the 'winnowing motion' of the Receptacle, which, in its shaking about of the elementary particles[18] (or rather, μορφαί and δυνάμεις—whatever we are to make of that), 'separated the most unlike kinds farthest apart from one another, and thrust the most like closest together; whereby the different kinds came to occupy different regions, even before the ordered whole consisting of them came to be' (53a4–8). He then, however, goes out of his way to assert (53a8–b3) that, despite this tendency to differentiate, they will never properly sort themselves out into anything coherent without the guidance of the Demiurge.

I declare this to be an unreasonable statement, and I hope for Plato's sake that it is a deliberately unreasonable one. It surely violates the principle of sufficient reason to declare that, once a certain process of sorting and articulation has been set in train, and is proceeding, it will nonetheless never come to fruition without some further intervention. It seems clear, after all, that if the process is achieving a certain result, there is really no reason why it should not continue to achieve the same result to an ever greater degree—unless one postulates some periodic disruptive *counter-movement*, such as

[18] Cornford quite rightly condemns the idea that the contents of the Receptacle in this scenario exist in the form of particles (*PC* 200–202), but he then fails, not surprisingly, to come up with a plausible suggestion as to what they might be. One cannot simply talk of 'qualities' being shuffled around, as I have just complained (see previous note).

Plato does not do (and which he could not do, it seems to me, without giving some reason for that).

No, there is some special reason behind this curious passage, and I think it is fairly plain what it is. Behind the whole plan of the *Timaeus*, after all, there lurks the *éminence grise* of Democritus, and the Atomist view of the universe. The idea that the blind, random movements of atoms in the void could ever come up with an ordered universe is totally abhorrent to Plato. He has devoted this whole dialogue to presenting an alternative, teleological scenario, and in this passage, even at the cost of logic, he has gone out of his way to take a direct swipe at the atomist theory. Of course, since there never was a stage when the elements were not under the control of intellect, the illogicality is of less importance, but it is still remarkable, it seems to me, that Plato should go out of his way here to put down Democritus by producing an illogical declaration. He is determined to convey to us his view that the random jostling of atoms could never, throughout all eternity, produce an ordered world, and he does this even at the cost of the plausibility of his account.[19]

IV

But I have now, I hope, said enough to make it plain that there are deliberate incoherences in Plato's account of the Receptacle, which should alert us to the fact that the concept of pre-cosmic chaos is not to be taken literally. Let us turn, finally, to consider the Soul.

Here, first of all, I would like to take the opportunity to say a word or two in praise of my old friend Plutarch of Chaeronea. Plutarch, in his essay *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, feels very strongly that he has uncovered the answer to the apparent contradictions and incoherencies of the *Timaeus*, though neither his successors in the Platonist tradition nor modern authorities in general have been much impressed by his solution. My view is that, although he does indeed in his exegesis grasp the wrong end of the stick and wave it about vigorously, nevertheless in the process he makes a number of shrewd observations that modern commentators on Plato would do well to note.

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[19] One could argue, I suppose—and it has been argued to me—that totally random motions would endlessly cancel each other out, and thus the process of sorting would be continually disrupted. But my contention is that, in a situation of total randomness, such a process could not even get under way, as Plato describes it as doing. And what *are* these particles, in any case?

The first thing that seems obvious to Plutarch, as it does to me, is that we cannot rest content with an apparent inconsistency in Plato's doctrine on such a major matter as the eternity or otherwise of the soul (nor yet on the doctrine that soul is the only cause of motion in the universe) as between such more or less contemporary dialogues as the *Phaedrus*, the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*. His solution, since (in contrast to his predecessors) he takes the account of the demiurgic creation literally, is that what is being described in 35aff. is not the creation of soul in general, but only of *rational* soul; *irrational* soul—which, for him, is soul in its 'natural' state—has always existed, and is responsible for the chaotic movement of precosmic matter—as it is responsible, also, for the innate movement of the world in the *Statesman* myth, after Kronos has retired into his conning-tower. This solution, as I say, would not commend itself very widely today, but in the process of asserting it I feel, as I say, that he makes some good points. Allow me to quote him on this question (*Mor.* 1016a [*Proc. An.*]):

> A first proof (*sc.* of the correctness of his interpretation) is that it resolves what is called and seems to be his inconsistency and self-contradiction. For one would not attribute even to a drunken sophist, and it is nonsense then to attribute to Plato in regard to the doctrines about which he had been most seriously concerned, such confusion and capriciousness as to declare of the same entity both that it is unsubject to generation and that it came to be—in the *Phaedrus* that the soul is unsubject to generation, and in the *Timaeus* that it came to be.

He then refers us to the famous passage of the *Phaedrus* (245cff.), in which the soul's eternity and indestructibility is tied to its being the source of motion both for itself and all other things. Plutarch's solution is, as I say, in my view the wrong one, but his analysis of the contradiction seems to me perfectly valid. I realise that a number of modern authorities[20] attempt to save Plato's consistency, at least on the matter of the disorderly motion of the Receptacle, by arguing that Plato only meant that Soul was the origin of all *orderly* motion in the universe. That may indeed be what Plato *means*, but it is certainly not what he says, and to that extent Plutarch makes a valid point.[21]

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[20] Notably Gregory Vlastos, 'The Disorderly Motion in the *Timaeus*', in R.E. Allen, ed., *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (London 1965) 390ff.

[21] Admittedly, in the atomist system, which Plato certainly has in his sights in this dialogue (as I have suggested above), no explanation is

More serious, though, is the question of the soul's createdness. Plato here, it seems to me, drops us a pretty clear clue at the outset of his account that all is not to be taken literally. As you will recall, he makes Timaeus give his account of the creation of the soul *after* that of the body of the world, and moreover preface this with a curious little apology (34bc): 'Now this soul, though it comes later in the account we are now attempting, was not made by the god younger than the body; for when he joined them together, he would not have suffered the elder to be ruled by the younger. There is in us too much of the casual and random, which shows itself in our speech ...'

Modern scholars, it seems to me, have been too ready to accept Timaeus' apology without reflecting on its significance. If Plato has introduced the creation of the soul after that of the body, that is because he has so arranged it that one of the elements out of which it is composed is 'the essence that comes to be divisible about bodies' (35a2–3), and he cannot very well so describe it before he has introduced bodies. What, therefore, are we to make of this οὐσία ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή? Plutarch, of course, takes this as a reference to the irrational soul (e.g. *Mor.* 1023eff. [*Proc. An.*]), but this lands him in all sorts of difficulties, which we need not go into at the moment.[22] Xenocrates, on the other hand,[23] who, as we know, maintained a non-literal interpretation, took the 'undivided essence' of *Ti.* 35a to be the One, and that divided about bodies to be Multiplicity (πλῆθος)—another term for the Indefinite Dyad, or Indefiniteness (ἀπειρία)—and their product, Soul, to be also, with certain important qualifications, Number. What distinguishes Soul from Number in general, in Xenocrates' view (as Plutarch tells us, albeit disapprovingly), is the addition of Sameness and Otherness. The blending in of these produces Soul as a *self-moving* number, itself made up of all the ratios (as described in 35bff.), but also able to communicate ratios and harmonies to the Receptacle, in the form of the primary triangles and the combinations arising from them, making Soul the conduit, and transformer, of the Forms in the process of generating physical bodies, and the physical world in general.

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given for the primordial motion of the atoms in the void (a feature of their theory which Aristotle criticises, *Met.* A, 985^{b}19, *De Caelo* 300^{b}8—though I think unfairly), and Plato may well be taking his cue from that—though with a view to showing up the incoherence of the concept.

[22] They are well set out by Harold Cherniss in his notes to the Loeb edition of the work (*Plutarch's Moralia*, XIII.1 [Cambridge MA 1976]).

[23] On Plutarch's own evidence (*Mor.* 1012de [*Proc. An.*] = Fr. 68 Heinze).

The latter part of this scenario—Soul's role as a conduit for the Forms—is, I must confess, my own extrapolation from what we know of Xenocrates' position, and from what its role comes to be in later Platonism, but it seems to me that something very like this must have been his interpretation. The main point, however, is that we have what seems to me a coherent account, from a man who should have known, of what a non-literal interpretation of the composition of the soul may be cashed out as, so to speak. When Plato presents us an account of the creation of the soul which comes after that of bodies, and which seems somehow to presuppose them, despite disclaimers to the contrary from its author, then, I think, we are being invited to look beneath the surface of the text, and what we are meant to discover cannot, I believe, be very different from what Xenocrates is expounding.

I say this rather defiantly, conscious as I am that Xenocrates' interpretation has been rejected by more or less everyone who has taken note of it, from Plutarch onwards; but I would ask, in turn, what, in terms of Plato's metaphysics, we are to suppose this 'divisible essence which comes to be about bodies'—or rather, this 'essence which comes to be divided about bodies', since I think that that is the more accurate rendering—may be. It is too easy for commentators to sidestep this question, or even to dismiss it as improper. Cornford, for instance, devotes a number of pages of his commentary to the issue (64–66)—beginning, very soundly, 'The epithets "indivisible" and "divisible" call for some explanation'—but he does not regard it as incumbent upon him to make any such identification.

However, I do not think that one can ignore this question, and this brings me round to one of the issues that I raised at the beginning, and with which I would like to close. Within a relatively few years of the composition of the *Timaeus*, Plato composed also the *Philebus*. Now the *Philebus* is by no means an entirely straightforward document either, but it does, in the process of enquiring into the nature of pleasure, set out the nearest thing to an explicit metaphysical system that we are going to get from Plato. This, as we know, involves a 'Pythagorean' pair of first principles, Limit and the Unlimited (23c), with, in addition, what Plato calls 'the cause of their mixture' (23d), which somewhat later (30cd) is characterised as 'Intellect' (νοῦς). Limit and Unlimitedness interpenetrate one another, and pervade the physical world, all existent things being 'mixtures' of them. The Cause is presented as a third thing, separate from, and superior to, these two, but it does not, I think, have to be taken as any more than the active, or 'executive', aspect of Limit, even as the Demiurge need not be regarded as distinct, except con-

ceptually, from the world of Forms. In both cases, it is what Plato likes to refer to as ὁ θεός, when he is not concerned to be specific.

As for Unlimitedness, it is that element in the universe which on the one hand causes bodies to be distinguished from one another and individuated, and on the other is that aspect of basic pairs of elements such as hot/cold, wet/dry, large/small, or indeed pleasure/pain which tends to indefiniteness and to extremes, and which must continually be regulated by Limit, which process then results in the fixing of definite quantities of these, and in the creation of means between the extremes. It is, therefore, that which comes to be divided among bodies, when it, in combination with Limit, has produced bodies for it to be divided among. It itself must be reckoned as prior to bodies—logically, but not temporally. It is this principle with which Xenocrates is identifying the οὐσία ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή, and I think that he is basically right.[24]

V

And this brings me to my very final point—again adumbrated at the beginning: What can all this confusion and difficulty tell us about the way in which Plato chose to present his dialogues? How can it be—irrespective of which of them is right or wrong—that immediate disciples of Plato such as Aristotle, Speusippus and Xenocrates can be in dispute over such a basic matter as whether the demiurgic creation of the world in the *Timaeus* is to be taken literally or not? This question retains its validity even if (as I maintain) Aristotle is being disingenuous and polemical in his literal interpretation, or (as many others would assume) Speusippus and Xenocrates are attempting some sort of whitewash of their master, to save him from the strictures of Aristotle. The dispute simply could not have arisen if

[24] It is not strictly true, by the way, as is often asserted, that ultimate principles find no place in the *Timaeus*. They are not dealt with, certainly, but they are alluded to in a way that no alert ancient reader or hearer could mistake. At 48c, Timaeus is made to say: 'We are not now to speak of the first principle (ἀρχή), or principles—or whatever name men choose to employ—of all things, if only on account of the difficulty of explaining what we think by our present method of exposition'. Timaeus, as everyone knows, is a Pythagorean philosopher, and all that he can possibly mean by first principles is the One and the Indefinite Dyad. It is surely Plato's way of letting us know that they are there, in the background, but he does not propose to bring them in.

Plato himself had ever made it clear what exactly he intended by what he wrote.[25]

But how on earth, you ask, could he have failed to make this clear? Surely his companions would have pressed him for an answer, and would not have rested until they had obtained one. Not necessarily, I would suggest. Not, of course, that they would not have wished to know, but they were quite aware of how Plato wished to proceed. He did not want to preempt discussion by laying down the law. Otherwise, he could have written treatises. He issued his dialogues to provoke debate, and his companions knew that perfectly well. He was careful never to include himself in a dialogue, even when he might well have been expected to have been present (as, famously, in the case of the *Phaedo*). If someone not acquainted with his principles were incautiously to enquire of him what he had meant in a given passage, I think that the great man would simply have smiled and said, 'How should I know? *I* wasn't there. *You* work it out'. And work it out we must.[26]

[25] The *Timaeus*, after all, is not a unique case. There is also, dating from the same period, the question of the meaning of the myth of the *Statesman*, and the subject-matter of the whole latter part of the *Parmenides*. And can we really decide even about the *Republic*, whether it is basically about the soul or the state?

[26] I am put in mind, in this connection, of a graduate seminar of Gilbert Ryle's that I once managed to sit in on when I was at Oxford, back in 1960/1. I shouldn't have been there, since I was only an undergraduate, so I kept very quiet, but there were some very voluble young sprigs of philosophers in the group, including at least one American (whom I think now was probably John Searle), and they kept up a lively discussion. In the midst of all this, Ryle simply sat there in his armchair, and sucked his pipe. He *must* now and again have said something, but all I can remember him doing was sitting there and nodding, and sucking his pipe. That, I must say, is what I rather like to think of Plato doing a good deal of the time, at least in his later years. And then, of course, he would go off and write another dialogue. Ryle, it may be noted, had quite a lively interest in the circumstances of the production of Plato's dialogues, as evidenced in that entertaining book, *Plato's Progress*, though I don't wish to claim that that influenced his conduct.

3

'THE DIVINE SIGN DID NOT OPPOSE ME': A PROBLEM IN PLATO'S *APOLOGY*?

MARK A. JOYAL

In an article published in 1986,[1] then again in 1989 in their book *Socrates on Trial*,[2] Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith have identified in Plato's *Apology* 29a4–b2 what they consider to be an inconsistency with another very famous passage in the same work. Simply put, the problem which Brickhouse and Smith identify is this: although Socrates claims not to know whether death is a good thing, both in *Ap.* 29a4–b2 and in 37b5–7, yet just a few moments before the end of his speech (*Ap.* 40a2–c3) he says that because his divine sign has not come to him the day of his trial, he can assume that what has happened to him—conviction and a sentence of death—is not bad, and that 'it is out of the question that our assumption is correct when we suppose that death is bad' (40b8–c2 οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι). Agnosticism, it seems, has now been replaced by confident assertion.[3]

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[1] T.C. Brickhouse, N.D. Smith, '"The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose Me": A Problem in Plato's *Apology*', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 16 (1986) 511–526 (hereafter 'Brickhouse-Smith 1986').

[2] Brickhouse and Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton 1989) 237–257 (hereafter 'Brickhouse-Smith 1989'), a revised version of Brickhouse-Smith 1986.

[3] 29a4–b2: τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; (I do not understand how Gregory Vlastos could cite this passage as one where Socrates establishes on rational grounds that death is no evil: *Socrates,*

There certainly does seem to be an inconsistency here, and therefore perhaps a problem. Working from the assumption that all three of Socrates' remarks are sincere,[4] Brickhouse and Smith endeavour to determine wherein consistency is to be sought. Their solutions run essentially like this: Socrates' divine sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον), which occurs to Socrates only to indicate that he should desist from an action on which he is about to embark, but never provokes him to action, warns him away from committing *moral* errors. But if we examine the ways in which the sign is likely to have operated or in which we may conceive it to have operated, we will realize that it did not provide Socrates with access to any *certain* knowledge on moral issues (for then there would have been no reason for him to practise philosophical dialectic). Hence we need not be troubled by the fact that through his divine sign Socrates demonstrates greater optimism in the prospects for death than he did a little earlier, since his claims can have no solid, rational foundation, and no *volte-face* can therefore have taken place. And in any case, the only thing that Socrates can infer from the sign's silence is that death is not a bad thing *for him*. Therefore we are not justified in believing that the claims which Socrates makes for the significance of the silence of his sign are at variance with the tentative nature of his earlier remarks about death in 29a4–b2.

There are several problems with these arguments, each of which results from over-interpretation and a failure to adhere to the evidence of the text. Let us first take the claim by Brickhouse and Smith that Socrates' sign warns him away from committing morally evil acts.[5] In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates observes in general about his sign that it comes to him and prevents him from acting if he is about

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Ironist and Moral Philosopher [Ithaca 1991] 283–284); 37b5–7: τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; It may be noted as well that the closing words of Socrates' speech (42a2–5) express uncertainty whether death or life is the better thing, not whether death is itself bad; indeed, Socrates has just asserted (41d3–5) that death is the better outcome for him (hence his sign has at no point in his speech dissuaded him, 41d5–6). But these two characterizations of death are less unambiguous, since they do not exclude the interpretation that death is the better thing on a scale of *evils* rather than on a scale of *goods*—i.e., that it is only relatively better, not absolutely good.

[4] Brickhouse-Smith 1986, 516–518; Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 242.

[5] Brickhouse-Smith 1986, 518–519; Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 242–245; they propose that Socrates' sign 'hates for Socrates to do an evil' (1986, 515; 1989, 240).

to do something 'incorrectly' (40a6–7 εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν). Hence its failure to come to him the day of his trial is evidence that what has happened to him is ἀγαθόν (40b8) and that death is not κακόν (40c1), since his sign would undoubtedly have made itself known to him if he were going to do something that was not ἀγαθόν (40c4). What Socrates means by μὴ ὀρθῶς is 'unsuccessfully' or 'disadvantageously'; likewise κακόν and ἀγαθόν mean, respectively, 'disadvantageous' or 'unfortunate' and 'advantageous' or 'fortunate'. The primary force of these words as they are used here is not an ethical one (e.g. 'morally evil/good', 'unjust'/'righteous')[6]; this is a point that deserves some emphasis, if only because the interpretation of Socrates' sign as a moral guide is frequently encountered in recent scholarship.[7] Of course, what is disadvantageous or unfortunate *may* be morally evil as well, but this is not always or necessarily the case, and certainly not in Plato's accounts of Socrates' sign. When, for instance, Socrates is in the Lyceum in the dialogue *Euthydemus* and he decides to leave, his sign comes to him; thus dissuaded, he sits down in time for the arrival of the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (272e1–273a2). Clearly there is no question here of the divine sign affording Socrates any moral guidance.[8] It is also

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[6] See J. Burnet, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* (Oxford 1924), on *Ap.* 40a5, c3; E. de Strycker, S.R. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates. A Literary and Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary* (Leiden/New York/Köln 1994) 154, with n. 7, and their n. on *Ap.* 40a6.

[7] Apart from Brickhouse-Smith see, e.g., T.C. West, *Plato's Apology of Socrates. An Interpretation, With a New Translation* (Ithaca/London 1979) 181–191; C.D.C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology. An Essay on Plato's Apology of Socrates* (Indianapolis/Cambridge MA 1989) 68–69; F. Vonessen, 'Das Daimonion des Sokrates in platonischer Sicht', in W. Sauer, D. Lauermann, eds., *Sokrates Gestalt und Idee.* Sokrates-Studien 1 (Baden-Baden 1993) 89–92; it is however unclear whether Vlastos views Socrates' sign as a moral guide (above, n. 3, 167, 280–287). Against this interpretation see also, e.g. (in addition to Burnet and De Strycker-Slings), E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, II.1 (Leipzig[5] 1922) 78–79; H. Gundert, 'Platon und das Daimonion des Sokrates', *Gymnasium* 61 (1954) 513, 524–525; A.E. Taylor, *Socrates. The Man and His Thought* (New York 1952) 45; R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge 1952) 15; A.H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* (Boston[3] 1959) 27

[8] That Plato wants the occurrence of the divine sign in this passage to be taken largely as a vehicle for irony is made clear by Socrates' statement earlier in the sentence (272e1): κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα κτλ. His presence in the company of the two charlatans was therefore secured by *two* instances of divine intervention. Note that the

hard to see how Socrates' remark in *Ap.* 40a6 that the divine sign opposed him 'on quite trivial occasions' (πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς) squares with the assumption that his sign's guidance was fundamentally moral. Further, Brickhouse and Smith overlook another piece of evidence from the *Apology*. In 31d1–2 Socrates observes that occurrences of his sign began when he was a child (ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον). At the least this detail raises serious doubts about the inextricable link which Brickhouse and Smith forge between the sign and moral judgements, since a Greek would have had great difficulty ascribing morality and conscience to an intellectually undeveloped mind.[9] Finally, when Socrates in 40a4–5 applies the word μαντική to τὸ δαιμόνιον, i.e., ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου, this strongly suggests a phenomenon which has more to do with expediency than with questions of right and wrong.[10] Therefore the investigation into the certainty with which Socrates can decide moral issues through the prompting of his sign gets off on the wrong foot, since it is based on a selective and incomplete use of evidence, and on translations of the Greek which beg the question.

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first instance is not to be confused with the second; rather, κατὰ θεὸν ... τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος is the virtual equivalent of θείᾳ τινι τύχῃ ἐκαθήμην (for the concept of θεία τύχη as it is presented in Plato see E.G. Berry, *The History and Development of the Concept of* ΘΕΙΑ ΜΟΙΡΑ *and* ΘΕΙΑ ΤΥΧΗ *Down To and Including Plato* [Diss. Chicago 1940] 72–85, with reference to *Euthd.* 272e1 at 78 n. 3). The theme of divine intervention is pursued, again ironically, in 273e5–274a1, in particular when Socrates addresses Euthydemus and Dionysodorus ὥσπερ θεώ (cf. 273e1–2).

[9] See K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 102–104, and M. Golden, *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens* (Baltimore/London 1990) 5–7, with the passages cited in these pages. For some Platonic and Aristotelian evidence cf. *R.* 401e1–402a4, 441a7–b1, *Lg.* 653a5–c4; Arist. *EN* 1099^{b}32–1100^{a}4, 1119^{a}33–1119^{b}15, 1144^{b}1–17, 1152^{b}19–20, 1153^{a}28–31, 1176^{b}21–24, *EE* 1224^{a}29, 1236^{a}2; see further W.W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 1975) 45–53.

[10] At 40a4–5 Schleiermacher secluded the words ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου on the grounds that they reflect the later characterization of Socrates' sign as a 'familiar spirit' (τὸ δαιμόνιον occurs in an oblique case only here within indisputably authentic Platonic works); see further Burnet and De Strycker-Slings *ad Ap.* 40a4. I mention this point because, as we shall see, this is not the only respect in which the presentation of τὸ δαιμόνιον in this part of *Ap.* is unique (cf. also the use of the term μαντική in 40a4, only here in the Platonic Corpus with reference to τὸ δαιμόνιον). The new Oxford editors retain ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου in their text of *Ap.*

What about the attempts by Brickhouse and Smith to determine the way in which Socrates' sign was likely to operate? Here they engage (though at a more sophisticated level) in the kind of speculation that has been entertained since at least the first century B.C.—namely, the attempt to uncover the true nature and *modus operandi* of Socrates' sign. To be sure, it is in research on the divine sign that some of the low points in the history of Socratic scholarship have been plumbed; there is, for example, the French scholar who in the middle of the last century maintained that the existence of Socrates' sign proved that Socrates was out of his mind![11] But the fact is that Plato says relatively little about the phenomenon, Xenophon does not say a great deal more, and the two are by no means always in harmony over their descriptions. One area in which they *do* agree is in their use of various terms to describe Socrates' sign: it is τὸ δαιμόνιον; τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον; τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον; θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον; τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον; τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον; ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική; φωνή τις (in Plato) and φωνή (in Xenophon). What does this

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[11] L.F. Lélut, *Du Démon de Socrate* (Paris 1856) 173–174; for a roughly contemporary discussion of Lelut's theory see H. Jackson, 'The ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΝ ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ of Socrates', *JPhil* 5 (1874) 232–247. Recently K. Kleve ('The Daimonion of Socrates', *SIFC* 79 [1986] 17) has concluded: 'If Socrates heard a voice nobody else could hear, and heard it not only occasionally, but usually, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that he must have been seriously ill'; compare also Friedrich Nietzsche's comments in, e.g., *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (K. Schlechta, ed., *Friedrich Nietzsche. Werke in drei Banden*, I [Munich 1966] 77): Socrates' sign was 'eine wahre Monstrosität *per defectum*'; and Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London 1946) 107: 'Whether [Socrates' sign] was analogous to what a Christian would call the voice of conscience, or whether it appeared to him as an *actual* voice, it is impossible to know. Joan of Arc was inspired by voices, which are a common symptom of insanity. Socrates was liable to cataleptic trances ...'. For further examples of speculation (drawn from the past four centuries) see K. Frieden, *Genius and Monologue* (Ithaca/London 1985) 27–47, esp. 39; P.J. FitzPatrick, 'The Legacy of Socrates', in B.M. Gower, M.C. Stokes, eds., *Socratic Questions. New Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates and its Significance* (London/New York 1992) 170, 176, 180–186; and for many ancient examples see my 'Tradition and Innovation in the Transformation of Socrates' Divine Sign', in L. Ayres, ed., *The Passionate Intellect: Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions presented to I.G. Kidd* (New Brunswick NJ/London 1995) 39–56. It may be observed here that Socrates' sign has always been of greater interest to interpreters for what they think it means or may symbolize than for what they are actually told about it by the earliest witnesses. This focus is in large measure due to the exiguous nature of the early evidence about τὸ δαιμόνιον, as well as to a *horror vacui*.

tell us? I suggest that Plato and Xenophon took over this rather wide range of terms from the habit of Socrates himself, and that the terms reflect even Socrates' uncertainty about the nature of his divine sign.[12] If this inference is correct, can we reasonably claim to be able to do better? In trying to do so, Brickhouse and Smith convict themselves of claiming to know something about which they can really know little or nothing.

What does Socrates actually say in the *Apology*? In 41d3–6, it is true, he observes that his divine warning has demonstrated that death is better *for him*. Note, however, that this assumption follows necessarily from his earlier inference in 40b7–c4: 'This thing that has happened to me is likely to be good, and it is out of the question that our assumption is correct when we suppose that death is bad. I have received an important indication[13] of this; for it is out of the question that my customary sign would have failed to oppose me if what I was going to do were not something good'.[14] Socrates here does not infer from the inactivity of his sign that death is not bad *for him*, but that it is not bad *simpliciter*. But if it is not bad, then it is not bad for him. Near the end of each of their two discussions, Brickhouse and Smith remark: 'Socrates may conclude that his own death will not be an evil thing, but he cannot conclude that anyone else's would not be evil, for the silence of the *daimonion* entails nothing general. Socrates' proffered interpretation (at 40c3–41d5) of

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[12] See my *op. cit.* (above, n. 11) 42–43, esp. 42 n. 9 for the sources of the various terms for Socrates' sign. After reviewing the most important Platonic passages which deal with the sign, Vlastos (above, n. 3), 285, concludes that they 'give us content enough to enable us to tell what is going on in Socrates' mind when a visitation of the *daimonion* occurs'. Although I am much less optimistic that this is so, Vlastos' findings are in any case vitiated by his mistaken inclusion of *Ap.* 28d9–29a2 and 33c4–7 as testimonia for the sign; see my *op. cit.* 45 n. 20; De Strycker-Slings (above, n. 6) 215–216. For other recent discussions about the operations of τὸ δαιμόνιον see Brickhouse and Smith, *Plato's Socrates* (New York/ Oxford 1994) 189–195; Vlastos, *TLS* 4,524 (1989) 1393 (review of Brickhouse-Smith 1989); M.L. McPherran, 'Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation', *JHPh* 29 (1991) 353–354.

[13] μέγα ... τεκμήριον, wrongly translated 'great proof' by Brickhouse-Smith (1986, 513; 1989, 237–238; the source of the mistranslation was apparently Fowler's Loeb translation of *Ap.*, see Brickhouse-Smith 1986, 512 n. 3). For the correct interpretation of μέγα τεκμήριον see Vlastos (above, n. 3) 283 n. 147.

[14] For the progression in this passage from the identification of death as 'not bad' to death as 'something good', and for the role played by the repetition of the emphatic phrase οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως within this progression, see n. 18 below.

why his death will not be an evil is, of course, more generally applicable, but this is Socrates' own interpretation, and in no way guaranteed by the *daimonion* or its silence'.[15] As to the first of these two sentences, I should say that Plato's text implies precisely that the silence of Socrates' sign *does* entail a general conclusion about death, viz., that it is not a bad thing and is in fact a good thing. As to the second sentence, it deserves notice that Socrates' general comments about the nature of death follow hard upon, and are meant to buttress, his equally general assertion about death in the previous paragraph, which dealt with the significance of his sign. Much as Brickhouse and Smith would like to assume that Socrates does not infer from the silence of his sign that death in general cannot be bad—and we may well sympathize with their desire to draw this conclusion—their assumption has no foundation in the text.[16]

Therefore the inconsistency between 29a4–b2, where Socrates claims that nobody knows whether death is bad, and 40b7–c3, where he says that death is not bad (and is in fact good), simply cannot be disposed of by appealing to the status of Socrates' sign as a moral agent, by arguments about its typical behaviour, or by reference to the text of the *Apology*. But perhaps there is another—rather obvious—way around this inconsistency. It may be proposed that it is only at the end of his speech that Socrates expresses greater confidence in the prospects for death because it is only at this point that he can be sure that his sign's opportunity to dissuade him has passed. Socrates does, after all, present us with the possibility that his sign could have occurred to him at some time earlier in his speech; for he draws significance from the fact that his sign opposed him 'at no place in my speech when I was about to say something' (40b3 ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν).

Yet such an explanation is not without its problems. When Socrates in 29a4–b2 expresses uncertainty about whether death is good or bad, he does so as evidence that he does not possess

[15] Brickhouse-Smith 1986, 525; Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 255. Cf. Brickhouse-Smith (above, n. 12) 202; West (above, n. 7) 227; Frieden (above, n. 11) 45–47.

[16] It is possible that through Socrates' words in 40b7–c3 in particular, as well as those in 41d3–6 (perhaps also 29a7–9 οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν), Plato intended to put his readers in mind of the *topos* that death is the greatest good for mankind, a *topos* which became frequent in consolation literature. A collection of ancient evidence for this commonplace can be found in L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia 1975) 209–211, with nn. 723, 724.

δοξοσοφία: τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα (for the full text see n. 3 above). δοξοσοφία is a typically human failing, because it is the gods, not humans, who can truly possess σοφία (23a5–7 τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός); it is rather φιλοσοφία that is the province of humans (cf. *Smp.* 204a1–2, *Phdr.* 278d3–4, *Lys.* 218a2–b3). It seems to me therefore that if Plato had intended that Socrates at the end of the *Apology* should be in possession of knowledge from which he had been earlier barred, he has been remarkably sloppy in exposing Socrates to the accusation of hypocrisy.

But this is not all. If Socrates had presented his earlier view of death in tentative terms, it might be argued that his later confidence is defensible as a natural development which has based itself upon new evidence (i.e., the silence of τὸ δαιμόνιον). But Socrates in the earlier passage is assertive and uncompromising in maintaining his ignorance about the nature of death: if he feared death he would justifiably be indicted for not acknowledging the existence of the gods (28e6–29a5); and it is not only he who does not know whether death is actually the greatest of blessings: nobody (οὐδείς) knows this (29a7–9).[17] Given this assertiveness it is remarkable how equally confident Socrates later is in his new belief in the goodness of death: οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κτλ. (40b8–c4).[18] Further, in 29b5–6 Socrates claims to have no clear knowledge περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, and so he refrains from saying anything about this. Yet in 40e4–41c7 he allows himself to speculate elaborately on this very topic. Finally, although the failure of Socrates' sign to occur seems to instill confidence in him about the nature of death, nevertheless his last words in the *Apology* (42a2–5) demonstrate a return to uncertainty (see also n. 3 above).

The inconsistency which exists between 29a4–b2 and 40b7–c3 therefore runs deeper than was originally imagined and cannot be

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[17] Of the section in which these words appear (28d10–30c1), De Strycker-Slings remark (above, n. 6, 140) that '[i]n no other part of the *Apology* is there so much emotion in the tone and so much confidence in Socrates' words'.

[18] Although in c1 Socrates presents death as merely 'not κακόν', the ensuing sentence (c2–4) indicates that 'not κακόν' is to be understood as τι ἀγαθόν. By invoking the emphatic formula οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως in both 40b8 and 40c2–3 Plato shows very clearly (if it were not clear enough already) that he wants his reader to make this identification (i.e., *there is no question* that death is not κακόν; for *there is no question* that Socrates' sign would have opposed him were he not going to do something ἀγαθόν).

overcome merely by supposing that the failure of Socrates' sign to occur now negates his earlier agnosticism about death, as well as the implications of this agnosticism. But should we even try to argue the inconsistency away? Much depends, I think, on whether we treat the *Apology* as a faithful record of Socrates' own words. For their part Brickhouse and Smith are quite resolute believers in the historicity of Plato's *Apology*; that is to say, to them the *Apology* is an historical document, and they speak of the 'essential accuracy' and 'basic accuracy' of Plato's report of Socrates' words.[19] Now, if we accept that the *Apology* represents more or less the words of Socrates as uttered the day of his trial, we will also feel rather compelled to reconcile apparently divergent claims within that work. We may not be forced to do this with other courtroom speeches, but with Socrates' ἀπολογία the case for doing so would appear to be much more urgent, since we expect intellectual consistency from Socrates. Hence Brickhouse and Smith comment on *Apology* 40a2–c3 that 'we see little point in Socrates' exploiting [his divine sign] insincerely at this stage of the trial. Why undertake to deceive or mislead those to whom he now speaks, the members of the jury who voted in his favour?'[20] But can the historicity of the *Apology* be assumed or convincingly defended?

This of course has long been one of the great questions in Platonic and Socratic scholarship. We are fortunate now, however, to have two major works which demonstrate how in its structure and composition the *Apology* follows patterns of contemporary forensic speeches down to the minutest detail: Thomas Meyer's dissertation, much neglected in scholarship on the *Apology* over the past thirty-five years; and the more recent interpretation and commentary of Emile de Strycker, completed posthumously by S.R. Slings.[21] By carefully

[19] Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 8, 9.

[20] Brickhouse-Smith 1986, 517; Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 242. It deserves to be noted that this remark is fundamentally flawed, since the trial itself would have actually concluded by the time Socrates uttered the words in question. If Socrates did in fact utter the words which Plato attributes to him here, he did so informally, and only to a segment of the jury. On this question see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon*, I (Berlin[5] 1959) 124–125; De Strycker-Slings (above, n. 6) 201–204.

[21] T. Meyer, *Platons Apologie* (Stuttgart 1962); De Strycker-Slings, *op. cit.* (above, n. 6); see also K. Seeskin, *Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method* (Albany NY 1987) 58–61. De Strycker (who died in 1978) himself described Meyer's book as 'the most important contribution to the interpretation of the *Apology* since Burnet's' (Preface, x).

documenting the rhetorical and literary principles on which the *Apology* was composed—in particular the tremendous variety of rhetorical elements that permeate the *Apology* from beginning to end—these scholars have placed the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of those who would defend the speech's claim to be an historical record. For if the *Apology* is an 'essentially accurate' account of what Socrates said in court, we are bound to accept that he ranks among the greatest logographers of antiquity, so skilfully did he manipulate rhetorical *topoi* for his own ends, often investing them with new purpose and meaning against the background of established practice.[22] For Brickhouse and Smith, however, the pervasively rhetorical character of the *Apology* poses no problem, since they believe—following Riddell, and after him Burnet and most other scholars[23]—that it is only the speech's *prooimion* that contains a rhetorical ingredient.[24] For my own part, however, I believe that the reason for the thoroughly rhetorical character of the *Apology* is that Plato, not Socrates, was its composer.

The problem then is not to smooth out the inconsistency which we have examined, but rather to explain why it exists and why Plato admitted it. And here we must observe that the way in which Socrates' divine sign is presented in *Apology* 40a2–c3 is unique in all the genuine works of the Platonic Corpus, since only here is the inactivity of the divine sign adduced by Socrates as positive grounds for proceeding on a course of action.[25] Elsewhere, however, Socrates cites

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[22] Yet it is precisely the use of rhetorical devices and *topoi* that Socrates at the beginning of his speech tells his jurors they will *not* hear from him: 17b9–c3 οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν κτλ.; cf. 17d3 ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. But these declarations are themselves rhetorical *topoi*; see Meyer (above, n. 21) 25–26, 38, 66–67; De Strycker-Slings (above, n. 6) 31–40; also the two works cited in n. 23 below.

[23] See J. Riddell, *The Apology of Socrates* (Oxford 1867) xxi; Burnet (above, n. 6) 66–68.

[24] Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 49–59. In no place do Brickhouse and Smith deal with Meyer's arguments, though they do cite his book in the bibliography to *Socrates on Trial* (295). Brickhouse's recent review of De Strycker-Slings (*AJPh* 117 [1996] 487–492) suggests that he does not find the intricate rhetorical structure and literary character of the *Apology* incompatible with its reliability as an historical record.

[25] In my *op. cit.* (above, n. 11), 46–49, I have considered the influence of this unique characterization on the way in which Socrates' sign is depicted in other, non-Platonic sources. — Socrates' description of τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Tht.* 151a2–5 appears to be parallel with that in *Ap.* 40a2–

only the occurrence of his sign, and that as a reason for desisting from a contemplated course of action. So in the *Apology* much greater efficacy is clearly ascribed to τὸ δαιμόνιον, since it is not only the apotreptic activity of Socrates' sign that possesses significance but also the sign's failure to occur. Brickhouse and Smith are aware of the idiosyncratic nature of this portrayal of Socrates' sign,[26] but appear not to be very interested in it and fail to inquire into the reason why here alone the divine sign should be characterized in the way it is. Yet had they done so, they may well have found that much of their discussion had been pre-empted.

Our task must therefore be concerned not with how to reconcile two divergent claims (29a4–b2, 40a2–c3) but with how to explain Socrates' unique description of his sign in this particular place, since he adduces this description as a crucial piece of evidence to support his new attitude towards death. My explanation is that Plato was moved to this description because he was responding to a controversy which Socratics had to confront in the years following 399. Essentially, it was this: Why did Socrates' sign, which as we are told in the *Apology* occurred to him 'even on quite trivial occasions', not

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c3, since the failure of τὸ δαιμόνιον to occur when a former associate returns to Socrates seems to guarantee that person's progress, and two groups of people are listed there in close succession, those (a3 ἐνίοις μὲν) whom τὸ δαιμόνιον prevents Socrates from associating with and those (a4 ἐνίοις δὲ) whom τὸ δαιμόνιον allows Socrates to associate with and who subsequently make progress. Yet the inactivity of τὸ δαιμόνιον is in fact no guarantee of future progress, since Socrates soon mentions a third group (b1 ἐνίοις δὲ) whose members he matches up (b3 προμνῶμαι) with Prodicus and other σοφοί. That this third group consists of people with whom τὸ δαιμόνιον has *not* simply prevented Socrates from associating is indicated by b2–3 οἳ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται κτλ.: μοι μὴ δόξωσι and γνούς show that Socrates' termination of his association with them is based on the opinion which he has formed (n.b. also the vague πως) about their capacity and the realization which he has developed that further time spent with them will be pointless; this is quite different from the simple and unequivocal prohibition of τὸ δαιμόνιον which is so succinctly described in *Tht.* 151a3–4. Hence τὸ δαιμόνιον is indeed solely apotreptic in *Tht.*—contrary to initial appearances—and its failure to occur is in no way determinative in and of itself.

[26] Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 242. In Brickhouse-Smith 1986, 514–516, it was assumed that Socrates' sign *always* opposed him when he was about to do something wrong, since (on their reading) it was committed to preventing Socrates from performing any morally evil act, large or small. They later wisely abandoned this position (Brickhouse-Smith 1989, 239), recognizing that its consequences 'seem terribly implausible'.

present itself to Socrates in such a way and on such an occasion as to forewarn him of the impending catastrophe? After all, interest in this phenomenon would undoubtedly have been heightened among many people who in the aftermath of the trial saw τὸ δαιμόνιον (correctly or not) as being at the root of the charge that Socrates had introduced ἕτερα δαιμόνια καινά. Plato's solution to this potentially embarrassing problem was to lay unparalleled emphasis on the significance of the divine sign's inactivity and on the inferences which could be derived therefrom. This was a controversy with which Xenophon also dealt. He assumes, in both the *Memorabilia* (4.8.1–6) and his *Apology* (4–6), that if death were not the better course for Socrates, an occurrence of the divine sign would have indicated this to him. Xenophon therefore felt bound to explain the sign's silence. So he observes that Socrates was already old and that death saved him from the inevitable collapse of his intellectual powers (*Mem.* 4.8.1, cf. *Ap.* 6–9). Yet Xenophon wants to have it both ways, for he adds that Socrates' inhibitory sign *did* occur to him after all—when he was contemplating his defence speech (*Mem.* 4.8.5; cf. *Ap.* 4).

Three features of Xenophon's accounts in *Mem.* 4.8.1–6 and *Ap.* 1–9 are for our purposes especially worth noticing.

1. The account in the *Memorabilia* forms part of the conclusion of that work. In the *Apology* (2–4) the first question which Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, asks Socrates is why he took so little thought over his defence speech, the answer to which question leads to the report about the divine sign's intervention. The prominent position given to this issue within the structure of both works suggests that Xenophon considered the sign's failure to occur to Socrates to be a matter that deserved special emphasis.

2. Two separate reasons are given to explain why Socrates' sign did not dissuade him from acting in a way that would lead to his demise. In the *Memorabilia* these reasons are not entirely compatible with one another (see above), but in the *Apology* (8) a greater attempt is made to present them as complementary. At any rate, it can be shown that Xenophon drew upon two distinct sources:

(a) The first reason—that Socrates was already near death and so was saved from the ravages of old age—appears in a different context in Plato's *Apology* 38c1–d2: Socrates tells those who have convicted him that had they waited a little longer nature would have run its course and they would not have jeopardized the good name of Athens, since he was already at an advanced age and near death. To the wording in Pl. *Ap.* 38c6–7 ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ

τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς, compare that in X. *Mem.* 4.8.1 οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστ', εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον (the theme is taken up by Libanius, *Decl.* 1.4 [15.17–16.1 Foerster]). Plato may be alluding to this argument of consolation in *Ap.* 41d3–7 as well, where he assures his supporters that it would be better for him to die and be released from πράγματα (d5), and that this is why (d5 διὰ τοῦτο) his divine sign has not dissuaded him at his trial; here πράγματα, 'troubles', probably refers to the troubles of old age.[27] I surmise that in the literary polemics which grew out of Socrates' trial and death the argument that Socrates could not in any case have expected to live much longer than his three score and ten years was one to which his supporters had recourse in order to explain why τὸ δαιμόνιον had failed to occur.

(b) The second reason—τὸ δαιμόνιον occurred at some time before the trial to prevent Socrates from composing a speech of defence—is attributed to the report of Hermogenes (see #1 above) in both *Mem.* 4.8.4 and *Ap.* 2 (the similarity of wording between *Mem.* 4–5 and *Ap.* 3–4 is extremely close). There seems no reason to doubt the reliability of the attribution.

3. Most importantly, the way in which Xenophon introduces the issue in *Mem.* 4.8.1 in itself supports the existence of the controversy which I have posited: Εἰ δέ τις, ὅτι φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δέοι καὶ ἃ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος, οἴεται αὐτὸν ἐλέγχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου ψευδόμενον, ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον ὅτι κτλ. The slightly intricate argument of the protasis (Εἰ δέ τις ... ψευδόμενον), which leads to Xenophon's exhortation (ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον ὅτι κτλ.), may be expressed paratactically as follows: 'Socrates claimed that τὸ δαιμόνιον indicated to him in advance what he should and should not do; but Socrates was convicted by his judges of a capital crime; if anyone thinks that for this reason Socrates is proved to have been lying about τὸ δαιμόνιον, let him reflect first that etc.'. Is the indefinite subject of the protasis (τις) a mere straw-man? The apologetic tone of the whole final section of the *Memorabilia* (4.8.1–11) argues powerfully against this conclusion (cf. *Mem.* 1.4.1 Εἰ δέ τινες ... νομίζουσιν, with n. 29 below); Xenophon is instead alluding to a real objection and to a real objector (or more than one; see LSJ *s.v.* τις II.4). Once

[27] Burnet (*ad Ap.* 41d4) denies this meaning to πράγματα in this passage, but see now De Strycker-Slings *ad loc.*

it is recognized that Εἰ δέ τις does not represent a genuine hypothesis, it becomes clear that we have before us an implicit reference to the controversy in question.

We can now see that Plato's method of dealing with the controversy was more subtle than Xenophon's. Like Xenophon, Plato raised the issue of Socrates' age, but unlike Xenophon he did not so obviously link it with the admonitions of τὸ δαιμόνιον; he could not do so, after all, since the Platonic Socrates' service to Apollo prevented Socrates from readily abandoning his mission simply because of advanced years.[28] This service to the god represents the primary religious focus of Plato's *Apology*, while τὸ δαιμόνιον plays only a peripheral role. But for Xenophon the situation is very different. The argument that Socrates' sign was not to be distinguished from conventional religious phenomena is central to his goal of demonstrating Socrates' religious orthodoxy (*Mem.* 1.1.2–20); hence the *Memorabilia* begins and ends with a discussion of τὸ δαιμόνιον. It is likely enough, moreover, that Plato knew the story (p. 54 above) which Xenophon attributes to Hermogenes (Hermogenes was with Socrates when he died, Pl. *Phd.* 59b7; cf. *Crat. pass.*), but Plato was forced to reject it, not so much because he found it lame and melodramatic (though he may well have done so),[29] but because the claim that Socrates was prevented from preparing a formal ἀπολογία was bound to strike Plato's readers as ludicrous in view of the supreme artistry which characterizes the speech that Plato puts into Socrates' mouth. And since Plato's *Apology* was intended to be dramatically realistic, Plato could not set forth the terms of the controversy in the straightforward manner that Xenophon does, for the controversy belonged to the period *after* Socrates' death.[30]

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[28] Cf. esp. 29d3–6 πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν κτλ. In *Tht.* 150c7–8 Socrates states that ὁ θεός *compels* him (ἀναγκάζει) to deliver (μαιεύεσθαι) the intellectual offspring of his associates.

[29] Note that in *Mem.* 4.8.5 Socrates' sign is said simply to have occurred, but in *Ap.* 4 it is said to have occurred *twice* (δίς). Possibly the latter passage represents a novellistic embellishment on the simpler account (cf. [Pl.] *Thg.* 129b6–c6).

[30] That the content of Plato's *Apology* and its depiction of Socrates' character and activity should have been at least partly determined by a controversy of the kind described here rather than by purely historical considerations is supported by analysis of another set of passages in that work. Up to the end of Socrates' cross-examination of Meletus in 28a1, Socrates behaves very much as he does elsewhere in Plato's dialogues, that is, as the practitioner of elenchus. But a little later, in 29d2–30c2,

One question remains to be answered: Since Plato's depiction of Socrates' sign in *Ap.* 40a2–c3 is unique, why is it unique? Why does Plato elsewhere assiduously avoid the same depiction as this one? Socrates says in the *Apology* that his divine sign's failure to occur to him on the day of his trial is evidence that death is not a bad thing, for if it were a bad thing, there is no question that his sign would have occurred to him. If we wished to press Socrates' words here without any regard for the evidence of other Platonic passages where Plato does *not* emphasize the efficacy of the sign's inactivity, we would be justified, I think, in assuming that the divine sign is a constant presence and guide in Socrates' life, inhibitory when it occurs *and* instigatory when it does not. The name which the Greeks gave to such an entity was δαίμων, which, in popular belief, was allotted to everyone at birth and was an omnipresent, tutelary element throughout a person's life. Was Socrates' divine sign a δαίμων? Both Plato and Xenophon use the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον in speaking of the sign, but neither of them ever applies δαίμων to it. So easy would it have been for them to do so that I am led to conclude that their reliance on the broad range of circumlocutions cited earlier (p. 47 above) represents a studied effort to *avoid* the use of the word δαίμων. They, and Socrates too, may not have known what the divine sign was, but they knew that it was not a δαίμων. And in Plato's eyes, how could it be? In *Republic* 496c4–5 he has Socrates

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Socrates claims certain traits which are much less recognizable, in particular the practice of exhorting his listeners to ἀρετή and the highest condition of their souls, and of criticizing those who fail to do so—a practice (νουθετητική) which he decries in *Sph.* 229e4–230a9 as the least effective sort of παιδεία. This discrepancy may be explained as Plato's response to the specific criticism that Socrates' activity was purely negative, that although he could reduce his interlocutors to a state of ἀπορία, he was unable to take them any further. Plato could not allow Socrates to claim that his activity of cross-examination was beneficial on the grounds that the ἀπορία to which it led made his interlocutors ready for learning; for the credibility of Socrates' whole defence is built around his profession of ignorance and inability to teach. So the presentation of a Socrates who exhorts others to virtue and the perfection of the soul provided Plato with the answer he needed without allowing Socrates to slough off his claim of ignorance. The same issue of Socrates' inability to lead his interlocutors beyond ἀπορία is treated elsewhere, by Xenophon in *Mem.* 1.4.1 (Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν κτλ.; cf. 4.8.1 Εἰ δέ τις ... οἴεται κτλ., discussed above), by the author of the pseudo-Platonic *Clitophon* (410e5–8), and, it seems, by Cicero in *De Oratore* (I.47.204), where Cicero appears to depend on a lost Socratic work. For discussion of this topic see S.R. Slings, *A Commentary on the Platonic Clitophon* (Diss. Amsterdam 1981) 163–167, to whose acute analysis I am greatly indebted.

claim that his sign found virtually no parallel among all who had gone before. The Platonic Socrates could not sustain this assertion if his divine sign was merely a δαίμων, since a δαίμων was allotted to *everybody*; Plato instead was interested in emphasizing the uniqueness of the phenomenon, as an important manifestation of Socrates' ἀτοπία. Since *Ap.* 40a2–c3 is the sole instance of the Platonic Socrates deriving special meaning from the inactivity of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and since this departure from normal practice was occasioned by special factors peculiar to *Ap.* itself, this passage proves the rule that Plato was interested in avoiding assimilation of τὸ δαιμόνιον with more conventional religious phenomena.

How tempting it was for writers to characterize Socrates' sign in terms of a conventional δαίμων is evidenced in some early Socratic literature. Considerations of space forbid the detailed examination of this question; I can however refer the reader to the evidence which I have gathered elsewhere.[31] At all events, it is apparent that when speaking of Socrates' sign Socratic writers after Plato were not as scrupulous as Plato himself in avoiding use of the language and characteristics commonly employed to describe δαίμονες; and I would suggest that these writers exercised this greater licence in part because they were not constrained by knowledge of and faithfulness to Socrates' actual practice.

Obviously I have been less than enthusiastic about the approach which Brickhouse and Smith have taken to some important passages in the *Apology*. They have however drawn welcome attention to a problem in this work. But it is not, I believe, the problem which they think it is.

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[31] See my *op. cit.* (above, n. 11).

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La Définition du Son dans le *Timée* de Platon

DENIS O'BRIEN

Deux pages avant la fin de la deuxième partie du *Timée* se trouve une définition du son.[1] Nous lisons (67b2–4): φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην. Je traduis : « Disons qu'un son est le choc infligé par l'air sur le cerveau et sur le sang, passant à travers les oreilles et transmis jusqu'à l'âme ».[2]

Cette traduction suppose quatre emplois différents du génitif: le choc qui arrive jusqu'à l'âme (μέχρι ψυχῆς), en passant à travers les oreilles (δι' ὤτων), est infligé par l'air (ὑπ' ἀέρος) sur le cerveau et sur le sang (ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος). Ce dernier emploi du génitif (ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος) est le seul qui, dans le grec, ne soit pas précédé d'une préposition. Dans la traduction que j'ai proposée, qui est aussi celle de Taylor et de Cornford,[3] cette expression (ἐγκεφάλου

[1] Les trois parties du *Timée*: 27d–47e (œuvres de la raison); 47e–69a (œuvres de la nécessité); 69a à la fin du discours (conjonction des œuvres de la raison et des œuvres de la nécessité).

[2] Mettons tout de suite de côté une difficulté, qui n'en est pas vraiment une. Je traduis φωνή par « son » et non point par « voix ». Le terme de φωνή peut évidemment avoir les deux sens. Mais rien ne laisse supposer que la théorie de l'harmonie, qui sera développée plus tard (80a3–b8), et à laquelle Timée renvoie expressément dans le présent passage (67b6–c3), ait pour objet une harmonie de « voix » (donc des chants), à l'exclusion d'une harmonie de « sons » musicaux. Je préfère donc retenir une traduction qui peut englober ces deux sens du terme.

[3] A.E. Taylor, *Plato: Timaeus and Critias*, translated into English with introductions and notes on the text (London 1929) 69–70 (« we may define sound as a stroke given by the air through the ears to the brain and blood,

τε καὶ αἵματος) possède une valeur que j'appellerai *objective*: si nous substituons à πληγή le verbe qui lui correspond, à savoir πλήττω, les deux substantifs « cerveau » et « sang » deviennent en effet les compléments *d'objet* de ce verbe. « L'air frappe le cerveau et le sang » deviendra, si l'on fait de ce verbe un substantif, « le frappement (πληγή) infligé par l'air sur le cerveau et sur le sang ».

Il n'y a rien de plus normal que cet emploi du génitif. Il se retrouve, par exemple, dans un passage du *De audibilibus* où l'auteur (un pseudo-Aristote) s'occupe des instruments de musique. Les cordes d'un instrument musical frappent l'air. L'auteur parle de « frappements imposés par les cordes sur l'air » (*De audibilibus* 803^{b}34–35: πληγαί ... τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῶν χορδῶν.[4] L'air, qui dans le *Timée* joue le rôle d'instrument, devient ici l'objet de l'action effectuée par les cordes. La syntaxe est pourtant la même dans les deux textes: l'« agent » (l'instrument) est désigné par la préposition (ὑπό), le

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continued to the soul »). Voir aussi, du même auteur, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford 1928) 476–477.

F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato*, translated with a running commentary (London/New York 1937) 275 (« sound we may define ... as the stroke inflicted by air on the brain and blood through the ears and passed on to the soul »). Voir aussi L. Brisson, *Platon. Timée, Critias*, traduction inédite, introduction et notes (avec la collaboration de M. Patillon pour la traduction), dans la collection *Garnier-Flammarion, Œuvres de Platon* (Paris 1992) 178 (« le son est le choc que subissent, par l'action de l'air et par l'intermédiaire des oreilles, le cerveau et le sang, et qui est transmis jusqu'à l'âme »).

[4] Si je préfère citer ce traité, d'un auteur inconnu, plutôt que l'un des nombreux autres textes où se trouverait la même syntaxe, c'est parce que cet auteur a eu connaissance de Platon. En témoigne sa théorie de l'harmonie, qui est manifestement tributaire de la théorie du *Timée* (*De audibilibus* 803^{b}40–804^{a}8; cf. *Tim.* 80a3–b8). — Les traducteurs d'Oxford n'ont pas reconnu cette parenté, pourtant manifeste (voir T. Loveday et E.S. Forster, *De audibilibus*, dans W.D. Ross, ed., *The Works of Aristotle*, translated into English, vol. VI [Oxford 1913]). Quand ils lisent, 804^{a}4–6: τὸν δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν ἤχων ἅμα συμβαίνει προσπίπτειν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς βραδυτέρας γιγνόμενον, ils traduisent: « The result is that the last note strikes upon our hearing simultaneously with an earlier sound produced by the slower impact », glissant ainsi dans leur traduction le mot *earlier* dont on ne trouve aucune trace dans le texte grec original. Pour l'auteur du *De audibilibus*, comme pour Timée, ce sont pourtant les mouvements les plus lents, donc les sons les plus graves, qui finissent par rattraper les mouvements plus rapides, donc les sons les plus aigus. Rien, dans cette théorie, ne contraint de supposer que les sons les plus lents partent les premiers. (Si l'on en croit Cornford, dans son commentaire du *Timée* [324], les deux mouvements, rapides et lents, au commencement de leur trajet, sont simultanés.)

« patient » (l'objet) est mis au génitif. Dans le *De audibilibus*, il y aura « frappements de l'air par les cordes » (πληγαί ... τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῶν χορδῶν). Dans le *Timée*, il y aura « le frappement du cerveau et du sang par l'air » (τὴν ... ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος ... πληγήν).

Fort de ce parallèle, je reviens à la traduction déjà proposée: « un son est le choc infligé par l'air (ὑπ' ἀέρος) sur le cerveau et sur le sang (ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος), passant à travers les oreilles (δι' ὤτων) et transmis jusqu'à l'âme (μέχρι ψυχῆς) ».[5]

Cette traduction me semble incontestable. Elle est pourtant contestée, tant par des éditeurs du XIXe siècle que par l'un des commentateurs les plus récents du *Timée*, Mlle Catherine Joubaud, qui suit sur ce point la traduction proposée par A. Rivaud dans la collection Budé. Pour Th.-H. Martin, en 1841, reprenant l'interprétation de G. Stallbaum, dans son édition de 1838, les deux génitifs ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος sont commandés par διά: le choc infligé par l'air arrive à l'âme en passant « à travers les oreilles, le cerveau et le sang » (δι' ὤτων ... ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος).[6] A. Rivaud arrive plus ou moins au même résultat en faisant gouverner ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος par ὑπό, préposition qu'il traduit « par l'intermédiaire de »: le choc transmis à l'âme à travers les oreilles passe « par l'intermédiaire de l'air, du cerveau et du sang » (ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος).[7]

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[5] Pour la commodité du français, je n'ai pas suivi l'ordre des mots dans le grec (67b2–4: φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην). Traduisons donc mot à mot: « un son est le choc, passant à travers les oreilles, infligé par l'air sur le cerveau et sur le sang, et transmis jusqu'à l'âme ». L'ordre de mots me semble en effet significatif. L'air dont il est ici question est un air qui passe à travers les oreilles avant de frapper le cerveau et le sang. La mention des oreilles doit donc précéder la mention du cerveau et du sang.

[6] Th.-H. Martin, *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, t. I (Paris 1841) 181: « le son est une impulsion transmise par l'air à travers les oreilles, le cerveau et le sang, jusqu'à l'âme »; G. Stallbaum, *Platonis Timaeus et Critias recensuit, prolegomenis et commentariis instruxit* (= *Platonis opera omnia*, vol. VII [Gothae et Erfordiae 1838]) 272: « *vox, hoc est, pulsatio quaedam (Schwingung) ab aëre per aures, cerebrum et sanguinem ad animum usque penetrans* ».

[7] A. Rivaud traduit, *Platon, Œuvres complètes*, t. X, Collection Budé (Paris 1925) 192: «le son est le choc, transmis, à travers les oreilles, par l'intermédiaire de l'air, du cerveau et du sang, jusqu'à l'âme». Cette traduction est reprise par Catherine Joubaud, *Le Corps humain dans la Philosophie platonicienne, Étude à partir du Timée*, dans la collection Bibliothèque d'Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris 1991) 172.

Aucune des ces deux traductions ne me semble possible. Il ne me semble pas en effet possible que διά puisse commander ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος malgré l'intervention d'un nouveau génitif et d'une nouvelle préposition (ὑπ' ἀέρος). Quand en effet l'auteur des *Placita* adopte la syntaxe qui sera celle de Stallbaum, il se voit contraint de changer l'ordre des mots, écrivant, non pas, comme dans le texte du *Timée*, δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος, mais ὑπὸ ἀέρος δι' ὤτων.[8] Mais le remède que Rivaud essaie de porter à la syntaxe de Stallbaum ne me semble d'aucune efficacité, car ὑπό ne peut pas se traduire « par l'intermédiaire de ... ». La préposition ὑπό désigne, à n'en pas douter, non pas un quelconque « intermédiaire », mais l'agent dont est issu le choc.

Si l'on suit la syntaxe proposée par Rivaud, on sera donc contraint de supposer que le choc qui passe à travers les oreilles et qui arrive jusqu'à l'âme est un choc infligé à la fois *par* l'air, *par* le cerveau et *par* le sang. Je veux dire: si nous adoptons la syntaxe proposée par Rivaud, mais si nous traduisons correctement la préposition ὑπό, les trois substantifs, « air », « cerveau » et « sang », désigneront, non pas les *intermédiaires* d'un choc produit à l'extérieur de l'oreille, mais les *agents* d'un choc. Mais comment imaginer que le cerveau puisse « frapper »? Et quel serait l'objet de son action? Le cerveau doit-il « frapper » l'âme?

Avant d'explorer les méandres de cette psychologie nouvelle et insolite, revenons à l'histoire du texte. La définition du son est commentée par deux auteurs de l'Antiquité, Théophraste et Plutarque. Dans deux passages de son *De sensibus*, Théophraste reprend la définition qu'a donnée Timée. Nous lisons (cap. 6, 500.14–15 Diels): φωνὴν γὰρ εἶναι (*sc.* dit Platon) πληγὴν ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου καὶ αἵματος δι' ὤτων μέχρι ψυχῆς.[9] Faisant allusion au même texte du *Timée*, Plutarque écrit, dans ses *Questions platoniciennes* (cap. VII 9, 1006b): ἔστι γὰρ (*sc.* selon Platon) ἡ φωνὴ πληγὴ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος.

Dans le texte de Théophraste, la mention du cerveau et du sang précède l'expression δι' ὤτων. Théophraste n'a donc pas lu ce texte du *Timée* comme le liront Martin et Stallbaum (le choc infligé par l'air passe « à travers les oreilles, le cerveau et le sang »). Dans le texte de

[8] Voir Aétius IV 19.1 (Diels, *Dox.* 408.1–3): πληγὴν ὑπὸ ἀέρος δι' ὤτων καὶ ἐγκεφάλου καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς διαδιδομένην. Cf. *Tim.* 67b2–4 (cité ci-dessus): φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην.

[9] Voir aussi cap. 85, 525.17–18 Diels: φωνὴν δὲ εἶναι (*sc.* dit Platon) πληγὴν ὑπὸ ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου καὶ αἵματος δι' ὤτων μέχρι ψυχῆς.

Plutarque, τοῦ αἰσθανομένου correspond manifestement à ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος. Cette formule est suivie par la mention de l'air (ὑπ' ἀέρος). Plutarque n'a donc pas lu ce texte comme le liront Rivaud et Catherine Joubaud (ὑπό commanderait à la fois l'air, le cerveau et le sang).

Il est vrai que, dans un autre traité, Plutarque parle d'un « frappement imposé à l'air » et qui serait transmis « à travers l'oreille et le cerveau ». Nous lisons (*De fortuna* 3, 98b): τὰ τῶν ἀκουόντων ... δύναμις ἀντιληπτικὴ πληγῆς ἀέρος δι' ὠτὸς καὶ ἐγκεφάλου προσφερομένης. L'auteur des *Placita*, dans un article antérieur de son recueil, parle, lui aussi, d'une théorie où l'air ne produit plus le choc, comme dans le passage que nous avons cité du *Timée* (67b2–4), mais le subit. L'auteur écrit (Aetius IV 16.4 = Diels, *Dox.* 406.28–9): πλήττεσθαι τὸν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀέρα.

Ces deux textes ne remettent pourtant pas en cause l'interprétation adoptée par Plutarque dans ses *Questions platoniciennes* et par Théophraste dans le *De sensibus*. Car, dans les deux textes cités (Plutarque, *De fortuna* 3, 98b; Aétius, IV 16.4), l'auteur essaie de résumer, non pas la théorie du son, mais la théorie de l'ouïe ou de l'écoute. Pour que le « son » se transforme en « écoute », le mouvement imposé au cerveau et au sang (*Tim.* 67b3) doit en effet repartir « de la tête » pour aboutir « à la région du foie » (*Tim.* 67b4–5). Pour résumer cette théorie, Plutarque parle d'un choc transmis « à travers l'oreille » (ainsi s'expliquerait la réception du son) et « à travers le cerveau » (ainsi s'expliquerait la transformation du « son » en « écoute »). Quant au choc infligé à l'air tant par Plutarque que par Aétius, cette inexactitude se comprend aisément. Le mouvement, tel que Timée l'exprimera plus tard dans sa théorie de l'harmonie (79e10–80c8), s'effectuerait par des chocs successifs (ce qu'Aristote appellera l'*antiperistasis*). Dans cette théorie, l'air est à la fois « agent » et « patient »; l'air qui subit un choc doit aussi en infliger un autre, et ainsi de suite.

J'en reviens à la définition du son donnée par Théophraste dans son *De sensibus* et par Plutarque, dans ses *Questions platoniciennes*. Les témoignages conjugués de ces deux auteurs me semblent décisifs. J'accorderais volontiers que Plutarque, de même que Théophraste, soit capable de fausser la théorie de Platon. (A la fin du passage cité, si nous nous fions aux manuscrits, Plutarque a en effet mal compris le rôle des sons aigus et graves dans la formation d'une harmonie.) Mais je ne crois pas que ces deux auteurs, dont les compétences linguistiques et littéraires ne sont pas à démontrer, aient pu se tromper sur la syntaxe du texte auquel ils font allusion.

J'en conclus que la traduction déjà proposée est la seule à rester en lice: dans la définition du son, le choc qui passe à travers les oreilles et qui arrive jusqu'à l'âme est infligé par l'air sur le cerveau et sur le sang.

5

PLATO AND PROFESSOR NUSSBAUM ON ACTS 'CONTRARY TO NATURE'

JOHN M. RIST

Classical philosophy occasionally gets into the courts. In a recent article relating to her testimony and that of others on a referendum in the State of Colorado Martha Nussbaum has revised her courtroom comments on the accounts of homosexuality that can be extracted from a number of Greek philosophers. Perhaps the most difficult texts she discusses are those from Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Laws* where Plato claims that homosexual intercourse is (at least usually) 'contrary to nature'.[1] Nussbaum's views on the interpretation of these texts are cast in the form of a direct rebuttal of the courtroom opinions and published comment of the Oxford legal philosopher John Finnis.[2] Finnis concluded that Plato (especially in the *Phaedrus* and *Laws*) regarded 'homosexual *conduct* as intrinsically shameful, immoral and indeed depraved or depraving' (1055). Against this Nussbaum determined that 'there is no evidence ... that Plato regarded same-sex conduct as morally worse than other forms of sexual conduct'. Finnis' position is the more vulnerable to Nussbaum's attack because he unwisely tried to assimilate Plato's view to his own theories about marriage, instead of contenting himself with the more modest claim that Plato's dialogues contain certain foreshadowings of those theories—a matter to which I shall

[1] M. Nussbaum, 'Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies', *Virginia Law Review* 80 (1994) 1515–1651 (hereafter 'Nussbaum').

[2] I shall not refer to Finnis' work in detail, though my attitude to some of it will become clear. When I allude to Finnis, it will be to his paper 'Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation"' in *The Notre Dame Law Review* 69 (1994) 1049–1076.

return—but Nussbaum's treatment of the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* also seems too slanted towards what, as an advocate, she finds it convenient to discover. But in matters affecting public policy, there must be a clear distinction between advocacy and scholarship, and I should therefore like to make yet one more attempt to clarify what the Plato of the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* thinks of homosexuality and more particularly what significance should be attached to his descriptions of homosexual *intercourse* as 'contrary to nature'.

A. *The Phaedrus*

Speaking of the vision of beauty and our desire (ἔρως) for it, the Platonic Socrates tells us that those who have not been recently initiated into true philosophy or those who have been 'corrupted'[3] turn their attention to the namesake of true beauty in the sensible world, seeking sexual activity either with women or with other men.[4]

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[3] Nussbaum (1575) herself uses the word 'corrupted' here (though she worries about the sense of διαφθείρω in the *Laws*, as we shall see), but she improperly glosses the text by saying not that individuals have been corrupted but that their *vision* has been corrupted.

[4] 250e3–251a1 is notoriously difficult to interpret. According to Nussbaum (1578), A.W. Price (see below, n. 8) now holds that the reference is exclusively to heterosexual activities. In the context of the *Phaedrus* this is most implausible, and Nussbaum is right to reject it. That seems to Nussbaum to leave the problem of whether one or two groups are involved. Is Plato then making no distinction between heterosexual and homosexual activities, saying, as Nussbaum suggests, that 'one and the same person, or type of person, may well be envisaged in both roles'? But the issue is not whether Plato is separating people or roles—it is obviously possible that he is envisaging bisexuality—but whether he describes heterosexual acts differently from homosexual acts. Nussbaum thinks that he does not, thus inferring that all sexual activity is now being described by Plato (in his most ascetic mood, it would seem) as animalistic and 'contrary to nature'. According to Nussbaum (1575), Plato is concerned with the type of person whose acts are all 'contrary to nature': 'He pursues pleasure animalistically [she interprets] with women, begetting children, and also animalistically with men, having sex for pleasure only, unconstrained by shame and reverence for the soul'. The words 'for the soul' are not in the Greek.

Nussbaum's interpretation enables her, in effect, to translate *both* τετράποδος νόμον *and* παρὰ φύσιν as 'animalistically'. Her justification (derived, she insists, from C.J. Rowe, *Plato, Phaedrus* [Warminster 1986] 184) is that 'in the manner of beasts' is merely explained as 'contrary to nature'. As Nussbaum says, Greek men liked to penetrate women *a tergo*, that is [as she interprets], like a four-footed animal, but if Plato has that in mind when talking about womanizers, he is saying that they always (or almost always) penetrated in that way—which is false (see K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* [New York 1978] 101). Surely *Plato* would

Whichever option they elect they are driven by pleasure: in the first case they 'surrender themselves to pleasure', in the second they 'pursue pleasure' (250e4–251a1). I shall call the first option womanizing and the second active male-male pleasure-seeking homosexuality. Plato distinguishes such activities (whether or not performed by the same person) as follows:

1. *Womanizing*. This is to attempt the 'animal-route' and impregnation (literally 'sowing children'). Plato does not mention marriage, though he would presumably include people who married simply for sexual pleasure. In Greece this group would be small, other female outlets being readily available, at least for male citizens.

2. *Active Male Pleasure-Seeking Homosexuality*. This would involve

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not want to argue that men who make love in the missionary position are *not* behaving like animals. There is no reason to explain τετράποδος νόμον as Nussbaum does, and thus no temptation to use such an explanation as part of an assimilation of heterosexual acts to homosexual acts as all 'contrary to nature'.

What does the sentence mean? The *Phaedrus*, unlike the *Laws*, is a polished work. On Nussbaum's reading Plato has produced a very sloppy sentence: within the space of a very few words he has indicated twice that a morally similar group of people are pleasure-seekers, though their activities are different. On Nussbaum's reading, behaving like beasts (which she agrees refers to heterosexual intercourse) is 'contrary to nature' and involves the abandonment of fear and shame, but although Plato may look down on heterosexual intercourse as inferior to abstinence, he never suggests one should be ashamed of it in every circumstance: at the least it may at times be necessary for the city. Nor is it easy to see why 'begetting children' (if that is what παιδοσπορεῖν means) should be called 'associating with wantonness' (even if 'wantonness' is *all* that ὕβρει means; Nussbaum may undertranslate it; she thinks [1568] it suggests rape at *Smp*. 219c5). How much simpler to assume that τετράποδος νόμον and παρὰ φύσιν refer to heterosexual and homosexual activity respectively. That both parallels what we shall find in the *Laws* and makes better sense of what would otherwise be a poor example of Platonic Greek.

I have taken παιδοσπορεῖν, with Dover (*op.cit.* 163 n. 15), to refer specifically to impregnating and not merely to ejaculating. That just possibly might be wrong, especially if Plato holds, as I believe (see J.M. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle* [Toronto 1989] 192), a 'one-seed' theory of conception whereby seeds are homunculi sown, if effectively, in a female field. If Dover is wrong, then a further interpretation would be possible, that preferred by G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies* (Princeton[2] 1979) 25 n. 76, that the whole passage of the *Phaedrus* is homosexual. I agree with most readers in rejecting that view, as well as the alternative that though Plato is thinking of women he has only anal penetration in mind.

'associating with wantonness' (or 'behaving offensively'[5]) in pursuing pleasure *contrary to nature*.

This formulation highlights Plato's view that among those who misuse beauty, either because they have not been 'initiated' into its mysteries or because they have been corrupted, active male homosexuals are behaving 'contrary to nature' while womanizers are not. So far the situation looks clear cut, but when Plato turns to those who are genuine, uncorrupted lovers of beauty things get more complicated.

We are now invited to consider the reaction of such a genuine lover when he sees a beautiful 'boy' (251a1–3).[6] His reaction to the 'godlike' beauty of the boy's face or bodily form is intense. If it did not seem like madness he would offer sacrifice to him as to the statue of a god. He experiences violent sexual arousal (251c), wishes to sleep as near as possible to the beloved (252a6–7), strives to make him better in accordance with whichever of the gods is his own patron (253a7–b1) and to 'capture' his beloved (253c6). From such capture, there will accrue to the beloved from his 'true' lover a noble and enriching initiation into the mysteries of love if they proceed to what they desire in the ways Plato advocates. What then is the desired route? When we see the 'lovable vision', part of us thinks of using

[5] For the difficulty of translating ὕβρει προσομιλῶν see also above, n. 4; but the presence of the active term ὕβρει at least seems to guarantee that Socrates is speaking of *active* homosexuals. Clearly, as most current debate acknowledges, he (and Greeks in general) would have a lower opinion of passive homosexuals (at least in so far as they get into the habit of being such)—in virtue of what we would now call a double-standard. See, for example, Nussbaum 1562, on the κίναιδος of the *Gorgias*. In *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge 1986) 143, Nussbaum used the phrase 'passive homosexual', though she now thinks that κίναιδος are normally to be read as those who are both habitually passive and get money for it. The arguments offered for this latter point by J.J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire* (London 1990) 45–70, seem to me, though not to Nussbaum, unconvincing, but Nussbaum does agree about the Greek contempt for habitual passivity in such matters: it risks turning a man into a 'woman'. What Plato thinks of a better form of *occasional* passivity, though with ἀντέρως 'less' passive, and of *occasional* activity, will appear below.

[6] It is hard to know the typical age of such boys. Dover mentions 14–18 year olds (above, n. 4, 84–89). Nussbaum, more warily, suggests (1551) 'the age of a modern college undergraduate'. This may be as much designed to defuse a charge of pedophilia as a scholarly estimate. The maximum age may be in the late twenties. We have little clear idea of how young are the youngest 'boys' in Platonic dialogues.

force[7]: we want to 'leap on' the beloved (254a2–3). Such urges, apparently irreduceable in human beings, must be vigorously, even violently suppressed; 'modest restraint' must prevail. But our darker side (typified by Plato's 'black' horse) will try seduction as well as force: we will be 'compelled' to approach the beloved boy, reminding him of the pleasures of sex. Then we will be pulled back, shocked at being 'compelled' to perform what we see as (ὡς) 'dreadful acts contrary to law'; and then again we yield and look at the 'radiant' face of the beloved.

The lover is on the point of sexual union, but then, unlike the 'corrupted' homosexuals we considered early, he remembers that Beauty itself is self-controlled and chaste (254b7). He is afraid and reins himself in violently, sweating with emotion (254c4). The same process is repeated again and again until the lover controls himself and secures a respectful (almost 'reverential', αἰδούμενον, 254e9), though still devoted, attitude towards the beloved. 'Wicked' ὕβρις (whether, it seems, under the guise of force or fraud, rape or seduction) is checked.

Now the relationship flourishes. The lover is devoted to the service of the beloved. Affected by a genuine devotion, the beloved overcomes the prejudice he may have acquired from his peers who have told him that it is 'disgraceful' to 'get close' to a lover. (The context makes it clear that πλησιάζειν—to 'get close'—cannot in this passage bear the meaning 'have sex with'; 'intimate (or close) friends' do not—despite much contemporary reductionist innuendo—have to be sexually intimate.) Part of this 'closeness' will involve [naked] contact in the gymnasia and elsewhere. Desire returns, inviting 'counter-desire' (ἀντέρως 255e1) in the beloved. Both parties, though the latter less strongly, want to 'see, touch, kiss and lie down beside' each other, and they do so 'likely enough'.

The 'dissolute' element of each now wants more: that of the lover wants to 'have a bit' (σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι); that of the beloved will 'give' (χαρίζεσθαι) anything if asked (256a1). He is already 'swelling up', and he embraces and kisses his friend.[8] If the 'better things of

[7] Note the reappearance of ὕβρεως at 253e3.

[8] Finnis (above, n. 2), 1057 n. 18, follows A.W. Price (*Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* [Oxford 1989] 8–94) against Vlastos (above, n. 4), 29 n. 87, in arguing that lovers will not properly 'engage in the sort of petting spoken of in *Phaedrus* 255e'. But there is a confusion in that Vlastos' 'petting' (in the manner of Rousseau) is not what Plato has in mind. Rousseau is thinking of 'petting' intended to increase the chance of full intercourse. That is precisely what the Platonic lover at 255e is tempted to do, but does not do. He does 'see, touch, kiss,

the mind' prevail, however—that is, those which lead to the ordered life of philosophy—both parties will check themselves, enslaving that which divisively[9] engenders 'evil' in the soul. The other alternative, renouncing the life of philosophy and preferring a 'more trivial' (or perhaps 'more banal', φορτικωτέρᾳ) lifestyle (256b7), that of 'lovers of honour' (or 'status'), is the lot of those lovers who, in a moment of carelessness, perhaps brought on by getting drunk, yield to their baser impulses and consummate a homosexual union—what the 'many' call 'divine' (μακαριστήν). They will then continue such intercourse, though infrequently, since they remain divided about it. But their erotic passion has brought them 'no small reward'.

In the *Phaedrus* Plato seems to list a group of erotic individuals in the following descending order of merit:

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embrace, lie down with his beloved and caress him' (255e2–256a3)—which presumably would constitute 'petting' of some 'weight'—and after that he is tempted (and declines) to go all the way. The difference between Plato's Socrates and Vlastos' Socrates is that Vlastos' Socrates is committed to the claim that he tried to get intercourse but didn't really want it, while Plato's Socrates is tempted (after some 'petting') to try but restrains himself. Finnis says that he wants to make his (mistaken) view clear because of his 'respect for Plato', but such 'respect' is misplaced. Finnis' error arises from the common and anti-historical equating of what an earlier philosopher says with what the core of his thought might be *developed* as saying. In any case Price's comments (*op. cit.* 89–90), on which Finnis relies, are mere assertion: 'I prefer Meredith ... It is hard to see how a perilous policy of deliberate mutual arousal without gratification could further a life of happiness and harmony'. That is both to misrepresent the text (where there is no mention of 'deliberate'; these things just happen in the intimate life) and to neglect a possible theory of the 'ennobling' effects of joint unconsummated (though heterosexual) desire known in the medieval Western tradition: see discussions of *purus* and *mixtus amor* in A.J. Denomy, *The Heresy of Courtly Love* (N.Y. 1947) and 'The "De Amore" of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnations of 1277', *Medieval Studies* 8 (1946) 107–149; see 112 for Andreas' notion of four grades of love (of which the third is the most ennobling and the fourth liable to happen, as with Plato but in a heterosexual version: *tertius in amplexu fruitione; quartus in totius personae concessione*). For possible influence of the (Neoplatonizing) Avicenna see E.L. Fackenheim, 'A Treatise on Love by 'Ibn Sina', *Medieval Studies* 7 (1945) 208–228. Parts of chapter 5 *may* include references to homosexual as well as to heterosexual love.

[9] This passage brings Plato nearest to the view of Finnis (above, n. 2), 1067, that homosexual [and other non-marital] conduct discourages what the *Phaedrus* calls a 'harmonious life', since the 'choice' [of such persons] 'to engage in such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting persons'.

1. Male lovers of the Form of Beauty whose love has become reciprocal, and of whom the 'active' partner has renounced force and seductive fraud as means of securing sexual intercourse before the beloved has developed his own reciprocal and sexual affection. Such couples are sexually aroused by one another, become 'close' and thus embrace and kiss (presumably, as in the gymnasia, when naked or virtually so), but refrain from intercourse.

2. Male lovers of the Form of Beauty who resemble class 1 but give way to their more dissolute selves from time to time, engaging in occasional intercourse and thereby abandoning the life of philosophy for a partial enslavement to practices which allow the growth of 'evil' in the soul.

3. 'Active' womanizers, who go the 'animal route', presumably including those who marry for pleasure.

4. 'Active' male homosexuals who pursue pleasure contrary to nature.

Clearly Plato is arguing that a technically celibate life, allowing a degree of homosexual intimacy (but not intercourse), among a special group of lovers of the Forms, is the best life.[10] Types 3 and 4 are inferior in the first place because those who live them *seek pleasure deliberately for its own sake*. This, and not what Nussbaum more vaguely describes as 'the familiar Platonic suspicion of bodily appetites', is Plato's primary concern.[11] Types 3 and 4 are both

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[10] One may wonder why, now that in the *Republic* Plato has introduced female guardians, he still in the *Phaedrus* speaks of the highest form of love as exclusively between males. The core of a reply can be constructed from Price (above, n. 8) 226: 'The lover set on mental union must either be a pederast, or treat women like boys'. I would go further, holding that Plato took the soul in both men and women to be male, or possibly sexless 'read' as male (311 n. 5). If something on these lines is correct, then occasional heterosexual intercourse should be permissible, though not ideal, among the enlightened (in an ideal society) in the same way as is occasional homosexual intercourse. Note Price's apt citation (228 n. 7) of Baudelaire: 'Loving intelligent women is a pederastic pleasure'. All this is of course worlds away from Finnis' ideal of the special goodness of marital intercourse. Price is again right to say 'while there is a reproductive kind of sexual activity ... that falls outside our spiritual nature' (230).

[11] Nussbaum 1574. Plato is not discussing purely intellectual pleasures in the *Phaedrus*, but there is no reason to suppose that he would have favoured loving the Forms for the sake of pleasure, or anything like the intellectual hedonism Aristotle probably intended to attribute to Eudoxus (*EN* 10.1172^{b}9). Nussbaum refers to the matter, again misleadingly, on 1578: 'What we have, then, is a commonplace of the culture,

'corrupted'. Type 4 people are those who pursue homosexual pleasure for its own sake. To pursue homosexual pleasure for its own sake is to pursue the worst form of male lifestyle and to engage in acts which are 'contrary to nature'. It looks as though not heterosexual acts nor homosexual acts as such, but homosexual acts deliberately sought for the sake of pleasure are to be classified as 'contrary to nature'. Such behaviour is 'hubristic', and constitutes what were shunned as 'dreadful acts contrary to law' (254b1) if force or over-persuasion, especially of a person not in love, is involved.

There is no direct reference to marriage in the *Phaedrus*. With the possible exception of those cases where males seek marriage simply for the sake of sexual pleasure (to whom Plato might be willing to apply the later phrase *iurata fornicatio*), there is not even an allusion to it.

B. *The Laws*

In *The Laws* Plato returned for the last time to the perennial topic of the attitude of the good man to pleasure and pain. The word 'bad', it is agreed in Book 1, is best applied to the man who is 'less than pleasures' (633e1). Overcoming such weakness is the virtue of 'restraint', or 'self-control' (σωφροσύνη, 635e6). The Athenian speaker (I shall refer to him in what follows as 'Plato') opens the discussion by suggesting that the long-standing Dorian practices of common-meals and gymnastic are supposed to have 'corrupted'[12] those sexual

given new Platonic sharpness: a stern criticism of the hedonist ... indifferent to the soul'. But what matters is what Plato thinks of as hedonism, namely the single-minded pursuit of pleasure *for its own sake*; whether pleasure is bodily or of the soul is not his immediate concern.

[12] δοκεῖ (which I have rendered 'are supposed') is probably a concession to the sensitivities of the two Dorians with whom Plato is speaking. Nussbaum (1624 n. 393), correcting Bobonich whom she cites as 'probably the English-speaking world's leading authority on the *Laws*', prefers 'ruined' because she thinks that 'the sense of the passage is that people do not take (as much) pleasure in opposite-sex relations any more, not that they do, but in a corrupt way'. Probably neither of Nussbaum's alternatives is the right one (the former of course begs the moral issue). Plato's point seems to be that the pleasures themselves are now corrupted, or 'spoiled': changed by being obtained from inferior kinds of acts. It is a typically Platonic theme that what makes a pleasure (or a pain) morally good is the nature of its intentional object. Here sex-pleasures are corrupted by being redirected from one object to another. Socrates was said to have 'corrupted' the youth in the same way, by giving them wrongful interests. (Nussbaum's alleged parallel at *Smp.* 174b3–6 is unhelpful.)

pleasures which are 'according to nature' among both human beings and animals (636b6). He explains this by saying that whether in jest or in earnest (εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα) we must bear in mind that, when female nature unites with that of males for procreation, the pleasure that ensues is thought to have been granted 'in accordance with nature', while when males come to males and females to females it is thought to be 'contrary to nature', and that those who first did this had the face to do it (τόλμημα is *at least* as strong as that[13]) because they could not control themselves in face of pleasure (636c6–7). The Cretans, Plato continues, are charged with inventing the story of Zeus and Ganymede, because since they derived their laws from Zeus they wanted a story about his conduct whereby they could rationalize their enjoyment of homosexual pleasures by saying that they were followers of the god.

This passage is hard to interpret, but the following points seem clear:

1. According to Plato gymnasia in particular have *corrupted* or *spoiled* (note the similarity with the *Phaedrus*) our satisfaction with heterosexual pleasures. We want more.

2. Heterosexual pleasures are according to nature both among human beings and among animals.

3. Presumably the common feature of the heterosexual pleasures shared by humans and animals which renders them 'according to nature' is in the first instance that they are associated with practices which are (at least possibly) procreational.[14] If they are procreational, they are according to nature. It is not clear at this point whether Plato is interested in identifying any distinction between natural human heterosexual copulation and natural copulation among (non-moral) animals. The only distinction with which he seems immediately concerned is that male-female (possibly) procreational acts are 'according to nature', while male-male and female-female intercourse is 'contrary to nature'.

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[13] The matter is discussed by Nussbaum at 1627–1630. I agree with her (and with her cited recantations of Dover and Price) that the notion of criminality cannot be imported. Dover's new version 'venture', on the other hand, seems too weak.

[14] Nothing is said here about contraceptive practices. By referring to possibly procreational activity I assume that Plato is merely identifying the vaginal penetration of a woman by a man: an act always recognizable as having something to do with procreation (even if contraception is used). Insertion of the penis elsewhere will have *nothing to do* with procreation. Plato speaks of procreation.

4. The degree of blame to be attached to τόλμημα is uncertain. Certainly some blame is to be attached, because Plato has already spoken of 'corrupted' or 'spoiled' pleasures and because those who seek them do so because 'they cannot control themselves in face of pleasure'. They offend against the virtue of self-restraint (and therefore, according to Plato's doctrine of the unity of the virtues, against virtue itself).

5. Sections 2–4 above (but not 1, where Plato speaks of what is held to be corruption) are attributed to popular belief, whether in jest or serious. Plato regularly 'jests' over matters he takes seriously, and there is no evidence that he does not, in this case, accept the popular belief. It is, in fact, in line with his own first proposition.

6. We must conclude that a sharp line is drawn between heterosexual procreative activity 'in accordance with nature' and homosexual intercourse between both males and females which is the source of 'spoiled' or 'corrupt' pleasures and is 'contrary to nature'.[15] Whether intercourse 'according to nature' is, though superior to homosexual intercourse, still merely 'animalistic', remains to be seen. No higher form of homosexual intercourse is discussed in Book 1.

The latter part of Book 6 of the *Laws* is devoted to the important subject of marriage, vital, Plato holds, for the prosperity of the city, and therefore carefully regulated. It is not surprising that his second set of comments on homosexuality should eventually follow such a discussion, for in Book 1 we have already seen how he connects homosexual acts with the corruption of heterosexual pleasure. But there is some way to go yet: Book 7 is concerned with the education of children and the opening of Book 8 deals with the military training of the young. In view of the fact that Plato is debating with a pair of Dorians, it is appropriate enough that military matters and gymnastics for males and females eventually bring him round to sex education. Here he pauses to emphasize the difficulty. We are speaking among 'corrupted souls' (presumably ordinary people) and in opposition to very great desires, relying on reason alone (7.835c8).

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[15] There is a long-standing textual problem which I do not feel confident of resolving; it is discussed by Nussbaum (1625). It is unclear whether Plato wants to say that the practice of homosexuality not only corrupts (spoils) heterosexual pleasures and is contrary to nature, but that it also spoils an old convention. The other reading, preferred by Nussbaum, is that the practice of homosexuality, *when of long-standing*, has had its undesirable effects on pleasures. I prefer the first version, but not much hangs upon it.

The problem, Plato continues at 836a6–b1, is how to control the loves of male and female 'young people' and of men for women and women for men. If we were to 'follow nature' (836c1) we would forbid homosexual intercourse, making the comparison with beasts that such intercourse is 'not by nature', but such a law would not be acceptable in Dorian states. Nevertheless, continues Plato, let us grant that it is legalized, noble and in no way disgraceful (as stated a *per impossibile* condition for a Platonic state), and ask what would it contribute to virtue. Would it make the persuader restrained or the persuaded courageous?[16] No-one would believe that: the one who plays the woman's part will be blamed for resembling his model in his 'softness' (μαλακίαν).

To understand what to do we need to know the truth about the nature of friendship, desire and the so-called loves (836e5–837a1). When we do, we shall recognize loves for the body alone (which have no respect for the character of the beloved), loves for the soul alone (which are chaste, possess all the virtues, and looking rather than loving, regard bodily satisfactions as insolence [ὕβρις again]), and a mixture of the two where the lovers, presumably, like the lovers of beauty in the *Phaedrus*, occasionally indulge in homosexual acts (perhaps again when drunk) but normally refrain.

That being the situation, what is the best law? It is unambiguously to forbid all homosexual intercourse. Thus the position is now stricter than that of the *Phaedrus*, and all acts 'contrary to nature' (even if performed by true lovers) are banned. And that despite the fact that at the beginning of this section Plato is speaking among 'corrupted souls'.

In the *Laws* Plato frequently thinks the best is beyond his reach, and so in this case. How can tough regulations be enforced? Plato suggests that if one could assimilate all forbidden sex acts to incest that would label them 'in no way holy, hateful to the gods and foulest of the foul (shamefullest of the shameful)' (838c1). Which acts would be so labelled? The aim is a use of reproductive intercourse by males which is 'in accordance with nature'. (Note again the contrast with the womanizers of the *Phaedrus*; their aim was pleasure, but this time, as we shall see, it is marriage—understood differently—which is to be protected.) Forbidden acts are as follows:

1. Male-male intercourse and not deliberately killing the human race.[17]

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[16] Nussbaum (1633 n. 432) is probably right to see a play on the two senses of ἀνδρεία (courage and manliness).

[17] Killing the human race is usually taken as a reference to infanti-

2. Masturbation and/or coitus interruptus.

3. Intercourse with any woman whom one would not wish to be pregnant.

The law as a whole, within the boundaries of what is 'according to nature', will prevent sexual frenzy and adulteries. Plato presumably thinks that animals would not be concerned if their mates became pregnant, so it looks as though he has *extended* the notion of 'contrary to nature' to include not only homosexual acts, but all extra-marital acts (and perhaps even marital acts if pregnancy is deliberately avoided—that *might* be using one's wife as a prostitute). But the advantage of such a law, and here we hear a different note, will be that it makes men 'close and friendly' (οἰκείους καὶ φίλους 839b1) to their own wives—not a familiar theme in Plato—as well as producing 'very many other goods'.

Young, testosterone-driven males may make an outcry: such regulations are foolish and impossible—and people may believe them. After all people think that for women to eat in public is not natural. (Plato does not say 'contrary to nature', perhaps to avoid confusing the issue, 839d3.) But Plato has an argument to show that his suggestion is not beyond man's power; he thinks it is fairly plausible. The argument is that men in training abstain from both women and boys. If they abstain to win an athletic victory, why would they not abstain for a victory over pleasures and the acquiring of the virtue of self-restraint? It would help if they could be persuaded that sexual intercourse is 'fine' if in private and secret, but otherwise shameful.[18]

Plato has now three arguments for restraint: reverence for the gods, love of honour and love of souls rather than bodies. Again he tries to describe what might be possible (841d1ff.). Men[19] should, among freeborn and 'noble' women, only touch their own wives. Sowing unhallowed and bastard seed in concubines is forbidden, as is sowing fruitless seeds in males 'contrary to nature'. (Now it looks as though Plato has reverted to restricting 'contrary to nature' to homosexual acts only.[20])

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cide, which seems irrelevant (and is permitted in the *Republic*). In view of the homunculus theory Plato may be merely referring to the spilling of seeds in homosexual intercourse which are thus left to die!

[18] This is roughly the interpretation of Nussbaum (1637–1638).

[19] There seems no justification for Nussbaum's view (1580; cf. 1638) that Plato is explicitly only addressing married men.

[20] Nussbaum (1639) says that 'this cannot be a reference to the unnaturalness of assuming a womanish position, but must be a reference

There is an alternative proposal: homosexual acts are forbidden, as is sex with women bought or otherwise acquired: the only permitted woman is a man's religiously married wife (841e6–7). This proposal is tougher still: it seems to outlaw dealings not only with concubines, but with household slaves and perhaps also 'companions' (who just might be noble and freeborn) such as one would meet at *sumposia*. We may recall that the Spartan speaker has earlier drawn attention to the benefits of banning sexual looseness there (1.637a5–6), and Plato may have that in mind when he speaks of excess meats and drinks at 839a8.

C. *Conclusions*

In the *Phaedrus* homosexual acts are 'against nature' and acts of the corrupt, except in the special case of those few who obtain a glimpse of Beauty and of the beautiful soul of the beloved, but who then, in a morally inferior way, and with loss of the best lifestyle, have occasional intercourse, though they are divided about it. Even the philosophers, however, are allowed something more than the looking rather than loving of the *Laws*, and it is assumed that intense and restrained homosexual longings will be part of their lives. Ordinary homosexuals are thought of as the lowest sort of sexual pleasure-seekers. There is no specific mention of marriage, though marriage just for sexual-pleasure would be corrupt.

In the *Laws* homosexual intercourse (presumably female-female as well as male-male, since they both involve 'corrupt' pleasures) is banned, though Plato admits that the ban will be difficult to enforce. In every case now it is thought of as 'contrary to nature' (and therefore sub-animal) and one of the advantages of banning it is that men will become fonder of their wives and marriage improved. Once Plato extends the notion of 'contrary to nature' not only to all homosexual acts—itself an extension of his view in the *Phaedrus*—but also to non-marital heterosexual acts as well, on the ground that they too involve a misuse of seed.

An important theme of the *Laws* is to make marriage work, for marriage, as Plato understands it, is essential for the well-being of the city. And it is worth noting that, even in the *Republic*, when Plato thinks of the intercourse of the philosopher with Lady Philosophy herself, it is marital imagery, not that of homosexual union, which he prefers. Lady Philosophy is surrounded (like Penelope) by ardent but

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to animal nature'. But in identifying homosexual acts as 'contrary to nature' Plato is thinking of them not as animalistic but as 'sub-animal' behaviour.

disreputable suitors, pseudo-philosophers all. But if they were to marry her, having intercourse when not worthy of her, the thought-children born would be bastards (*R.* 495e4–496a9). And in the *Symposium*, even if Price is right—and I am not entirely convinced—that close intimacy between lovers characterizes their entire ascent to Beauty itself, Diotima (surely Lady Philosophy too) expresses the union with Beauty in terms of begetting and childbirth; to a Greek that cannot but include a clear reference to marriage (as in the *Republic*). When Plato wants an analogy for intellectual birth he looks to physical birth; for *that* purpose homosexual parallels would not do.

Our conclusions do not justify Finnis' version of Plato's theory of marriage; Plato thinks that marital intercourse is necessary, and that it can make men more friendly with their wives.[21] Finnis would be on safer ground seeing a core of his theory in Plato, awaiting development.[22] But he might be more satisfied to observe that Nussbaum has greatly underestimated Plato's (apparently increasing) hostility to homosexual intercourse. Nussbaum writes that 'homosexual conduct is not singled out for special blame',[23] and (collaborating with Dover in an appendix) that 'there is no evidence that Plato regarded same-sex conduct as morally worse than other forms of sexual conduct'.[24] These statements are highly misleading if not simply false. Even in the *Phaedrus* Plato condemns *most* homosexual intercourse, only in a few special circumstances giving it limited approval. In the *Laws* Nussbaum and Dover are contradicted by 636b–c, however much one gives Nussbaum the benefit of the

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[21] Nussbaum (and Dover) (1642) are right to say that Plato appears to approve of contraception in the *Laws*, and that he has great 'concern about population size'.

[22] Cf. Price (above, n. 8) 232. But whatever Plato 'is clearly feeling his way towards', the fact remains that he separated reproductive love from spiritual love, which at its highest is celibate, involving male or 'really male' (i.e. female) souls alone. In addition to condemning homosexual intercourse, Plato did not marry. In this he differed from the inhabitants of the second-best city of his *Laws*, where, as Price says, 'no-one is expected to be wholly abstinent'.

[23] Nussbaum 1579 (repeated on 1580 and 1581). Plato's position seems to be that although some other forms of sexual conduct are not as bad as homosexual intercourse, they should be banned too. A further assertion of Nussbaum's on the same page is also misleading: 'Plato views married sex [in the *Laws*] more favourably not because it is thought to be better morally, but simply because it is necessary for the city'. The disjunction 'morally' ... 'better for the city' is false.

[24] Nussbaum and Dover 1648.

doubt over τόλμημα. Nussbaum adds (1580) that 'the criticism of those who indulge in the active role is that they are intemperate and over-indulgent, not that they are wicked'. Perhaps 'wicked' sounds too Christian to a sensitive ear; Plato might merely have said that to be 'intemperate and over-indulgent' is to be vicious, to exhibit κακία. It is also hard to see how the total (πάμπαν) ban on male homosexual intercourse (841d5) is applied only to married men. Female-female homosexuality, admittedly, is not mentioned in the specific ban, though Plato has denounced it as corrupt in 636c5–7. In that case, as Nussbaum herself admits (1640 n. 440), Plato has probably forgotten to mention it, since it is certainly true that he regards male homosexuality as more threatening to the city. In sum it looks as though, for better or worse, Nussbaum has misrepresented what Plato says about homosexual acts. That is unfortunate, since she will be widely cited as an authority.[25]

[25] I should like to thank Lloyd Gerson and Brad Inwood for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A somewhat later version was read and discussed at the SAGP meeting at Binghamton in October 1995.

II

THE PLATONIC TRADITION

6

Plato Monasticus: Plato and the Platonic Tradition Among the Cistercians

David N. Bell

Jacques de Vitry tells the tale of a master of the schools of Paris who, on a certain occasion, was astonished to see before him the appearance of one of his students who had died the previous day. The student was wearing a sort of cope made of parchment and covered with tiny writing, and when the master enquired as to the reason for the curious garment, the student replied that the writings were the *sophysmata et curiositates* on which he had spent his days, and that words failed him when it came to expressing his sufferings. 'But I can show you', said the student, 'by having you feel a single drop of my sweat'. Thereupon the master stretched out his hand, and the drop that fell upon it was so hot that his hand felt as if it had been pierced by the sharpest of arrows. He immediately forsook the schools of logic and entered the Order of Cîteaux, quoting the verse:

> Linquo coax ranis, cra corvis, vanaque vanis,
> Ad logicam pergo que mortis non timet ergo.[1]

The name of the master was Serlo, Serlo of Wilton, and after leaving the schools of Paris he first became a Cluniac at La Charité-

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[1] For the story, see T.F. Crane, *The Exempla or Illustrative Stories from the Sermones Vulgares of Jacques de Vitry* (London 1890) 12. See further M. Schwob, *La Légende de Serlon de Wilton, abbé de l'Aumône* (Paris 1899). Serlo was not the only *magister* to abandon the schools for the Cistercian cloister: Geoffrey of Auxerre, Adam of Perseigne, Gauthier of Cîteaux, David of Himmerod, and others did likewise (see J. Leclercq, tr. C. Misrahi, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God* [New York 1962] 195–196).

sur-Loire and then a Cistercian, ending his days as abbot of L'Aumône.

The truth of the story need not concern us—it is told of other *magistri* in other places at other times[2]—but whether it be true or not, it well exemplifies the opposition of the cloister and the schools which, as Stephen Ferruolo has pointed out, 'is a recurring theme in the Cistercian literature of the twelfth century'.[3]

To examine in detail the whole of this theme, from the strictures of Bernard of Clairvaux to the neglected writings of the Cistercian scholastics,[4] is not our purpose in this present enquiry. Rather we shall restrict ourselves to an examination of one small part of it, namely, the various attitudes of the Cistercians to Plato and the Platonic tradition, and it would be well to begin by saying something of the Cistercian attitude towards philosophy in general.

The Cistercians were not opposed to philosophy, nor to the techniques of scholasticism, provided they were used legitimately; and by legitimately they meant that philosophy and scholasticism might be used to elucidate the content of the faith, to provide a *ratio fidei*,[5] but not to question its bounds.[6] It was much like a game of chess: the players could neither move beyond the edges of the board nor question the rules of the game, but within those edges and those rules, they were limited only by their own ingenuity. 'I do not denigrate erudition in the arts', wrote Gilbert of Hoyland,

> et liberalium doctrinarum promptae memoriae, et perspicuae intelligentiae, in quibus scientiae consistit integritas. Bona enim artium notitia, sed si quis eis legitime utatur, id est tanquam gradu quodam et vestigio, non quo stetur et inhaereatur, sed quo utendum sit ad superiora quaedam et sanctiora et magis intima arcana sapientiae, in reconditos et suaves recessus, et in ipsam lucem inaccessibilem, quam inhabitat Deus.[7]

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[2] See F.C. Tubach, *Index Exemplorum* (Helsinki 1969) 89, no. 1103.

[3] S.C. Ferruolo, *The Origins of the University: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics 1100–1215* (Stanford 1985) 67.

[4] Cistercian scholasticism remains an area almost entirely unexplored (see L.J. Lekai, *The Cistercians: Ideals and Reality* [Kent 1977] 426–427). This is a pity, for it is of considerable interest.

[5] See D.N. Bell, '*Certitudo Fidei*: Faith, Reason, and Authority in the Writings of Baldwin of Forde', *Cîteaux: Commentarii Cistercienses* 42 (1991) 264–265 n. 56.

[6] See Bell (above, n. 5) 249–275 *passim*.

[7] Gilbert of Hoyland, *Ep.* 2.2 (*PL* 184: 291C–D). See Bell (above, n. 5)

Or, as Bernard put it, 'the spouse of the Word should not be stupid'.[8]

It is true, they said, that the true *philosophia* is the Christian *philosophia*,[9] but the judicious use of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, of the logic and dialectic of the schools, was not necessarily a bad thing. It *became* a bad thing when it was taken too far, and there was no doubt in the minds of William of Saint-Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux that Peter Abelard had taken it far too far. Thus, in his *Ep.* 190, in which he lists and condemns what he saw as the errors of Abelard, Bernard attacks the latter for defining faith as no more than 'personal opinion' (*existimatio*).[10] But was it (he asks) for their personal opinions that the martyrs suffered and died? Indeed not! We have infallible proofs of the truth of faith, and faith—the Christian faith—does not have as its boundaries those *aestimationes* of the Academics, 'quorum est dubitare de omnibus, scire nihil'.[11]

Similarly, a little later in the same letter, when he charges Abelard (not entirely accurately) with identifying the Holy Spirit with the *anima mundi*, Bernard accuses him of dripping with sweat in his efforts to make Plato a Christian, but in so doing, he—Abelard—simply shows himself to be a heathen ('quomodo Platonem faciat christianum, se probat ethnicum').[12]

Abelard did not, in fact, identify the world-soul with the Holy Spirit. He came close to it, that is true, but he did not take that final and irrevocable step of straightforward identification such as we find, for example, in Thierry of Chartres, William of Conches, or Bernard's friend and future biographer, Arnold of Bonneval.[13] 'Revolvatur et ille

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250–251. The letter is to an otherwise unknown Adam, clearly a student at some urban school, whom Gilbert wishes to convert to the cloister.

[8] Bernard of Clairvaux, *In Cant., serm.* 69.ii.2 (*SBO* 2, 203, 7).

[9] See J. Leclercq, *Études sur la vocabulaire monastique du moyen âge* (Rome 1961) 39–67; *id.*, 'Maria christianorum philosophia', *Mélanges des sciences religieuses* 13 (1956) 102–105; H. Rochais, 'Ipsa philosophia Christus', *Mediaeval Studies* 13 (1951) 244–247. The principle is an ancient one.

[10] Precisely how Abelard understood *existimatio* is not our present concern, but that it was ambiguous is not in question. It could indeed be interpreted to mean 'personal opinion'. See Bell (above, n. 5) 255.

[11] Bernard of Clairvaux, *Ep.* 190.iv.9 (*SBO* 8, 24, 22–25, 12).

[12] *Ibid.* iv.10 (*SBO* 8, 26, 6).

[13] See the fine study by T. Gregory, *Anima mundi. La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres* (Rome 1955) *passim* (but especially 133–154), and the same author's 'Nuove note sul platonismo medievale. Dall'anima mundi all'idea di natura', *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 36 (1957) 37–55.

maximus philosophorum Plato eiusque sequaces', wrote Abelard in his *Theologia christiana*,

> qui testimonio sanctorum patrum prae ceteris gentium philosophis fidei Christianae accedentes, totius Trinitatis summam post prophetas patenter ediderunt, ubi uidelicet mentem, quam 'noun' uocant, ex Deo natam atque ipsi coaeternam esse perhibent, id est Filium, quem sapientiam Dei dicimus, ex Deo Patre aeternaliter genitum. Qui nec Spiritus Sancti personam praetermisisse uidentur, cum animam mundi esse adstruxerint, tertiam a Deo et noy personam.[14]

What Abelard does, in fact, is to make what we might call an allegorical equivalence between the Holy Spirit and the world-soul,[15] but the subtlety of his position was neither of interest nor of relevance to the abbot of Clairvaux.[16] As far as Bernard was concerned, Abelard was simply trying to christianize Plato, and Plato, whom Abelard referred to as *maximus philosophorum* and *primus totius philosophiae dux*,[17] thereby became a symbol for all that was wrong with Abelard.[18]

This distrustful and disparaging view of Plato and the Academy appears again in two of Bernard's sermons. In the first of them he speaks of those who call themselves philosophers as *curiosi et vani*,[19] and tells us that the school to which we should belong is the school of the Holy Spirit. What we need is virtue, not knowledge, and *Platonis*

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[14] Abelard, *Theol. christ.* I, 68 (*CCCM* 12 [1969] 100, 897–905). See also the citations in D.E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge 1970) 124 n. 1.

[15] See the useful discussion in Luscombe (above, n. 14) 124–127.

[16] In any case, Bernard was simply following William of Saint-Thierry: see William's *Ep.* 326.3 (*PL* 182: 532B), and his *Disp. adv. P. Abael.* v (*PL* 180: 265A–266D). William was certainly a better theologian than Bernard, but I think that he too had some difficulty in appreciating just what Abelard really meant. I cannot say I blame him.

[17] See n. 14 above, and *Dialectica* I.ii; V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* (Paris 1936) 205–206. See further T. Gregory, 'Abélard et Platon', *Studi Medievali*, ser. III, vol. 13 (1972) 539–562.

[18] I do not believe that Abelard's satirical apologist, Berengar of Poitiers, was exaggerating too much when he accused Bernard of attacking Abelard 'non amore correctionis, sed desiderium propriae ultionis' (Berengarius, *Apol. pro P. Abael* [*PL* 178: 1861D]). 'Ubi enim deest misericordia', he continues, 'non est correctio justi, sed barbaries incondita tyranni' (*ibid.*).

[19] Bernard of Clairvaux, *In Pent., serm.* 3.3 (*SBO* 5, 173, 7–8).

argutiae, Aristotelis versutiae have no place in the Christian life.[20] And in the second sermon we are told that our *magistri* should be Peter and Paul, who were taught by the *Magister omnium*. They do not teach us how to read Plato, or how to immerse ourselves in the *versutiae* of Aristotle, or how to be always learning yet never coming to the knowledge of the Truth.[21] What Peter and Paul teach is how to live, and that (if we may quote Keats out of time and context) 'is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know'.[22]

On the other hand, it must not be thought that Bernard was ignorant of Platonic ideas. There is no sound evidence, *pace* Dom Déchanet,[23] that he ever read Plato/Chalcidius in the original,[24] and we cannot take seriously the polemical accusations of Berengar of Poitiers first, that Bernard taught that the soul was of heavenly origin and not created by God; and secondly, that he had derived this heretical idea from Plato, Pythagoras, and Origen.[25] Bernard's 'Platonism' was what one might call a diffused Platonism; and if by Platonist we mean one who intentionally adopts and deliberately follows the teachings of Plato, Bernard cannot be dignified by this appellation. He was, rather, 'Platonistic', in that the great Platonic themes that we see in his work—the flight from the world, the imprisoning body, the tripartition of the soul, interior *catharsis*, self-knowledge, image and likeness, participation, introversion and illumination, the contemplative ascent to God, and so on[26]—were either derived from the Fathers, especially Augustine and Ambrose, or absorbed, as it were, osmotically from the intellectual atmosphere of the times. Bernard was far from ignorant of what was going on in

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[20] *Ibid.* 3.5 (*SBO* 5: 173, 24).

[21] *Id., In solemn. apost. Petr. et Paul., serm.* 1.3 (*SBO* 5, 189, 25–190, 2).

[22] Keats, *Ode on a Grecian Urn.*

[23] See J.-M. Déchanet, 'Aux sources de la pensée philosophique de s. Bernard', *Analecta S.O.C.* 9 (1953) 76–77. For the contrary view, see Pietro Zerbi's introduction to the *De Consideratione* in *Opere di san Bernardo* (Milan 1984) vol. 1, 738–739. Abelard, of course, had been through the *Timaeus* with a tooth-comb.

[24] The translations of the *Meno* and *Phaedo* by Henricus Aristippus may safely be ignored.

[25] Berengarius, *Apol. pro P. Abael.* (*PL* 178: 1866C). Nor need we believe Berengar when he tells us that in composing the eulogy for his brother (*In Cant., serm.* 26), Bernard had deliberately chosen to follow such ancient models as Socrates and Plato (*ibid.* 1866A).

[26] See the useful summary by Aimé Solignac in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol. 12 (Paris 1986) cols. 1803–1811.

the schools and was well able to use scholastic argument when it suited him,[27] but since Platonism was (as Reginald Lane Poole observed many years ago) 'the vogue of the day',[28] to be educated and to be 'Platonistic' amounted to much the same thing. Bernard, writes Dom Jean-Marie Déchanet, '"platonise" presque à son insu; il pense avec une âme formée dans un monde fortement teinté de platonisme, avec un esprit accoutumé à envisager les choses sous un aspect platonicien; enfin quand il veut exprimer cette pensée intérieure, des formes d'expression du langage platonicien se présentent naturellement sous sa plume ou sur ses lèvres'.[29] But Plato himself—Abelard's Plato—was not to be countenanced.

Many of those who followed in the wake of the abbot of Clairvaux expressed similar views. Who, of his own ability, asks Baldwin of Forde, could ascend into heaven and bring down wisdom? 'Hanc sapientiam nec illi inuenerunt, qui per terras et maria litteras toto orbe fugientes persecuti sunt. E quibus erat Plato'.[30] True wisdom is not from the *schola Achademicorum uel Stoicorum*, but something that comes down from heaven, something that teaches us to despise the things of earth and to look to those which are celestial.[31] That this last theme is decidedly Platonic is conveniently ignored by Baldwin.

For Hélinand of Froidmont, divine wisdom teaches us the way of ascent, but many are unaware of the greatness of its *ars* and *magisterium*. Such are the philosophers, and whether they follow Plato, Pythagoras, Epicurus, or the Stoics makes not the slightest difference. All are to be classed with Lucifer and Simon Magus, for when they try to climb upwards, they climb not to heaven, but merely onto the horses of rebelliousness and pride. They are the sons of Belial![32]

For Adam of Perseigne, 'the principal doctor of monastic philosophy' is not Plato but Benedict. His philosophy 'does not argue needlessly in the Platonic way (*platonico more*) about the stars or the

[27] See Bell (above, n. 5) 250 n. 4, and the references cited there.

[28] R.L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning* (London^2 1920) 153. Cf. M.-D. Chenu, tr. J. Taylor and L.K. Little, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century* (Chicago/London 1968) 50: 'Plato's prestige was everywhere paramount in the twelfth century'.

[29] Déchanet (above, n. 23) 73.

[30] Baldwin of Forde, *De comm. fid.* xxv.3 (*CCCM* 99 [1991] 373, 28–29).

[31] *Ibid.* ll. 32–36.

[32] Hélinand of Froidmont, *Serm.* 15 (*PL* 212: 602A–C).

things of nature', but teaches us how to live the life of virtue. Christ, he says, is the *verus Plato* who, from the *cathedra crucis*, taught us the true liberal arts: those arts which alone can liberate us from the servitude of *philosophatio* and from the cares and burdens of this unhappy world.[33]

Among other Cistercians, however, we find not so much a general condemnation of Plato as a specific disapproval of certain of his doctrines. When Guerric of Igny, for example, is explaining what it means to dig into the depths of one's heart to find the riches of virtue, he is careful to point out that he is not teaching what Plato taught: 'Neque illud platonicum dico: quod anima ante corpus artes didicerit, quae, oblivione et mole corporis obrutae, disciplina et industria refodiendae sint'.[34] But this does not mean that Guerric had been reading Plato; he had been reading Augustine.[35] Similarly, the anonymous author of the influential *De spiritu et anima*[36] follows Gennadius of Marseilles in asserting that animals are not ruled by reason, 'sicut Plato et Alexander putant, sed ad omnia naturae incitamenta ducuntur'.[37]

On the other hand, it must not be thought that this wholly negative attitude towards Plato was universal among the Cistercians. Aelred of Rievaulx, for example, is happy to cite the *Timaeus* in support of the idea that angels possess immortal bodies, though (like Guerric), Aelred was not quoting Plato but Augustine, and Augustine, in turn, was quoting Cicero.[38] Similarly, Idung of Prüfening quotes, with approval, a comment attributed to Socrates that 'A beautiful woman is a shrine built over a sewer', though his source is the *De nugis philosophorum* of Caecilius Balbus.[39] And at

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[33] D. Mathieu, 'Un sermon inédit d'Adam de Perseigne', *Collectanea O.C.R.* 4 (1937) 108.

[34] Guerric of Igny, *De Epiph., serm.* I.2 (*SCh* 166, 242, 64–66).

[35] Augustine, *De Trin.* XII.15.24 (*CCSL* 50, 377, 1-378, 6). The Platonic source is *Phaedo* 72e–77b.

[36] The common ascription of the work to Alcher of Clairvaux cannot be sustained: see G. Raciti, 'L'Autore del *De Spiritu et Anima*', *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 53 (1954) 385–401. The true author remains unidentified, but he was almost certainly a Cistercian of the later twelfth century.

[37] *De spir. et an.* xlviii (*PL* 40: 815, 9–10), which is dependent on Gennadius of Marseilles, *Lib. de dogm. eccl.* xvii (*PL* 58: 985A). Gennadius obviously never had a cat.

[38] Aelred of Rievaulx, *De an.* ii.59 (*CCCM* 1, 729, 906–913). Aelred's source is Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XIII.16.1 (*CCSL* 48, 397, 22–34).

[39] Idung of Prüfening, *Arg. sup. quat. quaest.* III; ed. R.B.C. Huygens,

Clairvaux itself, Bernard's secretary, Nicholas (whose moral turpitude has no relevance to his intellectual abilities), was delighted to enter into a lively correspondence with Peter of Celle on the primacy of the *unitas Dei*, as conceived by Plato, over the *simplicitas Dei*, as conceived by Augustine.[40]

Aelred's biographer, Walter Daniel, presents us with both sides of the coin. On the one hand he refers to Plato as *princeps philosophorum* and says that both he and the other pagan philosophers knew God (to some extent) in their heart. Plato therefore was quite right in maintaining that God had created all things. Yet he was not always right, for he also worshipped idols, encouraged others to do the same, and had a wholly incorrect idea about human souls transmigrating into the bodies of animals. That such an opinion is wrong, says Walter, would be obvious to anyone *fide formosus.*[41]

More important than any of these, however, was Bernard's friend and theological advisor, William of Saint-Thierry, who, like Walter, was prepared to call Plato the *egregius* of pagan philosophers,[42] quote him with approval (though it was actually Plotinus, not Plato, he was quoting), and state unequivocally that 'Haec de Deo philosophi gentium et sapientes huius saeculi uiderunt', even though they saw them *longinquo.*[43] They sought God with *superba curiositas*[44] rather than humble piety, says William, but since he is to be found not in

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'Le moine Idung et ses deux ouvrages: *Argumentum super quatuor questionibus* et *Dialogus duorum monachorum*', *Studi Medievali*, ser. III, vol. 13 (1972) 348, 177–178, quoting Caecilius Balbus, *De nug. phil.* I.7. The saying is also attributed to Pythagoras.

[40] See M.-D. Chenu, 'Platon à Cîteaux', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 24 (1954) 99–106.

[41] Walter Daniel, *Serm.*; C.H. Talbot, ed., 'The *Centum Sententiae* of Walter Daniel', *Sacris Erudiri* 11 (1960) 377. Adelard of Bath and John of Salisbury also refer to Plato as *princeps philosophorum*: see Chenu (above, n. 28) 50–51.

[42] See n. 45 below.

[43] William of Saint-Thierry, *Exp. sup. Ep. ad Rom.* I (on Rom. 1: 18–19) (*CCCM* 86 [1989] 21, 540–541).

[44] The condemnation of *superba/otiosa curiositas* (Bernard, *De grad. hum. et sup.* x.29 [*SBO* 3, 39, 10–14]) is common from Augustine onwards (cf. *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol. 2 [Paris 1953] cols. 2654–2661), but it was of particular concern to Bernard and the Cistercians: see R. Newhauser, 'The Sin of Curiosity and the Cistercians', in J.R. Sommerfeldt, ed., *Erudition at God's Service: Studies in Medieval Cistercian History*, XI (CS 98; Kalamazoo 1987) 71–95.

the *regio rationis* but the *regnum caritatis*, they were therefore unable to find him fully.

> Quamuis fuerunt inter eos qui uiam ipsam, ratione duce, aliquatenus inuenerunt, sed praesumentes de semetipsis, in ea defecerunt. Vnde egregius eorum Plato: 'Fugiendum, inquit, est ad clarissimam patriam, ubi Deus Pater est, et lucida ueritas. Quae est haec classis? Quae fuga? Similitudo'.[45]

We must note, however, that this positive assessment appears in William's commentary on Romans, a work which was almost certainly completed by 1137,[46] and which therefore predated by some three years William's *Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum*. In this latter treatise, the tone has changed. While still not so harsh as Bernard, William now refers pejoratively to Abelard as a *novus Platonicus* who, *ex auctoritate Platonis*, teaches heresy.[47] 'Erubescit Evangelium Dei', he continues,

> viluit apud eum Christianae fidei simplicitas. Qui utinam vel ea benevolentia legeret Evangelium Dei, qua Platonem legit. Platonem cum legit, ubi eum intelligit, sensum in eo philosophicum magnifice praedicat et extollit, ubi vero non intelligit, vel secundum spiritus hujus mundi secus eum aliquid dicere deprehendit, in meliorem semper partem interpretari conatur.[48]

But even now, William's approach is not wholly condemnatory. The real problem lies not so much with Plato as with Abelard's

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45 William, *Exp. sup. Ep. ad Rom.* I (on Rom. 1: 18–19) (*CCCM* 86, 21, 548–553). The quotation is interesting. William would appear to be dependent on Augustine, *De civ. Dei* IX.17 (*CCSL* 47, 265, 4–7), but what Augustine actually says is 'Vbi est illud Plotini, ubi ait: "Fugiendum est igitur ad carissimam [not clarissimam] patriam, et ibi Pater, et ibi omnia. Quae igitur, inquit, classis aut fuga? Similitudo Dei fieri"'. The quotation is, in fact, a somewhat paraphrased conflation of Plotinus, *Enn.* 1.6.8 and 1.2.3, but there is manuscript evidence for the [mis-]reading 'Ubi est illud Platoni' rather than 'Plotini'. That is not surprising. There is not, however, such evidence for the other variants, but they may represent no more than a lapse of memory on the part of William.

46 See Paul Verdeyen's introduction to his edition of the *Exp. sup. Ep. ad Rom.*, *CCCM* 86, xxvii–xxviii. Although the work was completed at the Cistercian abbey of Signy, it may well have been begun at the Benedictine house of Saint-Thierry where William had been abbot (see *ibid.*).

47 William of Saint-Thierry, *Disp. adv. P. Abael.* v (*PL* 180: 265B).

48 *Ibid.* vii (270C).

reading of him. If he had *really* understood Plato, says William, and imitated what he had understood, the result might have been very different: 'Utinam et in hoc imitaretur Platonem, quem amat, quod ille cum de Deo agit, caute et prudenter edicit'.[49] But Abelard, alas, possessed neither Plato's caution nor his prudence—nor, as he says later, his *philosophica reverentia*[50]—and therein lay the problem. Abelard's error, said Thomas of Morigny, was that he introduced Plato, Virgil, and Macrobius into the banquet of the Highest King *intonsos et illotos*, 'unwashed and unshorn'—or, as we might better translate it, 'unbaptized and untonsured'.[51] But William was not the only Cistercian who found it necessary to change his tone as a consequence of controversy. We see precisely the same thing in Isaac of Stella.

Isaac is, without question, the most positive of all the Cistercians in his assessment of Plato and Platonic doctrines, and the only one of those we have so far named who, in all probability, had actually read Plato/Chalcidius. Those who had not attended the schools knew him only at second-hand, primarily through Augustine[52] (for volumes of Plato were very rare in Cistercian libraries[53]); and although those

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[49] *Ibid.* 270C–D.

[50] *Ibid.* 270D.

[51] Thomas of Morigny, *Disp. cath. patr. adv. dogm. P. Abael.* iii (*PL* 180: 321D). For the authorship of the work (formerly attributed to William of Saint-Thierry), see M.B. Carra de Vaux Saint-Cyr. '*Disputatio catholicorum patrum adversus dogmata Petri Abaelardi*', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 47 (1963) 205–220.

[52] There are, of course, huge amounts of Plato and Platonism in Augustine, and works such as the *De civitate Dei*—a vast repository of Platonic thought—were to be found in every monastic library. Anti-Platonic Cistercians, therefore, had to be careful not to condemn Augustine when they were condemning Plato.

[53] Max Manitius, *Handschriften antiker Autoren in mittelalterlichen Bibliothekskatalogen* (Leipzig 1935; repr. Wiesbaden 1968) 173–176, reports copies of 'Plato' at more than sixty locations (though his list is far from complete), but only two are Cistercian: a s. xiv catalogue from Kaisheim lists 'Plato'; and a list from Marienstatt dated 1490 lists 'Salustius, Macrobius, Plato'. The only evidence for the presence of Plato in an English Cistercian house comes from the 1396 catalogue of Meaux (see D.N. Bell, *An Index of Authors and Works in Cistercian Libraries in Great Britain* [CS 130; Kalamazoo 1992] 116); and at Clairvaux the earliest evidence for 'ung petit volume contenant Platonem in Thimeo' is the 1472 catalogue of Pierre de Virey (A. Vernet, *La bibliothèque de l'abbaye de Clairvaux du XIIe au XVIIIe siècle* [Paris 1979] vol. 1, 282, no. 1751). The book is not known to survive. Troyes, *Bib. mun.*, MS 215 (s.

who had been to the schools might be expected to have a wider acquaintance, it certainly does not follow that they had read all or any of the *Timaeus*.[54] But for Isaac of Stella, Plato was the *magnus ille gentium theologus*, *tantus philosophus*,[55] and in an abbatial sermon to his monks he is even prepared to associate him with Moses. Both theologians, he says, were subtly suggesting God's ultimate purpose, his *finalis causa*: Plato by referring to God's joy and Moses by referring to his goodness.[56] And the careful work of Bernard McGinn has revealed a multitude of places in which this learned and original abbot has happily incorporated specifically Platonic ideas into what remains a distinctively Cistercian outlook.[57]

'This', says McGinn, 'is where Isaac of Stella has his special place in the creative era of Cistercian theology. He managed to keep open both sides of his heritage. ... [His] thought ... demonstrates that bridges could be built between the vital religious force of the Cistercian Order and the more experimental facets of the theology of the schools, bridges that were not present in the other representatives of early Cistercian theology'.[58]

But the bridges were not built. Isaac remains, if not 'the great mystery among the Cistercians',[59] at least a voice crying in the wilderness. But why were the bridges not built? Why did the Cistercians, in general, happily absorb the diffuse ideas of twelfth-century Platonism, yet reject Plato and all they thought he stood for? Part of the answer has already been given: because of the unfortunate association of Plato with controversy. It was Plato's ideas, according to Bernard, which lay at the root of the dubious doctrines of both Abelard and Gilbert de la Porrée, and if Plato was to blame for these dangers to the faith, then the conclusion was not in doubt: Plato

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xii/s. xiii) (= Vernet 188, no. 966) contains no more than a few spurious *Dicta Platonis*.

54 Medieval and modern undergraduates are much the same: all of them were/are indefatigable note-takers, and all of them preferred/prefer to be told what Plato or Aristotle said rather than—God forbid!—having to read Plato or Aristotle for themselves.

55 Isaac of Stella, *Serm*. 24, 6–7 (*SCh* 207 [1974] 102, 48–49, 55).

56 *Ibid*. 7 (ll. 55–62).

57 B. McGinn, *The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella* (CS 15; Washington 1972).

58 *Ibid*. 237, 238.

59 L. Bouyer, tr. E.A. Livingstone, *The Cistercian Heritage* (Westminster 1958) 161. But when Bouyer made his comment, there were hardly any studies of Isaac or his works.

must go—and not only Plato, but also Aristotle[60] and the whole philosophical movement they had come to represent. Isaac himself agrees:

> Emerserunt olim quidam, quorum nomina taceo, spectabilis ingenii homines et exercitationis mirae, qui Scripturas sanctas non quidem ut haeretici pervertentes, sed earum legitimum sensum ad manum minus habentes, ad sua studia elegantissime accommodarunt, et de authenticis litteris, non sine multorum admiratione et plurima morum aedificatione, suavissime, ut omnium pace loquamur, nugati sunt.[61]

But this was not the whole of the story. Not only were such ideas dangerous, they were also dangerously popular. Isaac's sermons do not make for easy reading. They demand a sound knowledge of contemporary philosophy and a more than passing acquaintance with the doctrines of the schools. But whereas it might easily be thought that such difficult material would be beyond the grasp of most monks and of little interest to them, it is clear that the actual situation was quite the contrary. 'Olim, dilectissimi', says Isaac in his forty-eighth sermon, 'cernimus vos plus solito tepidos et quasi accidiosos factos ad audiendum'.[62] You are annoyed, he continues, that I no longer bring out subtleties and new ideas, that I no longer say wonderful things in a wonderful way, that I no longer clarify what was obscure. So why have I changed? 'Curiosi auditores omnes vos estis! Et ideo permutavimus dicendi modum, quia vos non imposuistis curiositati vestrae modum. Nova tantum captatis!'[63] In other words, despite the strident warnings of Bernard and Baldwin and Hélinand and others, it is clear that Cistercian monks in the second half of the twelfth century had a decided interest in the new ways of thinking, and there is no reason at all to suppose that this

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[60] Despite their manifold differences, and despite the fact that many saw Plato as being more 'religious' than Aristotle (Petrarch's *dictum* is well known: 'A pluribus Aristoteles, a majoribus Plato laudatus est'), Bernard and his followers simply lump the two together. They are no longer individuals, but have become symbols of the danger of unrestrained *curiositas*.

[61] Isaac of Stella, *Serm.* 48.5 (*SCh* 339 [1987] 156, 43–50). Isaac does not name these not-quite-heretics, but Abelard and certain of *magistri* of Chartres—William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert de la Porrée—must surely have been in his mind (see *ibid.* 156–157 n. 1).

[62] *Ibid.* 1 (152, 3–4).

[63] *Ibid.* 1-3 (152–154, 4–25). For the sin of *curiositas* see n. 44 above.

interest was confined to Stella.[64]

Isaac, therefore, was forced to change his style and was forced, likewise, to dismantle (at least in part) the bridge that he himself had built between Plato and Cîteaux. It did not surprise him,[65] though it may have distressed him, but it is clear from his comments that it was not only the threat of heresy, but a widespread and perilous fascination with 'dangerous novelties' that lay at the root of Cistercian distrust of the doctrines of the Academy.[66] The monks of Stella were so enamoured of the new teachings that they were prepared to 'blow away' (*exsufflare*) the *antiqua* and what was to be found in the scriptures,[67] and there is no way that such an attitude could be reconciled with the work and prayer, the labour and *lectio*, of the Cistercian *via monastica.*

Plato, therefore, was doomed. He was doomed because of his association with heresy; he was doomed because he had been condemned by Bernard (and there was no corner of the Cistercian world where the voice of Bernard was not heard); and he was doomed because he had become a symbol—an all too popular symbol—of an intellectual and academic approach to the Christian life which was wholly alien to the principles and purposes of the Order of Cîteaux. Cistercians were becoming more interested in information than transformation, and, for a monk, an intellectual understanding of, say, the nature of charity is as useless as an intellectual understanding of the nature of water when one is dying of thirst in the desert.

On the other hand, although the person of Plato himself had become *persona non grata*, the same was not true of his ideas. The

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[64] I have argued elsewhere that the long and tedious commentary on the Song of Songs compiled at the end of the twelfth century by John of Forde represents a last-ditch attempt at retaining the old approach of *lectio divina* in the face of widespread Cistercian interest in the new techniques of scholasticism: see D.N. Bell, '*Agrestis et infatua interpretatio*: The Background and Purpose of John of Forde's Condemnation of Jewish Exegesis', in H. Costello and C.J. Holdsworth, eds., *A Gathering of Friends: The Learning and Spirituality of John of Forde* (CS 161; Kalamazoo 1995) 131–151. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Nicholas of Clairvaux was alone in his Platonic interests.

[65] See Isaac of Stella, *Serm.* 48.6–7 (*SCh* 339, 158, 62–69).

[66] Cf. P. Zerbi, 'Les différends doctrinaux', in *Colloque de Lyon-Cîteaux-Dijon. Bernard de Clairvaux: Histoire, Mentalités, Spiritualité* (*SCh* 380; Paris 1992) 452–453: 'Le nom de Platon, comme celui d'Aristote, était associé par [Bernard] à des nouveautés dangereuses, qui pouvaient nuire à la pureté de la foi, et qui étaient répandues dans les villes par des écoles florissantes'.

[67] Isaac of Stella, *Serm.* 48.3 (*SCh* 339, 154, 26–27).

essential Platonic themes so characteristic of the theology and spirituality of the age—especially the ideas of image, likeness, and participation—remained unchallenged and unquestioned, but it is well said that what the eye doesn't see, the heart doesn't grieve. Bernard, in fact, reminds one of M. Jourdain in Molière's *Le Bourgois Gentilhomme*: 'Quoi?', says M. Jourdain to the *maître de philosophie*, 'quand je dis: "Nicole, apportez-moi mes pantoufles, et me donnez mon bonnet de nuit", c'est de la prose'. 'Oui, monsieur', replies the *maître*. 'Par ma foi!', says M. Jourdain, 'il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que j'en susse rien'.[68] Substitute 'platonisme' for 'prose', and there you have Bernard of Clairvaux.

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[68] Jean-Baptiste Molière, *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, II.iv. Cf. n. 29 above.

7

PLUTARCH, JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY

F. E. BRENK

Over fifteen years have passed since John Whittaker wrote what is undoubtedly the most important essay on Plutarch's religious philosophy and its influence on Christianity.[1] In it he stressed the importance of Plutarch's having lived in the first century and early

[1] 'Plutarch, Platonism and Christianity', in H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus, eds., *Essays in Honor of A. H. Armstrong* (London 1981) 50–63, reprinted as ch. XXVIII in *Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought* (London 1984). Earlier versions were presented at Durham in 1970 and at Dalhousie University in 1971. See also his 'Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire', *ANRW* II.36.1 (1987) 81–123, esp. 119–123; J.M. Dillon, 'Plutarch and Second Century Platonism', in A.H. Armstrong, ed., *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality. Egyptian, Greek, Roman* (New York 1986) 214–229; P.L. Donini, 'Plutarco, Ammonio e l'Academia', in F.E. Brenk and I. Gallo, eds., *Miscellanea plutarchea* (Ferrara 1986) 97–110; C. Froidefond, 'Plutarque et le platonisme', *ANRW* II.36.1 (1987) 184–233; and in the same volume, F.E. Brenk, 'An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia', *ANRW* II.36.1 (1987) 248–349; Indices II.36.2 (1987) 1300–1322; and H. Dörrie and M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, IV (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1996) esp. 58–59 (*Isis and Osiris* 373e–f), 62–63 (*The Generation of the Soul in the* Timaios 1024b–d), 83 (*The Obsolescence of the Oracles* 433d–e [Apollon-Sun]).

Some excellent new studies treat Plutarch's understanding of the relationship between God and Plato's higher entities: C. Schoppe, *Plutarchs Interpretation der Ideenlehre Platons* (Münster 1994); F. Ferrari, *Dio, idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea* (Naples 1995); *id.*, 'La generazione precosmica e la struttura della materia in Plutarco', *MH* 53 (1996) 44–55; and *id.*, 'Plutarco filosofo platonico', *Cenobio* 2 (1996) 107–125, esp. 121. For an approach with Christianity in view, see H.-J. Klauck, 'Ein Mittelplatoniker: Plutarch von Chaironeia', in his *Die religiöse Umwelt des Urchristentums II. Herrscher- und Kaiserkult, Philosophie, Gnosis* (Stuttgart 1996) 124–143.

second century, when Christianity in its formative state came into contact with Greek philosophy. He argued that though Plutarch may not have been either the first or most original in his formulations, he profoundly influenced Christian writers and was often unique in holding a 'Christian' position. Here one could mention the belief in a God who is transcendent yet in a sense also immanent and knowable; the literal interpretation of creation in Plato's *Timaios*, including the creation of the soul; the movement from impersonal to personal terms in describing God; and the lack of interest in a First and Second God, only the latter of whom is the creator of the universe and knowable to the human mind.[2] One could add Plutarch's adaptation of the 'beatific vision' of the Forms in Plato to that of a personal God, and the suggestion that a God, identified with the Forms, returns or initiates love for the beloved, the human soul who seeks Him.[3]

[2] E. Valgiglio, 'Echi cristiani in Plutarco', *Atti dell'Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere* 42 (1987) 168–187, stresses Plutarch's Platonic 'monotheism', but his article is more a listing of parallels than an analysis. In 'La teologia di Plutarco', *Prometheus* 14 (1988) 253–263, he analyzes Plutarch's drift towards a Christian type of monotheism. See also Schoppe (above, n. 1), esp. 139–181; and Ferrari, *Dio* (above, n. 1) 57–62, 249–262. Ferrari, noting divergences in Ammonios' speech from the little we know of Eudoros' doctrine, is somewhat sceptical about Plutarch's presumed source; it remains 'only a hypothesis' (62). For First and Second God—identified in Alkinoos but separated in Noumenios (fr. 16 Des Places)—see now J. Whittaker, *Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon* (Paris 1990) xix, 23–24, and 106 n. 202; and J. Dillon, *Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism* (Oxford 1993) 17–19, 100–111, esp. 103–104, 106.

[3] The seeking aspect is especially strong in the introduction to Plutarch's *Isis and Osiris* (352e–353a). For the return of love in the same treatise, see for example 352a; cf. F.E. Brenk, 'Plutarch's *Erotikos*: The Drag Down Pulled Up', in M. Marcovich, F.E. Brenk, J.P. Hershbell, P.A. Stadter, eds., *Plutarch. Robert Flacelière in Memoriam. ICS* 13.2 (Champagne-Urbana 1988) 457–472 (at 464). The matter is rather fluid in Plutarch. At *Isis and Osiris* 373e–f, Osiris is identified with the intelligible (νοητόν), the Form (ἰδέα), the model (παράδειγμα), and the Father, of Plato's *Timaios* (50c–d). At 374d–e, Osiris is identified with a Resourcefulness (πόρος)—who already has aspects of the Good—'the first beloved and desired, the perfect and self-sufficient', and then explicitly with the Good. In 383a, he is first seen as Eros, leading the soul to the Good or Beautiful, then once again as the Good and Beautiful. That he returns or initiates love would be clear from his role as lover of Isis, and from his sexual relationship with her, which leads to the birth of Horos (the world) (374d–e), though in fact, Plutarch explicitly only depicts (esp. 373e–374a) the yearning and love of Isis (matter, receptacle, mother, nurse, seat, place of generation—and in the allegory, each human soul).

It would be rash to redo Whittaker. But one might remark that Plutarch's philosophical ideas were available at first to a relatively small circle—mostly of friends, then as his works became 'classics', these ideas opened up to a vast public. Through Christianity, a Platonic interpretation of religion and the divine has been communicated to hundreds of millions of persons. How much that interpretation was really Plutarch's will be left to others to determine. Rather, an attempt will be made here to study the strange symbiosis between Plutarch, Jews, and Christians, as exemplified in particular by his eschatological writings.[4]

Plutarch was arguably the greatest historian of religion, even of comparative religion, of his day. He traveled extensively in both the eastern and western parts of the Empire and was intensely interested in different religions and cults. He also lived in the first century A.D., the cradle of Christianity, which was to be the most successful of the new religions of that time. Christians were not unknown—though they might have preferred to be. Their spectacular martyrdom as scapegoats for the great fire of Rome in A.D. 64 attracted the attention of historians used later by Tacitus.[5] The ideology of *Iudaea Capta* became the cornerstone of Flavian political propaganda and the basis of dynastic legitimacy, not only leading to the construction of unforgettable monuments in Rome—which Plu-

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The Sun is also related to Osiris in the manner of its relationship to the Form of the Good in Plato's *Republic* (e.g. 371f–372a, 372b–e).

[4] J. Trebolle Barrera, 'Messianism and Eschatological Apocalypse', in F. García Martínez and J. Trebolle Barrera, *The People of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Their Writings, Beliefs and Practices* (Leiden 1995) (= *Los Hombres de Qumrán* [Madrid 1993]), sees 150 years as the apogée of apocalyptic books, characterized by predestination and a fixed direction for the world, but with the balancing act between legality or law (*halakhah*) and latent anarchical and anti-legalistic tendencies creating an explosive mixture (70–76, esp. 73, 75–76).

[5] If Tacitus is not mistaken. R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians in the Mediterranean World from the Second Century AD to the Conversion of Constantine* (London 1986), argues that since before A.D. 250, inscriptions, non-Christian histories, texts, and papyri make virtually no reference to Christians (269–270), they could not have been very numerous or steadily growing in numbers before Constantine (588); so also A. Cameron, *The Later Roman Empire* (London 1993) 57. However, R.S. Bagnall, *Egypt in Late Antiquity* (Princeton 1993), argues that the Egyptian religion was in ruins by the time Constantine came to power, that it seems virtually to disappear before any significantly repressive laws, and that Christianity—probably a strong minority which quickly became a majority—was already extensive and well-organized (261–263, 267–268, 278–281).

tarch must have seen—but to obsequious poetry recited throughout the realm.[6] Or was this a reason for his near silence about Jews and Christians? During Plutarch's maturity, the first of the great Jewish revolts was crushed. Not only do the two greatest Jewish authors in Greek—Philo and Josephus—belong to this period, but Josephus lived in Rome at the time Plutarch visited it.

The strange affinity then between Plutarch, Jews and Christians is quite perplexing. In fact, about Christians we have only his total silence. To the Jews, or more properly to Judaism, Plutarch dedicated the grand total of six pages. Even so, his six pages represent about three or four percent of all that is extant about them in classical Greek and Roman authors.[7] Traditional in his approach, Plutarch is neither particularly vicious nor particularly flattering. *On Superstition* 166a and 169c treated the Sabbath observance as something like 'wallowing in filth' (166a). However, along with Morton Smith—always an uncomfortable bedfellow—one might doubt that Plutarch actually wrote this essay.[8] *The Contradictions of the Stoics* 1051e treats Jewish ideas about the gods (the stories in *Genesis*?), along with Syrian, on a par with the 'superstitions' of the poets. Still, he notes that even Jews and Syrians, unlike the Stoics, are not so perverse as to consider gods as subject to extinction. Elsewhere in the *Ethika* (*Moralia*), Plutarch is relatively unprejudiced, as in the brief references or allusions to Jews in the *Lives*. For example, in *Isis and Osiris* 363c–d he reports anti-Jewish propaganda, probably derived from the Hellenized Egyptian priest, Manethon, without subscribing to it. Plutarch's suspicions are aroused by the lack of relevance to the Isis myth.

He again reveals himself less prejudiced than his contemporaries in his only extended treatment of Judaism. At the same time he fails to grasp the inner significance and religious power of Judaism. His treatment of Judaism, then, is reduced essentially to two short sections of the *Symposiaka* (*Table Talk*, *Quaestiones Convivalium*). These are *Symposiaka* 4.5 (introduced by the end of 4.4), 'Why the

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[6] G. Alföldy, 'Eine Bauinschrift aus dem Colosseum', *ZPE* 109 (1995) 195–226, esp. 220–223, has recently reconstructed an inscription repeated on several architraves of the Colosseum to read that it was built 'from the spoils of Judaea'. Though possible, or probable, such reconstructions are always controversial.

[7] A rough estimate based on the pages in M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (Jerusalem 1974-1984).

[8] M. Smith, 'De Superstitione (Moralia 164e–171f)', in H.D. Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden 1975) 1–35 (at 1–6).

Jews abstain from pork'; and 4.6, 'Who is the god of the Jews'.[9] Both 'questions' probably were Hellenistic *topoi*. Though the treatment—in the mouths of *personae*—might dismay even his modern admirers, Plutarch reveals, nonetheless, a sympathetic willingness to seek good motives for seemingly irrational behavior.

However, Lamprias, who elsewhere speaks with more authority than other personages in Plutarch's dialogues, settles for hygienic reasons behind the Jewish abstinence from pork. The procedure reveals Plutarch's preference, as in historical matters, to provide a wide range of explanations, using different approaches and often allowing the reader to enter into his reasoning. At the same time Lamprias/Plutarch would seem to deconstruct his argument. After the hygienic motif, he introduces an aetiological myth involving Hellenistic syncretism, which essentially reduces the prohibition again to taboo. A pig (wild boar) slew Adonis, who is the same god—we are told—as Dionysos. The seemingly incoherent explanation serves as a transition to the identification of the Jewish god with the Greek Dionysos. Plutarch himself seems to have missed the link between Adonis and Adonai, a name for the Jewish god.[10]

Plutarch is not original, of course, in identifying the Jewish god with Dionysos, though that was not necessarily the obvious solution. The new speaker, Moiragenes, who makes this equation, supposedly has gleaned his information from the mysteries of Dionysos. Probably he is referring to a revelation in the rites, like the 'myrionym' (the thousand names epithet) of Isis, in which the divinity is revealed to be worshipped by all peoples, but under different names.[11] However, he would not have had to be initiated to learn that. Moiragenes could easily have learned elsewhere that among the Jews Dionysos is worshipped as YHWH. The Jewish god, however, could equally have been Zeus, an assimilation apparently made by Antiochos Epiphanes.[12] Tacitus, in fact (*Histories* 5.5.5), dislikes the Dionysiac

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[9] For the passages see Stern, I (above, n. 7) 549–576, along with his introduction to Plutarch, 545–562; and S.T. Teodorsson, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks. II (Books 4–6)* (Göteborg 1990) 96–134.

[10] The opening of *Question* 6 (671c), however, suggests that Plutarch's immediate or remote source might have made a connection between Adonai, as the Jewish god, and Adonis.

[11] See, for example, L. Bricault, 'Isis Myrionyme', in C. Berger *et al.*, eds., *Hommages à Jean Leclant* III (*IFAO.BdE* 106/3) (Cairo 1994) 67–86.

[12] For example, Valerius Maximus, who lived under Tiberius (1.3.3), had identified the Jewish god with Iupiter Sabazios; thus his presumed source, Livy, had not simply linked the Jewish god with Dionysos. For the diversity within Judaism in this period see, for example, A.F. Segal,

identification. Plutarch's argument is primarily 'phenomenological' rather than 'theological': the similarity of festivals, and the attributes and accourtrements employed. He follows with etymological grounds for the identification: Sabbath as related to *Sabi* (*Bakkhoi*), and Levites as from *Lysios*, or *Euios*—epithets used for Dionysos.[13]

The manuscripts break off here, leaving us puzzled forever whether this was Plutarch's last word or whether another speaker changed all. What we have is rather 'old hat' and superficial. In spite of his hostility to the Jews, Tacitus is more profound. In *Histories* 5.5.4, contrasting the Jews favorably with the Egyptians, he indirectly praises their monotheism and refusal to represent their god in images.[14] Plutarch might have approved. In *Isis and Osiris* he asserts that the divine is not present in inanimate, colored objects (i.e., statues). But his sense of tradition seems to interfere. He even defends the Egyptian practice of seeing the gods in animals, 'since all living things reflect and receive their being from the divine' (382a–c). At any rate, in the *Symposiaka* Plutarch does not accuse the Jews of superstition, treats their religion with respect, and seeks to incorporate them into the Greek religious world.[15] His speaker, in fact,

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'Universalism in Judaism and Christianity', in T. Engberg-Pedersen, ed., *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (Edinburgh 1994) 1–30; and T. Rajak, 'The Location of Cultures in Second Temple Palestine. The Evidence of Josephus', in R. Bauckham, ed., *The Book of Acts in Its Palestinian Setting* (*The Book of Acts in Its First Century Setting*, IV) (Grand Rapids 1995) 1–14, esp. 7–9.

[13] Stern, I (above, n. 7) 553–558. It is extremely difficult to determine Plutarch's own views. Seldom, if ever, does any one of his personages seem perfectly to reflect these. Where a speaker's views provoke strong opposition by later speakers, presumably they are less likely to represent the author's thinking. For an excellent treatment see P. Donini, 'Plutarco e la rinascita del platonismo', in G. Cambiano *et al.*, eds., *Lo spazio letterario della Grecia antica*, I.III. *I Greci e Roma* (Rome 1994) 35–60 (at 56–58). His position contrasts with that of D. Babut in 'Le rôle de Cléombrote dans le *De defectu oraculorum* et le problème de la "démonologie" de Plutarque', *Parerga. Choix d'articles de Daniel Babut* (1974-1994) (Lyon 1994) 531–548, who would see Plutarch to some extent endorsing the ideas of all the speakers, thus constructing a kind of architectural whole.

[14] *Iudaei mente sola unumque numen intelligunt.* See Stern, II (above, n. 7) 19, 26, 43.

[15] See N. Livradas, 'L'antisémitisme de Plutarque et le passage Mor. 169c', in P. Oliva and A. Frolíková, *Concilium Eirene* 16 (Prague 1983) 280–285. He argues, too sanguinely, that Plutarch was not antisemitic, since Dionysos, identified with the Jewish god, was especially honored in Boiotia (280, 283).

identifies their god with an attractive Greek god supposedly born in Plutarch's Boiotia, even if to modern eyes Dionysos does not quite seem to be 'the God of Abraham and Isaac'. Plutarch has not the least interest here in something like Philo's identification of the Jewish god as He who is. Yet as Whittaker pointed out, there is much in common between Ammonios' god at the end of *The E at Delphoi*, and Philo's. Plutarch's spiritual and eschatological allegory moves in the footsteps of Philo.[16]

Plutarch is, then, rather tolerant and understanding of Jewish religion in the *Symposiaka*. His contemporaries, Tacitus, Seneca, Quintilian, and Juvenal, were rather nasty. The first, who branded Christianity a pernicious superstition, probably did not think much better of Judaism. Still, at least our extant Plutarch lacks an appreciation of the finest elements in Judaism, such as its monotheism, lofty concept of God, high moral code, and heroism in maintaining the faith. He should have been more sympathetic. The author of the sublime discourse on God at the end of *The E at Delphoi* should have appreciated the Jewish identification of God with ὁ ὤν, τὸ ὄν, or τὸ ἕν, or liked the Jewish contrast between the mutability and imperfection of the visible world, including the transitory existence of mortals on earth, and the eternal permanence and being of God.[17]

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[16] J. Whittaker, 'Ammonius on the Delphic E', *CQ* 19 (1969) 185–192, reprinted in *Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought*. Apparently in the Hellenistic period the Delphic Apollon had been identified with Helios, the sun, which in Platonic philosophy is an image of the Good. For an inscription with this identification, see M.-A. Zagdoun, 'Plutarque à Delphes', *REG* 108 (1995) 586–592 (at 590), citing her *Fouilles de Delphes*, IV.6. *Reliefs* (Athens 1977) 40–41, no. 10, fig. 25.

Recently J. Opsomer, 'Divination and Academic "Scepticism" according to Plutarch', in L. Van der Stockt, ed., *Plutarchea Lovaniensia. A Miscellany of Studies on Plutarch*. Studia Hellenistica 32 (Leuven 1996) 165–194, notes the close connection in Plutarch between philosophy and religion and in particular the use in Ammonios' speech of oracles and riddles interpreted in an allegorical fashion as God's way of drawing men to knowledge of the higher realities (187–189).

[17] Based on the LXX version of *Exodus* 3:14, which may have deliberately been translated to reflect Platonic 'Being'. For the source, see Whittaker (above, n. 16). Philo, *Joseph* 128, 130ff., contrasts the mutable world with the permanence of the heavens. Whittaker traces the source to Eudoros—used by Plutarch for his commentary on the *Timaios*. Eudoros identified the transcendent One of the Neopythagoreans with ὁ ὑπεράνω θεός (Whittaker 188–192). See also H. Dörrie and M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, III (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1993) 48 (81.4), 211–212; Ferrari, *Dio* (above, n. 1) 55–61.

The appearance of a Sibyl predicting the eruption of Vesuvius may be another point of contact with Judaism. The reference occurs in two essays belonging to Plutarch's 'Pythian Dialogues'. These are *The Oracles at Delphoi* (398e) and *The Divine Vengeance* (566e), which was only artificially separated from the other 'Pythian Dialogues' by the Renaissance editor, Stephanus.[18] In these, Plutarch alludes to, or cites verses from, a Sibylline oracle which mentioned the eruption of Vesuvius and the death of an emperor. Elsewhere in extant literature only the Jewish Sibyl predicts the eruption of Vesuvius. Naturally she sees it as divine vengeance for the destruction of Jerusalem (*Fourth Sibylline Oracle* 115–136).[19] Was Plutarch acquainted with the Jewish Sibyl, either directly or indirectly?[20]

Christians are not happy about his silence regarding them, and it is not entirely excusable, but the feeling would have been reciprocal. The Neronian period should have seared his impressionable youth. The Flavian one left unforgettable memories. He had links to the anti-Neronian opposition, some of whom were executed by Domitian.[21] Domitian, too, may have persecuted Christians, and—as already mentioned—they constituted a nuisance for Trajan.[22] If Plutarch were blind to Christianity, Paul did no better by Middle-

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[18] Treated by S. Schröder, *Plutarchs Schrift De Pythiae Oraculis* (Stuttgart 1990) introduction and 192–224.

[19] F.G. Downing, 'Cosmic Eschatology in the First Century: "Pagan", Jewish and Christian', *AC* 64 (1995) 99–109, however, notes similar tendencies in late republican and early imperial Roman writers such as Lucretius, Pliny the Elder, and Seneca. Whether the world would end through fire or water was uncertain, but these writers associate physical decline or the end of the world with moral depravity. Pliny the Younger hints at this in his description of the eruption of Vesuvius (*Ep.* 6.16.5–7) (108).

[20] For the most recent treatment see E. Renna, *Vesuvius Mons. Aspetti del Vesuvio nel mondo antico. Tra filologia, archeologia, vulcanologia* (Naples 1992) 53–59, 94 (nn. 203–208); F.E. Brenk, 'The Sibyl Sings of Vesuvius', in I. Chirassi Colombo, ed., *Sibille e linguaggi oraculari. Mito, storia, tradizione. Convegno Internazionale, Macerata e Norcia, 20–24 Settembre 1994* (forthcoming). Schröder (above, n. 18) 224–232 leaves it an open question whether Plutarch knew the *4th Sibylline Oracle*.

[21] V. Rudich, *Political Dissidence under Nero. The Price of Dissimulation* (London/New York 1993), notes that Pomponia Graecina, who was linked to the Neronian opposition, might possibly have been a Christian (on Pomponia, 24–25, 85–86, 266, 284). For Plutarch's associating with Thrasea Paetus and the Neronian opposition, see C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford 1971) 24, 51–53.

[22] Plutarch should have known Pliny, who wrote letters to Trajan on the Christian problem. See Jones (above, n. 21) 61.

Platonism. At least ostensibly in his Areopagos speech in *Acts* 17, he only speaks of Stoics and Epicureans. A trace of Middle Platonism may be the image of the mirror used elsewhere, in 1 *Corinthians* 13:12, for the knowledge of God in this world. Some scholars have found a relationship between Paul and Plutarch in the expressions 'in a mirror, in an enigma' and 'an enigma of the divine as in mirrors' (*On Isis* 382a).[23] However, chronology is important. Paul's interrogation by the proconsul Gallio at Corinth, the brother of Seneca (*Acts* 8), apparently took place in A.D. 52. Plutarch may have been only a boy of twelve years. The philosophy of the Alexandrian Eudoros, living in the middle and late late first century B.C., was perhaps the single greatest impetus to Middle Platonism. Plutarch cites his work. Philo, who was both Alexandrian and Jewish, reflects many features of the Middle Platonism later known to Plutarch. Yet Middle Platonism had not burst into full flower by Paul's time. Significantly, in the speech at Athens Paul—or 'Luke'—directs his arguments almost entirely to the Stoics. While admitting the presence of Epicureans, he seems blithely unaware of Platonists. For him, philosophy seems to be Stoicism and Epicureanism. Stoicism was strong at Tarsos, Paul's birthplace; but Nestor, a Platonist who became the tutor of Augustus' nephew Marcellus, also came from Tarsos. Could the Stoicizing Platonism of the eschatology of Aeneas' vision in the Sixth Book of the *Aeneid* belong to Nestor?[24] And could Paul have known something about Middle Platonism? If so, Middle Platonic speculation may have shaped Paul's ideas on divine judgment and punishment in the next life, and on the 'beatific vision'.

Some similarities between Paul's speech and contemporary Platonism have been noted by Whittaker. For example, in the Areopagos speech Paul moves freely from an impersonal divine principle or 'divinity' (τὸ θεῖον) to a personal God, much as Philo and

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[23] δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι (Paul); αἴνιγμα τοῦ θείου ... ἐναργεστέρων ἐσόπτρων (Plutarch). See R. Seaford, '1 Corinthians XIII:12', *Journal of Theological Studies* 35 (1984) 117–120, who attributes the phraseology to the influence of the mysteries.

[24] The information on Nestor comes from Strabo's account of Tarsos (14.5.24 [C 675]). For Vergil's possible use of material exploited later by the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists, see F.E. Brenk, 'The Gates of Dreams and an Image of Life: Consolation and Allegory at the End of Vergil's *Aeneid* VI', in C. Deroux, ed., *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, VI (*Coll. Latomus* 217) (Brussels 1992) 277–294 (with abundant bibliography on the subject).

Plutarch do.[25] Presumably Eudoros is in the background.[26] Significantly, Plutarch's most magnificent speech on the nature of God in a Pythian Dialogue is delivered by the Alexandrian Platonist, Ammonios. Since Ammonios' speech in *The E at Delphoi* is quite unlike anything elsewhere in Plutarch, the author may be making a genuine attempt at reproducing the Alexandrianism of his teacher. Just as Paul was teasing Hellenistic philosophy into the direction of a Christian God, Plutarch shifts the ground from an Alexandrian philosophical One to his personal god, the Apollon at Delphoi, represented, unusually for Plutarch, as the supreme god.

But more than that. Though Paul never mentions Platonists, his message is peculiarly apt for them and very close to some Plutarchan positions: creation—presumably in time—by a transcendent God, who is both our father and the maker of the universe; 'seeking God'; judgment after death, and a new life in a transformed state—in Paul resurrection—as the *telos*, or ultimate destiny of the soul.[27] Could the chronological gap between the actual speech in Athens and the spread of Middle Platonism be reflected on the one hand in Paul's apparent obliviousness of the Platonists in a scene in which only Stoics and Epicureans appear, and on the other in the tone of the speech reported by 'Luke' which seems so redolent of Middle Platonism?

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[25] H.D. Betz, P.A. Dirkse and E.W. Smith, 'De sera numinis vindicta (Moralia 548a-568a)', in Betz (above, n. 8) 181–235, commenting in general on the work (184), see a tendency in Plutarch to remove the anthropomorphic from his concept of God, to a degree which goes far beyond early Christian literature.

[26] Whittaker (above, n. 1) esp. 54–55. Whittaker earlier (50) notes the similarity between the transcendence of God in the *New Testament* (e.g. *John* 1:18; 6:46; I *John* 4:12 and 20) and Plutarch. Unlike Noumenios, but like Christians, Plutarch does not have a First and Second God, the latter of whom is the creator (or Demiourgos). On Noumenios, see Whittaker 53.

[27] See Whittaker (above, n. 1). As he observes (51), Plutarch wrote a 'question' on why God in the *Timaios* is called our father (1000e–1001c), while at the same time not dividing God into 'First' and 'Second'. His essay *The Generation of the Soul in the Timaios* treats at great length creation in time (57–59). Moreover, the eschatological parts of his dialogues are much taken up with judgment, while elsewhere he refers directly or indirectly to the 'beatific vision' of the soul. On creation in time as belonging to concealed doctrines, see R. Lamberton, 'The ἀπόρρητος θεωρία and the Role of Secrecy in the History of Platonism', in H.G. Kippenberg and G.G. Stroumsa, eds., *Secrecy and Concealment. Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions* (Leiden 1995) 139–152 (at 142–143).

With the exception of resurrection, the speech of Paul is indeed very close to Platonist thinking.[28] If resurrection is understood in a primarily spiritual sense as the ascent of the soul to God and to a beatific vision of God as the Good, then Paul's speech is almost perfectly in harmony with some versions of Middle Platonism, such as that espoused by Plutarch.[29] The expression 'God our Father and Maker' actually occurs in Plato (*Ti.* 28c) and was commented upon by Plutarch; while finding God through observation of His mind manifested in creation, especially in the heavenly motions, is a thought from the *Timaios* reflected in Paul's speech and frequently in Plutarch.[30] The search for God or the divine and the knowledge of Him is especially important in perhaps Plutarch's last work, *On Isis and Osiris*, above all in the preface; but even in *The Divine Vengeance* we are supposed to take God as the model of virtue.[31] Without knowing God, it would be impossible to take Him as our model.

The peculiar affinity between Plutarch and aspects of contemporary Judaism and Christianity is particularly reflected in the rather untypically murky Plutarch of the essay on divine punishment. In many respects he and his age were characterized by a spectacular interest in apocalyptic and eschatology. The climax of Paul's speech to the Areopagos—and the apparent stumbling block for Stoics and Epicureans—is his profession of a coming divine judgment and the resurrection of the dead. The text leaves it unclear whether part of his audience found the ideas too novel and bizarre, just too 'old hat',

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[28] Plutarch in fact speaks of resurrection (ἀναβίωσις) in *On Isis* 364f, referring to Isis' resuscitation of Osiris, and in *On Eating Flesh* 998c, in connection with the rebirth of Dionysos.

[29] In the first century there were many divergent beliefs in Judaism about the resurrection. The resurrection of the body is not necessarily implied; see J.J. Collins, *A Commentary on the Book of Daniel* (Minneapolis 1993) 395–398. The funeral epigrams at Beth She'arim near the modern Haifa—ending in the fourth century—were probably influenced by Hellenism. These express a firm belief in a blessed life after death; so P.W. Van der Horst, *Ancient Jewish Epitaphs* (Kampen 1991) 114–126 (ch. 8, 'Death and Afterlife').

[30] In *Acts*, however, Paul, who apparently is citing Aratos, does not specifically use the term 'father'. R. Renehan, '*Acts* 17:28', *GRBS* 20 (1979) 347–353, argues (353) that only Aratos is being cited. However, he thinks the phrase ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, which has no Stoic precedent, may nonetheless be inspired by Kleanthes' *Hymn* 4–5.

[31] *On Isis* uses a metaphor, 'to touch' (θιγεῖν, 382c), which corresponds to that in Paul, ψηλαφᾶν: ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν (17:27): 'to seek God in the hope of laying hands on him'. On the Plutarchan text, see Ferrari, *Dio* (above, n. 1) 259–260.

or simply repugnant to Stoic and Epicurean doctrine.[32] The *New Testament* itself, with its *Apocalypse* (or *Book of Revelation*), closes in spectacular eschatological fashion, like some Plutarchan dialogues. There was a veritable explosion of Jewish apocalyptic in this period. Sometimes the eschatology concerns a final kingdom of God on earth or divine punishment in this world for the non-righteous, who in general are responsible for the slaughter of the just. Jesus in the *Gospels* predicts with his future coming both horrible punishments and glorious rewards in the next life.[33] Outside the *Gospels* such an eschatology is best represented in a host of Jewish apocalyptic works and in the *New Testament Apocalypse*. Scholars generally hold the latter to reflect the epoch of Domitian, but there are at least allusions to the world of Nero.[34] Many of these works react to the fall of Jerusalem. Is it pure chance that the reincarnation of Nero, the 'Beast from the Abyss' and the anti-Christ of the *Apocalypse*—an ominous figure in Jewish apocalyptic as well—closes Plutarch's most horrendous eschatological vision, that of *The Divine Vengeance* (567e–f)?[35]

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[32] See S.S. Bartchy, '*Agnostos Theos*: Luke's Mesage to the "Nations" about Israel's God', in E.H. Lovering, *Society of Biblical Literature 1995 Seminar Papers*. Seminar Papers 34 (Atlanta 1995) 304–321 (at 304); J.H. Neyrey, 'Acts 17, Epicureans, and Theodicy: A Study in Stereotypes', in D.L. Balch *et al.*, eds., *Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (Minneapolis 1990) 118–134.

[33] In his review of E. Puech, *La croyance des Esséniens en la vie future: immortalité, résurrection, vie éternelle? Histoire d'une croyance dans le judaïsme ancien. I. La résurrection des morts et le contexte scripturaire* I. *La résurrection* (Paris 1993); J.J. Collins, *Dead Sea Discoveries* 1 (1994) 246–252 (at 247–248, 250–251), sees no evidence for resurrection in the major scrolls but some in fragmentary texts from Cave 4.

[34] On the date see, for example, A. Yarbro Collins, *Crisis and Catharsis. The Power of the Apocalypse* (Philadelphia 1984) 69–73, 76–77. The argument rests on Irenaeus' testimony ('end of Domitian's reign'), and on the use in Jewish literature of Babylon for Rome only after the destruction of the Holy City.

[35] In Plutarch, Nero is reincarnated as a frog; see F.E. Brenk, 'From Rex to Rana; Plutarch's Treatment of Nero', in A. Cerasa-Gastaldo, ed., *Il protagonismo nella storiografia classica* (Genova 1987) 121–142 (at 132–135). R. Bauckham, *The Climax of Prophecy. Studies on the Book of Revelation* (Edinburgh 1993) 384–452 ('Nero and the Beast'), points out how consistently Nero is depicted as an animal in both Christian and non-Christian authors (409; and in general, 412–431). L.J. Lietaert Peerbolte, *The Antecedents of Antichrist. A Traditio-Historical Study of the Earliest Christian Views on Eschatological Opponents* (Leiden 1996) esp. 114–169 ('The Dragon, the Beast, and the False Prophet'), and 326–339 ('The Sibylline Oracles'), also notes how Nero—in his view identical with

Thus the essay on divine punishment, if not inspired directly by Jewish and Christian apocalyptic, belongs to the climate of the age. And this literature was in part a reaction to the blood of the martyrs under Nero and probably Domitian—as in the case of the *Apocalypse*—and to the Jewish blood spilled at Jerusalem in A.D. 70 under Titus and Vespasian.[36] In both cases God's justice in the present time left much to be desired. Jews and Christians looked for horrendous retribution in the next life. Still, Plutarch's treatise is not inspired by quite the same spectacular vengeance as often found in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic.[37] Nor does it offer much in scenes of glory, triumph, and blessed vision for the virtuous.

On the surface, Plutarch in the *Divine Vengeance* follows the corrective penology of Plato. Plato desires the reform of the 'criminal', not the mere exaction of punishment. He seeks justice (*dike*), not revenge (*timoria*), employing the death penalty only for incurables. The guilty party in Plato, if he cannot come to love justice, at least should not hate it. Punishment therefore only has value in a compelling or teaching sense.[38] Plutarch's punishment for 'incurables'

Beliar of the 2nd and 3rd *Oracles*—is the eschatological tyrant, who appears as evil reaches its climax (334, 338–339).

[36] C. Rowland, '"Upon Whom the Ends of the Ages have Come": Apocalyptic and the Interpretation of the New Testament', in M. Bull, ed., *Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World* (Oxford/Cambridge MA 1995) 38–58, notes the lack of interest in this theme shown by scholars until the middle of the nineteenth century. In his view much is unsavory or even profoundly unhealthy, but apocalyptic offered hope where the hand of God was hard to discern, and presented a critique of social injustice (46–47, 50, 56).

[37] See, for example, J.J. Collins, 'The Genre Apocalypse in Hellenistic Judaism', in D. Hellholm, ed., *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East* (Tübingen 1983, rev. 1989) 531–548 (at 540, 536–537, 543); and in the same volume, A. Yarbro Collins, 'Persecution and Vengeance in the Book of Revelation', 729–750 (esp. 738); J.J. Collins, *Daniel. With an Introduction to Apocalyptic Literature* (Grand Rapids 1984) 22; *id.*, *The Apocalyptic Imagination. An Introduction to the Jewish Matrix of Christianity* (New York 1984) 163, 186, 201, 213; *id.* (above, n. 29) 395–398; M. Stone, *A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra* (Minneapolis 1990) 203, 221, 226, 235, 247, 251–252, 277, 360.

[38] So T.J. Saunders, 'Plutarch's *De Sera Numinis Vindicta* in the Tradition of Greek Penology', in O. Deliberto, ed., *Il problema della pena criminale tra filosofia greca e diritto romano. Studi economico-giuridici* 44 (1991-1992) (Naples 1993) 64–94 (at 66–68), and his *Plato's Penal Code. Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology* (Oxford 1991) 196–211. See also his 'Plato on the Treatment of Heretics', in L. Foxhall and A.D.E. Lewis, eds., *Greek Law in its Political Setting* (Oxford 1996) 91–100 (repeating matter from *Plato's Penal Code*). Saunders notes (95) that

apparently is relegation to non-existence, the 'unspeakable and unseen'—a slap at Epicureans (564f). However, since he believes in the immortality of the soul, he could hardly have envisaged non-existence. The 'divine vengeance', then, is more humane in Plutarch than in much Jewish and Christian eschatology. Vice is contrary to the soul's nature which is inherently good. God, as in Plato, seeks to heal vice. Punishment is a medicine to cure the soul (550a–b). God looks for repentance, granting time for reform (551d) as a period of grace.[39] He cures the adulterous and rapacious by removing the vice before the 'seizure' (562d).[40] As is frequent in apocalyptic literature, including Plato's myths, conversion is an important characteristic. The visionary in Plutarch's treatise (Aridaios), for example, receives in the afterlife a new name, Thespesios ('voice of the divine'?), and returns to earth totally transformed.[41] In his former life he had 'abstained from no shameful act conducive to gratification or gain', but afterwards the Kilikians knew of no one more honest or pious, 'so great a reordering of his character had taken place' (563e). Plutarch's hero lives not so much in Plato's *Politeia* as in the charged conversion atmosphere of the Roman Empire of Barnabas and Paul.[42]

However, the theme of *The Divine Vengeance* is not, strictly speaking, penology or conversion, but rather divine retribution. The punishment aspect is, indeed, striking, and goes far beyond Plato. Whole cities suffer for the crimes of their ancestors (558f–559a). Individuals in a 'purgatory' suffer the torments of the (Christian) damned—'fearful suffering' (566f), 'most fearful agonies' (567d).[43] Souls coiled like

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Plato stuck to his principles in refusing even to execute the worst heretics.

[39] P.H. De Lacy and B. Einarson, *Plutarch's Moralia*, VII (Cambridge MA 1959) 201, note that the thought appears in Philo, *On Providence* II.

[40] On this see Saunders, 'Plutarch's *De Sera* ...' (above, n. 38) 77: God, moved by gentleness (*praotes*) and magnanimity (*megalopsychia*), seeks repentance rather than revenge—an eye for an eye (literally, 'pain for pain', 551b).

[41] Plutarch undoubtedly meant the name to recall Plato's tyrant (Ardiaios) found in the myth of Er in Plato's *Politeia* (*Republic*). Collins, *Daniel. With an Introduction* ... (above, n. 37), 20, notes that otherworldly journeys only begin to appear in Jewish literature in the Hellenistic period, under the influence of Greek literature.

[42] Still important is Nock's thesis of 'conversion', which recently has been reaffirmed by J. North, 'The Development of Religious Pluralism', in J. Lieu, J. North, T. Rajak, eds., *The Jews among Pagans and Christians* (London 1992) 147–173, esp. 175.

[43] Betz *et al.* (above, n. 25), 184, argued that the survival of the soul after death does not play an important part in early Christianity, having

vipers devour one another in rancor. Others, *daimon* torturers plunge into lakes of molten gold, lead, and iron. In Plato's *Phaidon* the 'lake' (λίμην) had offered temporary salvation from torments (113a–c, 114a). Plutarch's lake recalls that of burning sulphur (*Apocalypse* 21.8), where the condition of the suffering is called a 'second death'. His *daimones* themselves act like the angelic (*Apocalypse*) or demonic tormentors of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic. Yet Plutarch is not describing the *inferno*, only a *purgatorio*. His eschatology, however, with its allegorical figures—Poine, Dike, and Erinys—is in many respects traditionally Platonic. Even the *daimon* torturers—at first glance out of the Christian hell—can be found in Plato.[44] Plutarch's hero Aridaios—turned Thespesios—evidently was meant to stress the Platonic heritage of *The Divine Vengeance*. However, Plato does not, like Plutarch, call his torturers *daimones*, but rather 'savage men glowing like fire' (ἄνδρες ἄγριοι, διάπυροι). Still, they must be spiritual beings. Yet the total picture in Plutarch puts us in a different world.

Some scholars see growing attempts on the part of oracles and religious writers to create moral conversion through fear, and claim that this should be related to Jewish and Christian apocalyptic.[45] However, elsewhere Plutarch affirms that the fear of eschatological torments does not deter the wicked, that for most men the joys of religion and the concept of a merciful god far outweigh the fear of punishment, that few believe in the stories about legendary punishments in the next life, and that those who do fear them, find remedies in the mysteries (or rites, *teletai*) and in purifications (*A Pleasant Life is Impossible According to Epicurus* 1092c, 1101c–1102a, 1104b–

given way to the resurrection of the dead. But the newer studies reveal a very complex set of beliefs at the time. See Collins (above, n. 29) 395–397, who believes the persecution of Antiochos Epiphanes gave great impetus to the belief in resurrection and judgment after death. Bodily resurrection was not always involved. In *Jubilees* 23.31, the bones of the righteous 'will rest in the earth, while their spirits will increase in joy' (Collins 397). The Qumran evidence is very ambiguous. However, retribution after death became firmly embedded in the Qumran community. *Community Rule* 1QS 2 consigns the evil 'to a murky place of everlasting fire', while in 1QS 4:7–8, the righteous enjoy 'everlasting blessing and eternal joy in life without end, a crown of glory ... in unending light' (Collins 397–398).

[44] Demonic torturers appear in Plato's *Republic* (615a–616b), where they single out Ardiaios for punishment. See H.D. Betz, 'The Problem of Apocalyptic Genre in Greek and Hellenistic Literature: The Case of the Oracle of Trophonius', in Hellholm (above, n. 37) 577–597 (at 586).

[45] Betz (above, n. 45) 596.

c, 1105b). A new element in Plutarch's penology and eschatology, however, is the very thorough and systematic framework of divine providence (*pronoia*). The souls about to be reincarnated, for example, do not themselves choose the new form of life—repenting and making a better choice. Nor are they reincarnated in an automatic system as they seem to be in Plato's *Laws*, but rather through divine dispensation.[46] This, too, puts Plutarch closer to Paul than to Plato.

How, then, does Plutarch let the Christians' 'Beast from the Abyss', a Platonic tyrant *par excellence* despised or even hated by Plutarch himself, escape so lightly? The emperor, true, has already been subjected to horrible torments and is still glowing—not as once, from the limelights—but from 'piercing rivets' due to the horror of his crimes. But just as he is to be reincarnated as a viper, a voice shooting forth from a great light commands the *daimones* to change him into a frog, 'because of his grant of freedom to the race most loved by the gods'. If Plutarch has no ulterior motive—possibly an inner meaning found in Plato's *Laws*—Nero's escape is due either to the clemency of Platonic penology or, more likely, to Academia's reluctance to forget a benefactor.[47] The vision is about to end, but not before—as so frequently in Plutarch—a deconstructionist note is struck. A 'marvelously beautiful woman' suddenly turns on Thespesios with a hot rod, 'the better to remember everything' when another female figure comes to his rescue. Is the supernatural world ruled by a slow-motion deity as Plutarch maintains in the central thesis of the work, or must one rather always reckon with sudden caprice? And is this the lesson of apocalyptic, that only fear of torture motivates good behavior, consoles the afflicted, and dismays the impious?[48]

It is hard to criticize Plutarch—in these times of prison building and death row—for being too interested in moral deterrence and little in re-education.[49] But how does burning in liquid gold, though a

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[46] Saunders, 'Plutarch's *De Sera* ...' (above, n. 38) 71.

[47] If incarnated as a viper, he would, in popular belief, be killed by his young issuing from the womb. According to Plato's *Laws* 870d–e and 872c–873e, Nero would have to be slain by his own children to be freed from the pollution of matricide; for more, see Brenk (above, n. 35) 138. On the prominence of Nero in the apocalyptic literature, see, e.g., Jones, *Domitian* (London 1992) 114–117; A. Yarbro Collins (above, n. 37) 741–742; V. Rudich, *Political Dissidence under Nero. The Price of Dissimulation* (London/New York 1993) 86; Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination* ... (above, n. 37) 189.

[48] Betz (above, n. 45) 588, citing Plato, esp. the *Politeia*.

[49] See Saunders, 'Plutarch's *De Sera* ...' (above, n. 38) 89, 91.

salutary deterrence, inculcate virtue? Presumably the experience is so horrible that—given a second chance in another reincarnation—one does not repeat the same vice. In Thespesios' case his conversion is not due simply to his experience of the torments. He witnesses the ascent of the virtuous souls, comes to understand the nature of metempsychosis, sees the kindly light issuing from the divine, observes the accuracy of prophecy (the Sibyl), and perhaps does not forget the kindness of the second supernatural lady who saves him from the first, just as he is cast back to this world. Still, as seen above, Plutarch went farther than Plato. A bad moral disposition is enough to merit punishment, even in the innocent. Children should suffer for their ancestors' crimes, and an innocent third party has no reason for complaint, should he be struck by the divine. 'Decimation' re-establishes discipline in an army (560a). In short, deterrence seems to mean more than reform and one can find comfort in eschatological torments as long as they are not for oneself. Plato would seem to forbid the punishment of children for the sins of the parent, and there is no clear proof that he allowed persons to be punished solely because they had bad moral dispositions.[50]

As in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic, the divine is the focal point. Yet the divine in Plutarch' essay on vengeance remains aloof and the lot of the blessed is not described. Apollon's tripod is visible and from it light descends—suggestive of the 'blessed vision'—but the god himself and any scene of human bliss remains unseen.[51] We should not forget that the *Divine Vengeance* is part of the *Pythikoi Logoi*. At the end of *The E at Delphoi*, we find a sublime identification of Apollon ('A-pollon'), whose name best serves for the supreme God, with Platonic Being. He is ὁ ὤν, or τὸ ὄν, existing in an eternity where all is present to Him. In the *Apocalypse*, the Lord, like Plutarch's God, has created all (4.11). But He is also 'He who was, is, and will be' (ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, 4.8), the focal point both of the vision and of all eschatology. Plutarch was facing stiff competition. For a grand theological overview of history and spectacular

[50] Saunders, 'Plutarch's *De Sera* ...' (above, n. 38) 85–86.

[51] Betz *et al.* (above, n. 25), 230, note the similarity between the heavenly tripod of Apollon and the 'Heavenly Jerusalem' of the *Apocalypse*. In 2 *Baruch*, written in the interval between the two Jewish Wars, the destruction of Sion is only temporary, and in any case, the celestial Temple remains; see Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination* ... (above, n. 37) 199–203. For the importance of light in Plutarch's intimations of the celestial destiny, see F.E. Brenk, 'The Origin and the Return of the Soul in Plutarch', in M. García Valdés, ed., *Estudios sobre Plutarco: ideas religiosas* (Madrid 1994) 3–24.

descriptions of the next life, in particular the lot of the blessed, his world would eventually turn to exciting new visions such as those in the *Apocalypse*. Plutarch had described the second death optimistically as the separation of intellect (*nous*) from soul (*psyche*) in *The Face on the Moon* 943a–b and 944e. In *Apocalypse* 20.14 and 21.8, the second death is now the punishment of the wicked in fire. A similar concept appears six times in the Targum, as well as in the *Sibylline Oracles* (4.184–186), in the *Book of Biblical Antiquities* (*LAB*) 16.2, and in the Syrian *Apocalypse of Baruch* (2 *BA*) 30.1–4.[52]

Time is short and Plutarch's art is long (he wrote very fast). There is more common ground with Judaism and Christianity. His allegorical interpretation flows in the vein of Philo and later Christian literature.[53] In *Isis and Osiris*, where he seems to be almost writing a kind of *Bible of Jerusalem* for the Isis cult, he provides, like Philo, as full an account as possible, wringing profusely out of Platonism unsuspected allegorical interpretations. Perhaps nothing similar existed in 'pagan' authors Plutarch had read. Still, he might have known that Jews and Christians, not to mention other peoples of the East, liked this type of allegory.[54] Plutarch's demonology as represented in modern scholarship is often what he reported rather than what he believed himself. Much has therefore been frequently misrepresented

[52] Puech (above, n. 33) 282–285. The texts are very difficult to interpret.

[53] See P.R. Hardie, 'Plutarch and the Interpretation of Myth', *ANRW* II.33.6 (1992) 4743–4787, esp. 4772–4777.

[54] J.G. Griffiths, 'Allegory in Greece and Egypt', in *Atlantis and Egypt. With other Selected Essays* (Cardiff 1991) 295–324 (= *JEA* 53 [1967] 79–102), notes that Plato disliked allegory, but that it was popular with Cornutus and Herakleitos. These were possibly contemporaries of Plutarch. Allegorical interpretation was not very developed in Egyptian literature, but appears in the animal fable tradition, in folk motifs like the parts of the body which revolt against the head, and in ritual. Still, Egypt produced the three great allegorists of the Judaic and early Christian traditions: Philo, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen (295, 297, 306, 308–311, 317). See also Griffiths, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (Cardiff 1970) 100–101, 504–505, 564–565; and J. Hani, *La réligion égyptienne dans la pensée de Plutarque* (Paris 1976) 225–252 (esp. 248–252), 282–283, 290–293.

F. Ferrari, 'La generazione precosmica ...' (above, n. 1), 51–54, bases Plutarch's allegorical interpretation on belief in the absolute supremacy of good over evil, and—what he saw as an omission in Plato—on the principle that matter must somehow be influenced by the intelligible even before 'creation' by the Demiurge (55). For a recent study of later Platonic spiritual allegory, see M.J. Edwards, 'Porphyry's "Cave of the Nymphs" and the Gnostic Controversy', *Hermes* 124 (1996) 88–100.

or exaggerated. Nonetheless, some of its more radical elements may have been influenced by contemporary Jewish and Christian demonology. Plutarch's less traditional 'daimonology'—since it really treats *daimones* rather than demons—sometimes seems closer to the *New Testament* than to Plato. At the same time (in my view) he was sceptical. When not treating *daimones* as lesser gods, he usually prefers to see them as souls or intelligences (*nous* without *psyche*) temporarily or permanently free from bodies.[55] Though the doctrine of metempsychosis is strong in his works, unlike Plato in the *Politeia* and *Laws*, Plutarch allows a final escape for the virtuous. From *daimones* they become 'gods' (*theoi*). After their intelligence (*nous*) is ultimately released from the soul (*psyche*), they are freed from rebirth. And he firmly asserts the doctrine of 'assimilation to God', who is, in particular, our model for virtue.

Plutarch's *Isis and Osiris*, written at the end of his life, helps explain the role of Judaism in the Graeco-Roman world, and its eventual turn towards Christianity. Not only does it reveal an openness towards an 'oriental religion', but towards a mystery religion in which a god suffers, dies, is 'resurrected', and rules in majesty in the otherworld. The same god is identified, like Apollon previously, with the highest entities of Platonic philosophy: Being, the Good, the Beautiful.[56] But there is something new. This god, much more than an abstract principle, not only is the object of the soul's desire but, at least in two passages, might possibly love the seeker after Him with an intense and perfect love (352a, 383a).[57] Because Plutarch's religion is intensely philosophical and universal, the ancient Egyptian religion can be Hellenized and transformed. Here, too, we see the importance of Judaism with its antiquity of scripture and cult.

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[55] In *The Obsolesence of the Oracles* 415a, Kleombrotos attributes the doctrine to the Persians, Thracians, or Egyptians, in spite of the fact that Platonists attributed it to *Symposion* 202e. See C. Moreschini, 'Osservazioni sul "De defectu oraculorum" di Plutarco', in C. Curti, C. Crimi, eds., *Scritti classici e cristiani offerti a Francesco Corsaro* (Catania 1994) 501–507 (at 503–504); and A. Rescigno, *Plutarco. L'eclisse degli oracoli* (*CPM* 19) (Naples 1995) esp. 298–299. Kleombrotos, however, needs *daimones* that die (though Plutarch may be seeking to portray his ignorance).

[56] On this see F.E. Brenk, 'Darkly Beyond the Glass: Middle Platonism and the Vision of the Soul', in S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser, eds., *Platonism in Late Antiquity* (Notre Dame 1992) 39–60; M.J. Edwards, 'Middle Platonism on the Beautiful and the Good', *Mnemosyne* 44 (1991) 161–167.

[57] See Brenk (above, n. 3) 464.

Christianity presented itself first as a sect within Judaism, or as true Judaism, then as the spiritual heir to Judaism. Without the *Old Testament* and its Jewish heritage, would Christianity have succeeded in the Graeco-Roman world? In a similar vein, Christianity presented itself, already in the time of 'Luke'—if not really that of Paul at Athens—as the heir of the entire Greek philosophical tradition, and in particular, of Platonism.[58]

Plutarch is not as pessimistic as the *Delay of the Divine Vengeance* might suggest. And in fact the protagonist of the myth becomes a model of virtue, thus proving the efficacy of the author's teaching. Nor is he anywhere near as pessimistic—in our eyes—as the eternally reincarnating Plato of the *Republic* and *Laws*. Still, even in a late work, the *Dialogue On Love*, Plutarch seems to envisage nothing but the eternal recycling process of reincarnation. Elsewhere he does speak of an escape from the cycle and eventual divinization; but it apparently is limited to the relatively few souls of outstanding virtue, and after a seemingly long process of purification. In contrast, the Eleusinian mysteries, centuries before, had offered a blessed life to all who were morally upright and initiated. Christianity went farther. It promised eternal salvation and unbelievable happiness to all who asked for forgiveness and were baptized.

Eventually, then, Plutarch's world of religious philosophy would be overcome by Christianity. In many respects much more spectacular than the older Greek religion, it offered clearer punishments and eternal rewards, a more comprehensible view of divine forgiveness, and a resolution of the problem of divine distance and intimacy. In Jesus, and the saints, the divine could seem very close. At the same time the mystery of the divine, especially in its trinitarian formulation could remain beyond human comprehension in Platonic aloofness. Whether the advances towards Christian positions merited for Plutarch, like Plato, a place in heaven—as requested in the metropolitan's prayer, and perhaps in Whittaker's—remains to be seen.[59] But let us hope he did not—through an un-

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[58] Some Jews and Christians might have believed that Moses was the teacher of Pythagoras (so Hermippos in Josephus, *Against Apion* 1.165), and thus ultimately of Plato; cf. A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* (Cambridge 1975) 144–145.

[59] P. Lagarde, *Joh. Euchaitarum. metrop., Quae in cod. Vat. gr. 676 supersunt* (Göttingen 1882) 24, cited at the end of Whittaker's 'Plutarch, Platonism and Christianity'. For the Greek, see A. Garzya, 'La tradizione monoscritta dei *Moralia* di Plutarco', in I. Gallo, ed., *Sulla tradizione manoscritta dei 'Moralia' di Plutarco* (Salerno 1988) 9–39 (at 17), or Livradas, 283.

known failing, or some ancient crime of city or ancestors, or as innocent third party in a dark affair—fall an unknowing victim, possibly in paludean incarnation, to his own slow-moving but relentless God.[60]

[60] The proofs of this article were already corrected before it was possible to see L. Feldman, 'The Jews as Viewed by Plutarch', in L. Feldman, *Studies in Hellenistic Judaism* (Leiden 1996) 529–552.

An earlier version of this article in Italian, highlighting religious and historical aspects, was given as a paper at Ravello, May, 1995, and has now been printed as 'Lo scrittore silenzioso. Giudaismo e cristianesimo in Plutarco', in I. Gallo, ed., *Plutarco e la religione* (Naples 1996). I am grateful to Professor Italo Gallo for consenting to the publication of this rather different English version, which is more concerned with Plutarch's religious Platonism. I am also very grateful to Professor John Dillon of Trinity College, Dublin, for his usual graciousness and expertise in looking over the manuscript and offering several helpful suggestions.

8

TROIS CORDONNIERS PHILOSOPHES

RICHARD GOULET

Dans le chapitre de ses *Progymnasmata* (§8) qu'il consacre au discours de louange (ἐγκώμιον), Théon passe en revue les « biens »—de l'âme, du corps ou du monde extérieur—qu'il convient de célébrer lorsqu'on fait l'éloge d'une personne, morte ou vivante. Envisageant le cas où nul bien remarquable ne retient l'attention chez la personne à célébrer, Théon recommande au rhéteur de mettre à profit les ressources du paradoxe. Dans l'infortune cet homme ne montra aucune bassesse, pauvre il ne fut pas injuste, dans le besoin il ne fut pas servile. Issu d'une ville sans renom il parvint à la célébrité, comme Ulysse et Démocrite; ayant grandi sous une constitution vile il n'en fut pas perverti, mais devint le meilleur des hommes de son temps, comme Platon qui avait grandi sous l'oligarchie. Sera loué également celui qui est devenu un grand homme alors qu'il sortait d'une humble maison, comme Socrate, le fils de Phénarète la sage-femme et de Sophronisque le sculpteur. Il convient aussi d'admirer celui qui a pu réaliser quelque chose de bien malgré son métier manuel ou sa condition sociale dépravée, comme l'ont fait, à ce que l'on dit, *Héron le cordonnier* d'une part, Léontion la courtisane d'autre part, qui tous deux furent philosophes. C'est en effet dans les infortunes qu'au plus haut point brille la vertu.[1]

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[1] Cf. L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, coll. *BT*, II (Leipzig 1854) 111.31–112.2: ἄξιον δὲ ἄγασθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκ βαναύσου τέχνης ἢ πονηρᾶς τύχης ἀγαθὸν δυνηθέντα τι ἐργάσασθαι, ὁποῖον λέγουσιν Ἥρωνα μὲν τὸν σκυτοτόμον, Λεόντιον δὲ τὴν ἑταίραν φιλοσοφῆσαι· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀτυχήμασιν ἐκλάμπει ἡ ἀρετή. Il n'existe pas d'édition plus récente de ce texte. Le texte de Chr. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, I (Leipzig 1832) 145–257, offre en plus une annotation reprenant souvent des commentaires plus anciens. Pour notre passage, voir 230.12–231.1. Une édition critique du traité de Théon, préparée par Michel Patillon est sous presse aux Belles Lettres;

C'est, semble-t-il, le seul témoignage que nous possédions sur un cordonnier nommé Héron qui se serait illustré comme philosophe à l'égal de l'épicurienne Léontion. H. von Arnim a cru pouvoir l'identifier avec un contemporain de Théon beaucoup mieux connu, Héron d'Alexandrie, l'auteur de plusieurs traités conservés, dont les *Pneumatica*: « Der Ausdruck φιλοσοφῆσαι hindert durchaus nicht, den zu Theons Zeit berühmtesten H., den Mathematiker aus Alexandreia, Verfasser der Πνευματικά usw. zu verstehen ».[2]

Cette identification qui n'a jamais été contestée est extrêmement douteuse. Son unique fondement est que le cordonnier et l'ingénieur portent le même nom, un nom des plus fréquents en Égypte depuis l'époque ptolémaïque.[3] En vérité, Héron d'Alexandrie n'est jamais désigné comme philosophe dans les sources anciennes, mais plutôt comme un μηχανικός,[4] un ingénieur, ou un mathématicien. A supposer que l'on eût quelque raison de lui prêter le titre de philosophe,[5]

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elle comprendra une rétroversion grecque de la version arménienne, plus complète que la version grecque. Cette version arménienne a autrefois été éditée par A. Manandjan: TʻEOVNEAY, *Yałags čartasanakan krtʻutʻeanç*, ašxatutʻyamb prof. Hakob Manandyan (Erivan 1938). Sur les particularités de cette ancienne traduction, voir G. Bolognesi, « La traduzione armena dei *Progymnasmata* di Elio Teone », *RAL* 17 (1962) 86–125 (qui n'étudie pas notre passage). La seule traduction moderne existante des *Progymnasmata* se trouve dans *Teón, Hermogénes, Aftonio, Ejercitos de retórica.* Introduccíon, traducción y notas de Maria Dolores Reche Martínez. *Biblioteca Clásica Gredos* 158 (Madrid 1991) 279 p. Notre passage est traduit à la p. 127.

[2] H. von Arnim, art. « Heron » 3, *RE* VIII.1 (1912) col. 992. C'était déjà l'identification que proposait Walz, qui reprenait une note de l'édition de G.G. Scheffer (1670): « Constat nempe hinc, agi de Herone Alexandrino, philosopho et mathematico celeberrimo, quem sutorem primo fuisse, nescio an alii tradiderint ». Elle n'est pas remise en cause dans la traduction de Mme M.D. Reche Martínez (127 n. 208): « Con el nombre de Herón existió un famoso matemático alejandrino, célebre pro sus vastos conocimientos en matemáticas, física, mecánica, etc. »

[3] Voir les dictionnaires onomastiques de W. Pape & G.E. Benseler, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen*, I (Braunschweig[3] 1863–1870) 474; F. Preisigke, *Namenbuch* (Heidelberg 1922) col. 125; D. Foraboschi, *Onomasticon Alterum Papyrologicum. Supplemento al Namenbuch di F. Preisigke. Testi e Documenti per lo Studio dell'Antichità.* Serie papirologica 2, n° 16 (Milano 1971) 128; P.M. Frazer & E. Matthews, *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, I: *The Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Cyrenaica* (Oxford 1987) 207.

[4] Voir par exemple Proclus, *in primum Euclidis Elementorum librum Commentarii*, 305.24 Friedlein, ou *Hypot. astron.* ch. 4.73, p. 120.23 Manitius.

[5] Héron d'Alexandrie est de fait appelé φιλόσοφος dans le titre de

il resterait à prouver que ce savant avait été préalable-ment un cordonnier, ce qui est, dans le cas de Héron d'Alexandrie, tout à fait invérifiable.

Plutôt que d'identifier de façon aussi gratuite Héron le cordonnier à Héron le mécanicien, il serait préférable d'ajouter un philosophe à la liste des philosophes anciens. On croira cependant difficilement que Théon ait choisi le nom d'un inconnu comme exemple dans un manuel de rhétorique. Les autres personnages mentionnés dans ce passage, à commencer par Léontion, sont des figures classiques que tout rhéteur devait connaître et avec lesquelles il pouvait sans doute établir une comparaison dans son discours de louange. L'emploi du mot λέγουσιν montre qu'en citant Héron et Léontion Théon ne faisait que reprendre des exemples connus par la tradition.

On ne peut dès lors s'empêcher d'établir un rapprochement avec un autre cordonnier philosophe beaucoup mieux connu: Simon le disciple de Socrate.[6] Selon Diogène Laërce (II.122–124), ce cordonnier athénien avait noté sous forme de dialogues le souvenir des conversations tenues par Socrate dans sa boutique.[7] Diogène cite ainsi trente-trois « dialogues de cordonnier » ou plutôt « de cordonnerie » (σκυτικοὺς διαλόγους).

Simon le cordonnier apparaît dans un certain nombre de textes anciens[8] et constitue l'une des principales figures des Lettres pseud-

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quelques manuscrits tardifs, mais C.R. Tittel, art. «Heron» 5, *RE* VIII.1 (1912) col. 995, considère cette désignation comme «unbegründet».

[6] Cf. H. Hobein, art. « Simon » 6, *RE* III.A 1 (1927) col. 163–173; R.F. Hock, « Simon the Shoemaker as an ideal Cynic », *GRBS* 17 (1976) 41–53, réimpr. dans Margarethe Billerbeck (édit.), *Die Kyniker in der modernen Forschung. Aufsätze mit Einführung und Bibliographie.* Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 15 (Amsterdam 1991) 259–271. Quelques témoignages sur Simon sont rassemblés dans G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, collegit, disposuit, apparatibus notisque instruxit. *Elenchos* 18, vol. II (Napoli 1990) 640–641 (VI B.87–93). Il faut ajouter, comme nous allons le voir, quelques passages des commentateurs grecs d'Aristote.

[7] Ce témoignage mérite d'être rapproché de Xénophon, *Mémorables* IV.2.1, où Socrate vient rendre visite avec quelques compagnons au jeune Euthydème dans la boutique d'un sellier (ἡνιοποιεῖον) sur l'agora (voir aussi IV.2.8 et III.10.1). Sur le paradoxe des cordonniers s'intéressant à des débats philosophiques (comme celui de la mobilité universelle), voir encore Platon, *Théétète* 180d.

[8] Hock, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 6) 42 [260] n. 2, mentionne Diogène Laërce II.122–123; Plutarque, *Maxime cum princ. phil. diss.*, 776b; Synésius, *Dion* 1153–1155; *Suda*, *s.v.* Σωκράτης et Φαίδων, *P. Ross. Georg.* 13.

épigraphes des Socratiques.[9] On a parfois douté de son existence historique, notamment parce que Platon et Xénophon ne le mentionnent jamais parmi les amis de Socrate.[10] Un tel scepticisme est sans doute excessif et il est possible que l'archéologie lui ait apporté un démenti fracassant: on a dégagé à l'angle sud-ouest de l'agora à Athènes une boutique de cordonnier de la fin du Ve siècle avant J.-C. devant laquelle on a retrouvé un vase de la même époque portant le nom de « Simon ».[11]

Les commentateurs d'Aristote mentionnent parfois Simon pour expliquer un passage du *De interpretatione* d'Aristote. Selon Aristote, si l'on veut respecter l'unité de la proposition dialectique, il convient de n'affirmer plusieurs prédicats d'un seul sujet que si l'ensemble des prédicats correspond à une « chose une ». Je puis dire que l'homme est animal, bipède et civilisé, parce que ces déterminations correspondent à « quelque chose d'un », mais, si un homme est (du point de vue moral) *bon* et s'il est *cordonnier*, il faut éviter de regrouper ces prédicats accidentels en disant que l'homme est *bon cordonnier*, car il n'est pas (nécessairement) un bon cordonnier.[12]

Chez plusieurs commentateurs,[13] la figure historique de Simon illustre l'exemple anonyme d'Aristote où un cordonnier qui est *bon* n'est pas un *bon cordonnier*. Dans le commentaire d'Ammonius,[14]

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[9] Cf. A.J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles. A Study edition. Society of Biblical Literature*. Sources for Biblical Studies 12 (Missoula MT 1977). Voir *Lettres* 9 (Aristippe à Antisthène), 246.29–33; 11 (Aristippe à Eschine), 248.18–19; 12 (Simon à Aristippe), 250.1–12; 13 (Aristippe à Simon), 250.13–252.9); 18 (Xénophon aux amis de Socrate), 266.21–26. Cet ensemble de lettres est traduit en anglais par Stanley Stowers. A noter dans la *Lettre* 13 (d'Aristippe à Simon): Θαυμάζω μέντοι σε καὶ ἐπαινῶ εἰ σκυτικὸς ὢν σοφίας ἐμπλησθείς κτλ.

[10] Entre autres, voir U. von Wilamowitz, « Phaidon von Elis », *Hermes* 14 (1879) 187. Autres références dans Hobein, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 6) col. 163, qui tente (col. 164–165) d'expliquer ce silence de Platon et de Xénophon.

[11] Voir sur cette découverte l'article très intéressant de Dorothy Burr Thompson, « The House of Simon the Shoemaker », *Archaeology* 13 (1960) 234–240.

[12] Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 20^{b}36; 21^{a}15. Voir aussi *Soph. Elench.* 177^{b}14–15, où le cordonnier est cette fois dit *mauvais* cordonnier (μοχθηρός).

[13] Ces passages ne sont pas pris en compte par Hobein, Hock (qui cite seulement Ammonius, *in De interpr.*) ou Giannantoni.

[14] Ammonius, *in De interpretatione*, 205.6–7 Busse (*CAG* IV.5 [1897]): δείκνυσιν ἐπὶ ὑποθέσεως σκυτέα τινὰ λαμβάνων τὴν μὲν τέχνην οὐκ

Simon le cordonnier est simplement rapproché, à titre de suggestion, du cordonnier anonyme d'Aristote: Aristote a pris comme exemple un cordonnier qui ne fut pas d'une grande compétence dans son art (Aristote ne dit pas cela de façon explicite, du moins dans le *De Interpretatione*!), mais qui était très bien au point de vue moral, « ainsi qu'a la réputation de l'avoir été Simon, le compagnon de Socrate ». On trouve moins de réserve chez les commentateurs postérieurs qui reconnaissent sans plus le *mauvais cordonnier* Simon dans le cordonnier d'Aristote,[15] comme si Aristote avait simplement omis de mentionner le nom du personnage qu'il avait à l'esprit.

Il est intéressant de remarquer que seuls les commentateurs d'Aristote semblent informés de l'incompétence de Simon comme cordonnier. Leur source d'information est facile à identifier. C'est évidemment Aristote! Ils ont prêté à Simon les traits du cordonnier anonyme d'Aristote avec lequel ils se croyaient autorisés à l'identifier. Aristote pensait-il de fait à Simon? Rien n'est moins sûr, car l'exemple du cordonnier est utilisé dans de nombreux contextes en plusieurs de ses œuvres, sans que jamais la figure de Simon ne soit évoquée.[16]

ἀκριβώσαντα τὸ δὲ ἦθος ἐπιεικῶς διακείμενον, ὁποῖος δοκεῖ γεγονέναι ὁ Σίμων ὁ τῷ Σωκράτει γνώριμος.

[15] *Anon. in Soph. Elench.*, Section 21.15 Hayduck (*CAG* XXIII.4 [1884]): ἦν γὰρ ὁ Σίμων ἀγαθὸς μὲν τὸν τρόπον, ἀφυὴς δὲ τὴν τέχνην. Voir aussi David, *Proleg. Philos.*, 42.27–32 Busse (*CAG* XVIII.2 [1904]); Philopon, *in Anal. Post.*, 350.32 Wallies (*CAG* XIII.3 [1909]); Michel d'Éphèse, *in Soph. Elench.*, 40.23–27 Wallies (*CAG* II.3 [1898]): ἔστι δέ τις ἑτέρα κατηγορία, ἣ χωρὶς μὲν ἀληθῶς κατηγορηθήσεται, ἅμα δὲ ψευδῶς, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Σίμωνως (lire Σίμωνος)· κατὰ τούτου γὰρ κατηγορεῖται τὸ μὲν "σκυτεύς" κατὰ τέχνην, τὸ δὲ "ἀγαθός" κατὰ τὴν διαγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν ἤθεσιν εὐτροπίαν· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ σκυτεὺς ἐκεῖνος ὁ τῷ Σωκράτει συγγεγονώς, τὴν μὲν σκυτικὴν οὐ πάνυ τι διακριβωσάμενος, τὴν δὲ ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθός. Voir aussi 41.16–18; 146.8–19; Stephanus, *in De Interp.*, 52.16 Hayduck (*CAG* XVIII.3 [1885]).

[16] C'était déjà un exemple omniprésent dans la bouche de Socrate selon Alcibiade, dans Platon, *Banquet* 221e: « il parle d'ânes bâtés, de forgerons, de cordonniers, de tanneurs ... » (trad. Robin). On pourrait citer des dizaines de passages des dialogues pour illustrer cette affirmation. Pour Aristote, voir *EE* 1219^{a}20–23, 1243^{b}31–33; *EN* 1097^{b}28–29, 1101^{a}4–5, 1133^{a}7–10 et 23, 1163^{b}34–35; *Métaph.* 996^{a}34, 1064^{b}21, 1260^{b}2; *SE* 184^{a}5. Peut-être faut-il tenir compte de la différence professionnelle entre σκυτεύς (le mot employé par Aristote) et σκυτοτόμος, même si *LSJ* établit une synonymie entre les deux termes. Sur ce vocabulaire et, plus généralement, sur le métier de cordonnier dans l'antiquité voir O. Lau, *Schuster und Schusterhandwerke in der griechisch-römischen Literatur und Kunst* (Diss. Bonn 1967) 219 p., notamment p. 50. Tout en reconnaissant que σκυτεύς et σκυτοτόμος peuvent recouvrir les mêmes activités

Simon n'est d'ailleurs pas le seul cordonnier à qui l'on ait reconnu dans l'antiquité des dispositions philosophiques. Cratès de Thèbes considérait que le cordonnier Philiscos qui, dans son échoppe, écoutait avec attention, tout en travaillant, la lecture qu'il faisait du *Protreptique* d'Aristote (fr. 1 Ross), avait à l'égard de la philosophie une plus grande disponibilité que n'en manifestait le roi de Chypre, Thémison, auquel l'ouvrage était dédié.[17]

Après avoir ainsi ajouté quelques témoignages—en apparence compromettants, au moins du point de vue professionnel—à la liste des fragments de Simon et avoir révoqué en doute la valeur historique du témoignage des commentateurs d'Aristote, il nous faut revenir au passage de Théon. Ce cordonnier Héron, philosophe malgré son métier manuel, ressemble trop au cordonnier philosophe Simon, « bon », même s'il était mauvais cordonnier, pour que l'on ne soit pas tenté d'envisager chez Théon une erreur dans la transmission du nom. Si les deux noms ne sont pas vraiment semblables du point de vue paléographique, leurs finales en grec sont identiques (ΣΙΜΩΝΑ – ΗΡΩΝΑ) et le nom de Héron pouvait sembler plus fréquent et naturel que celui de Simon, surtout à Alexandrie.

Quant à savoir si une telle faute a été commise par un copiste au cours de la tradition manuscrite ou par Théon lui-même, trompé par sa mémoire, on ne saurait se prononcer de façon péremptoire. Sans vouloir rejeter un nouveau cordonnier de l'histoire de la philosophie,[18] on peut légitimement penser que Théon, dans son manuel de rhétorique, avait en vue Simon, le disciple de Socrate, et non un cordonnier philosophe inconnu du nom de Héron.

Cette correction du texte de Théon a d'ailleurs déjà été proposée par A. Meineke, dans une note de son édition des fragments de Ménandre et de Philémon.[19] Elle est signalée dans une note de Walz, mais, comme nous l'avons vu, n'a jamais été prise en compte par les

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(voir par exemple Platon, *République* X, 601c, où les deux termes sont employés de façon synonyme), Lau considère que le premier terme est plus général et peut désigner le tanneur qui prépare les cuirs aussi bien que le cordonnier, alors que le second s'applique plus spécialement au cordonnier qui fabrique des chaussures en taillant le cuir. Sur Simon, voir Lau, *op. cit.* 189–190.

[17] Télès IV B, 46.6–14 Hense^2 = Cratès de Thèbes, fr. V H.42 Giannantoni = Zénon de Citium, fr. 273 von Arnim.

[18] Lau, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 16) 194–195, signale quelques cordonniers philo-sophes dans la littérature allemande.

[19] *Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiae edidit Augustus Meineke* (Berlin 1823) 113: « Simonis nomen, ut hoc addam, restituendum videtur Theoni Prog. p. 105 ».

éditeurs, les traducteurs ou les commentateurs. Il n'y a pourtant guère d'imprudence à l'accepter, car j'ai appris, après avoir écrit cette étude, qu'elle est confirmée par la version arménienne qui porte en toutes lettres dans ce passage le nom de Simon![20]

[20] Je tiens cette information de mon collègue Michel Patillon (voir n. 1).

9

THE NEOPLATONIC HYPOSTASES AND THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY

SALVATORE R.C. LILLA*

The present paper is meant to dwell upon the very close relations existing between the doctrine of the hypostases as it appears in the different exponents of Neoplatonism (from Plotinus to Damascius) and the views of some patristic Greek authors concerning the three persons of the Trinity. During the first centuries of our era, the Christian trinitarian doctrine is not something immutable, unequivocally established from the very beginning: as far as patristic Greek thought is concerned, it undergoes a process of growth and transformation, and reaches its climax and its perfect orthodox formulation only in the theological speculation of the Cappadocian Fathers. It will be the main purpose of this paper to show that a full comprehension of this process, as well as of the trinitarian theology of ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, can by no means afford to disregard the contemporary Platonic tradition.

Methodologically, one thing should be clear from the outset: it

* The text of this paper is mainly based on a lecture given at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, on September 20, 1996 (only the sections on Didymus and Synesius and some further evidence about Cyril have been added here). The title reproduces, with but a slight variation, that of a paper by F. Picavet, 'Hypostases plotiniennes et Trinité chrétienne', *AEHE* 1917; cf. also the second part of the title of the recent book by P. Aubin, *Plotin et le Christianisme. Triade plotinienne et Trinité chrétienne* (Paris 1992). Father R. Dodaro, OSA, deputy headmaster of the Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Rome, and Prof. W. Hankey, Dalhousie University, Halifax, were so kind as to read through the English text and to improve it on some points. The section on Synesius was also read by Father L. Boyle, Prefect of the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana from 1984 to 1997.

would be wrong to identify Neoplatonism *sic et simpliciter* with its founder and most illustrious exponent, Plotinus, as though the later representatives of this philosophical stream had nothing new to propose. Consequently, it would be unwise to think that the rejection of the hierarchical position of the three Plotinian hypostases on the part of the Cappadocian Fathers automatically implies the rejection of the whole of Neoplatonism. In fact, from Plotinus to Porphyry it is possible to observe a substantial change in the conception of the first principle: Porphyry's 'one' is no longer the 'one' of Plotinus, even if it still keeps some of the characteristic features of the Plotinian first principle.

A comparative study of the Platonic tradition of late antiquity and of the patristic Greek tradition shows that the evolution of the theological thought of the Greek Fathers is parallel to the evolution of the Neoplatonic speculation concerning the first principles. Clement of Alexandria is closely dependent not only on Philo, a forerunner of Neoplatonism, but also on Middle Platonism and early Neoplatonism. Origen's theology is deeply influenced both by Middle Platonism and by the hierarchical structure of the system of early Neoplatonism, reflected in the teaching of Ammonius and Plotinus. The three hypostases of Plotinus and of the Plotinian phase of Porphyry's thought are openly compared by Eusebius of Caesarea, Didymus of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret of Cyrus to the three persons of the Christian Trinity who, in their opinion, are clearly foreshadowed by them. In the post-Plotinian phase of Porphyry's speculation, in which the Chaldaean oracles play a relevant role, the conception of the first principle as a threefold 'one', sharply contradicting Plotinus' doctrine of the 'one', throws some light on the growth of the orthodox trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocians, which also takes up some Plotinian and Porphyrian doctrines. Synesius' trinitarian conception cannot be dissociated from the Chaldaean oracles and Porphyry's exegesis of them, and shows also striking parallels not only with earlier Neoplatonism and Neopythagoreanism, but also with the pagan and Christian gnosis. Finally, ps.-Dionysius' trinitarian theology reproduces faithfully the main features of that of the Cappadocians, but at the same time borrows some tenets and images from Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus and Damascius.

I

Clement of Alexandria

Our survey of the trinitarian views of the most outstanding Greek Fathers begins with Clement of Alexandria, who, more than the Greek apologists, must be regarded as the real founder of Greek patristic theology. As Lebreton, Ladaria and Ziebritzki have observed,[1] in the works which have come down to us Clement has not fully developed a trinitarian theology, since he does not seem to have paid much attention to the nature, hierarchical position and role of the Holy Spirit. In a section of the fifth book of the *Stromateis*, however, he regards the Christian Trinity as being foreshadowed in a famous passage of the second Platonic epistle dealing with the 'three kings'. After quoting *verbatim* its text, he adds his own comment:

> Consequently, when Plato says 'all beings lie around the universal king, and all beings exist for him, and he is the cause of all beautiful things; the beings of the second rank lie around the second king, and the beings of the third rank lie around the third' [*Ep.* II 312el–4],[2] I cannot interpret these words as announcing something different from the Holy Trinity: the third king is the Holy Spirit and the second is the Son, 'through whom everything was born' [*Ioh.* 1:3] according to the will of the Father.[3]

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[1] J. Lebreton, 'La théologie de la Trinité chez Clément d'Alexandrie', *RSR* 34 (1947) 64; L.F. Ladaria, *El Espíritu en Clemente Alejandrino* (Madrid 1980) 269; H. Ziebritzki, *Heiliger Geist und Weltseele. Das Problem der dritten Hypostase bei Origenes, Plotin und ihren Vorläufern*, *BHTh* 84 (Tübingen 1994) 120, 126 ('Trinität als solche war für Klemens kein Thema').

[2] Unlike modern scholars, the Middle Platonists, the Neoplatonists and the patristic Greek authors regarded the second Platonic epistle as genuine; cf. H. Dörrie, 'Der König. Ein platonisches Schlüsselwort, von Plotin mit neuem Sinn gefüllt', *RIPh* 24 (1970) 217 (= *Platonica minora* [München 1976] 390): 'daß dieser Text nicht authentisch sei, ist keinem antiken Leser in den Sinn gekommen'. Two learned inquiries on the exegesis of this passage in the Platonic and patristic traditions can be found in Dörrie, *op. cit.* 217–235 (= *Platonica minora* 390–405), and H.D. Saffrey-L.G. Westerink, *Proclus. Théologie platonicienne*, II (Paris 1974) XX–LIX. P. Aubin (*Plotin et le Christianisme. Triade plotinienne et Trinité chrétienne* [Paris 1992] 57) observes 'le moyen-platonisme et le néoplatonisme on largement exploité ce texte, de même que la gnose valentinienne et les écrivains chrétiens'.

[3] *Strom.* V.103.1 (395.12–7). On this passage of Clement see R. Arnou, *Platonisme des Pères*, *DThC* XII.2 (Paris 1934) 2324 (who paraphrases it

Clement's interpretation of the three kings of the second Platonic epistle has its exact counterpart in that given by Plotinus. In chapter 8 of the first treatise of the fifth Ennead, in order to give a Platonic foundation to his own theory of the three hypostases, Plotinus appeals to the same Platonic passage as well as to other expressions taken from other Platonic writings. He makes it clear that Plato mentions not only the three kings, but also the 'father of the cause' and the cause itself, which is also the productive principle of the soul:

> For this reason, Plato's realities also occupy three ranks: all realities—he means the realities of the first rank—lie around the universal king; the second king is concerned with the realities of the second rank, and the third with those of the third rank [*Ep.* II 312e1–4]. He also says that there is a father of the cause [*Ep.* VI 323d4], and calls the cause intelligence [*Phlb.* 30c5–6, *Ti.* 29a5–6, 39e7; both passages of the *Timaeus* refer to the demiurge]; according to him intelligence is the demiurge [*Ti.* 39e7], who produces the soul in the bowl [*Ti.* 41d4–5]. He names the father of the cause, which is the intelligence, the good and whatever is above intelligence and being [*R.* 509b9]. On many occasions he defines being and intelligence as an idea.[4] Consequently, Plato knew perfectly that the intelligence originates from the good, and that the soul originates from the intelligence.[5]

Plotinus' interpretation of the three kings can thus only be the following: the universal king is the good, which is above intelligence and being and is also the father of the cause; the second king is the cause, identical with the demiurge, the intelligence, absolute being

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rather freely); H. Dörrie (above, n. 2) 223 (= *Platonica minora* 396); Saffrey-Westernik (above, n. 2) XLIII; P. Aubin (above, n. 2) 24 (who reproduces it in French translation); H. Ziebritzki (above, n. 1) 125 (who quotes the Greek text in n. 169).

[4] *Sph.* 248e7, 249a2, a4 (being is endowed with φρόνησις and νοῦς), *Ti.* 27d6, 28a6–7, 39e7–8 (being is a model and contains the ideas).

[5] *Enn.* V.1.8 (2.280.1–10). On this passage see Dörrie (above, n. 2) 224–225 (= *Platonica minora* 397–398), who rightly remarks: 'er [*sc.* Plotinus] setzt eine Reihe von Platon-Stellen, an denen das gleiche Thema behandelt wird, miteinander in Verbindung. Insofern diese Stellen Gleiches ausdrücken, wird durch sie erwiesen, daß Platon eben das Dogma, dem der Nachweis gilt, ausgesprochen habe'. In saying that according to Plato intelligence originates from the good and soul originates from intelligence Plotinus has in mind such Platonic passages as *R.* 509b7–8 (the good is the cause of the existence of being), *Sph.* 249a2, a4 (being is endowed with νοῦς), *Ti.* 34c1, c6 (the demiurge-intelligence makes the world-soul).

and the idea; and the third king is the world-soul produced by the demiurge-intelligence. If we compare this interpretation with that given by Clement, we cannot help noting a close parallel between the three Plotinian hypostases (the good, the intelligence-demiurge and the world-soul) and the three members of the Christian Trinity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. This correspondence finds its full support in the adoption, on the part of Clement and Plotinus, of the interpretation of the first two hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides* going back, as E.R. Dodds has shown, to Moderatus, a Neopythagorean of the first century A.D.[6]; and it is also confirmed by the strong analogies which it is possible to observe between Clement's God (the Father) and the 'one'-good of Plotinus, as well as between Clement's Son and the Plotinian intelligence. Unfortunately, due to the lack of evidence concerning the Holy Spirit, we cannot draw an analogous comparison between the latter and the Plotinian world-soul.

It is J. Whittaker's merit to have drawn attention to Clement's dependence on the interpretation of the 'one' of the first two hypotheses of the *Parmenides* which had currency in the Neopythagorean school of Moderatus and in that of Plotinus.[7] In a passage of the fourth book of the *Stromateis* (IV.156.1–2 [317.21–318.1]) Clement contrasts the Father with the Son:

> God, being not subject to a demonstration, cannot be the object of scientific knowledge either; the Son, on the contrary, is wisdom, science and truth ... the Son is neither simply the 'one' as such, nor manifoldness as though He had many parts. Rather, He is one inasmuch as He is the one-totality; hence He is all beings.

Another passage, belonging to the fifth book of the *Stromateis* (V.81.5–82.1 [380.18–25]), emphasizes God's negative attributes:

> How could God be utterable ... it would not be correct to call Him the whole: the whole implies magnitude, whereas God is the father of all beings. Nor should one speak of His parts: the 'one' is not subject to division, and therefore it is infinite. It must be conceived not as intraversable, but as having neither dimensions nor limit; it is therefore formless and nameless.

As Whittaker has shown, the former passage is based on the

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[6] E.R. Dodds, 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One"', *CQ* 22 (1928) 136–138.

[7] J. Whittaker, ''Επέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας', *VC* 23 (1969) 98–99 (= *Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought* [London 1984] XIII).

opposite conclusions of the first two hypotheses of the *Parmenides*: whereas God, the Father, is practically identified with the negative 'one' of the first hypothesis, which cannot be the object of scientific knowledge (*Prm.* 142a3–5), the Son receives the positive attributes of the 'one' of the second hypothesis, inasmuch as He is the object of scientific knowledge (*Prm.* 155d6) and also the one-totality (*Prm.* 145c4–5, cf. 144bl–2, e1–3).[8] The latter passage applies to God (the Father) some important negative connotations of the 'one' of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*: God is unutterable (*Prm.* 142a3, a5); He is neither whole nor parts (*Prm.* 137c5–6, d2–3); He is infinite (*Prm.* 137d7–8); He has neither dimensions nor limit (*Prm.* 137d4–8); He is without form and name (*Prm.* 137d8, 142a3, a4–5).

This interpretation of the first two hypotheses of the *Parmenides* corresponds substantially to that which is characteristic of Moderatus and Plotinus. According to Moderatus, whereas the first 'one' is above being—in this way he interprets the μὴ ὄντι of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (142a2)—the second 'one' is the absolute, intelligible being and also the totality of the ideas (as we shall see presently [below, pp. 133–134], Clement also places the Father above the Son, the highest of beings, and regards the Son as the totality of beings and as the idea).[9] Plotinus says that Parmenides, in the Platonic dialogue of the same name, distinguishes the first or absolute 'one' from the one-manifoldness (*Enn.* V.1.8 [282.23–6]).[10] Both Moderatus and Plotinus also mention the one of the third hypothesis, which they identify with the world-soul[11]; but this third 'one' does not seem to have a direct bearing on Clement's theology, which, as has been seen, does not deal in detail with the Holy Spirit. One point is particularly emphasized by Plotinus: in the first three hypotheses Parmenides hints clearly at the three metaphysical hypostases (*Enn.* V.1.8 [282.25–6]), the one-good, the intelligence and the world-soul.

Since Clement and Plotinus identify the negative 'one' of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* with the first principle, and the 'one' of the second hypothesis respectively with the Son (or *logos*) and the

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[8] See S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria* (Oxford 1971) 205.

[9] Moderatus in Simplicius, *in Ph.* 230.36–231.1; see Dodds (above, n. 6) 136–137.

[10] On the one-manifoldness (ἓν πολλά) in the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* cf. *Prm.* 144a5, e5–7.

[11] Moderatus in Simp. *in Ph.* 231.1–2; Plot. *Enn.* V.1.8 (282.26). Plotinus' definition of the one of the third hypothesis of the *Parmenides* as ἓν καὶ πολλά originates from *Prm.* 155e5.

metaphysical intelligence, the strong analogies between Clement's God and Plotinus' 'one' on the one hand, and between Clement's Son (or *logos*) and Plotinus' intelligence on the other should not be surprising. Both Clement and Plotinus maintain that such names as 'one', 'good', 'intelligence', 'being' and 'god' attributed to the first principle are not its real names, but simply the best concepts on which man bases his own approach to it.[12] If for Plotinus the 'one' lies above intelligence and being, for Clement the Father is the cause which lies beyond the Son, 'the highest and best of beings' (ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ὄντων)[13]—a clear proof of his 'subordinationism'. Both Clement and Plotinus lay a strong emphasis on the fact that God's infinity must not be understood in the sense that He is 'intraversable' (Clement's οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀδιεξίτητον [*Strom.* V.81.6 (380.23)] corresponds fully to Plotinus' οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ [*Enn.* VI.9.6 (316.10)])[14] and use the verb ἀφαιρεῖν, a technical term which in the Platonic tradition indicates the process of progressive elimination of all attributes from the first principle (*Strom.* V.71.2–3 [374.7.11]).[15] Both of them make it clear that this process can only show what God is not, but not what He really is (*Strom.* V.71.3 [374.14–5], *Enn.* V.3.14 [324.6–7]).[16] Many of the negative attributes which Clement allots to God are the same as those which are characteristic of Plotinus' 'one'.[17] Clement's *logos* proceeds from the Father, just as Plotinus'

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[12] *Strom.* V.82.1 (380.25–381.1); *Enn.* V.4.1 (332.8–9), VI.2.17 (78.2–5), VI.9.6 (316.12–4). See Lilla, 'Minutiae Clementinae et ps.-Dionysianae', in *Paideia Christiana. Studi in onore di M. Naldini* (Pisa 1994) 34–37.

[13] *Strom.* VII.2.3 (4.6–7) ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, τὸν υἱόν ... τὸ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον, τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὅλων. See Whittaker (above, n. 7) 93.

[14] See Lilla, 'Minutiae Clementinae' (above, n. 12) 34–35.

[15] Cf. Pl. *R.* 534b9–c1; Plot. *Enn.* V.3.17 (331.38), V.5.13 (360.11), VI.8.21 (305.26); these passages of Plotinus are quoted in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 209–211 (passages 3.6.8).

[16] See L. Früchtel, *app. font.* of the reprint of Stählin's edition of Clement, 374; Lilla, 'La teologia negativa ...', *Hel.* 28 (1988) 209 n. 254, and 'Minutiae Clementinae' (above, n. 12) 37.

[17] For instance the negative attributes surveyed in *Strom.* V.71.4–5 (374.15–20) and V.81.5–82.1 (380.18–25) occur in Plotinus as well: cf. the references given in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 217–218 (the 'one' is without parts, indivisible), 219–220 (the 'one' has no dimensions), 220 (the 'one' has no shape), 221, 234 (the 'one' has no limit), 222–223, 226 (the 'one' is above space and time, movement and rest), 229 (the 'one' admits neither genus nor species nor differences), 231–232 (the 'one' is unutterable and without names), 232–233 (the 'one' is infinite). On some parallels between Clement's God and Plotinus' 'one' see also A.F. Daehne, *De* γνώσει *Clementis Alexandrini et de vestigiis neoplatonicae philosophiae in ea*

intelligence originates from the overflowing of the infinite power of the 'one' (*Strom.* V.16.5 [336.12–3] προελθών)[18]; and Clement's Son is the 'light of the Father' (φῶς πατρῷον), exactly as Plotinus' intelligence can be compared to the light which the sun radiates (*Strom.* VII.5.5 [6.1–2]).[19] Clement's Son and Plotinus' intelligence are generated *ab aeterno*[20] (it should not be forgotten, in this connection, that for Clement the creation of the sensible world did not take place in time, *Strom.* VI.145.4 [506.14–6]).[21] Clement regards the Son as the one-totality (πάντα ἕν) and as the centre of the circle, in which all radii are united (*Strom.* IV.156.2 [318.1–2]); in the same way, Plotinus regards the metaphysical intelligence as a composite unity which is also the totality of intelligible beings, and compares the union of these beings in the intelligence to the union of the rational principles in the seed and to the centre of the circle.[22] As Clement brings the Son (the *logos*) into direct connection with the ideas (*Strom.* V.16.3 [336.8–9]), in the same way Plotinus regards the intelligence as the generative principle of the ideas and as their sum (*Enn.* V.1.7 [279.29–30]).[23] Plotinus' metaphysical system is, however, much

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obviis (Lipsiae 1831) 75ff.; E.F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (Cambridge 1957) 25–37; 'Clément, Plotin et l'un', in *ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΙΝΑ. Mélanges offerts à Claude Mondésert, S.J.* (Paris 1987) 185–189; Lilla (above, n. 8) 221–222.

[18] Cf. *Enn.* V.2.1 (290.8) ὑπερερρύη, V.2.1 (292.16) προέχεε, V.3.12 (320.40) ῥυεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν, V.5.5 (347.23) ῥυέντα.

[19] Cf. *Enn.* V.1.6 (276.28–9), V.3.12 (320.40), VI.9.9 (322.7). In *Protr.* 98.4 (71.26) the Son is described as φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον φῶς, an expression which should be compared with Plotinus' φῶς ἐκ φωτός, *Enn.* IV.3.17 (35.13–4), and φῶς πρὸ φωτός, *Enn.* V.3.12 (320.43). On the parallelism between Clement and the former passage of Plotinus see R.E. Witt, 'The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria', *CQ* 25 (1931) 196 n. 9.

[20] This idea seems to be implied in *Strom.* V.1.3 (326.9–10): 'the Father does not exist without the Son; in fact His being Father goes together with His being the Father of the Son'; cf. also *Adumbr. in ep. Ioh. pr.* (210.2–3): *generationem tangit sine principio filii cum patre simul exstantis* (here I have modified my previous opinion about this last passage, *op. cit.* [above, n. 8] 200 n. 1). For Plotinus cf. *Enn.* V.1.6 (276.29–30).

[21] See Lilla (above, n. 8) 198–199.

[22] *Enn.* V.3.15 (326.21) ὁμοῦ πάντα, V.1.4 (268.21) ἔχει ... [ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] πάντα, V.5.2 (342.8-9) τῷ ἀληθινῷ νῷ δοτέον τὰ πάντα, V.9.6 (418.1–3) νοῦς ... πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ... ἔχων ... πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ, V.9.6 (418.12–419.13) οἱ λόγοι ὥσπερ ἐν ἑνὶ κέντρῳ. Further evidence can be found in Lilla (above, n. 8), 205, where attention is also drawn to the presence of the same doctrine in the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides*.

[23] On some correspondences between Clement's *logos* and Plotinus' νοῦς see also Daehne (above, n. 17) 95ff.; Witt (above, n. 19) 196, 201–

more coherent than that of Clement: for Plotinus the fact that the 'one-good' is above intelligence and has no noetic activity is an undiscussed axiom,[24] whereas Clement, though admitting that the term intelligence is inadequate to express God's nature (*Strom.* V.82.1 [380.25–6]), is strongly inclined to regard God as a thinking intelligence (*Protr.* 98.4 [71.25], *Strom.* IV.155.2 [317.11])[25]; and whereas for Plotinus the 'one-good' is not only above intelligence, but also above absolute being (which, in his opinion, is identical with intelligence, *Enn.* V.1.4 [270.31–2], V.1.8 [280.15–7], V.3.5 [305.26–8], V.4.2 [336.43–4]),[26] for Clement God, as Whittaker has not failed to point out, remains the ὤν of *Ex.* 3:14 (*Strom.* V.34.5 [348.18–9], VI.137.3 [501.19]),[27] even if in one passage of the *Stromateis* (VII.2.3 [4.6]) the Son is defined as 'the highest and best of beings' (see also n. 13 above). Clement's God, as far as His definition as νοῦς and ὤν is concerned, still resembles that of Philo,[28] and can also be compared with the 'first god' of Alcinous and Numenius and the intelligence of Plotinus.[29]

II

Origen

As Porphyry reports, Origen had been a pupil of Ammonius, Plotinus' teacher (Eus. *H.E.* VI.19.6 [558.26–560.1]); he 'always lived together with Plato' (Eus. *H.E.* VI.19.8 [560.11]), and was also intimately

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202; E.F. Osborn (above, n. 17) 41 (with n. 11); Lilla (above, n. 8) 205–206.

[24] Cf., e.g., *Enn.* V.1.8 (280.6–8) V.3.12 (320.47), V.4.2 (336.42–3), V.6.4 (365.3–4), VI.7.40 (266.35); further evidence in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 240–241, 251–252.

[25] See Lilla (above, n. 8) 222; Ziebritzki (above, n. 1) 29 n. 40, 99.

[26] On the 'one' being above οὐσία and νοῦς cf. *Enn.* V.1.8 (280.6–8), passage quoted also above in n. 24; and the futher evidence collected in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 236, 240–241.

[27] See Whittaker (above, n. 7) 94.

[28] For Philo God is νοῦς and τὸ ὄν, cf., e.g., *De Opif. M.* 8 (i.2.19), *Quod D. sit imm.* 69 (ii.72.11), *De Migr. Abr.* 192 (ii.306.3–4), 193 (ii.306.8), *De Vit. cont.* 2 (vi.47.7). The passage *Leg. Alleg.* II.46 (i.99.20) ὁ πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ θεός, to which Whittaker has drawn attention (above, n. 7, 102), represents an exception. On this point see also *Hel.* 22–27 (1982–87) 232 n. 55.

[29] Alcin. *Did.* 163.32–3, 164.26–7, 29–30, 165.23, 179.42; Numenius fr. 16 des Places (57.3–4) νοῦς, 17 (58.3–4) πρῶτον νοῦν, αὐτοόν, 20 (60.12) πρῶτος νοῦς. For Plotinus' νοῦς see my remarks (above, n. 8) 222–223.

acquainted with the writings of several Middle Platonic, Neopythagorean and Stoic philosophers (Eus. *H.E.* VI.19.8 [560.11–15]); he thus managed to hellenize deeply his theology, which was based on the application of Greek philosophical tenets to barbarian myths (Eus. *H.E.* VI.19.7 [560.10–11]). Small wonder, therefore, if the Platonic tradition—including both Middle Platonism and early Neoplatonism—left deep traces on his views about the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit and their mutual relations.

Due to the complexity of the question, it will be best to concentrate our attention on the following points: (1) the meaning of the term ὑπόστασις; (2) the 'universal king' of the second Platonic epistle; (3) the hierarchical disposition of the members of the Trinity, which explains Origen's 'subordinationism'; (4) the question whether the Father is above νοῦς and οὐσία or identical with them; (5) the analogies and differences between Origen's Father, the 'first god' of Middle Platonism and Plotinus' first and second hypostases; (6) the correspondences between Origen's Son (or wisdom), Numenius' 'second god' and Plotinus' second hypostasis; (7) the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son; (8) the correspondences between Plotinus' world-soul, Origen's *logos* and his doctrine of the *Corpus Christi.*

(1) As both H.A. Wolfson and H. Dörrie have shown, among the Greek Fathers it is Origen who first attributes to the term ὑπόστασις the meaning 'individual entity' which will be canonized by the Cappadocians.[30] They mention four passages of Origen, in which ὑπόστασις indicates the two distinct individual realities represented by the Father and the Son[31]; to them two further passages should be added.[32] It is important to observe the complete agreement between Origen and Plotinus on this point: Plotinus indeed refers the term

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[30] H. Dörrie, ''Υπόστασις. Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte', *NAWG* Phil. Hist. Klass. 1955, 3, 76–77 (= *Platonica minora* 53–54); H.A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge MA 1976³) 317–320.

[31] *in Ioh.* X.37.246 (212.13–6), *Cels.* VIII.12 (229.21–2), VIII.12 (229.31–230.1), *princ.* I.2.2 (28.18–19). As to the last passage, Dörrie (above, n. 30) 77 (= *Platonica minora* 54) proposes for Rufin's Latin text *substantialiter subsistentem* the retranslation οὐσιωδῶς ὑφεστῶτα, where ὑφεστῶτα is the exact equivalent of ὑπόστασις.

[32] *in Mt.* XVII.14 (624.13–4) τῇ ὑποστάσει ἕνα διδόντες εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν (where, due to the polemic against Sabellianism, ὑποστάσει clearly means 'individual reality'); *in Ioh.* II.10.75 (65.15–7) τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ... τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα (the latter passage is quoted by Aubin [above, n. 2] 13).

ὑπόστασις to his three distinct metaphysical principles, viz., the one-good, the intelligence-demiurge and the world-soul. Some passages of the *Enneads* to which J.N. Deck and J.A. Anton have drawn attention[33] and also the titles of the first and third treatises of the fifth Ennead[34] are worth noting in this respect.

(2) In chapter 18 of the sixth book of his *Contra Celsum* (VI.18 [89.1–13]) Origen, after quoting the passage of the second Platonic epistle dealing with the three kings, compares the 'universal king' to the God of Isaiah and Ezechiel, whose face and feet are hidden by the Seraphim and who lies above the Cherubim.[35] Origen's attitude towards the 'universal king' is therefore the same as that of Clement,

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[33] J.N. Deck (*Nature, Contemplation and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus* [Toronto 1967] 9 n. 5) and J.A. Anton ('Some Logical Aspects of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus', in R.B. Harris, ed., *The Structure of Being: a Neoplatonic Approach.* Studies in Neoplatonism Ancient and Modern IV [Norfolk VA 1982] 25), quote *Enn.* V.6.3 (364.11), VI.8.7 (282.47), VI.8.13 (292.43–4), VI.8.15 (295.28), VI.8.20 (302.11). To this evidence *Enn.* V.1.7 (279.42), V.3.12 (319.14–8) and V.4.2 (336.35–6) are worth adding (the latter passage is quoted by A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition. A Study in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism* [The Hague 1974] 17). As Dörrie (above, n. 30), 68, 72 (= *Platonica minora* 46, 49), rightly points out, Plotinus associates the notion of 'unity' with the term ὑπόστασις; he thus paves the way to the meaning of ὑπόστασις as 'individual reality', 'person', which was to become current in the trinitarian theology of the Greek Fathers. This notion of 'individual reality' appears particularly clear in VI.8.13 (292.43–4), VI.8.15 (295.28) concerning the 'one', V.4.2 (336.35–6) concerning the intelligence, V.1.7 (279.62) concerning the world-soul, and is implied in V.3.12 (319.14–8) concerning the 'energies' coming from the intelligence. In V.1.8 (282.27) φύσεσι is synonymous with ὑποστάσεσι (on this point I agree with Deck, *op. cit.* 66, against Anton, *op. cit.* 26).

[34] Although the titles of *Enn.* V.1 and V.3 (περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων, περὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑποστάσεων), like those of the other Plotinian treatises, are not Plotinus' own, but were added by his disciples (cf. Porph. *Plot.* 14.6.16–8; Deck [above, n. 33] 9 n. 5; Aubin [above, n. 2] 9, 12), they could easily be inferred from the text of the *Enneads.* Plotinus calls ἀρχή the 'one', the intelligence, and the world-soul (cf. J.H. Sleeman-G. Pollett, *Lexicon Plotinianum* [Leuven 1980] 154–156), and sometimes uses ὑπόστασις in the sense of 'individual reality' (see n. 33 above). Aubin's suspicion concerning a possible Origenistic influence on the choice of the title of *Enn.* V.1 ([above, n. 2] 12–13) seems thefore to be unfounded. When he, having in mind V.1.8 (282.27), says 'l'expression "trois hypostases" n'est pas plotinienne ... on serait plus fidèle à Plotin en comptant "trois natures"' (*op. cit.* 43), he does not take into account the possibility of Plotinus' use of φύσις in the sense of ὑπόστασις (see the end of n. 33 above).

[35] Cf. [Pl.] *Ep.* II 312el–313a2; *Is.* 6:2, *Ezech.* 1:25, 10:1.

and does not substantially depart from that of Plotinus (both for Origen and Plotinus the 'universal king' corresponds to the highest god).

(3) The inferiority of the Son with respect to the Father, and that of the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son are strongly emphasized in a fragment coming from an anti-origenist florilegium and inserted by the emperor Justinian into his *Epistula ad Memnam* (since in the florilegium the fragment is attributed to Origen's *De Principiis*, it has been included by Koetschau in his edition of this work):

> God the Father who holds the universe together, reaches each being and, taking His own nature as a starting point, imparts to each being its own identity; in a lesser degree with respect to the Father, the Son, being the second after Him, reaches only the rational beings; and in an even lesser degree the Holy Spirit reaches only the Saints. Consequently, the power of the Father is greater than that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and the power of the Son is greater than that of the Holy Spirit; in the same way, the power of the Holy Spirit surpasses that of the other holy beings.[36]

A striking correspondence with this fragment can be observed in a passage of an epistle of Jerome to Avitus (*Ep.* 124.2 [*CSEL* 56.98.1–6]), in which Jerome reports and condemns Origen's views:

> The Son, being the second after the Father, is inferior to Him; and the Holy Spirit, dwelling in all saints, is inferior to the Son. Due to this disposition, the strength of the Father is greater than that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, just as that of the Son is greater than that of the Holy Spirit; for the same reason the power of the Holy Spirit is greater than that of all those beings which are called holy.

One of the greatest specialists of Origen, H. Crouzel, raises strong doubts about the full authenticity of the doctrines set forth in both passages: in his opinion, both the anti-origenist Palestinian monks who composed the florilegium, and the anti-origenist Jerome, arbitrarily inferred the inequality of the power of the three members of

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[36] Just. *ep. ad Memn.* P.G. 86.1, 981B7–C2 (= Mansi, *Sacr. Concil. nova et ampliss. Coll.* IX [Florentiae 1763] 524E–525A; Or. *princ.* I.3.5 [55.4–56.8]). This fragment is quoted in Italian translation by M. Simonetti, 'Sull'interpretazione di un passo del De principiis di Origene (I.3.5)', *RCCM* 6 (1964) 14–15, and in English translation by J. Dillon, 'Origen's Doctrine of the Trinity and some later Neoplatonic Theories', in D.J. O'Meara, ed., *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought.* Studies in Neoplatonism Ancient and Modern, III (Norfolk VA 1982) 19–20.

the Trinity from their different functions.[37] But even admitting with Crouzel some exaggeration in the exposition of Origen's doctrines due to the fierce anti-origenist bias both of the authors of the florilegium and of Jerome (the latter in particular carries on an intemperate polemic), it is remarkable that both of them drew the same conclusions from their reading of Origen's text (Crouzel's hypothesis concerning the dependence of the authors of the florilegium on Jerome cannot be proved). Moreover, a careful reading of both passage shows their strong dependence on Neoplatonic doctrines and their substantial agreement with three other origenist passages whose authenticity is unquestionable. First of all, the fact that the more general principles embracing a greater number of beings are higher than the more particular principles concerned with a narrower number of realities and comprehend them is for Neoplatonism a plain truth and an established axiom, going back ultimately to Aristotle.[38] Secondly, as in the florilegium and Jerome the Son is inferior to the Father but superior to the Holy Spirit and all other realities, in the same way Plotinus' intelligence is lower than the one-good, but higher than the world-soul and all other realities.[39] Thirdly, such expressions in the florilegium as ἐλαττόνως, ἡττόνως, μείζων, πλείων, have their exact counterpart in the expressions οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον, ὑποδεέστερον, κρατοῦντος of a passage of *Contra Celsum* (VIII.15 [233.6–15]), in

[37] H. Crouzel, 'Les personnes de la Trinité sont-elles de puissance inégale selon P. Arch. I 3.5.8?', *Gregor.* 57 (1976) 109–123; see esp. 122–123.

[38] This idea is implied in *Enn.* V.5.9 (352.29–32), a passage concerning the relationship between the sensible universe, the world-soul, the intelligence and the 'one': the sensible universe, being produced by the world-soul, is comprehended in it; the world-soul, being the cause of the sensible universe but not of νοῦς, is lower than the νοῦς, and contained in it; the νοῦς, being the cause of all beings but not of the 'one', is lower than the 'one' and contained in it; and the 'one', being the cause of everything, including the νοῦς, is not contained by a higher principle and contains the νοῦς; see *Hel.* 28 (1988) 222. The same idea is expressed in more general terms at the beginning of the same chapter, V.5.9 (351.1–11); see *Hel.* 28 (1988) 221. The best codification of this law is given by Proclus, *El.Theol.* 57 (54.23–4), 60 (58.3–5), 101 (90.22–3), *Theol.Plat.* III.7 (9.12–20); see also Dillon (above, n. 36) 21. Aristotle, *Metaph.* M 1087^{a}3, makes it clear that the principle is higher than the realities deriving from it (cf. Plot. *Enn.* VI.8.9 [284.9–10]), and that consequently the universal principle comprehends all realities in itself, *Ph.* Γ 203^{b}10–1; see *Hel.* 22–27 (1982-87) 233, and 28 (1988) 221 n. 301.

[39] Besides the passage quoted at the beginning of n. 38 above, cf. also *Enn.* V.1.6 (276.38–9, 40–1; 276.43–277.44), V.3.15 (325.7–11), V.4.1 (335.40–1).

which the subordinate position of the Son with respect to the Father is unambiguous. The passage is well worth quoting:

> We say in fact quite clearly ... that the Son is not stronger than the Father but inferior to Him. We say this obeying Him who said 'the Father who sent me is greater than I am' [*Ioh.* 14:28]. None of us is so silly as to say 'the son of man is the Lord of God'. We say that the Saviour dominates all those beings which are subject to Him especially when we conceive Him as God, as *logos*, as wisdom, as justice and as truth; but this does not mean that He dominates His Father and God, who on the contrary dominates Him.[40]

Another passage of Origen, belonging to his commentary on John, presents the same idea, embedded in that of the ascent to the Father through the Son and in the two images of the Holy of Holies and of the steps of a temple (*in Ioh.* XIX.6.37–8 [305.14–9]):

> It is not possible to conceive or to contemplate first god and then the truth; one must first conceive and contemplate the truth, so as to reach the contemplation either of the essence of God or of His power and nature, lying above essence (cf. Pl. *R.* 509b9). As in a temple there is a flight of steps through which it is possible to enter the Holy of Holies, in the same way our flight of steps is represented by the only-begotten Son of God.

This passage can be fully appreciated only if it is read in the light of Plotinian ideas and images. The analogies between it and two passages of the *Enneads* are really astonishing. According to Plotinus (*Enn.* VI.7.35 [258.4–10], V.5.3 [342.1–6]), the human soul which has become a completely pure intelligence conceives first the intelligible realm (identical with the truth and the metaphysical intelligence, the second hypostasis) and then the highest god, the one-good placed upon the intelligence, which is comparable to a flight of steps.[41] There is thus a full correspondence between Origen and

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[40] Origen's words οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον ... ἀλλ' ὑποδεέστερον (233.7–8) should be compared with *Enn.* V.3.15 (325.8–9) οὐδέ γε βέλτιον ... χεῖρον ἄρα ... ἐνδεέστερον.

[41] Origen's ἀναβαθμοί, *in Ioh.* XIX.6.38 (305.17.19), have their counterpart in Plotinus' κρηπῖδος, V.5.3 (342.5). Synesius and Damascius will apply this image not to the intelligible world, but to the first principle itself: for Synesius the Father will be the παιδὸς κρηπίς (III.60); in the same way, Damascius will present the ὕπαρξις or 'one' as the θεμέλιον or ἔδαφος of the two subsequent hypostases, the manifoldness (or infinite generative power) and the united being (the ἡνωμένον or paternal intellect), *Pr.* 121 (iii.152.19–21).

Plotinus: like Origen's only-begotten Son, Plotinus' intelligence is also the first object of contemplation, the truth, and is presented as a flight of steps; and it is on such flight of steps that both Origen's Father and Plotinus' one-good are based. It must also be pointed out that, if Origen compares the Father to the Holy of Holies, Plotinus, in another passage (*Enn.* VI.9.11 [326.18–19]), compares the one-good to the ἄδυτον of the Greek temple, which corresponds substantially to the *Sancta sanctorum.*

In a third passage (*in Ioh.* II.10.75 [65.19–21]),[42] the subordination of the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son is clearly implied:

> The Holy Spirit is more precious than any other being which has come into existence through the *logos*, and first in rank among all those beings which have been generated by the Father through Christ.

The Holy Spirit seems thus to occupy an intermediate position between the *logos*-Christ and all beings generated through Him; this idea corresponds substantially to that which underlies the passages of the *florilegium* and Jerome, where the Holy Spirit is placed above all holy beings.[43]

(4) Quoting the passage of Origen's commentary on John, which describes the ascent from the contemplation of the Son to that of the Father, we have come across another question of prime importance, that of the relationship between God, οὐσία and νοῦς. In other words: must God be conceived as being above νοῦς and οὐσία, or must He simply be identified with these two realities? In the passage quoted above (*in Ioh.* XIX.6.37–8 [305.14–9]), Origen leaves the question of the relationship between the Father and οὐσία open to both solutions; and he does the same in a passage of *Contra Celsum* (VI.64 [135.4–6]).[44] The same two alternative solutions, extended this time to νοῦς, appear in a further passage of this work (VII.38 [188.11–2]): νοῦν τοίνυν ἢ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας λέγοντες εἶναι ...

[42] To this passage attention has been drawn by M. Simonetti, 'Note sulla teologia trinitaria di Origene', *Vet. Christ.* 8 (1971) 284.

[43] I am glad to see that my interpretation of the Greek fragment of the florilegium is the same as that which is given by Simonetti, *RCCM* 6 (1964) 16, 20 n. 10, 21, 27, 29, and *Vet. Christ.* 8 (1971) 292. In the same way, J. Dillon (above, n. 36), 19, regards both the fragment and Jerome's report as expressing Origen's genuine views. The hierarchical structure of Origen's Trinity is clearly reproduced in the diagram given by R.M. Berchmann, *From Philo to Origen*: *Middle Platonism in Transition* (Chico 1984) 118.

[44] See Whittaker (above, n. 7) 92.

τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεόν, 'when we say that the universal God ... is an intelligence or above intelligence and being'.[45] In none of these passages does Origen engage himself in a clear and definite answer. As Whittaker has rightly pointed out, in doing so he seems to be well aware of the debate on this problem existing both in the various philosophical traditions and in the Middle Platonic or Neoplatonic schools of the second and third centuries A.D.[46] If Plato, in the well-known passage of the sixth book of the *Republic* (509b9), had clearly placed the good above οὐσία, Aristotle had thought it possible to regard God both as an intelligence or as something above it.[47] Some exponents of Neopythagoreanism had unhesitatingly supported the thesis of the superiority of the first principle with respect to νοῦς and οὐσία.[48] As to Middle Platonism, if Plutarch had identified his first principle with absolute being and intelligence (*Mor.* 393a–b [*De E*], 371a [*De Is. et Os.*]), Numenius had regarded his 'first god' both as the principle of οὐσία and as an οὐσία and intelligence[49]; Alcinous had clearly maintained that the 'first god' was a νοῦς, but had also hinted at the possibility of his being something higher than intelligence itself[50]; Celsus, instead, had unequivocally placed his god above νοῦς and οὐσία (Cels. VII.45 [188.8–11 Bader]).[51] Plotinus' one-good, the first hypostasis, is above νοῦς and οὐσία, which form together one and the same entity in the second, lower hypostasis[52]; but like Plutarch Origen the Neoplatonist, a pupil of Ammonius who

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[45] See Whittaker (above, n. 7) 92–93.

[46] See Whittaker (above, n. 7) 92: 'Origen's statement [*sc.* in *Cels.* VI.64] seems to imply that the matter was under dispute in current speculation'.

[47] Περὶ εὐχῆς fr. 26 Rose (Bekker V 1483^{a}27–8), *EE* 1248^{a}28–9; see *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 227.

[48] This is the case of ps.-Brotinus in Syrianus, *in Metaph.* 166.5–6, and of ps.-Archytas in Stobaeus I.41 (i.280.15–7 WH); see Whittaker (above, n. 7), 95, 102–3, and Lilla in *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 247.

[49] Fr. 16 des Places (57.5.9–10.15–6) on the first god as principle of οὐσία and as οὐσία at the same time; fr. 16 (57.3–4), 17 (58.3–4), 20 (60.12) on the first god as intelligence (on the last three passages see also n. 29 above).

[50] On the first god as νοῦς see n. 29 above; on the possibility of the existence of something above the νοῦς cf. *Did.* 164.20–2, and Whittaker (above, n. 7) 103.

[51] See Whittaker (above, n. 7) 92.

[52] On the 'one' being above οὐσία and νοῦς see n. 26 above; on the identity between νοῦς and οὐσία (or ὄν) cf. the evidence produced on p. 135 above.

must be distinguished from the more famous homonymous patristic author,[53] identifies his first principle with absolute being and intelligence, and is for this reason severely rebuked by Proclus.[54] We have observed an analogous wavering in Clement (p. 135 above); and the same can be said about Philo, at least as far as the relationship between God and νοῦς is concerned (p. 135 above, with n. 28). A closer examination of the analogies and differences between Origen's Father and Plotinus' first hypostasis can however enable us to give a clearer solution to this question.

(5) Apart from several negative attributes which are characteristic not only of Plotinus' first hypostasis, but also of the first god of Middle Platonism and of the God of Philo and Clement (such as absence of generation and corruption, aloofness with respect to all beings and space, immutability, absence of needs, self-sufficiency, lack of form, dimensions and colours, ineffability, lack of names, lack of passions, simplicity, indivisibility and lack of parts),[55] Origen's Father has in common with the one-good of Plotinus and with the god of Celsus, Philo and Clement, but not with the god of other exponents of Middle Platonism and of the Greek apologists, the property of being unknown to the human reason (*Cels.* VI.65 [135.17–20]).[56] Moreover, like Plotinus, Origen also resorts to the images of God as 'source' (πηγή, *fons*; *princ.* I.1.6 [21.12–3], I.3.7 [60.2])[57] and of the outpouring of the multiplicity of beings from His unity (Origen's expression τὸ ποικίλον ... ἀπορρεόντων [*princ.* II.1.1 (107.4–5)] has its counterpart in Plotinus' πλῆθος ἐξερρύη [*Enn.* V.1.6 (272.7)]). But unlike Plotinus' first hypostasis which, as has been seen (p. 135, with n. 24), is devoid of any noetic activity, Origen presents the

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[53] On the literature concerning this question see Lilla, *DPAC* II (Casale Monferrato 1983) 2352–2353 (= *EEC* II, 624).

[54] Cf. Procl. *Theol.Plat.* II.4 (31.4–28 = Origen the Neoplatonist, fr. 7 Weber).

[55] A survey of these negative connotations can be found in Lilla, (above, n. 53) 2830–2831 (= *EEC* II, 692).

[56] On the possibility of knowing God by means of intelligence in Middle Platonism and the Greek apologists see *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 237 n. 69. Here, however, the reference to Celsus VII.45 is not completely appropriate: for Celsus God is unknown to ordinary human reason (cf. *Cels.* VI.65 [135.18]), but can be conceived by means of a higher, ineffable faculty (*Cels.* VII.45 [197.3] = 188.11 Bader).

[57] Cf. *Enn.* I.6.9 (117.41), III.8.10 (408.7, 409.27), VI.7.23 (242.21), VI.9.5 (315.36), VI.9.9 (322.1–2). On the presence of this image in Plotinus see especially H.J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam 1967) 339, 345. The Platonic source is *Phdr.* 245c9.

Father as a self-thinking intelligence, a connotation which rather pertains to Plotinus' second hypostasis and Alcinous' 'first god' (*in Ioh.* fr. 13 [495.22–4]),[58] and which is current in the Peripatetic tradition going back to Aristotle (Alex. Aphrod. *Mantissa* 109.4–7; Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 1072^{b}19–21). Besides, Origen's Father does not possess the infinite generative power of the one-good of Plotinus,[59] since His power corresponds exactly to the number of beings which He wants to govern.[60]

(6) Dealing with the question of the hierarchial position of the three members of Origen's Trinity, we have already had the opportunity of drawing attention to an important correspondence between Origen's Son and Plotinus' νοῦς: the subordination of both of them to the first hypostasis is unmistakable (see pp. 138–139 above). The close parellelism between Origen's second hypostasis and that of Plotinus is enhanced by several other points, which it is worth while to survey briefly. (i) Origen's *logos* and Plotinus' νοῦς are the 'second god',[61] an expression used by Numenius as well[62]; (ii) the *logos* is comprehended by the Father, just as the νοῦς is contained in the 'one'[63]; (iii) though being distinct from the Father, the *logos* is not

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[58] In Justinian's *ep. ad Memn.* Origen's God is presented as knowing Himself (P.G. 86.1, 983A7–8, 11–12). Cf. Plot. *Enn.* V.3.13 (322.17–9), V.9.5 (416.6–417.7) on the νοῦς; and Alcin. *Did.* 164.29–30 on the first god as intelligence. Unlike Origen, Plotinus denies that the 'one' can know itself, *Enn.* V.6.6 (369.31), cf. *Hel.* 28 (1988) 252. The differences between Origen's God and Plotinus' 'one' and the parallelism between the former and Plotinus' νοῦς are particularly emphasized by Ziebritzki (above, n. 1) 140, 143. His sentence 'der Gottesbegriff des Origenes steht grundsätzlich auf einer Stufe mit Plotins Intellektenbegriff, trägt aber auch Merkmale von Plotins Begriff des Einen' (143), reproduces faithfully what I had said about Clement's God ('He is the Plotinian νοῦς with some of the attributes which Plotinus allots to the one'; above, n. 8, 223).

[59] *Enn.* II.4.15 (199.19), V.5.10 (354.21), VI.9.6 (316.10–11), see *Hel.* 28 (1988) 233.

[60] Just. *ep. ad Memn.* P.G. 86.1, 981C3–D3. As the reference to matter shows (981C9–11), we are here faced with the application to God's power of the Stoic doctrine according to which the quantity of the existing matter is neither excessive nor deficient (οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων), but corresponds exactly to the total number of beings in the universe, *SVF* I.87 (24.29), II.316 (115.19–20).

[61] *Cels.* V.39 (43.22–6), cf. *Enn.* V.5.3 (342.3–4).

[62] Fr. 11 des Places (53.3–4), 15 (56.2–3.5.7), 16 (57.10.16), 19 (59.8.11).

[63] *Cels.* IV.92 (365.19–20), VII.34 (184.16–7), VIII.15 (233.14–5), Just. *ep. ad Memn.* P.G. 86.1, 983A5–6 = *princ.* IV.4.8 (360.1–2); cf. *Enn.* V.5.9 (351.1–2.352.31), and n. 38 above.

detached from Him, just as the νοῦς is not detached from the 'one'[64]; (iv) the *logos* is the splendour emanating from the light of the Father, just as the νοῦς can be compared to the light emanating from the sun[65]; (v) like the νοῦς, the *logos* is generated by the Father *ab aeterno*[66]; (vi) the *logos* owes His existence and His being God to His contemplation of the Father, just as the νοῦς is such because it turns towards the contemplation of the 'one'[67]; (vii) like the 'one' and the νοῦς, the Father and the Son are two lights[68]; (viii) like Plotinus' νοῦς and Numenius' 'second god', the *logos* is the demiurge[69]; (ix) as the *logos* is an image of the goodness of the Father, but not the absolute good, which is identical with the Father,[70] in the same way Plotinus' νοῦς is the image of the 'one', the absolute good, and Numenius' 'second god' is 'good', but not the good itself, inasmuch as he partakes of the first god, who is the absolute good and the model[71]; (x) the divine wisdom, which is identical with the higher stage of the *logos*, contains all forms and rational principles conceived by God (viz., His thoughts),[72] just as the νοῦς contains all beings and ideas

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[64] *princ.* I.2.7 (37.8), IV.4.1 (348.15); cf. *Enn.* V.3.12 (340.42–5), VI.8.17 (298.18–9).

[65] *princ.* I.2.4 (33.1–2), I.2.7 (37.7–8), IV.4.1 (349.17–9), *in Ioh.* XIII.25 (249.29–30), *hom. in Jer.* IX (70.17–20); the last two passages are reminiscent of *Ebr.* 1:3 and *Sap.* 7:26. For Plotinus see n. 19 above. This image is akin to that of the 'overflowing' of the *logos* from the Father or of the νοῦς from the 'one': cf. *princ.* I.2.5 (33.10–34.1), a passage which is reminiscent of *Sap.* 7:25 where the term ἀπόρροια occurs; and also the evidence concerning Plotinus quoted in n. 18 above.

[66] *princ.* I.2.4 (33.1), *hom. in Jer.* IX (70.16–22); for Plotinus see n. 20 above.

[67] *in Ioh.* II.2 (55.5–8), *Enn.* V.2.1 (290.9–292.13), V.4.2 (336.23–5).

[68] *in Ioh.* II.23 (80.16–21); for Plotinus cf. the evidence quoted in n. 19 above. Plotinus' expression φῶς ἐκ φωτός, *Enn.* IV.3.17 (35.13–4), occurs in the Nicaean symbol as well, see Picavet, *AEHE* (1917) 27, and Witt (above, n. 19) 196.

[69] *Cels.* VI.47 (119.1–2), *Enn.* I.3.18 (183.14–5), V.9.3 (414.25–6), Numenius fr. 12 des Places (54.3.7.14), 13 (55.4), 16 (57.4.6.8.11–12.15), 17 (58.3), 18 (58.7), 20 (60.3–4.6.10), 21 (60.4–5).

[70] *in Mt.* 19.17 (374.25–7, 375.20–3), *princ.* I.2.13 (46.13–47.2, 47.3–5), *in Ioh.* XIII.36 (261.27–8).

[71] *Enn.* V.1.7 (277.1), V.4.2 (336.25–6), V.5.13 (359.1–2), Numenius fr. 16 (57.8–10, 14–5), fr. 20 (60.5, 7).

[72] *in Ioh.* I.19 (24.1–2, 5–7), I.34 (43.20–2), *princ.* I.2.2 (30.7–8), *Cels.* V.39 (43.22–6). On this point see Lilla, 'Die Lehre von den Ideen als Gedanken Gottes im griechischen patristischem Denken', in *EPMENEY-MATA. Festschrift für H. Hörner zum sechzigsten Geburtstag. BKAW* N.F.,

and the world-soul contains all rational principles.[73] Moreover, Plotinus' νοῦς also is 'wisdom' (*Enn.* V.5.8 [390.14–6]).[74]

(7) In the patristic Greek tradition Origen seems to be the author of the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, which was to be taken up and developed especially by the Cappadocian Fathers, and to become official in the Byzantine Church. Origen maintains quite openly that the graces bestowed by the Holy Spirit upon those who show themselves capable and worthy of partaking of them hail from the Father and are transmitted through Christ to the Holy Spirit, in whom they have a substantial existence (*in Ioh.* II.10.77 [65.26–31]; cf. also *princ.* I.3.7 [60.10–2, 19–20]). The background of this view, however, must be sought not only in St. Paul (*Tit.* 3:6), but also in Neoplatonism: according to Plotinus, the third hypostasis is produced by the outpouring or overflowing of the power of the second, just as the second hypostasis is produced by the outpouring or overflowing of the infinite power of the first (*Enn.* V.2.1 [292.13–6]); it is the same divine power that overflows from the 'one' to the intelligence and from the intelligence to the world-soul.

(8) The inferiority of the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son and His procession from the Father through Christ are the only two points in which it is possible to establish a precise correspondence between the third member of Origen's Trinity and the third hypostasis of Plotinus.[75] In the Plotinian system one of the main tasks of

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2 Reihe, 79 (Heidelberg 1990) 38–41. On the identity between the divine wisdom and the higher stage of the *logos* cf. *in Ioh.* XXXII.31 (478.28–30).

[73] E.g. *Enn.* V.3.5 (305.27–8), V.5.2 (342.10–1), V.6.6 (418.1–2) on the νοῦς; II.3.16 (180.19–20) V.9.3 (414.30–1) on the world-soul. This correspondence between Origen's *logos* and Plotinus' νοῦς has been noted by H. Crouzel, 'Il "Logos" di Origene e il "Nous" di Plotino', in *La Cristologia dei Padri della Chiesa, Academia Cardinalis Bessarionis* 5 (1986) 97–101.

[74] The identity νοῦς–σοφία goes back to Plato, *Phlb.* 30c5–6. I have surveyed the main correspondences between Origen's *logos* and Plotinus' νοῦς in *DPAC* II 2832–2833 (= *EEC* II, 692–693).

[75] See pp. 138–139, 141 and 146 above. That Origen does not equate the Holy Spirit with the world-soul has been rightly pointed out by R.M. Berchmann (above, n. 43) 133; by H. Crouzel (above, n. 73) 102–103, and 'Qu'est-ce qui correspond chez Origène à la troisième hypostase plotinienne, l'âme du monde?', in *ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΙΝΑ, Hellénisme, Judaisme et Christianisme à Alexandrie. Mélanges offerts à Claude Mondésert S.J.* (Paris 1987) 205, 213; and more recently by H. Ziebritzki (above, n. 1) 143–144. Berchmann's total identification of Origen's Holy Spirit with the *logos* ('the Logos or Holy Spirit', 133) cannot however be accepted.

the world-soul is to administer and hold together the sensible universe.[76] Origen, instead, apparently allots this task not to the Holy Spirit but to the *logos*, who, like the Stoic *logos-pneuma* and the *logos* of Philo and Clement,[77] embraces and holds together the sensible world (*De Or.* 23.1 [349.28–350.1]).[78] Most probably Origen, like Clement and Philo,[79] has distinguished the transcendent stage of the *logos*, identical with divine wisdom (see n. 72 above), from a lower stage, in which it is the cosmic power immanent in the universe. This assumption seems to be fully supported by a passage of the commentary on John, in which Origen distinguishes the σοφία–ἀρχή of *Prov.* 8:22 and *Ioh.* 1:1—identical with Christ—from the *logos* of *Ioh.* 1:1 (*in Ioh.* I.19 [23.18–24]).[80] An analogous distinction can be observed in the *Wisdom of Solomon*. In this product of Hellenistic Judaism, strongly dependent on Posidonius' syncretistic Stoicism,[81] the divine wisdom is both transcendent and immanent.[82] It contains in itself a holy spirit, a πνεῦμα ἅγιον, penetrates everywhere like the Stoic *logos-pneuma* and transforms the holy souls into 'friends of God and prophets' (*Sap.* 7:22, 27). Influenced by the Stoic theory of the *logos-pneuma* and by the *Wisdom of Solomon*, Origen probably regarded the Holy Spirit as belonging also to the immanent stage of the *logos* which, as has been seen, corresponds substantially to Plotinus' world-soul; but at the same time he allotted Him the specific function of the transmission of holiness,[83] which he inferred from the *Book of*

Like the πνεῦμα ἅγιον of the *Book of Wisdom* (*Sap.* 7:22, 27), Origen's Holy Spirit belongs to the *logos*, but is not entirely identical with it (see also pp. 147–148 below).

[76] E.g. *Enn.* II.3.13 (175.3–4), II.3.16 (180.5), IV.3.9 (25.31; 26.36–7, 42–4, 46–8), IV.8.2 (232.26–8, 30–3).

[77] See Lilla (above, n. 8) 210–211, *id.*, *JThs* 31 (1980) 98 n. 2.

[78] Ziebritzki (above, n. 1, 143–144) is quite right in pointing out the close parallelism between the cosmic function of Origen's *logos* and that of the Plotinian world-soul (but he does not seem to be aware of the necessity of drawing a distinction between the transcendent and the immanent stage of the *logos*; see n. 80 below).

[79] See Lilla (above, n. 8) 203–212.

[80] See Lilla (above, n. 72) 38. What Ziebritzki (above, n. 1, 143–144) says about the correspondence between Origen's *logos* and Plotinus' world-soul (see n. 78 above) must be referred only to the immanent stage of the *logos*.

[81] See Lilla, 'La Sapienza di Salomone tra Stoicismo e Neoplatonismo', in *Letture cristiane dei libri sapienziali*, *SEA* 37 (Roma 1992) 521.

[82] See Lilla (above, n. 81) 520–521.

[83] This specific task of Origen's Holy Spirit has been rightly empha-

Wisdom.

H. Crouzel has discovered a trace of the Plotinian doctrine of the world-soul in Origen's theory of the *Corpus Christi*: as the world-soul is at the same time one and manifold inasmuch as it consists of the souls of all living beings, in the same way, according to Origen, the body of Christ, which is one, is formed by the manifold members represented by the whole of mankind and perhaps also by all living creatures.[84]

III

Eusebius of Caesarea, Didymus of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret of Cyrus

In order to demonstrate the dependence of Platonic philosophy on the Old Testament, in book XI of his *Praeparatio evangelica* Eusebius attempts to emphasize the substantial agreement between Plato and Moses by quoting a number of passages not only from Plato himself, but also from the subsequent Platonic tradition. Such a procedure shows that he aims at finding the theology of Neoplatonism in the Old Testament, which he interprets from the point of view of this theology. Chapter 21 of book XI bears the title Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων, which reproduces exactly the title of the first treatise of Plotinus' fifth Ennead. In order to prove Plato's dependence on the trinitarian theology which, in his opinion, is well present in the 'Jewish oracles', he quotes the famous passage of the second Platonic epistle. Since Eusebius' quotation is embedded in his own comment, it is better to quote here the entire section (*P.E.* XI.21.20.1–3 [46.5–20]) [85]:

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sized by Simonetti (above, n. 36) 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31–2.

[84] H. Crouzel (above, n. 73) 105, and *id.* (above, n. 75) 215. He draws attention to *hom. II in Ps. 36* (P.G. 12. 1330A), a passage which, though referring to *Eph.* 5:30, must also be brought into connection with Stoic and Plotinian doctrines: whereas the sentence *Christus ... cuius omne hominum genus ... corpus est, et unusquisque nostrum membra ex parte est*, must be compared with the Stoic views which are set forth by Plotinus in *Enn.* IV.3.1 (13.16–8, 24–6, 31–3) and are also present in *SVF* I.495 (111.9), II.774 (217.17), the words *imo fortassis totius naturae universitas* show the influence of the Plotinian doctrine—going back to Posidonius—of the extension of the universal soul to all beings, including animals and plants, cf. e.g. *Enn.* IV.3.9 (26.37–8), IV.7.14 (220. 4–6), IV.9.1 (252.4–7, 253.20–1), IV.9.3 (254.10–1), V.2.1 (292.21–4).

[85] Unfortunately this important section of Eusebius has been overlooked by Picavet, *AEHE* 1917, 36–37.

> The Jewish oracles, after speaking about the Father and the Son, put the Holy Spirit at the third place, and have this idea of the Holy and blessed Trinity: <according to them>, the third power surpasses any nature subject to birth; it is the first among the intelligent beings which have received their existence through the Son, but the third after the first cause. Look now how Plato hints at such doctrines in his letter to Dionysius, when he says ... [there follows the quotation of *Ep.* II 312 d–e]. Those who attempt to interpret Plato refer these words to the first god, to the second cause and thirdly to the world-soul, which they regard as the third god; but according to our tradition the divine utterances regard as principle the holy and blessed Trinity, formed by the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

This section deserves some comment. (a) The 'Jewish oracles' which, in Eusebius' opinion, expound the trinitarian doctrine are the *Wisdom of Solomon*, which mentions, besides God, the Wisdom and the Holy Spirit as well (cf., e.g., *Sap.* 1:6, 1:7, 1:13, 7:15, 7:21, 7:22, 7:24–6); (b) when Eusebius says 'those who attempt to interpret Plato', he means first of all Plotinus, to whose three hypostases he refers; (c) Eusebius juxtaposes Clement's interpretation of the Platonic passage (which refers the three kings to the three members of the Trinity) and that of Plotinus (which identifies them with the three hypostases); (d) that Eusebius wants indeed to see the Trinity not only in the three kings of the Platonic epistle but also in the three Plotinian hypostases is confirmed by chapters 15–19 of book XI of his *Praeparatio*: the wisdom of the *Proverbs*, of the *Psalms* and of Solomon (*P.E.* XI.15.14.1–10 [34.10–35.26]) is identified by him not only with Philo's *logos* (*P.E.* XI.16.15.1–7 [36.2–37.6]) but also with Plotinus' νοῦς (*P.E.* XI.18.17.1–10 [38.9–40.8]) and with Numenius' 'second god' (*P.E.* XI.19.18.1–10 [40.13–41.22]). Particular attention should be paid, in this respect, to the quotation, in chapter 18, of the beginning of chapter 8 of the first treatise of the fifth Ennead, where, it will be remembered, Plotinus quotes the passage of the Platonic epistle (*P.E.* XI.18.17.9–10 [39.22–40.8]; see p. 130 above, with n. 5).

In the second book of his *De Trinitate* (P.G. 39. 760B3–12) Didymus of Alexandria finds a support for his orthodox trinitarian doctrine—expressed by the formula μία οὐσία (or μία θεότης), τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, 761A8–9—in a passage of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* (fr. 16 Nauck),[86] a work which still belongs to the Plotinian

[86] The importance of this passage for the formulation of the trinitarian doctrine of Basil and Victorinus has been rightly emphasised

phase of his speculation. As we shall see presently, the same passage will be taken into account by Cyril as well:

> Porphyry, who usually has no sound opinion about the divine reality and, so to speak, more than not contradicts himself, nevertheless, trying to set forth Plato's views, thinks it proper to express himself in these terms, as though he were constrained by the truth or by his veneration for Plato: 'Plato said that the divine essence proceeds as far as the three hypostases.[87] The highest god is the good; after him, the demiurge comes second and the world-soul comes as third. In fact the divinity proceeds up to the soul'.[88]

Anticipating what Cyril will say, Didymus identifies Porphyry's world-soul with the Holy Spirit. He cannot help concluding that the 'wretched Porphyry' (ὁ ἐπάρατος Πορφύριος), despite his obscure expressions (ἀμυδρῶς), had called 'soul' the monadic Holy Spirit of God who produces salvation (P.G. 39. 761A1–5); and that the pagan wise men also were able to witness the shining appearance of the three blessed individual realities in one and the same godhead, τοὺς τῶν ἔξω σοφοὺς μαρτυροῦντας, ὡς αἱ τρεῖς μακάριαι ὑποστάσεις ἐν μιᾷ θεότητι ... ἐξεφάνησαν (P.G. 39. 761A7–10; θεότητι is the equivalent of οὐσίᾳ).

In his work *Against Julian*, which is meant to be an answer to Julian's work *Against the Galilaeans*, Cyril aims at demonstrating that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, rejected by Julian, is in fact present in Greek philosophy. Besides several other philosophers Cyril also quotes passages from Plotinus and Porphyry. He attaches much importance to the first treatise of the fifth Ennead, Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων, which he often quotes in books II, IV and VIII of his work. For our theme, however, among all these quotations, particularly relevant is, in book I, that of two passages of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*. The first passage is the same as that which is quoted by Didymus; in the second, Porphyry quotes the

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by M. Simonetti, *La crisi ariana del IV secolo. SEA* 11 (Roma 1975) 513–514; cf. also his paper 'Genesi e sviluppo della trinitaria di Basilio di Cesarea', in *Atti del congresso internazionale su "Basilio di Cesarea: la sua età e il Basilianesimo in Sicilia"* (Messina 1983) 185 n. 36.

[87] Porphry's sentences ἄχρι ... τριῶν ὑποστάσεων ... τὴν τοῦ θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν and ἄχρι ... ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν are reminiscent of Plot. *Enn.* V.1.7 (279.48–9) καὶ μέχρι τούτων τὰ θεῖα; see W. Theiler, 'Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios', in *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1966) 261.

[88] The last sentence of Porphyry's fragment harks back to the first (see n. 87 above).

section of the second Platonic letter concerning the three kings. We give here the text from the section of Cyril in which the two Porphyrian passages occur (*C. Iulian.* I [P.G. 76. 553B4–556A1]):

> These passages suffice to demonstate completely that they also [viz., the Greek philosophers] had in mind the only-begotten *logos* of God. But, in my opinion, to what I have been saying it is also necessary to add their utterances about the Holy Spirit. In his exposition of Plato's views, Porphyry says: 'The divine substance proceeds as far as the three hypostases. The highest god is the good; after him, the demiurge comes second; and the world-soul comes as third. In fact, the divinity proceeds up to the soul' [*Hist. Phil.* fr. 16 Nauck].[89] In saying this, he clearly maintains that God's substance extends to three realities. In fact the universal God is one; but, like the knowledge which has Him as object, He expands in the holy and consubstantial Trinity: I mean the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, whom Plato calls the world-soul.[90] The Spirit quickens, and proceeds from the living Father through the Son ... And again, the same Porphyry says about Plato [*Hist. Phil.* fr. 17 Nauck]: 'Hinting secretly at these realities, Plato says "all beings lie around the universal king, and all beings exist for him, and he is the cause of all beautiful things; the beings of the second rank are concerned with the second king, and those of the third rank with the third" [*Ep.* II 312e1–4]. All beings lie thus around the three gods, but on a first level around the universal king, on a second level around the god deriving from the first, and on a third level around the god deriving from the second'. Starting from the <universal> king, Porphyry showed the origin of the other two kings from the upper, and the descent and declension of the gods who come after the first, indicated by the words 'on a first level', 'on a second level' and 'on a third level'; he also showed that all beings derive from one principle, and are preserved through it. But his views are not completely sound: like the followers of Arius' doctrines, he divides the hypostases and presents them as subordinate to each other; he believes that the holy and consubstantial Trinity consists of three divided gods. He did not, however, ignore the truth entirely.[91]

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[89] Cf. Didymus, *Trin.* II (P.G. 39. 760B3–12).

[90] Cf. *Ti.* 30b4, 34b3, b10, c5, *Phlb.* 30d1–2, *Phdr.* 245c5, 246a1, *Lg.* 896a6, b2, d10–e2, e8, 897c7.

[91] Picavet, *AEHE* 1917, 45–46 n. 1 (cf. also 48–49), quotes only a part of this long section in his French version. A French version of the whole

Like Eusebius, Cyril draws a close comparison between the three kings of the Platonic epistle, the three Plotinian and Porphyrian hypostases and the three persons of the Christian Trinity; and, unlike Origen but like Didymus, he does not hesitate to identify Plotinus' and Porphyry's world-soul with the Holy Spirit.[92] The only two aspects of Porphyry's system which he is not prepared to accept are the hierarchical disposition of the three hypostases and their radical division; two doctrines which, in his opinion, point to Arianism. In this section the clear formulation of the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son is also worth noting (P.G. 76. 553C6 πρόεισιν ἐκ ζῶντος πατρὸς δι' υἱοῦ).

The first of the two fragments of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* (fr. 16 Nauck) quoted in this section of the first book *Against Julian* is quoted again in book VIII (P.G. 76. 916B3–9). The attitude which Cyril manifests just before quoting the Porphyrian text is the same as that noted in book I: on the one hand, Cyril points out the agreement between the Neoplatonic system of the three hypostases and the Christian views about the Trinity; on the other, he criticizes the Neoplatonic construction for missing the notion of 'consubstantiality' (τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον) and placing the three hypostases at different hierarchical levels (P.G. 76. 913D3–916A9):

> They also [viz., the Neoplatonists], supposing the existence of three original hypostases[93] and maintaining that the essence of God stretches as far as these three realities,[94] sometimes use the term 'trinity' and thus agree with the Christian views. Nothing of their construction would be defective in this respect, if they had applied the notion of 'consubstantiality' to the three hypostases. In this way, the nature of the Godhead could have been conceived as one, and its threefoldness would not have implied a difference in nature. The three hypostases should not have appeared as inferior to each other. In fact, they place the first cause at the highest level, and regard it as absolutely firm, unmoved and inactive. They say that it is the good. Intelligence originates from it and, contemplating it,

section is, instead, given by Saffrey-Westerink (above, n. 2) L–LII.

[92] Cf. pp. 146–147 and 150 above.

[93] The words τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις (P.G. 76. 913D3) are reminiscent of the title of *Enn.* V.1.

[94] The sentence μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ προσήκειν (P.G. 76. 913D4–5) reproduces the first sentence of fr. 16 of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* (P.G. 76. 553B10–11, 916B4–5); for its dependence on Plotinus see n. 87 above.

> becomes perfect.[95] They call this intelligence 'second god' and the demiurge of the universe,[96] who comes next immediately after <the first principle>; but they subordinate him by placing him at a second level with respect to the first god. And they mention the world-soul as third; it does not receive its perfection from itself, but becomes more divine and stronger in its production of life thanks to its relation with the higher intelligence.[97]

Plotinus also is criticized for the same reasons. After quoting the section *Enn.* V.1.6 (276.39–277.49) which illustrates the mutual relations between the three hypostases (*C. Iulian.* VIII [P.G. 76. 917D10–920A10]), Cyril comments: 'Holding these views, and dragging down what they admire so much into a dissimilarity of natures, they boast of their silly and childish opinions' (P.G. 76. 920B7–10). But despite this criticism Cyril admits that 'the Greek wise men had some knowledge of the Holy Trinity' (P.G. 76. 920C2–3). The Plotinian theory is acceptable inasmuch as it keeps the contiguity of the three hypostases excluding any interval between them and makes it clear that the relationship between the intelligence and the good is analogous to that which exists between the soul and the intelligence (P.G. 76. 920C3–8). In Cyril's opinion, both points find their support in the Plotinian text of *Enn.* V.1.6 (276.39–277.53): after quoting the sections 276.39–277.49 (P.G. 76. 917D 10–920A10), Cyril quotes the immediately following section, 277.50–3 (P.G. 76. 920C10–4). In order to illustrate the distinction between the Father and the Son, concerning not their nature, but their mode of being (P.G. 76. 920D4–7), he deems it worth while to borrow Plotinus' sentence ὡς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνῃ κεχωρίσθαι (277.53), pointing to the distinction between the generative principle and what is generated: κεχωρίσθαι δὲ μόνῃ τῇ ἑτερότητι (P.G. 76. 920D4).[98]

Like Eusebius and Cyril, Theodoret also identifies the three persons of the Trinity with the three hypostases of Plotinus; and, like Didymus and Cyril, he explicitly brings the world-soul into connection with the Holy Spirit. A passage of book II of his *Graecarum*

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[95] Cf. point 6 of Origen's doctrine of *logos*, p. 145 above (with n. 67).

[96] Cf. points 1 and 8 of Origen's doctrine of *logos*, pp. 144 and 145 above (with nn. 61 and 69).

[97] On this section see also Picavet, *AEHE* 1917, 45 (who quotes the first part of it in French translation), and Aubin (above, n. 2) 28–29.

[98] These passages of Cyril concerning Plotinus are quoted in French translation by Picavet, *AEHE* 1917, 45 (but the reference to *Enn.* V.7.7 is wrong).

Affectionum Curatio (II.85), in which he mentions Plato, Plotinus and Numenius, deserves our particular attention:

> So, for instance, both Plotinus and Numenius, trying to explain Plato's thought, say that he regarded as being above time and eternal three principles, the good, the intelligence and the world-soul; he called 'the good' the principle which we call Father; intelligence, the principle which we call Son and *logos*; and soul, the power which animates and quickens all things, and which the divine words call Holy Spirit.[99]

IV

The Cappadocian Fathers

Everybody who has some acquaintance with the early Christian theology knows very well that, according to the Cappadocian Fathers, God is at the same time a threefold monad and a Trinity which is also 'one', since He is 'one' in His substance, divinity, power and will, and threefold in His three distinct hypostases or persons[100]; and that this conception, officially proclaimed by Gregory of Nazianzus at the council of Constantinople of 381,[101] aims at being an answer, on the one hand, to Sabellianism and Judaism, which blurred the distinction between the three persons, and, on the other, to Arianism, tritheism and the metaphysical system of Plotinus, which split the fundamental unity of the Godhead by subordinating the second hypostasis to the first and the third to the second[102] (Numenius, Plotinus and the tritheists had even come to the conception of three different gods, vehemently rejected by the Cappadocians).[103] It is

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[99] *SCh* 57.1, 161.15–162.5, quoted also by Picavet both in its Greek text and in French translation, *AEHE* 1917, 49 (with n. 1).

[100] Cf., e.g., Bas. *ep.* 214.4 (205.11–15), 236.6 (53.3–7), Gr. Nyss. *comm. not.* 21.6–15, 15–9, 25.10, *or. catech.* 1 (8.10–11), 3 (13.18–9), Gr. Naz. *or.* 20.7 (*SCh* 270.70.5), 21.35 (*SCh* 270.184.14–5), 25.17 (*SCh* 284.198.3–4), 30.12 (*SCh* 250.250.20), 31.9 (*SCh* 250.292.13–4.17–8), 39.11 (*SCh* 358. 172.19–20), *poem. dogm.* 3.60 (P.G. 37. 413A), 3.72–74 (P.G. 37. 414A).

[101] I.D. Mansi, *Sacr. Concil. nova et ampliss. Coll.* III (Florentiae 1769) 541E1–2, 10–11, 544A1–4 (= *Or.* 42.15, *SCh* 384.80.7–8, 82.15–20).

[102] I have collected some evidence concerning this point in the chapter devoted to the Cappadocian Fathers and ps.-Dionysius Areopagita in E. Dal Covolo, ed., *Storia della teologia* I (Roma/Bologna 1995): see in particular 267 n. 15, 284 (on Basil), 285, 287, 305 n. 371 (on Gregory of Nyssa), and 304–307 (on Gregory of Nazianzus).

[103] See Lilla (above, n. 102) 284 nn. 159–160, 287 n. 185, 305 n. 372, 307 n. 389.

neither necessary nor advisable to dwell at present on these questions, which have long been studied and of which I have recently attempted to give a sketch elsewhere.[104] In my opinion, instead, two points must be particularly emphasized here: first of all, the conception of God as a threefold monad or as a triad which is also a unity is not an original achievement of the theological speculation of Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, but is of earlier growth, since it occurs in the *Chaldaean Oracles* and in the post-Plotinian phase of Porphyry's thought; secondly, despite their categorical rejection of the hierarchical structure of Plotinus' system, the Cappadocian Fathers do not hesitate to resort to Plotinian and Porphyrian tenets whenever they want to illustrate some properties of the three hypostases of the Trinity or to establish the laws which are meant to regulate their mutual relations.

In a fragment of the *Chaldaean Oracles* (fr. 26 des Places) we find the expression μουνάδα ... τριοῦχον, 'threefold monad'; in another fragment (fr. 27 des Places), the sentence παντὶ ... ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει τριάς, ἧς μονὰς ἄρχει is also worth noting.[105] The anonymous author of a commentary on the *Parmenides*, whom P. Hadot rightly identifies with Porphyry,[106] refers openly to this doctrine and adopts it: 'some others [viz., the *Chaldaean Oracles*] ... admit ... that power and intelligence are unified in his simplicity' (*in Prm.* IX.1–4)[107]; 'the one

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[104] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 102) 265–321.

[105] On fr. 26 see H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*. Rech. d'archéol., de philol. et d'hist. XIII (Le Caire 1956) 106 n. 164; P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* I (Paris 1968) 96 (with n. 2), 261 n. 1; on fr. 27 see Lewy, *op. cit.* 106 n. 164; Hadot, *op. cit.* 261 n. 1; Theiler (above, n. 87) 260.

[106] P. Hadot, 'Fragment d'un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide', *REG* 74 (1961) 410–438; *id.*, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre', in *Porphyre. EAC* XII (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1965) 130. Despite his reservations about the authorship of the anonymous commentary on the *Parmenides*, A. Smith regards the doctrine of δύναμις displayed in this commentary as a direct development of Porphyry's views: *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic tradition. A Study in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism* (The Hague 1974) 18–19.

[107] On this passage see also G. Kroll, *De Oraculis Chaldaicis*, *BPhA* VII.1 (Breslau 1894) 12; H. Lewy (above, n. 105) 78 n. 45, 79 n. 47; Hadot (above, n. 105) II.91 nn. 1–2, and *id.*, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' (above, n. 106) 134–135. As Hadot has pointed out (above, n. 105), II.91 n. 2, Porphyry had in mind the verse ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις σὺν ἐκείνῳ, νοῦς δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου (fr. 4 des Places), where ἐκείνῳ refers to the πατήρ.

is one and simple according to its own first notion ... and not one and not simple according to its existence, life and thought' (*in Prm.* XIV. 10–2, 15–6). In the post-Plotinian phase of his speculation, in which the influence of the *Chaldaean Oracles* is remarkable, Porphyry puts thus at the top of his metaphysical system not the absolute 'one' of Plotinus, which admits no division whatever in itself (*Enn.* V.3.15 [326.31] οὕτως εἶχεν ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα),[108] but a threefold 'one', viz., an intelligible triad composed by existence (ὕπαρξις, corresponding to the Father of the *Chaldaean Oracles*), by its power or life (δύναμις, ζωή) and by its intelligence or noetic activity (νοῦς, νόησις, corresponding to the paternal intellect, πατρικὸς νοῦς, of the *Chaldaean Oracles*). Hadot is quite right in pointing out that Porphry does not place the 'one' above this triad.[109] That this is indeed Porphyry's view is directly confirmed by Proclus and Damascius, and indirectly by St. Augustine. Proclus, who comes back to the Plotinian conception of the 'one' which excludes any division, does not conceal his criticism of Porphyry's view: 'We are very far from saying that the summit of the intelligible realm is the first god—I know that some of those who are first in theology hold this view; and we are also very far from identifying the father of that realm with the universal cause ... The father is divided into his power and intelligence, of which he is said to be the Father, and forms a triad together with them' (*in Prm.* VI [40.19–41.7]).[110] Damascius, who is inclined to adopt Iamblichus' theory of a very first principle placed even above the 'one', is equally determined in his rejection: 'shall we say, together with Porphyry,

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[108] On the antecedents of this doctrine, which goes back to the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, cf. *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 219, 226, 232, 250, 254, 266, 278, and 28 (1988) 203–204.

[109] Hadot (above, n. 105) I.97: 'il ne place même pas l'un avant la triade'. Theiler (above, n. 87), 260, referring to Damascius, *Pr.* 43 (see p. 157 below), points out the difference between Porphyry and the other Neoplatonists in this crucial point: 'Auch Porphyrios kennt die Dreiheit ... Es kommt ihm [i.e. Damascius] darauf an, Porphyrios von den übrigen Platonikern abzuheben, die die μία τῶν πάντων ἀρχή ... nicht in der ersten Stelle der Triade suchten, sondern als durchaus unvergleichbar von der Triade trennten'.

[110] On this passage see Theiler (above, n. 87) 260, and Hadot (above, n. 105) I.258–259. According to Hadot (I.259 n. 1), the verb ἀντιδιῄρηται used by Proclus in his description of Porphyry's triad points to the coordination of the father with his power and intelligence (the three members of the triad thus occupy the same level). This view becomes fundamental in the trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians, which excludes a hierarchical disposition of the three hypostases (being equal in dignity, they are on the same level).

that the sole universal principle is in fact the father of the intelligible triad?' He also appeals to Iamblichus who had rejected Porphyry's view about the existence of a distinction inside the highest intelligible (*Pr.* 43 [ii.1.11–3], 113 [iii.119.23–8]).[111] St. Augustine, in turn, explicitly admits to be unable to give a precise identity to the intermediate member whom Porphyry places betwen the Father and the paternal intellect, *quem alium dicat eorum medium non intellego* (*De civ. D.* X.23 [= Porph. *De Regr. An.* fr. 8 Bidez]).[112] Having Plotinus' construction still floating in his mind, and taking it as the starting-point in his interpretation of the Porphyrian triad,[113] he does not conceal his surprise about the nature of the first triad of the post-Plotinian Porphyry, who regards as the second member of this triad not the intelligence, but the δύναμις-ζωή (*in Prm.* XIV.16, 17–21, 25–6).[114] What is important to bear in mind here, is that the three distinct and coordinated members of Porphyry's triad are also the three constitutive elements of his first principle, and form all together a unity which is in itself simple and above number.[115] As Beierwaltes has not failed to point out, this is also the idea which underlies the orthodox doctrine of the Christian Trinity[116]: the absolutely simple Godhead is a monad composed of three distinct hypostases which, however, form a unity not only because they have the same substance and the same will, but also because they dwell in each other and blend themselves together without blurring their distinctive

[111] On the former passage see Theiler (above, n. 87) 260; Hadot (above, n. 105) I.96 (with n. 3); A. Linguiti, *L'ultimo platonismo greco. Principi e conoscenza* (Firenze 1990) 15; Lilla, *Hel.* 31-32 (1991-92) 8; on the latter see Theiler, *op. cit.* 260 (the πρεσβύτης criticized by Iamblichus is most probably Porphyry: see Theiler, *ibid.*; Saffrey-Westerink, *Proclus Théologie plat.* III [Paris 1978] XXXVIII n. 1; J. Combès, *Damascius. Traité des premiers principes* III [Paris 1991] 214 n. 7).

[112] On this passage see also Theiler (above, n. 87) 261, and Hadot (above, n. 105) 475.

[113] See S. Lilla, *Un dubbio di S. Agostino su Porfirio*, *NAFM* 5 (1987) 320.

[114] See also Hadot (above, n. 105) 475. ζωή corresponds both to the δύναμις of the Chaldaean oracles (*in Prm.* IX.3, fr. 3 and 4 des Places), and to the phase of πρόοδος (*in Prm.* XIV.25-6 κατὰ δὲ τὴν ζωὴν ἐκ τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐκνεύσασα ἐνέργεια). See Lilla (above, n. 113) 323–324.

[115] *in Prm.* IX.4 ἐν τῇ ἁπλότητι αὐτοῦ συνηνῶσθαι; IX.6–7 ἀναιρεῖν ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῦσιν. On the coordination of the three members of the triad see n. 110 above.

[116] W. Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen* (Frankfurt/m 1985) 198; *id.*, 'Unity and Trinity in Dionysius and Eriugena', *Hermathena* 157 (1994) 15 n. 10.

connotations.[117]

We have thus come across one of the most characteristic features of the trinitarian speculation of the Cappadocians, which can be adequately appreciated only by taking its Neoplatonic background into account. Nothing can synthethize it better than the formula 'unity-in-distinction, distinction-in-unity', suggested by Dodds and Beierwaltes.[118] Gregory of Nyssa sets forth clearly this view in his short treatise *De Differentia Essentiae et Hypostasis* which has mostly been transmitted to us as Epistle 38 of Basil (but first Cavallin and then, with more cogent arguments, Hübner have shown its true authorship)[119]: 'neither can the distinction between the hypostases break the contiguity of nature nor can the community of essence blur the peculiar features by means of which the hypostases can be recognized. Do not be surprised if we say that the same reality is at the same time united and divided and if we enigmatically think of a new and extraordinary kind of united distinction and divided union' (*diff. ess.* 4 [87.85–91]). Even if the idea of the presence of the three persons of the Trinity in each other (John of Damascus will call it περιχώρησις[120]) has a firm scriptural foundation,[121] we are here faced with the Neoplatonic idea of the mutual, complete blending of incorporeal realities which, however, excludes any blurring (σύγχυσις) and keeps them clearly distinct from each other. H. Dörrie has clearly pointed out that Porphyry, in his *Symmikta Zetemata*, maintained

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[117] On the three hypostases possessing the same substance see n. 100 above, n. 124 below, and Lilla (above, n. 102) 267–268, 286 nn. 179 and 182, 306 n. 376; on their common will and power see n. 100 above and Lilla (above, n. 102) 306 n. 377; on the presence of the three hypostases in each other and their mutual blending cf., e.g., Bas. *Spir.* XVIII.45 (*SCh* 17 bis 406, 10–12), *Eun.* III.3 (*SCh* 305.154.7–156.13), *hom.* 24.4 (P.G. 31. 609A11–C1), Gr. Nyss. *diff. ess.* 4 (= [Basil] *ep.* 38 [86.76–87.84]), *Maced.* 89.25–90.1, Gr. Naz. *or.* 31.3 (*SCh* 250.280.17), 31.14 (302.8–9), 40.41 (*SCh* 358.294.17–9.22–4), 42.15 (*Sch* 384.82.17–18).

[118] E.R. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology* (Oxford 1933) 291: 'unity-in-distinction'; Beierwaltes, 'Unity and Trinity' (above, n. 116): 'unity in difference and difference in unity'.

[119] A. Cavallin, *Studien zu den Briefen des hl. Basilius* (Lund 1944) 71–81; R. Hübner, 'Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der sog. Ep. 38 des Basilius', in *Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal J. Daniélou* (Paris 1972) 463–490.

[120] *fid. orth.* 14 (42.12–3) τὴν ἐν ἀλλήλαις περιχώρησιν. On περιχώρησις see A. Deneffe, 'Perichoresis, Circumincessio, Circuminsessio. Eine Terminologische Untersuchung', *ZKTh* 47 (1923) 497–532.

[121] *Is.* 61:1, *La.* 4:20, *Sap.* 1:6.7, 7:22, *Ioh.* 4:24, 10:38, 14:10.11, 14:20, 15:26, 17:21, *Rom.* 8:9, *2 Cor.* 3:17-8, *Phil.* 1:19.

that the intelligibles are at the same time intimately united to each other and yet not blurred.[122] Since, according to Damascius' witness quoted above, Porphyry called his highest triad 'intelligible' (see p. 157 above), it is very likely that he applied his general view about the mixture of the intelligibles to the three intelligible members of his triad as well. If this is the case, Porphyry's doctrine of the first principle must indeed be regarded as the closest antecedent of the orthodox trinitarian doctrine of the Cappadocians, not only from the point of view of the conception of the threefold monad, but also from that of the particular relationship between the three hypostases. The doctrine of the union or mixture of the intelligibles has a long story within Neoplatonism (it is also present in Numenius, Ammonius, Plotinus, Amelius, Iamblichus and Proclus) and goes ultimately back to the κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων of the Porch and Anaxagoras' homoeomery; but this is not the right place to set it forth by examining its presence in each of these authors.[123]

A Neoplatonic background underlies also the formula μία φύσις (or οὐσία or θεότης), εἷς θεός–τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις adopted not only by Didymus (see p. 150 above), but also by the Cappadocians and the council of Constantinople of 381.[124] Dealing with Didymus and Cyril, we have mentioned a passage of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* (fr. 16 Nauck) in which the divine substance is presented as stretching up to the third hypostasis (see pp. 150–151 above). Here we must add that Plotinus uses the expression μία φύσις in order to make it clear that the world-soul remains one and does not lose its basic unity though being present in the manifold particular souls of the

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[122] H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' Symmikta Zetemata*. Zetemata 20 (München 1959) 54, 107, 160 n. 1.

[123] A partial sketch of the history of this tenet can be found in Dodds (above, n. 118) 291–292.

[124] Cf., e.g., Bas. *hom.* 24.4 (P.G. 31. 605B8) μίαν οὐσίαν; *ep.* 236.6 (53.3–5) οὐσίαν ... μίαν ... ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσαν; Gr. Nyss. *Eun.* III (ii.110.22) μία ... ἡ θεία φύσις, *or. dom.* III (42.5–6) μία ... ἡ φύσις, *comm. not.* 20.27 μία οὐσία καὶ ἡ αὐτή, 21.14–5 μίαν ... οὐσίαν, πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος, 33.2–4 ἕνα θεόν ... ἐν τρισὶ προσώποις ἤγουν ὑποστάσεσι, *fid.* 67. 4–6 μίαν ... φύσιν ... ἐν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι; Gr. Naz. *or.* 21.35 (*SCh* 270.184.14–5) τῆς ... μιᾶς οὐσίας καὶ τῶν τριῶν ὑποστάσεων, 31.9 (*SCh* 250.292.13–4) τῶν τριῶν ὑποστάσεων ἐν τῇ μιᾷ φύσει, 42.15 (*SCh* 384.82.16–7) φύσις δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ μία, ὁ θεός, 42.16 (84.14–6) ἓν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ... τρία ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι, εἴτουν προσώποις. On the council of Constantinople, cf. Theodoret, *Hist. eccl.* V.9 (P.G. 82. 1216B13–C2) οὐσίας μιᾶς ... ἐν τρισὶ τελειοτάταις ὑποστάσεσι, ἤγουν τρισὶ τελείοις προσώποις. The same formula will be adopted by Leontius of Byzantium, *arg. Sev.* (P.G. 86. 2. 1920D9–11) τρεῖς μὲν ὑποστάσεις ... μίαν δὲ τούτων φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν καταγγέλλομεν.

living beings; in the same way the nature of the Godhead remains one and the same though being equally present in each person of the Trinity.[125]

The borrowing of the Plotinian expression μία φύσις is not of course the sole point of contact between the theology of the Cappadocians and Plotinus' metaphysics. Unfortunately it is not possible to show here exhaustively and in detail how the Cappadocians base their conception either of the whole Godhead or of the three hypostases on Plotinian tenets; we must limit ourselves to a brief survey of some relevant correspondences. We shall dwell first on the whole Godhead and on the first two persons of the Trinity, and then pass to the third person.

(1) When the Cappadocians try to describe the Godhead, they regularly resort to the various negative attributes which are also characteristic of the 'one' of Plotinus, of the first principle of the earlier Platonic tradition, of the God of Philo and of the 'one' of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*.[126] (2) Gregory of Nyssa explicitly refers to the method based on the removal (ἀφαίρεσις) of all possible attributes from God.[127] The same method is adopted by Plotinus and, in Middle Platonism, by Alcinous and Celsus in their attempt to approach the first principle.[128] (3) The Father is the 'root' and the 'source'; both images are referred by Plotinus to the 'one'.[129] (4) Like the Plotinian first principle, God is the πρῶτον ἀγαθόν and is desired by all beings.[130] (5) Being difficult to reach, God can be compared to

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[125] *Enn.* IV.7.11 (217.18) μία φύσις ἐνεργείᾳ ζῶσα, IV.9.5 (257.1–2) οὐσία μία ἐν πολλαῖς ... ἡ μία ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλη, VI.2.4 (61.31–2) μία φύσις πολλά, VI.4.4 (141.34–6) οὔτε τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὰς πολλὰς ἀναιρεῖ ... οὔτε μάχεται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκεῖ τῷ ἑνί.

[126] Cf., e.g., Bas. *hom.* 15.1 (P.G. 31. 465C2–8), Gr. Nyss. *in Cant.* V (157.16–21, 158.8–12); see the surveys in Lilla (above, n. 102) 266, 289–290, 301–302. On the presence of negative concepts in Plato's *Parmenides*, in Philo, in Middle Platonism, in Plotinus, and in Porphyry, see my study 'La teologia negativa ...', *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 211–279, 28 (1988) 203–279.

[127] *Eun.* II (395.23–6); Lilla (above, n. 102) 288 (with n. 203).

[128] On Alcinous, Celsus and Plotinus see *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 264–265, 270 n. 294, 28 (1988) 209–212.

[129] Bas. *hom.* 15.2 (P.G. 31. 465C12) ῥίζα, 24.4 (P.G. 31. 609B5) ῥίζα καὶ πηγή; cf. *Enn.* III.3.7 (308.11) ῥίζης, VI.9.9 (322.1–2) πηγήν ... ῥίζαν; see also the references to Krämer in n. 57 above.

[130] Bas. *hom.* 15.2 (P.G. 31. 465C5–6); Gr. Nyss. *virg.* 10 (288.17; 289.25–6), 11 (294.22–3); Gr. Naz. *or.* 21.1 (*SCh* 270.112.22, 25), 28.13 (*SCh* 250.128.24–5), 38.7 (*SCh* 358.116.17). Cf. *Enn.* I.7.1 (119.22), I.8.2 (122.3), V.4.1 (334.34–5) and the title of the seventh treatise of the first

the *adyton* of a temple; the same image is applied by Plotinus to the 'one'.[131] (6) All properties of God belong to His own nature and are not simple accidents coming from the outside; in the same way, Plotinus' first principle is the absolute good and not simply 'good', since it does not receive the good from a higher principle.[132] (7) Like Plotinus' 'one', the Son is the source of life.[133] (8) The Father is the 'original form', comparable to Plotinus' 'form of forms' produced by the 'one' and identical with the second hypostasis.[134] (9) The Son shines and comes from the essence of the Father; in the same way, Plotinus' αἰών shines and comes from οὐσία, the absolute intelligible being identical with the second hypostasis; and his νοῦς is the splendour of the 'one', comparable to the sun.[135] (10) There is no separation, no gap between the Father and the Son and between the Son and the Holy Spirit, exactly as Plotinus' three hypostases, though occupying three

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Ennead, Περὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ. For Philo also God is the πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, *Leg. ad G.* 5 (vi.156.9–10). The doctrine according to which the good is desired by all beings is Aristotelian, cf. *EN* 1094ᵃ3 (this reference is given by Henry-Schwyzer *app. font.* I.119, 122), 1172ᵇ14–5, *Top.* 116ᵃ19–20, *Rh.* 1362ᵃ23.

[131] Gr. Nyss. *in Cant.* I (22.17), XI (323.3–4), *or. dom.* III (33.16), *beat.* VII (149.13) ἄδυτον ... ἅγιον ἁγίων, *v. Mos.* II (88.21); cf. *Enn.* VI.9.11 (326.18). On the presence of this idea in Gregory of Nyssa see esp. J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique* (Paris 1953) 182–189.

[132] E.g. Gr. Nyss. *v. Mos.* I (40.10–1), *virg.* 11 (296.15–7), *Eun.* II (246.27–30), III (ii.212.25–6, 237.5–6); cf. *Enn.* V.5.13 (359.1; 360.27–8; 360.29–361.34). This important correspondence unfortunately escaped F. Diekamp, *Die Gotteslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nyssa* (Münster 1896) 203.

[133] Bas. *hom.* 15.2 (P.G. 31. 465C13) πηγὴ τῆς ζωῆς; cf. *Enn.* III.8.10 (408.2–5), VI.9.9 (322.1) πηγὴν ... ζωῆς. Basil's passage is quoted by Henry-Schwyzer, *app. font.* III.322.

[134] Bas. *hom.* 15.2 (P.G. 31. 468A7) πρωτοτύπῳ μορφῇ; cf. *Enn.* VI.7.17 (235.35) εἶδος εἰδῶν, an expression borrowed from Aristotle, *de An.* III. 432ᵃ2 (cf. Henry-Schwyzer, *app. font.* III.325). Both expressions should be compared with Philo's definitions of the *logos* as ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς (*De Opif. M.* 25 [i.8.2]) and σφραγίς, ἰδέα ... ἰδεῶν (*De Migr. Abr.* 103 [ii.288.19–20]). Numenius calls his first god 'idea of the demiurge', fr. 20 des Places (60.6). Basil could easily apply the Plotinian, Philonic and Aristotelian notion of the 'original form' to the Father since from Him the Father was νοῦς like the second hypostasis of Plotinus (see n. 142 below).

[135] Bas. *hom.* 15.2 (P.G. 31. 468B4) ἐκλάμψας, 24.4 (P.G. 31. 605C1), *Spir.* VIII.19 (*SCh* 17 bis 316.58) ἀπολάμψας; cf. *Enn.* III.7.3 (371.24–5) ἐκλάμπον, and the further Plotinian passages quoted in n. 19 above. Iamblichus also uses the verb ἐκλάμπειν in describing the origin of the second 'one' from the very first principle, *Myst.* VIII.2 (262.3) ἐξέλαμψε.

different levels, are not separated from each other.[136] (11) No passion, no division, no alteration whatever catches the Father in the generation of the Son; in the same way, despite the generation of the νοῦς, Plotinus' 'one' remains exactly the same and suffers no division.[137] (12) Like Plotinus' νοῦς, the Son is generated *ab aeterno*, out of time.[138] (13) Life belongs to the very essence of the *logos*, and is not something added to Him; in the same way, the presence of all beings in the νοῦς is not the result of an impression from the outside, but is a part of the essence of intelligence, which is also identical with life.[139] (14) The generation of the Son is identical with the generative will of the Father, just as the generation of Plotinus' νοῦς is an ἐνέργεια identical with the productive will of the 'one'.[140] (15) As all models of virtues and beings are present in Plotinus' and Porphyry's νοῦς, in the same way all models of virtues are present in Christ and all models of beings are contained in the divine wisdom.[141]

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[136] Bas. *hom.* 15.2 (P.G. 31. 468B5), 16.3 (P.G. 31.477C14–D1), 24.4 (P.G. 31. 605B14–5, 609B10–1), *Spir.* VI.14 (*SCh* 17 bis 288.5–6), Gr. Nyss. *Trin.* 7.19–21, *Maced.* 98.26–30, 99.1–2, 100.23–4, and the evidence concerning Gregory of Nazianzus quoted in Lilla (above, n. 102) 307 n. 389. For Plotinus cf. *Enn.* V.1.6 (277.48–9), VI.2.22 (84.7–8), VI.8.17 (298.18–9). R.E. Witt (above, n. 19, 200) points out the presence of this tenet both in Plotinus and in Christian theology (but he mentions only Athanasius).

[137] Bas. *hom.* 16.3 (P.G. 31. 477B14–5, C12–3), 16.4 (480C9–10); Gr. Nyss. *virg.* 2 (253.11–2, 14–5); Gr. Naz. *or.* 23.9 (*SCh* 270.298.3–4), 25.17 (*SCh* 284.198.6–7), 29.8 (*SCh* 250.192.21–2), 30.20 (*SCh* 250.266.6); cf. *Enn.* V.4.2 (336.20–21), V.5.5 (346.1–2), V.5.12 (359.42–3). Basil's sentence μένων ὅλος ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ συστάσει in *hom.* 16.3 (P.G. 31. 480A1–2) recalls analogous Plotinian sentences, μένοντος ἐκείνου ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἤθει (*Enn.* V.3.12 [320.34]), μένοντος οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἤθει (V.4.2 [336. 21]), borrowed from Plato, *Ti.* 42e5–6 (cf. Henry-Schwyzer, *app. font.* II. 320, 336).

[138] Bas. *hom.* 16.2 (P.G. 31. 476B14–C1), *Spir.* VI.14 (*SCh* 17 bis 288. 3–4); Gr. Nyss. *fid.* 61.5–6, 64.24–65.1, *Apoll.* 220.3–4, *Eun.* I (224.12–6), III.2 (ii.189.27–8); Gr. Naz. *or.* 20.7 (*SCh.* 270.72.11–18.22–3), 30.11 (*SCh* 250.246.13), 30.19 (*SCh* 250.266.21–2), 39.12 (*SCh* 358.174. 12–3); cf. *Enn.* V.1.6 (276.30).

[139] Gr. Nyss. *or. catech.* 1 (9.22–10.1); cf. *Enn.* V.1.4 (266.6–268.8; 268. 15–7), V.5.2 (341.1; 342.8–9, 12–3), V.5.3 (342.1), III.8.9 (407.32–3) ζωὴ πρώτη, III.8.10 (408.2) νοῦς ζωή ... πρώτη. This doctrine goes back to the well-known sentence of Aristotle, *Metaph.* Λ 1072^{b}26–7 ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή.

[140] Gr. Naz. *or.* 29.6 (*SCh* 250.188.32–3); cf. *Enn.* V.3.12 (320.39–41), VI.8.18 (300.40–301.41; 301.47–9), VI.8.20 (303.15), VI.8.21 (304.9–10, 14, 16–18).

[141] On the presence of beings in the divine wisdom or in the νοῦς cf.

It would, however, be misleading to see a total correspondence between the first person of the Trinity of the Cappadocians and the 'one' of Plotinus. Like Clement's and Origen's God, but unlike Plotinus' 'one', the Father of the Cappadocians is a thinking intelligence[142]; moreover, due also to their polemic against Arianism, the Cappadocians could not deprive Him completely of an οὐσία,[143] whose presence in the 'one' is instead categorically denied by Plotinus.[144] And a further relevant difference must also be pointed out: whereas Plotinus regards infinitude (ἀπειρία) as the product of the 'one', as the result of the outpouring of its infinite generative power and as the basic element of the second hypostasis,[145] Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus do not hesitate to identify God with ἀπειρία itself.[146] In this particular point they will be followed by ps.-Dionysius.[147]

Gr. Nyss. *hex.* (P.G. 44. 69A4–5, C5–6), *perf. Chr.* 182.13–7, 183.3–4 (these passages are taken into account in Lilla [above, n. 72] 45), Plot. *Enn.* III.8.11 (411.28–9), V.1.4 (266.5–7, 268.10–1), V.1.7 (279.28–32), V. 9.5 (417.14–5, 22–3, 24–5); on the presence of all models of virtues in Christ and the νοῦς cf. Gr. Nyss. *prof. Chr.* 134.14–135.21, *perf. Chr.* 174.21–176.17, 178.2–17, 181.16–182.2, Plot. *Enn.* I.2.6 (71.14–7), Porph. *Sent.* 32 (28.6–29.3; 29.8–10; 31.8).

142 Bas. *hom.* 16.3 (P.G. 31. 477B14); Gr. Nyss. *hex.* (P.G. 44. 72B10–1), where the 'eye of God' can only mean 'the intelligence of God' (in 72C16 God's διάνοια is openly mentioned), *or. catech.* 1 (11.12–3, 18–20), *Apoll.* 177.14–5; Gr. Naz. *or.* 20.10 (*SCh* 270.78.4–5) 30.20 (*SCh* 250.266. 5–6), 40.5 (*SCh* 358.204.6–7), *poem. dogm.* 1.29 (P.G. 37. 400A). See Lilla (above, n. 102) 274, 291, 300, 315–316.

143 On this point see Lilla (above, n. 102) 267–268 (on Basil), 291 (on Gregory of Nyssa), 299 nn. 315–317, 303 n. 355 (on Gregory of Nazianzus). Like Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus does not exclude the possibility of God's being above οὐσία, *or.* 6.12 (P.G. 35. 737B5–6); see Lilla (above, n. 102) 303 n. 355.

144 *Enn.* V.5.6 (347.5), VI.7.41 (269.35), see *Hel.* 28 (1988) 237–238. For Plotinus being originates when the energy overflowing from the 'one' halts near it: καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἐποίησε, V.2.1 (292. 11–12).

145 *Enn.* II.4.15 (199.18–20), VI.5.11 (174.23–5), VI.5.12 (175.7–9). The Greek text of these passages is quoted in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 234.

146 Gr. Nyss. *Eun.* II (246.16–22), III.2 (ii.58.26–7), *tres dii* 52, 15–20; Gr. Naz. *or.* 38.7 (*SCh* 358.114.7; 116.23–4). See Lilla, *JThS* 31 (1980) 102, and *op. cit.* (above, n. 102) 290 n. 223 (with the reference to the important book by E. Mühlenberg, *Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa* [Göttingen 1966]), 303 with n. 354.

147 *DN* I.1 (109. 10–11), I.2 (110.9), III.1 (138.11–2), V.10 (189.8); see Lilla, *JThS* 31 (1980) 98, 101.

Something must now be said about the Holy Spirit. It is Basil's merit to have revalued the third person of the Trinity and reaffirmed His full divinity against the Anomoeans and Pneumatomachians (or Macedonians) who had lowered Him to the level of a creature and regarded Him as a simple 'servant'.[148] His speculation on the Holy Spirit began probably around 360, when he wrote the short treatise commonly known as *De Spiritu.*[149] The detailed researches of P. Henry and H. Dehnhard have shown beyond any doubt not only that Basil used the *De Spiritu* in some sections of his later large work *De Spiritu Sancto* and in some of his homilies and letters, but also that he, in composing the *De Spiritu*, drew very much from Plotinus (the synoptic correspondences are so evident and manifold that Henry called this treatise 'un centon plotinien').[150] The most exhaustive exposition of Basil's views about the Holy Spirit is contained in H. Dörries' work.[151] The two other Cappadocians, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, follow closely in Basil's footsteps, even if they are more explicit than Basil in calling the Holy Spirit God.[152] Without attempting to repeat mechanically what I have said in a recent Italian essay,[153] I shall only draw attention here to some points in which the borrowings from Plotinian tenets concerning not only the world-soul, but also the two other hypostases are really remarkable.

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[148] On this question see Lilla (above, n. 102) 275–279.

[149] See P. Henry, *Les états du texte de Plotin. Études plotiniennes* I (Paris/Bruxelles 1938) 167–168, and Lilla (above, n. 102) 279.

[150] P. Henry (above, n. 149) 171–196; H. Dehnhard, *Das Problem der Abhängigkeit des Basilius von Plotin, PTS* 3 (Berlin 1964) 7–13. On the definition of the *De Spiritu* as 'centon plotinien' see Henry, *op. cit.* 168.

[151] H. Dörries, '*De Spiritu Sancto.* Der Beitrag des Basilius zum Abschluß des trinitarischen Dogmas', *AAWG* Phil. Hist. Klass., Dritte Folge, 39 (Göttingen 1956) 118–144; see also his article 'Basilius und das Dogma vom Heiligen Geist', in *Wort und Stunde* I (Göttingen 1966) 118–144.

[152] E.g. Gr. Nyss. *comm. not.* 20.1–3, 6–8, 25–6; Gr. Naz. *or.* 23.11 (*SCh* 270.302.14–15), 31.6 (*SCh* 250.286.14.20), 31.8 (290.14–5), 31.10 (292.1–2). That Basil does not attribute explicitly the term θεός to the Holy Spirit has been pointed out by modern scholars: see, e.g., Dörrie (above, n. 151) 23–8, *id.*, 'Basilius und das Dogma' (above, n. 151) 133; Dehnhard (above, n. 150) 14 n. 2; Simonetti (above, n. 86) 494, *id.*, 'Genesi e sviluppo della trinitaria' (above, n. 86) 181, 188. On this question see also Lilla (above, n. 102) 287 (with n. 190), 296, 308 (with n. 397, where further evidence concerning Gregory of Nazianzus can be found).

[153] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 102) 275–284 (on Basil), 296–298 (on Gregory of Nyssa), 318–320 (on Gregory of Nazianzus).

(1) The relationship betwen the Holy Spirit and the Son is analogous to that which exists between the Son and the Father; and the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son just as the Son is the image of the Father. Plotinus holds the same views about the relationship existing between the world-soul and the νοῦς and between the νοῦς and the 'one'.[154] (2) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son (in the section on Origen we have noted the Plotinian background of this tenet).[155] (3) Like Plotinus' world-soul and 'one', the Holy Spirit transmits life.[156] (4) Like Plotinus' 'one' and world-soul, He outpours and shines everywhere.[157] (5) Like Plotinus' world-soul, He is not divided though distributing Himself.[158] (6) Like Plotinus' world-soul, though transmitting life, He is not detached from it.[159] (7) Though bestowing His benefits and being participated, He suffers neither weakening nor diminution and is unexhaustible; this is also a property of Plotinus' 'one'.[160] (8) He comprehends all immortal beings, all intelligences, all souls in Himself; the same property is attributed by Plotinus both to the intelligence and to the world-soul.[161] (9) Possessing everything *ab aeterno* and being perfect,

[154] Bas. *Spir.* XVII.43 (*SCh* 17 bis 398.14–5), XXVI.61 (466.11–2), XXVI.64 (474.1–476.2, 476.9–11); Gr. Nyss. *tres dii* 47.22–4, *Maced.* 107.9–13, 109.14–5, 114.2–5; Plot. *Enn.* V.1.3 (265.7), V.1.6 (277.44-5), V.1.7 (277.1). See Lilla (above, n. 102) 283.29–30, 297.14.

[155] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 12.84–5 Dehnhard, *Eun.* III.6 (*SCh* 305.168.36–170.38), *Spir.* XVIII.47 (*SCh* 17 bis 412.20–1); Gr. Nyss. *tres dii* 48.1–2, 48.23–49.1, 56.5–6, *Maced.* 93.4–6; Gr. Naz. *or.* 31.31 (*SCh* 250.338.6–8). See Lilla (above, n. 102) 278, 297, 313, 318. On the Neoplatonic background see p. 146 above.

[156] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 8.16–7, *Spir.* IX.22 (*Sch* 17 bis 324.25), *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469B3); Plot. *Enn.* V.1.2 (262.2, 8–9, 10) on the world-soul, VI.9.9 (324.49–50) on the 'one'. See also Henry (above, n. 149) 178–179; Dehnhard (above, n. 150) 49–50; Lilla (above, n. 102) 280.1.

[157] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 8.27–28, 10.46, *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 *bis* 324.26), *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 472A7–8); Plot. *Enn.* III.9.4 (415.1–2), V.1.6 (272.7), V.3.12 (320.40), V.5.5 (347.22–3) on the 'one', V.1.2 (262.18–9, 264.37–8) on the world-soul. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 281.3.

[158] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 10.45–6, *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 472A8–9); Plot. *Enn.* V.1.2 (264.35–7) on the world-soul. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 281.8.

[159] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 10.67–70; Plot. *Enn.* V.1.3 (265.8–266.12) on the world-soul. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 281.11.

[160] Bas. *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469B4–7); Gr. Nyss. *Maced.* 95.13–4, 108.26–7; Plot. *Enn.* V.5.10 (354.21–2), VI.9.5 (315.35–8) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 281.12, 297.10.

[161] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 12.72–3; Plot. *Enn.* V.1.4 (268.10–11) on the intelligence, II.3.16 (180.19–20), V.3.8 (310.7) on the world-soul. See

He is not subject to any increase or addition and is unchangeable, exactly as Plotinus' 'one' and intelligence.[162] (10) Like Plotinus' 'one', He knows no limit and is infinite in power.[163] (11) Like Plotinus' 'one', He is measured neither by time nor eternity, and is also above space.[164] (12) Like Plotinus' 'good', He is generous in bestowing His own benefits.[165] (13) Like Plotinus' intelligence, He is full.[166] (14) Like Plotinus' 'one', He fills everything with His power.[167] (15) Like Plotinus' 'good', He is desired by all beings.[168] (16) Like Plotinus' 'one', He is unreachable.[169] (17) Like Plotinus' absolute being, identical with the intelligence, He is simple in His essence and manifold in His power.[170] (18) His benefits are enjoyed according to different degrees, depending not on His power but on the nature of the recipients; the same happens with Plotinus' absolute being, world-soul

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Lilla (above, n. 102) 281.13.

[162] Bas. *hom. Spir.* 12.73–5, *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 324.16, 24–5); Gr. Nyss. *Maced.* 95.10–4; Plot. *Enn.* V.5.5 (346.1–2), VI.7.41 (268.16–7) on the 'one', V.1.4 (268.12–4) on the intelligence. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 291.14.

[163] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 322.14–324.15, 324.18–9); Gr. Nyss. *Maced.* 94.20-1, 32, 100.32–3; Gr. Naz. *or.* 34.10 (*SCh* 318.214.8); Plot. *Enn.* V.5.10 (354.18–9, 21), V.5.11 (356.2–4), VI.7.32 (253.15), VI.9.6 (316.10–1) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.17–8, 297.9.

[164] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 324.19); Gr. Naz. *or.* 41.9 (*SCh* 358. 334.10); Plot. *Enn.* III.7.6 (375.1–2), VI.8.20 (303.24–5), VI.9.3 (311.42) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.19.

[165] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh.* 17 bis 324.20); Plot. *Enn.* V.4.1 (334.34–5) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.20.

[166] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 324.26); Plot. *Enn.* V.1.7 (279.30–1) on the intelligence. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.22.

[167] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 324.30), *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469B1–2, 472A7); Gr. Naz. *or.* 31.29 (*SCh* 250.334.23), 41.9 (*SCh* 358.334.7–8); Plot. *Enn.* III.9.4 (415.2–3) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.25.

[168] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 324.21); Plot. *Enn.* I.6.7 (113.1–3), I.7.1 (119.22), V.5.12 (358.6–7.11) on the 'good'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.21.

[169] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 324.29). Although the adjective ἀπρόσιτον used in this passage is Pauline (*1 Tim.* 6:16), the idea which it conveys is the same as that which appears in Plot. *Enn.* V.5.10 (354.9–10), a passage concerned with the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 282.24. On the presence of this doctrine in Plato's *Timaeus*, in Philo, in the *Corp.Herm.*, and in Plotinus, see *Hel.* 22-27 (1982-87) 221, 235, 256, and 28 (1988) 229.

[170] Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 326.32–3); Plot. *Enn.* VI.4.11 (151.15–6) on absolute being, identical with intelligence. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 283.26.

and providence.[171] (19) Like Plotinus' 'one', He is without needs.[172] (20) Like Plotinus' 'one', He does not partake, but is participated.[173] (21) What He possesses is not something added, but belongs to His own essence *ab aeterno*. The same happens with Plotinus' 'one' and intelligence.[174]

The Cappadocians could easily apply to the Holy Spirit some of the properties of Plotinus' 'one' or of the intelligence since they put Him at the same level as that of the Father and of the Son; the correspondence between their third hypostasis and Plotinus' world-soul is therefore only partially true, although it is particularly evident in the points 1, 2, 5 and 6 mentioned above (see p. 165).

Gregory of Nazianzus has a further point of contact with Plotinus: as the former attributes the demiurgic role both to the *logos* and to the Holy Spirit,[175] in the same way the latter calls the νοῦς demiurge, and allots the task of making the sensible universe to the world-soul which, like the Stoic *logos*, transmits the rational principles (*logoi*) to the formless matter.[176]

Like Origen, Philo and the Stoics (see p. 147 above), Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus regard not the Holy Spirit, but the divine power of the *logos* as the ruler and the law of the sensible world and nature[177] (as we have seen, Plotinus attributes this role to the world-soul).[178]

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171 Bas. *Spir.* IX.22 (*SCh* 17 bis 326.39–40), *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469B4); Plot. *Enn.* II.9.3 (226.3), III.3.5 (304.1–4), VI.4.11 (151.3–7) on the world-soul, providence and absolute being. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 283.27.

172 Bas. *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469B8); Gr. Nyss. *fid.* 66.3–4, *Maced.* 97.9, 109.25–6; Plot. *Enn.* I.8.2 (122.4–5), V.3.12 (320.48), VI.9.6 (317.24–6, 34–5) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 297.12, 298 n. 301.

173 Gr. Naz. *or.* 31.29 (*SCh* 250.334.22), 41.9 (*SCh* 358.334.6–7); Plot. *Enn.* V.3.17 (330.8–9), V.5.10 (354.3–4), V.5.13 (360.27–8) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 319.

174 Bas. *hom. Spir.* 12.79–80, *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469A4–5); Gr. Nyss. *fid.* 66.3–4, *Maced.* 92.22, 105.18; Plot. *Enn.* V.1.4 (268.16–7), V.5.2 (341. 1), V.5.3 (342.1–2) on the intelligence, V.5.13 (360.29–361.31), VI.9.6 (317.27–30) on the 'one'. See Lilla (above, n. 102) 281.15, 297.7.

175 Gr. Naz. *or.* 41.14 (*SCh* 358.344.1–2). See Lilla (above, n. 102) 320.

176 *Enn.* III.9.1 (412.1–2), V.1.8 (280.4–5), V.9.3 (414.25–6) on the intelligence as demiurge; IV.3.10 (28.38–41), V.9.3 (414.28–9) on the world-soul which transmits the rational principles or forms to matter.

177 Gr. Nyss. *an. et. res.* (P.G. 46. 28A5–9, 28D1–29A2), *hex.* (P.G. 44. 73A17–8), *prof. Chr.* 138.27–139.4; Gr. Naz. *or.* 28.16 (*SCh* 250.134.19–24), 28.22 (148.27–8). See Lilla (above, n. 102) 294, 317.

178 See pp. 146–147 above (with n. 76).

V

Synesius of Cyrene

In a long and detailed study of 1942, republished in 1966, W. Theiler showed the manifold, close connections between Synesius' hymns and the Neoplatonic exegesis of the *Chaldaean Oracles*, which has its starting-point in Porphyry.[179] Continuing in the direction indicated by Theiler, P. Hadot in 1968 concentrated his attention particularly on Synesius' conception of the Trinity. By means of a comparison between Synesius' hymns and some texts of Marius Victorinus, he managed to show that the substantial agreement between the former and the latter finds its most natural explanation in their dependence on the Porphyrian exegesis of the *Chaldaean Oracles*.[180] Taking the results of Theiler and Hadot for granted, I wish only to draw attention here to some expressions, images and tenets concerning the Trinity, which bear unmistakable marks of their origin. In some cases striking parallels are provided not only by the *Chaldaean Oracles* and Neoplatonism, but also by the Orphic hymns, the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the teaching of some gnostic sects.

Like Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, Synesius maintains that the Godhead is a triadic monad and a monadic triad.[181] We have already noted the presence of the same conception in the *Chaldaean Oracles* and in the fragment of Porphyry's commentary on the *Parmenides* in which he traces this doctrine back to the oracles.[182]

The Father is the monad of monads (I.174, II.60, IX.59 μονάδων μονάς), the henad of unities (IX.58 ἑνοτήτων ἑνάς), the number of numbers (I.175 ἀριθμῶν ἀριθμός), the idea of ideas (II.68 ἰδεῶν ἰδέα), the source of sources (I.171 παγὰ παγῶν, II.63 παγῶν παγά), the

[179] W. Theiler, *op. cit.* (above, n. 87).

[180] P. Hadot (above, n. 105) 461–474. Cf. his conclusions, 474: 'Synésius et Victorinus ont donc utilisé, pour formuler leur théologie trinitaire, des texts dans lesquels Porphyre commentait ou paraphrsait les *Oracles chaldaïques* et proposait une doctrine des principes inspiréé des *Oracles*'.

[181] Synes. *hymn.* I.210–3, II.117–9, V.25–6 μία ... τριφαὴς ἔλαμψε μορφά, IX.65–6 μονάς ... τριχόρυμβον ἔσχεν ἀλκάν. On the Cappadocian Fathers see n. 100 above.

[182] See pp. 155–156 above. On the importance of the *Chaldaean Oracles* and the Porphyrian exegesis of them for Synesius' conception of the μονάς–τριάς see also the recent book by H. Seng, *Untersuchungen zum Vokabular und zur Metrik in den Hymnen des Synesios*, Patrologia IV (Frankfurt/M 1996) 176.

principle of principles (I.172, II.62 ἀρχῶν ἀρχά), the root of roots (I.173, II.64 ῥιζῶν ῥίζα), the father of fathers (I.145–6 πατέρων πάντων πάτερ, II.61 πάτερ ... πατέρων), the 'one' which is everything and at the same time prior to everything, even to the 'one' (I.180, 199 ἓν καὶ πάντα, I.182 ἓν ... πρὸ πάντων, I.149 ἓν ἑνὸς πρότερον, IV.2 ἑνοτήτων ἐπέκεινα), the intelligence of intelligences prior to being and devoid of being (II.231 νόος ... νόων, I.152 προανούσιε νοῦ), the hidden and ineffable monad (II.201 κρυφίας μονάδος, II.141 μονὰς ἄρρητος), the hidden root (II.21, 105 κρυφίαν ῥίζαν), the hidden seed (II.70 κρύφιον σπέρμα),[183] the bottomless and ineffable abyss (I.132 ἀκάμαντι βυθῷ, I.189 βυθὸν ἄρρητον), male and female, father and mother at the same time (I.186, V.63-4). He is also identical with silence and voice (V.65 σὺ δὲ φωνά, σὺ δὲ σιγά).[184] According to Theiler, the doubling of some epithets is characteristic of the oracles[185]: for example, the expression πηγὴ τῶν πηγῶν occurs in a fragment quoted by Damascius (*in Prm.* 190 [ii.67.1 Ruelle] = fr. 30 des Places)[186]; Damascius himself, most probably under the influence of the oracles, calls his first principle ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν (*in Prm.* 190 [ii.66.7]).[187] In the same way, Proclus presents Cronos as πατὴρ πατέρων (*in Crat.* CVII [59.6–7]).[188] Synesius' expression 'henad of unities' anticipates the definition of the first principle as 'henad of henads' given by Proclus (*Theol.Plat.* II.11 [65.12], III.7 [30.4], *in Prm.* VI [10.17–8], *in Ti.* i.457.23).[189] The two definitions 'number of numbers' and 'ideas of ideas' are more understandable in the light of Pythagorean (or Neopythagorean) and Neoplatonic tenets. According

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[183] See Theiler (above, n. 87) 274.

[184] The association of silence with the divine world occurs in V.22 and IX.75.

[185] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 87) 259 n. 19. The biblical expressions θεὸς τῶν θεῶν (*Deut.* 10:17, *Dan.* 2:47), κύριος κυρίων (*Deut.* 10:17, *Ap.* 17:14, 19:16), κύριος τῶν κυριευόντων (*1 Tim.* 6:15), βασιλεὺς βασιλέων (*Ap.* 17:14, 19:16), βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων (*1 Tim.* 6:15) reflect the same tendency. Plato's θεοὶ θεῶν (*Ti.* 41a7), Iamblichus' and Proclus' θεὸς θεῶν (*Myst.* VIII.2 [262.4], *Theol.Plat.* II.11 [65.11]), and Plotinus' βασιλεὺς ... βασιλέων (*Enn.* V.5.3 [343.20])—cf. Saffrey-Westerink, *Proclus Théol. plat.* II (Paris 1974) 123–124 nn. 9–10—are also worth noting.

[186] See Theiler (above, n. 87) 259 n. 19. Proclus takes up this expression in *in Ti.* i.451.17, see Saffrey-Westerink (above, n. 185) 124 n. 10.

[187] See Theiler, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 186).

[188] See Theiler, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 186).

[189] See Theiler (above, n. 87) 275–276; Saffrey-Westerink (above, n. 185) 124 n. 10; Seng (above, n. 182) 178.

to Hierocles, the Pythagorean *Holy Speech* called the demiurgic intelligence 'number of numbers' (*in CA* XX.12 [87.19–21]); as Athenagoras reports, the Pythagorean philosopher Lysis, to whom the source of Diogenes Laertius attributes the *Holy Speech* (VIII.7 [ii.395.14–6] = Pythagoras fr. 16 Diels [i.105.15–7]), called God 'ineffable number' (Athen. *Leg.* 5 [6.15–6] = Lysis fr. 4 Diels [i.421.4–5]). This definition could have been welcomed by Synesius, for whom the Father is 'ineffable' (I.189, II.141, cited above on p. 169). Plotinus' second hypostasis, the intelligence-being and the one-manifoldness (or one-totality; see n. 22, and *Enn.* V.1.4 [270.31–2], V.1.8 [280.15–7], V.3. 5 [305.26–8]), is both the absolute number and the form of forms,[190] a conception which goes ultimately back to the doctrine of the identity between the forms-ideas and the numbers, characteristic of Xenocrates and recurrent in Neopythagoreanism, in Neoplatonism and perhaps also in the *Chaldaean Oracles.*[191] It is important to remember, in this connection, that for Synesius the Father is an intelligence (I.152, II.231, cited above on p. 169). The three images of the source-root-seed are applied by Plotinus to his first hypostasis and occur in the *Chaldaean Oracles* and in gnostic theology as well.[192]

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[190] *Enn.* III.8.9 (406.3–4) ἀριθμὸς δὲ οὗτος, VI.6.9 (189.28–9.30) καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀριθμός, νοῦς δὲ ἀριθμός, VI.7.17 (235.35) εἶδος εἰδῶν. On the latter expression cf. Aristotle, *de An.* III 432ᵃ2, Philo, *De Migr. Abr.* 103 (passages quoted also in n. 134 above), [Iamb.] *Theol. arithm.* I (2.22). Attention should also be paid to the words ἐν εἴδεσιν εἶδος ... ἀριθμός of the Orphic fragment quoted by Porphyry in his *De Philosophia ex Oraculis haurienda* (see n. 203 below).

[191] Xenocrates fr. 34 Heinze; Nicom. Ger. *Arithm.* VI (12.6–9); Plot. *Enn.* V.1.5 (272.15–6), V.4.2 (335.7–8), VI.6.9 (189.29–31, 33–4), VI.9.2 (309.27–8); Iamb. *in Nic.* 11 (10.13–4), *Comm.Math.* 19 (64.2), where the expression ἀριθμὸν εἰδητικόν goes back to Aristotle, *Metaph.* N 1088ᵇ34; see also Krämer (above, n. 57) 292–311. As to the *Chaldaean Oracles*, Krämer 27 draws attention to a passage of Iohannes Lydus (*de Mens.* II.8 [28.1–3]), quoted by G. Kroll, *De Oraculis Chaldaicis*, *BPhA* 7 (Breslau 1894) 18, πάντα γὰρ τὰ νοητὰ ἐν τῇ τριάδι περιέχεται καὶ πᾶς ὁ θεῖος ἀριθμὸς ἐν τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ προελήλυθεν.

[192] See the evidence collected by Krämer (above, n. 57) 339–341, 345, and, on ῥίζα, also Seng (above, n. 182) 214 (his remarks on παγά, 126–128, are rather general). Krämer (346–348, 351–352) traces the image of the 'seed' back to Neopythagoreanism and Speusippus. As to the *Chaldaean Oracles*, cf. fr. 30, 37 ll. 2, 8, 13, 16 (πηγή), fr. 28 (ἔσπαρται). On ῥίζα and σπέρμα see Theiler (above, n. 87) 273–274. On σπέρμα Seng (214–215) quotes passages from Damascius and Victorinus which he regards as dependent on commentaries on the *Oracles*. For the Naasenes and Simon Magus the original god is a 'seed' and a 'root', cf. Hippolytus, *Haer.* V.7.25 (84.14), V.9.5 (98.19), VI.9.4–5 (136.18–9.21), VI.17.3 (143.11). The gnostic Justin regards his three original principles as 'roots' and

Porphyry also resorts to the image of the 'source'.[193] The view which on the one hand identifies the first principle with the totality of beings and on the other places it above all beings and even above the 'one' is typically Neoplatonic.[194] The conception of the first principle as an intelligence prior to being and devoid of being is characteristic of Porphyry, but not of Plotinus.[195] The definition of the Father as 'monad' has parallels in the Platonic and Neopythagorean traditions: H.J. Krämer has produced pieces of 'Pythagorean' and 'Platonic' doctrines preserved by Iamblichus, Stobaeus, ps.-Galen and Anatolius, in which the monad is identified with the 'one' and the good.[196] Theon of Smyrna and Nicomachus of Gerasa call their first principle 'monad' (Theo Sm. *Exp. Rer. math.* 99.24–100.1; Nicom. Ger. *Arithm.* VIII [14.18–9]); in the *Chaldaean Oracles* the triad is governed by a monad (fr. 27 des Places τριάς, ἧς μονὰς ἄρχει). Porphyry presents his first principle as a monad (Porphyry in Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* I.6.7 [19.25]); and Iamblichus does the same with his first god and king who, though emanating from the very first principle, is nevertheless identical with the good and the principle of οὐσία in accordance with Plato, *R.* 509b (*Myst.* VIII.2 [261.14, 262.4–5]).

'sources', Hippol. *Haer.* V.26.2 (127.4–5).

[193] Porphyry in Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* I.6.7 (19.27), quoted by Theiler (above, n. 87) 259.

[194] On the one-totality in Plotinus cf. *Enn.* III.3.7 (308.9), III.8.10 (408.1) δύναμις τῶν πάντων, V.2.1 (290.1–2), VI.7.32 (253.13); see Theiler (above, n. 87) 274; Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen* (above, n. 116) 38–72; Linguiti (above, n. 111) 27 n. 21; Lilla, *Hel.* 31-32 (1991-92) 6 n. 832. On the 'one' above all beings (or prior to all beings) cf. *Enn.* III.9.4 (415.7), V.3.11 (318.22), V.4.1 (332.5), V.4.2 (336.39–41), V.5.13 (361.35), and Porph. *in Prm.* II.11–2. On the 'one' being even above the one cf. *Enn.* V.4.1 (332.8–9), Porph. *in Prm.* I.29–30, II.10–13, IX.6–8, *Corp.Herm.* V.2 (60.17–8), Philo, *Praem.* 40 (v.344.17–8), *Vit. cont.* 2 (vi.47.7–8). This last doctrine is based on *Prm.* 141e10–12.

[195] For Porphyry intelligence is originally contained in the one-good or ὕπαρξις and comes out from it, *Hist.Phil.* fr. 18 Nauck (15.1–3), *in Prm.* XIV.16–20, Macrob. *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* I.6.8 (19.29.31–2). Being originally in the one-ὕπαρξις, it is like the 'one' prior to and devoid of being, *in Prm.* X.25 (τὸ προούσιον), XII.23–4 (ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ ὄντος), XII.5 (ἀνούσιον), XII.24 (ὂν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ οὐσία). Numenius' first god also is an intelligence above οὐσία, fr. 16 des Places (57.2–4). For Plotinus, instead, the intelligence as such originates only when the infinite energy emanating from the 'one' turns towards its source and contemplates it, *Enn.* V.2.1 (290.8–292.12); it is not originally contained in the 'one', which is devoid of any noetic activity (see the evidence in *Hel.* 28 [1988] 291–292).

[196] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 57) 57–59, 63 n. 140.

The equivalence monad-henad, which can be inferred from the application of both terms to the Father,[197] occurs in Plato, in Theon of Smyrna, in Syrianus, in Origen and perhaps in Porphyry as well.[198] The two adjectives 'hidden' (κρύφιος) and 'ineffable' (ἄρρητος) occur in the oracles (fr. 198, 219.4 des Places). Κρύφιος will be frequently applied by Proclus and ps.-Dionysius to the first principle and the highest realities[199]; and ἄρρητος is a common appellation of the divinity in the negative theology of the Platonic and patristic traditions.[200] The epithet βυθός referred to the Father reflects the teaching of the *Oracles* and Valentine: the former mentioned the πατρικὸν βυθόν (fr. 18 des Places),[201] the latter, having two famous Pauline passages in mind (*Rom.* 11:33 ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ; *1 Cor.* 2:10 τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ), called Βυθός (or Βάθος) his very first god.[202] The image of the bisexual father has its antecedent in an Orphic fragment,[203] in Porphyry,[204] in the *Corpus Hermeticum*[205] and in

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[197] Cf. Synes. *hymn.* I.174, II.60, 141, 201, IX.58, 59 (cited above on p. 169). Ps.-Dionysius will do the same in *CH* VII.4 (32.8–9), *DN* I.4 (122.11).

[198] Pl. *Phlb.* 15b1–2 (quoted by Dodds [above, n. 118] 258); Theo Sm. *Exp. Rer. math.* 21.16 ἑνάδα, ἥτις ἐστὶ μονάς (quoted by Dodds 258 n. 5 and I.P. Sheldon-Williams, 'Henads and Angels: Proclus and the ps.-Dionysius', in *Studia Patristica* 11, *TU* 108 [Berlin 1972] 65); Syrian. *in Metaph.* 183.24–5 (cf. Dodds 258 n. 1); Origen *princ.* I.6 (21.13). Porphyry's sentence in Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* I.6.7 (19.25) μονάς *id est unitas*, also reflects this view, if *unitas* translates the Greek term ἑνάς (if it translates ἑνότης, this term could be regarded as a synonym of ἑνάς).

[199] Cf. the evidence collected by H. Koch, *Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen* (Mainz 1900) 120–121.

[200] It is not worthwhile to produce extensive evidence here; I limit myself to referring to Pl. *Sph.* 238c10, Plot. *Enn.* V.3.13 (322.1), Porph. *in Prm.* I.3, II.20, II.24–5.

[201] Hadot (above, n. 105) 99 n. 6 rightly observes: 'pour les *Oracles*, cet abîme paternel désigne le Père lui-même'. The expression πατρικὸς βυθός is taken up by Synesius himself, V.27, βυθὸς πατρῷος; see Theiler (above, n. 87) 264. Proclus, who quotes fr. 18 of the *Oracles* in *in Crat.* CVII (57. 25), reproduces the expression in *in Ti.* ii.92.8 and *Theol.Plat.* VI.16 (388. 38 Portus); see Theiler (above, n. 87) 263–264.

[202] Iren. *haer.* I.1 (*SCh* 264.28.76; 31.100); Clem. *Strom.* V.81.3 (380. 12), *exc. Thdot.* 29 (116.24); Hippol. *haer.* VI.37.5 (167.10), X.13.2 (274.2). In my opinion, the agreement between Synesius and gnosis on this and other points is worth mentioning, even if Seng (above, n. 182), 121, excludes any dependence of the former on the latter.

[203] This fragment, preserved by Porphyry in the second book of his lost work *De Philosophia ex Oraculis haurienda*, has been edited by G. Wolff,

Christian *gnosis*.[206] E. Norden is quite right in bringing Synesius' verses σὺ πάτηρ, σὺ δ' ἐσσὶ μάτηρ, σὺ μὲν ἄρρην, σὺ δὲ θῆλυς (V.63-4) into connection with some Orphic fragments.[207] If Synesius calls the Father 'silence', the oracles had spoken of the silence of the 'fathers', i.e., of the silence of the transcendent gods (fr. 16 des Places),[208] an idea which is taken up by Synesius himself when he speaks of the 'blessed silence of the intellectual and intelligible beings' (V.22–3.).[209]

Porphyrii De Philosophia ex Oraculis haurienda Librorum Reliquiae (Berolini 1856) 146–147; to it attention has been drawn by E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Stuttgart[4] 1956) 228.

[204] Porphyry in Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.* I.6.7 (19.25–6).

[205] I.9 (i.9.16), I.15 (i.12.1), *Asclep.* 20 (ii.321.9–10), 21 (ii.321.18).

[206] The first god of the Valentinians consists of a couple formed by βυθός and Ἔννοια or Σιγή; in the same way, the subsequent six aeons constituting the original ogdoas together with them are arranged in three couples or syzygies (Νοῦς–Ἀλήθεια, Λόγος–Ζωή, Ἄνθρωπος–Ἐκκλησία), Iren. *haer.* I.1.1 (*SCh* 264.30.92–32.105), Hippol. *haer.* X.13. 1–2 (274.1–4). Each of the four male entities (Βυθός, Νοῦς, Λόγος, Ἄνθρωπος) is thus in fact ἀρρενοθήλυς, Iren. *haer.* I.1.1 (31.99–101). As to the other gnostic sects cf. Hippol. *haer.* V.6.5 (78.7) on the Naassenes, V.14.3 (108.27) on the Perates, VI.18.4 (144.19), VI.18.6 (145.3) on Simon Magus, VIII.9.2 (227.23), X.16.2 (277.20) on the Docetists. Further evidence concerning this doctrine can be found in Norden (above, n. 203) 228–231; J. Kroll, 'Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos', *BGPhM* XII.2-4 (Münster 1914) 51–54; W. Scott, *Hermetica* III (Oxford 1926) 135–138; A.D. Nock-A.J. Festugière, *Corpus Hermeticum* I (Paris 1945) 20 n. 4; Theiler (above, n. 87) 270–271 n. 67.

[207] *Op. cit.* (above, n. 203) 230 n. 1 (beginning on p. 229). See also Seng (above, n. 182) 49 n. 23.

[208] On the meaning of the 'Fathers' see des Places' n. 1 pertaining to this fragment (*Oracles chaldaïques* [Paris 1971] 70). The fragment is quoted by Proclus in *in Crat.* CX (63.26), where Uranos is presented in the act of contemplating 'the supra-celestial region and what is included into the silence of the Fathers, which nourishes the gods'; see Theiler (above, n. 87) 263. Uranos belongs to the class of the intelligible-intelligent gods, *in Crat.* CX (59.28, 60.22–3). The supracelestial region which he contemplates is identical with the uncoloured and formless essence of *Phdr.* 247b6–7 and with the living intelligible being, embracing all living intelligible beings, cf. *Ti.* 30c7–8, 31a4–5; it therefore pertains to the purely intelligible realm, *in Crat.* CX (60.26–9). The νοητὸν ζῷον of the *Timaeus* is Proclus' νοητὸς νοῦς, which is part of the third triad of the intelligible gods; see *Hel.* 29-30 (1989-90) 165.

[209] Proclus' πατρικῇ σιγῇ (*in Crat.* CVII [59.6], see Theiler [above, n. 87] 263) refers to Cronos' Father, Uranos. If the latter belongs to the class of the intelligible-intelligent gods (above, n. 208), the former belongs to the lower class, that of the intelligent gods (*in Crat.* CIX [59. 15], CX [59.28]).

The identification of the Father with silence has a close parallel in the Valentinian system, where Σιγή appears closely united to Βυθός (or Βάθος; see beginning of n. 206 above), with whom she forms the first syzygy of aeons; Proclus, Damascius and ps.-Dionysius also will equate their first principle with silence.[210] The contemporary application of the two opposite concepts 'silence' and 'voice' to the Father is only apparently contradictory: it can be best explained by assuming Synesius' dependence on the Porphyrian exegesis of the *Parmenides*, marked by the contemporary application to the 'one'—considered under the twofold aspect of μονή and πρόοδος—of the opposite concepts of the first and second hypotheses of the Platonic dialogue (cf. Porph. *in Prm.* XIV.26–34). If 'silence' is based on the ineffability and lack of names characteristic of the 'one' of the first hypothesis (*Prm.* 142a3, a4–5), 'voice' points to the property of being utterable and object of names characteristic of the 'one' of the second hypothesis (*Prm.* 155d8–e1).[211] The same trend of thought underlies the doctrine, adopted by the *Corpus Hermeticum* and ps.-Dionysius, according to which God is at the same time devoid of names and object of all (or many) names (*Corp.Herm.* V.10 [i.64.8–9], *Asclep.* 20 [ii.321.5–6]; Ps.-Dionysius *DN* I.6 [118.2–3, 4, 11], cf. also II.4 [126.17–127.1]). The adoption of Porphyry's exegetical method explains also the contemporary application of the opposite epithets 'root' and 'shoot', 'generator' and 'generated', 'illuminating' and 'illuminated', 'hidden' and 'manifest' to the Father[212]; whereas 'root',

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[210] Procl. *Exc. Chald.* IV (210.27); Dam. *Dub. et Sol.* 29 (i.84.19–21); Ps.- Dionysius, *DN* I.1 (109.14), II.4 (126.17). On the passages of Proclus and Damascius and their parallelism with Valentinian gnosis see also *Hel.* 31-32 (1991-92) 32 (with n. 963). In *in Prm.* VII (164.1–2), however, Proclus places the 'one' ἐπέκεινα σιγῆς; cf. also, in the same book, a passage from the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke, *unius quod autem supra silentium est* (505.90–1). In *Theol.Plat.* II.11 (65.13) the 'one' is πάσης σιγῆς ἀρρητότερον, and in *Theol.Plat.* III.7 (30.7–8) the 'union' is prior to silence (these references are given by Saffrey-Westerink, *Proclus Théol. plat.*, II.124 n. 12, IV.134 n. 1; see also Seng [above, n. 182] 272).

[211] Theiler (above, n. 87), 270, and Seng (above, n. 182), 273, do not take into account the possibility of the influence of the Porphyrian interpretation of the *Parmenides* on Synesius' φωνά–σιγά (cf. p. 169 above).

[212] I.184 ῥίζα καὶ ὅρπαξ, I.191–6 σὺ τὸ τίκτον ... τικτόμενον ... φωτίζον ... λαμπόμενον ... φαινόμενον ... κρυπτόμενον. On ῥίζα καὶ ὅρπαξ Theiler (above, n. 87), 273–274, and Seng (above, n. 182), 214, refer to Damascius' parallel expression ῥίζα ἅμα καὶ κλάδοι (*Pr.* 40 [i.124.2–3]). They do not, however, mention the Porphyrian interpretation of the *Parmenides* (see also n. 211 above).

'generator', 'illuminating' and 'hidden' refer to His μονή, the epithets 'shoot', 'generated', 'illuminated', 'manifest' point to His πρόοδος and the two other persons of the Trinity, in whom He is present.

Being the original source, the Father pours out His own 'good' (IX.129 ἀγαθορρύτοιο παγᾶς), which gives origin to the other two hypostases. It is just by means of this outpouring that the paternal monad becomes a manifest, fully developed triad[213]: μονάς ... χυθεῖσα τρικόρυμβον ἔσχεν ἀλκάν; μία παγά, μία ῥίζα τριφανὴς ἔλαμψε μορφά (IX.65–6, V.25–6; see also n. 181 above). Both sentences remind us of a parallel sentence of Gregory of Nazianzus (*or.* 29.2 [*SCh* 250. 180.13–4]): μονὰς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη,[214] where κινηθεῖσα corresponds exactly to Synesius' χυθεῖσα.[215] The image of the effluence from the source, of which Synesius is so fond,[216] is characteristic of Plotinus, who presents the origin of the third hypostasis from the second and of the second from the first, the one-good, as the result of an outpouring of δύναμις: δύναμιν προχέας πολλήν ... ὥσπερ αὖ τὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε (*Enn.* V.2.1 [292.14–6]). This δύναμις is identical with the *bonum diffusivum sui*, the good which overflows from its source: πλῆθος ἐξερρύη (*Enn.* V.1.6 [272.7]), ὑπερερρύη (*Enn.* V.2.1 [290.8]), ῥυεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν (*Enn.* V.3.12 [320.40]). Synesius' ἀγαθορρύτοιο παγᾶς (see above) thus corresponds fully to Plotinus' πηγὴν ... ζωῆς, πηγὴν ... νοῦ ... ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν (*Enn.* VI.9.9 [322.1–2], where ἀγαθοῦ points to the effluence of πρόοδος). The *Chaldaean Oracles* also use the verbs ῥεῖν and προχεῖν and the substantive ῥοή; in the same way Proclus, referring to the *Oracles*, has ῥέουσα, and Damascius, in a context clearly dependent on the *Oracles*, uses χύσις and χεόμενον.[217] But the closest antecedent of the

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213 The monad is potentially a triad since it contains the other two hypostases in itself before bringing them forth: cf. Hadot (above, n. 105) 469 (with n. 10, where he refers to II.123–4 and IV.8, 10). The same view will be held by Damascius (see p. 186 below, with n. 273).

214 The words μέχρι τριάδος are reminiscent of Porph. *Hist.Phil.* fr. 16 Nauck (14.3.6–7) and Plot. *Enn.* V.1.7 (279.48–9); see n. 87 above.

215 Usually Gregory of Nazianzus rejects the Plotinian image of the 'outpouring' of the good, *or.* 29.2 (*SCh* 250.180.18–24), 29.8 (192.21), 31. 31 (*SCh* 250.338.11–2); but in 31.31 (338.6–10) he compares the Father to the original point (or 'eye') of a source, the Son to a source and the Holy Spirit to a river.

216 Cf. I.202 ἐξεχύθης, I.207 προχυθείς, I.217 χύθης, II.106 προχυθῇ, II. 108 πρόχυσις, II.115 πρόχυσιν, IV.10 χυθέντες; see also Theiler (above, n. 87), 269, and Seng (above, n. 182), 134–5. Neither Theiler nor Seng, however, takes Plotinus into account.

217 *Or. Chald.* fr. 31.1, 56.1.3; Procl. *Theol.Plat.* III.26 (91.5), quoted by des Places (above, n. 208), 73, *app. font.* of fr. 31; Dam. *Dub. et Sol.*

idea of the development of the original monad (or 'one') into a triad conveyed by the passages of Synesius and Gregory of Nazianzus quoted above, must be sought in Porphyry's commentary on the *Parmenides*: the energy comes out (ἐκνεύσασα, corresponding to Synesius' χυθεῖσα, to Plotinus' ῥυεῖσαν, to Proclus' ῥέουσα and to Damascius' χύσις and χεόμενον) from the ὕπαρξις (or 'one') as ζωή and second member of the triad; and after turning towards itself—or, more exactly, towards its own source—it becomes a fully developed noetic act (νόησις) and the νοῦς, the third member of the triad (*in Prm.* XIV.16–26).[218]

The outpouring of the good manifests itself, first of all, in the generative will of the Father, which is identical with the throes of the generation (I.218–9, 227, II.94–6, IV.6, V.36)[219]; this will and these throes have their hypostatic reality in the female entity represented by the 'Mother' (II.101)[220] or Holy Spirit (πνοιά),[221] who in Synesius appears as the second, intermediate member of the triad[222] and must consequently by identified not with the third, but with the second person of the Trinity. This rather unusual position of the Holy Spirit inside the Trinity[223] sharply distinguishes Synesius' trinitarian theology not only from that current in the fourth century,[224] but also from the early Church tradition, in which the Holy Spirit is mentioned as third (*2 Cor.* 13:13, Clem. Rom. *1 Cor.* 46:6, Ignatius *ad Eph.* 9 [14.6–8 Zahn]).[225] It is Hadot's merit to have pointed out that

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121 (iii.154.1, 3), quoted by Theiler (above, n. 87) 269.

[218] The words ἑαυτὸν ἴδῃ (XIV.20) point to the presence of νοῦς in the νοητόν or ὕπαρξις (XIV.18–20).

[219] See Theiler (above, n. 87) 268–269, Hadot (above, n. 105) 469.

[220] Cf. Hadot's pertinent remarks, 469: 'Ce désir, cette volonté génératrice, représente dans la triade le moment féminin et maternel'; 470 'comme une entité féminine'; 472 'le moment féminin et maternel'.

[221] II.98 ἁγίαν πνοιάν, III.53 τὰν σύνθωκον πνοιάν, III.64 ἄχραντος πνοιά, V.32 ἁγίας ... πνοιᾶς.

[222] I.220-1 μέσα φύσις, I.224 δεύτερον, I.234 μέσον, II.97 μεσάταν ἀρχάν, II.99–100 κέντρον γενέτου ... κόρου, II.110 μέσα, III.54 μέσσαν, III.65 κέντρον κόρου καὶ πατρός, IV.9 μεσσοπαγὴς νοῦς. If on the one hand in *De civ. D.* X.23 Augustinus is puzzled about the identity of the second member of Porphyry's triad (see p. 157 above), on the other in *De civ. D.* X.29 he is inclined to identify this second member with the Holy Spirit, thus agreeing with Synesius (the text of the latter passage is quoted by Theiler [above, n. 87], 262; see also Lilla [above, n. 113] 319).

[223] But see pp. 177–178 below, with nn. 231 and 232.

[224] Cf. Hadot (above, n. 105) 470.

[225] For this and further evidence see H. Usener, 'Dreiheit', *RMPh* 58

Synesius' Holy Spirit, conceived as a female entity and as the second member of the triad, corresponds to the female power (δύναμις) which in the *Chaldaean Oracles* and their Neoplatonic commentators acts as intermediate member between the Father and the paternal intellect.[226] A. Smith is quite right in maintaining that 'Synesius ... has hypostasized the term δύναμις'.[227] Here we can add that this generative will, this Mother with throes, this πνοιά or Holy Spirit corresponds not only to the ἐκνεύσασα ἐνέργεια–ζωή of Porphyry's commentary on the *Parmenides* (XIV.25–6),[228] but also to Plotinus' δύναμιν ... πολλήν, ῥυεῖσαν ἐνέρειαν, ἀπειρία,[229] to Porphyry's and Iamblichus' ἄπειρον, to Proclus' and Damascius' ἀπειρία or δύναμις ἄπειρος[230]; and that, as H. Usener and W. Bousset have shown, the conception of a female entity as second member of the triad formed by the Father, the Mother and the Son occurs in the Aramaic gospel

(1903) 38–40. To the passages quoted by Usener, 38, Clement *Paed.* I.42.1 (115.10–11) is worth adding. The baptismal formula of *Mt.* 28:19, quoted by Clement, *Exc. ex Theod.* 76.3 (131.5–6), is probably a western interpolation (cf. Usener, 39–40).

226 Hadot (above, n. 105) 474: 'c'est dans les *Oracles* eux-mêmes que Porphyre, et à sa suite, les néoplatoniciens, avaient recontré cette notion d'une puissance féminine intermédiaire entre le Père et l'intellect engendré'. According to Damascius, *Pr.* 91² (iii.15.10–1), the oracles had called this power πατρικὴ δύναμις. Proclus applies this doctrine to the class of the inferior divinities, that of the 'intelligent' gods: if Cronos is the father, Rhea is the symbol of his generative power, whereas Zeus is the expression of the paternal intellect (*in Crat.* CXLV [82.28–9]). The role of the intermediate, generative power can be played by Demeter as well (*in Crat.* CLVII [91.6–11]). See also Theiler (above, n. 87) 266 (who refers to Damascius), and Hadot (above, n. 105) 263.

227 *Op. cit.* (above, n. 106) 17.

228 In I.25–6 the δύναμις ἄπειρος belongs to the 'one'; but its pouring out is identical with the ἐκνεύσασα ἐνέργεια.

229 On δύναμιν ... πολλήν and ῥυεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν cf *Enn.* V.2.1 (292.14), V.3.12 (320.40), quoted also above, p. 175; on ἀπειρία cf. *Enn.* II.4.15 (199. 19–20), VI.5.11 (174.25), VI.5.12 (175.7–9), quoted in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 234.

230 Cf. Iamb. *in Ti.* fr. 45 Dillon (148.7–8), where Porphyry also is mentioned, and Dam. *Princ.* 51 (ii.28.4); Procl. *Theol.Plat.* III.8 (32.5, 21–3) γεννητικὴν ... δύναμιν ἀπειρίαν, γόνιμος ... ποίησις ... ἀρχηγικωτάτης ... ἀπειρίας; Dam. *Princ.* 91² (iii.15, 9–10) δύναμιν ἄπειρον ... πατρικὴ δύναμις (cf. *Hel.* 31-32 [1991-92] 53), 121 (iii.153.23–4, 154.1–2) μέσον, ἡ δύναμις ... χύσις καὶ ἀπειρία τοῦ ἑνός (see Theiler [above, n. 87] 269, and Seng [above, n. 182], 134 n. 69). In the former passage (iii.15.11) Damascius refers openly to the oracles (see also n. 226 above).

used by the Ebionits, in some gnostic systems[231] and also in some religions of the Middle East.[232] The Holy Spirit is prior to being, προούσιον (I.222). This adjective, used by Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus,[233] has its counterpart in Plotinus' πρὸ οὐσίας.[234] The image of the 'shoot' referred to the second person of the Trinity[235] points to the πρόοδος of the Father.[236] It may well come from the *Oracles*, even if in one of the extant fragments (fr. 88.2 des Places) they bring βλάστημα into connection with the evil matter (Proclus uses ἐκβλαστάνοντα [*El. Theol.* 36 (40.3)] and Damascius calls κλάδοι the multitude of beings pouring out from the 'one' and forming the second principle [*Pr.* 40 (i.124.3), quoted also in n. 212 above]). Like the Father, the Holy Spirit also is a νοῦς (IV.9 μεσσοπαγὴς νοῦς, quoted in n. 222 above); this epithet becomes more understandable, if one remembers that Porphyry calls νοῦς the ἐνέργεια–ζωή emanating from ὕπαρξις and identical with the second member of the triad (*in Prm.* XIV.18–21). The contemporary attribution to the Holy Spirit of such appellatives as 'mother', 'sister', 'daughter' (II.101–3) has an astonishing parallel in Simon Magus' view about the highest δύναμις, as reported by Hippolytus (*Haer.* VI.17.3 [143.8–11]). The function of connecting the first member of the triad with the third, which Synesius allots to the intermediate member of the Trinity (V.31 ἑνοτήσιόν τε φέγγος), is also, according to Iamblichus and Proclus, a property characteristic of the centre of a series: the centre binds together the highest and lowest members of a series inasmuch as it conveys the power of the

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[231] See Usener (above, n. 225) 41 (with n. 4), and W. Bousset, 'Gnosis', *PWK* VII.2, 1515. On this question see also P. Gerlitz, *Ausserchristliche Einflüsse auf die Entwicklung des christlichen Trinitätsdogmas* (Leiden 1963) 12–17.

[232] Bousset (above, n. 231) 1515–1516; see also Norden (above, n. 203) 230 (with n. 1).

[233] Porph. *in Prm.* X.25; Iamb. *Myst.* VIII.2 (262.5); see Lilla, *Hel.* 28 (1988) 274, 29-30 (1989-90) 108; also Seng (above, n. 182) 179 n. 41; Procl. *Theol.Plat.* III.12 (45.5). Iamblichus juxtaposes προούσιος and ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας, an expression found in Numenius fr. 16 des Places (57.5).

[234] *Enn.* VI.2.17 (78.7), VI.9.5 (315.43); see *Hel.* 28 (1988) 274 n. 522 (where, however, the reference to the second Plotinian passage must be corrected).

[235] I.220 βλάστησε, II.109.116, V.35 βλάσταν; see Seng (above, n. 182) 59 n. 90.

[236] Like ὅρπαξ (see n. 212 above), βλάστα also pertains to πρόοδος, since it is closely connected with the image of the 'effluence' (cf. I.217, 220 χύθης ... βλάστησε, II.106, 108, 109, 115, 116 προχυθῇ ... πρόχυσις ... πρόχυσιν ... βλάσταν).

former to the latter and enables the latter to turn towards the former (Iamb. *Myst.* I.5 [17.8–20]; Procl. *El.Theol.* 148 [130.8–13]).[237]

The fruit of the 'throes' of the Mother-Holy Spirit is the Son or *logos* (I.217–8, 226, 236–42, II.135 λόγος εἶ γενέτου).[238] Like the Holy Spirit, He also is a 'shoot' (II.115–6, III.10.54). Like the Father and the Holy Spirit, He is a νοῦς (I.167, VIII.53, IX.76), since He corresponds to the πατρικὸς νοῦς of the *Chaldaean Oracles* (22.1–2, 37.1, 39.1, 49.2, 108.1, 109.1; cf. Porph. *in Prm.* IX.3), to the third member of Porphyry's highest triad, the fully developed νοῦς whose main function is νόησις (*in Prm.* XIV.16, 18, 19, 24), to Iamblichus' πατρικός or καθαρὸς νοῦς, the first, highest product of the combination of πέρας with ἄπειρον and identical with the absolute being or ἓν ὄν, and also to Damascius' ἡνωμένον or πατρικὸς νοῦς.[239] If the Father is the 'idea of ideas' (see p. 169 above), the Son is the 'first sown form', πρωτόσπορον εἶδος (V.42, IX.64).[240] This epithet originates from the Plotinian doctrine of the metaphysical νοῦς as 'genus of the forms' and 'form of forms' (*Enn.* V.9.6 [418.9–10], VI.7.17 [235.35], on which see also n. 190 above); it has two parallels in Iamblichus' doctrine of the καθαρὸς νοῦς which is the cause of οὐσία εἰδητική and in Damascius' παντέλειον εἶδος, contained in the πατρικὸς νοῦς (Iamb. *In Phlb.* fr. 4 Dillon [102.8]; Dam. *Pr.* 121 [iii.153.19, 21–22]).[241] Like the Plotinian νοῦς and the *logos* of Origen and the Cappadocians, He is the wisdom and the demiurge (I.205–6, IV.11, 14–5, V.30 κοσμοτεχνῖτις, VI.13–5).[242] Like the *logos* of the Porch, Philo, Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, and Plotinus' world-soul (see pp. 146–147 and 167 above, with nn. 76, 77 and 177), He rules over the sensible universe (II.145–212, IV.16–7, 20–1, IX.87).[243] Like Plotinus' world-soul, He is present as

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[237] The underlying idea of both passages derives from the function allotted to the daemons by Plato, *Smp.* 202e3–7 (see Dodds [above, n. 118] 277, on *El.Theol.* 148).

[238] On this last passage see Theiler (above, n. 87) 270, and Seng (above, n. 182) 280.

[239] Iamb. *in Phlb.* fr. 4 Dillon (102.5–6; on the text see however my remarks in *Hel.* 29-30 [1989-90] 111 n. 571), fr. 7 (104.7); Dam. *Pr.* 117 (iii.133.14–5; 134.15; 136.3; 137.6.13), 121 (153.21–2).

[240] See Theiler (above, n. 87) 271.

[241] On the latter passage see also Theiler (above, n. 87) 271.

[242] On the Stoic origin of τεχνῖτις see Lilla (above, n. 81) 510.

[243] The sentence πολιῶν ἄστρων ἀγέλα νέμεται (II.173–4) is echoed in IV.17 τὰν δ' ἄστρων ἀγέλαν ἀεὶ νομεύεις.

a whole everywhere (IX.85–6).[244]

Two fundamental Neoplatonic laws—that of 'unity-in-distinction' (or 'distinction-in-unity') and that of μονή, πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή—have left deep marks on Synesius' trinitarian conception. The 'indivisible divisions' which mark the relationship between the three persons of the Trinity[245] reflect both Porphyry's theory of the mixture between the intelligible realities (see p. 159 above) and the Plotinian doctrine which excludes any gap between the three distinct hypostases (see n. 136 above).[246] Like Porphyry's ὕπαρξις or Plotinus' 'one', the monad of the Father is the expression of μονή (II.118 μονὰς ἅ γε μένει).[247] Despite its outpouring in the πρόοδος, the good which is to form the two other persons of the Trinity remains in its source (μονή).[248] The second and third person, after 'springing out' from the Father, do not abandon Him, but keep on streaming around Him (IX.69–70 ἀπὸ κέντρου τε θορόντων, περὶ κέντρον τε ῥυέντων); this can only be due to their turning back (ἐπιστροφή, ἐπιστρέφεσθαι) towards their principle. In the same way, in Plotinus the fact that the δύναμις gushing from the 'one' halts near it originating absolute being and intelligence is the direct consequence of the turning of this δύναμις towards its source (*Enn.* V.2.1 [290.9–292.12]).

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[244] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* IV.9.5 (257.1–2), quoted also in n. 125 above; V.1.2 (264.35–8), quoted by C. Lacombrade, *Synésios de Cyrène*, I: *Hymnes* (Paris 1978) 103 n. 4.

[245] I.208 ἀτόμοις τομαῖς, I.214–6 νοερὰ δὲ τομὰ ἄσχιστον ἔτι τὸ μεριστὸν ἔχει (the same sentence occurs in II.120–22); see Theiler (above, n. 87) 264–265.

[246] Theiler (above, n. 87), 264, draws attention to Dam. *Pr.* 110 (iii.107.20–1) τὸν κρύφιον διάκοσμον ... ἀδιάκριτον, and to Proclus' use of τομαί as a synonym of διακρίσεις (*Theol.Plat.* V.36 [131.18–9]).

[247] Cf. Porph. *in Prm.* XIV.22–3 κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἑστῶσα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια; Plot. *Enn.* V.4.2 (336.19–22), V.5.5 (346.1–2).

[248] I.207 προχυθεὶς δὲ μένεις, I.406–7 ἐν σοὶ δὲ μένει σέθεν ἐκπροθορών, II.123 προθορὼν δὲ μένει. Like προέρχεσθαι, χεῖσθαι and προχεῖσθαι, ἐκπροθορών and προθορών point to πρόοδος and have parallels in the *Chaldaean Oracles*: ἀποθρώσκει (fr. 34.1), ἐκθρώσκουσιν (fr. 35.1), ἐξέθορον (fr. 37.3), ἔκθορε (fr. 42.1); cf. also Damascius' ἀνέθορεν concerning the origin of the 'one' from the ineffable, *Pr.* 26 (i.68.8), quoted in *Hel.* 31-32 (1991-92) 50. On θρώσκειν and its compounds see also Theiler (above, n. 87) 269–270, and Seng (above, n. 182) 58–59 (who draws attention to passages from classical literature and Proclus' hymns).

VI

Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita

Dionysius' God cannot correspond entirely to the 'one' of Plotinus and Proclus, who exclude any kind of division (διάκρισις, διαίρεσις) from their first principle[249]: being a trinity composed by three hypostases which form however a unity, He is both a τριαδικὴ ἑνάς (*DN* I.5 [116.8–9]; cf. also *CH* VII.4 [32.9] ἑνὰς τρισυπόστατος), a triadic henad which admits a διάκρισις in itself (*DN* II.5 [128.8–10, 14–5], cf. II.3 [125.19–20]), and an ἐναρχικὴ τριάς (*DN* II.4 [126.15]), a triad governed by the principle of unity, a conception which, as has been seen, has its antecedents in the μουνὰς τριοῦχος of the *Chaldaean Oracles*, in the threefold 'one' (or first intelligible triad) of the post-Plotinian Porphyry and in the God of the Cappadocians and Synesius, who is at the same time one and trine.[250] But a deeper and comprehensive inquiry about the relations between Dionysius' God and the Neoplatonic hypostases must go far beyond these almost obvious remarks. First of all, a detailed comparison can enable us to discover not only further, important correspondences between Dionysius' first principle and that of Porphyry's commentary on the *Parmenides*, but also its close connections with Plotinus' and Proclus' 'one' and Damascius' 'ineffable' and 'one'. Secondly, Dionysius' stressing both of the triadic character of the 'one' and of the fundamental unity of the Trinity has a close parallel in Damascius' conception of the triad formed by the three principles lying below the ineffable. Thirdly, Dionysius' three hypostases can be compared to Proclus' henads, and in their mutual relations are governed by the same law of 'unity-in-distinction and distinction-in-unity'[251] which

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[249] Plot. *Enn.* V.3.15 (326.31), quoted also on p. 156; Procl. *in Prm.* VI (41.4–8), where Porphyry's view about the first principle is criticized; see also p. 156 (with n. 110). Plotinus' and Proclus' 'one' is indivisible and without parts, cf. *Hel.* 28 (1988) 217–218 and 29-30 (1989-90) 155.

[250] See pp. 155–157 and 168 above.

[251] See p. 158 above. On Dionysius cf. especially *DN* II.4 (127.2–128.1). Dionysius' words ἡνωμένα τῇ διακρίσει καὶ τῇ ἑνώσει διακεκριμένα, 127.7, have close parallels in Gregory of Nyssa's διάκρισίν τε συνημμένην καὶ διακεκριμένην συνάφειαν (*diff. ess.* 4 [87.90–1]), and Gregory of Nazianzus' ἑνικῶς διαιρουμένην ... συναπτομένην διαιρέτως (*or.* 28.1 [*SCh* 250.102.16–7]), διαιρεῖται ... ἀδιαιρέτως ... συνάπτεται διῃρημένως (*or.* 39.11 [*SCh* 358. 172.18–9]); see C. Pera, *S. Thomae Aquinatis ... in librum beati Dionysii De divinis Nominibus Expositio* (Romae 1950) 49; W. Völker, *Kontemplation und Exstase bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita* (Wiesbaden 1958) 140–141 n. 6; Lilla, *Aug.* 13 (1973) 609–610.

also governs the mutual relations between these Procline entities. Lastly, Dionysius' first and second hypostases have some points in common with the 'one' of Plotinus and Proclus; and Dionysius' Jesus, the second hypostasis (*DN* I.4 [113.7–9], II.2 [125.19], II.6 [130.6, 8]), can also be compared to Plotinus' νοῦς, at least in four of His aspects.

(1) The God of Dionysius, the first principle of the post-Plotinian Porphyry, the 'one' of Plotinus and Proclus, the ineffable and the 'one' of Damascius.

(a) Dionysius' God is not simply one and trine at the same time: he is not even one since He is above the 'one' (*DN* II.11 [136.10–11], XIII.2 [229.4–5]), and He is a non-being since He is above being (*DN* I.1 [109.16], IV.18 [162.7–9]). Though lying above being and intelligence (*DN* I.1 [108.8–9, 109.10–11], I.5 [116.1], II.10 [134. 13–4], XIII.3 [229.12], *Ep.* I [157.1–2]), He is nevertheless a supra-essential being (ὑπερούσιος οὐσία) and an unconceivable intelligence (νοῦς ἀνόητος; *DN* I.1 [109.13–4], II.10 [134.12–3]). Considered under the twofold point of view of His firmness (μονή) and procession (πρόοδος), He can at the same time be the object of the negative and positive conclusions which mark respectively the first and second hypotheses of the *Parmenides* (He is unknown and can be known [*DN* I.4 (115.10–3), II.4 (127.1–2), VII.3 (198.4–7), *MT* I.2 (143.3–5); cf. *Prm.* 142a3–5, 155d6], He has no name and all names [*DN* I.6 (118. 2–3), I.7 (119.10–11); cf. *Prm.* 142a3, 4–5, 155d8–el], He is none of the beings and all beings [*DN* I.6 (119.9), V.8 (187.12–3); cf. *Prm.* 141e5–7, 144b1, 144e3–7], He has no form and every form [*DN* II.10 (134.11–2), V.8 (187.13–4); cf. *Prm.* 137d8, 145b3], He neither moves nor stands firm, but can also move and stand firm [*DN* V.10 (189.12–3), *Ep.* IX.3 (203.2–3); cf. *Prm.* 139b2–3, 145e7–8, 146a7]). Exactly the same ideas are set forth by Porphyry in his commentary on the *Parmenides*: his triadic first principle is also above the 'one' and a non-being above being (*in Prm.* I.29–30, II.10.13, X.24–5, XII.23–4); it is marked by ὕπαρξις (*in Prm.* XIV.6–7, 15–6, 18–9, 23, 25–6),[252] which is the real being and the first member of the triad (*in Prm.* IV.27, XIV.15–6, 22–3); it contains the νοῦς, which is not only the third member of the triad, but also proceeds from ὕπαρξις (see the beginning of n. 195 above); and it is the object of the opposite conclusions of the first two hypotheses of the *Parmenides* (*in Prm.*

[252] On the first Porphyrian triad being marked by ὕπαρξις see Hadot, 'La métaphysique' (above, n. 106) 138.

XIV.26–34).[253]

(b) It is not possible here to go through all negative attributes of Dionysius' first principle, which I have surveyed elsewhere[254]; they are practically the same as those of the 'one' of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* and of the Neoplatonic 'one'. I wish, instead, to draw attention to some other properties which the 'one' of Proclus and Plotinus has in common with that of Dionysius, despite the triadic character of the latter. Both for Dionysius and Proclus, when the 'one' becomes the object of the apophatic proceeding, it is not emptied of its content: negations, if referred to the first principle, do not deprive it of its properties, but on the contrary are meant to enhance them and to emphasize consequently the excellence of the 'one' with respect to all beings.[255] Like Proclus, Dionysius regards his 'one' as the first of the henads (*DN* I.1 [109.13]; for Proclus see the evidence quoted on p. 169 above); he also presents this henad as ὑπερηνωμένη (*DN* II.1 [122.13], II.4 [127.4]), a participle which recalls immediately the terms ὑπερήνωται and ὑπερένωσιν which Proclus applies to the 'one' (*in Prm.* VI [41.11–2], VII [177.19]).[256] Like the 'one' of Plotinus and Proclus, Dionysius' first principle is by no means weakened by the overflowing and outpouring of its superabundant, infinite generative power which produces all beings in its πρόοδος, but keeps its own character remaining exactly the same (*CH* I.2 [8.5–6], *DN* II.11 [136.2–9], IX.4 [209.9–10, 12–3, 14], IX.8 [212.17–213.1], XI.1 [218.10–3], *Ep.* IX.3 [202.2–203.5])[257]; and it is desired by all beings

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[253] Cf. *Prm.* 139b2–3, b4–5, e4–5, 139a6–7 (first hypothesis), 145e7–8, 146a6–7, a9–b1, 147b6–8, 145b6–7, e5 (second hypothesis). I have dealt in greater detail with these correspondences between Dionysius and Porphyry in my paper 'Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite, Porphyre et Damascius', only recently published in Y. de Andia, ed., *Denys l'Aréopagite et sa postérité en Orient et en Occident*, Actes du colloque international Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994, *CEA* Série Antiquité 151 (Paris 1997) 120–124, 126–128, where I quote the Greek texts.

[254] Cf. my contributions in *Aug.* 22 (1982) 547–548, and in *La mistica* I (Roma 1984) 365–368.

[255] *DN* IV.3 (146.7–9), VII.1 (193.14–194.2), VII.2 (196.8–12), VII.3 (198.1–2), *Ep.* I (156.4–5); Procl. *in Prm.* VI (48.2–4, 87.11–3), *Theol.Plat.* I.12 (56.17–9), II.6 (42.27–43.1). This idea derives from the principle according to which 'the properties of the effects pre-exist in the cause in a superabundant way and as part of their essence', *DN* II.8 (133.3–4); cf. Procl. *El.Theol.* 18 (20.3–7), 57 (54.32–56.1), 65 (62.16–7), 97 (86.8–10, 17–9). On this topic see Lilla in *La mistica* (above, n. 254) 393–394, and *Hel.* 29-30 (1989-90) 141–144.

[256] ὑπερήνωται occurs in Dionysius as well, *DN* XI.1 (218.10).

[257] For the text of *DN* XI.1, see however Lilla, *Aug.* 31 (1991) 448; and

(*DN* I.5 [117.15–6], IV.4 [148.15–6])[258]—a doctrine which goes ultimately back to Aristotle (see n. 130 above). It is the cause of unity, of the perfection, of the conversion of all beings and of their being held together[259]; these are also characteristic features of Proclus' 'one'.[260]

(c) Dionysius' 'one' is not simply 'unknown': it is 'the most unknown', τὸ ὑπεράγνωστον.[261] This adjective must be brought into connection with Damascius' παντελὴς ἄγνοια or ὑπεράγνοια, the condition into which the human mind plunges whenever it attempts to approach the ineffable (*Pr.* 5 [i.11.15–6], 29[1] [i.84.16–8]). Both Damascius and Dionysius personify ignorance and silence and identify them with their first principle[262] (the ineffable in the case of the former, the 'one' in the case of the latter); in describing it, both of them like to resort to the negations of opposite concepts.[263] Dionysius insists on the 'one''s property of comprehending all beings in itself before bringing them forth[264]; this idea, though present in the 'one' of earlier Neo-

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in *CH* I.2 (8.6) I prefer the ἐνδότητος of the Greek manuscripts in place of the ἑνότητος of the Syriac version, accepted by Heil: cf. in *DN* XI.1 (218.12) ἔνδον ὅλη μένουσα, a sentence deriving partly from Plot. *Enn.* III.3.7 (308.10), VI.9.9 (322.6). For Plotinus and Proclus see the evidence collected in *Hel.* 28 (1988) 215–216, 224–225, 29-30 (1989-90) 153, 166.

258 Cf. Plot. *Enn.* I.6.7 (113.1–3), I.7.1 (119.22), I.8.2 (122.3), V.5.12 (358.7.11), Procl. *El.Theol.* 8 (10.5–6), *Theol.Plat.* I.22 (101.27), *in Alc.* 329.12–3.

259 Cf. *DN* I.7 (120.1–2) τελειωτική ... συνεκτική ... ἐπιστρεπτική, IV.1 (144.13), IV.10 (155.3) συνοχή, IV.2 (144.18) ἑνώσεις, IV.6 (150.10–11) τελειωτική, ἐπιστρεπτική, IV.10 (154.15) τελειότητες, IV.10 (154.20) ἕνωσις.

260 Cf. Procl. *Theol.Plat.* I.22 (104.3–4), II.6 (40.18.25) ἐπιστρεπτικόν, *in Alc.* 16.7 τελειοῦν, 109.8 ἕνωσις, *in Prm.* II (125.14) τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἑνώσεως, VII (212.9) τῆς ἑνώσεως καὶ τῆς συνοχῆς πᾶσιν αἴτιον (in *in Ti.* ii.158.30–1 this property pertains to ταὐτόν).

261 *DN* I.4 (115.13), I.5 (116.8, where I prefer the *v.l.* ὑπεράγνωστον, see *ASNSP* 10 [1980] 131.21), II.4 (126.9), *MT* I.1 (141.2).

262 *DN* I.1 (109.14), II.4 (126.17–127.1), *MT* II (145.12); cf. *Pr.* 13 (i.39.13–4), 29[1] (i.84.19–21). On the first principle being identical with silence in Synesius and gnosis see pp. 169, 173 and 174 above (with nn. 184, 206).

263 *MT* IV (148.1) οὔτε ἀνούσιος, V (149.6) οὔτε οὐσία, IV (148.6) οὔτε ἀδύναμος, V (149.5–6) οὔτε δύναμις, IV (148.2) οὔτε ἄζωος, V (149.6) οὔτε ζῇ οὔτε ζωή, V (150.4) οὔτε σκότος ... οὔτε φῶς, V (150.5) οὔτε πλάνη οὔτε ἀλήθεια, V (150.5) οὔτε ... θέσις οὔτε ἀφαίρεσις. Cf. *Pr.* 6 (i.13.18–9) οὐδὲ ἓν οὐδὲ πάντα, 8 (i.22.16–8) οὐδὲ ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά, οὐδὲ γόνιμον οὐδὲ ἄγονον, οὐδὲ αἴτιον οὐδὲ ἀναίτιον, 29[1] (i.84.17) οὔτε γιγνώσκειν οὔτε ἀγνοεῖν.

264 Cf., e.g., *DN* I.5 (116.2) προληπτική, II.10 (134.10) προέχουσα, IV.4 (148.13) πάντα, IV.7 (151.2) συνειληφυίας, V.8 (187.11) προέχων, V.9 (189. 3) προέχει, V.10 (189.10) προέχει, VIII.6 (204.1) προέχοντα, XIII.1 (227.3)

platonism (see n. 194 above), appears particularly emphasized in Damascius' doctrine of the 'one', the principle which lies immediately below the ineffable.[265]

(2) Dionysius and Damascius on the triadic character of the henad-monad and the unity of the triad.

In accordance with Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius makes it clear that the ἕνωσις of the 'one' has in itself a διάκρισις represented by the three hypostases[266] and that these hypostases, though being closely united to, or mingled with each other, admit no reciprocity between themselves and keep their own identity without blurring their specific features (*DN* II.3 [125.19–20], II.4 [127.15–128.1], II.5 [128.9–13]). This is the reason that the monad-henad of the Godhead is also a triad (cf. *DN* I.5 [116.8–9], *CH* VII.4 [32.9], cited on p. 181 above). On the other hand, however, the three hypostases form together the highest, most transcendent ἕνωσις (*DN* II.5 [128.9–10, 14–5]), the ὑπερηνωμένη ἑνάς which cannot be split (*DN* II.1 [122.12–3]); the triad which they present is in fact governed by the principle of unity: it is the ἐναρχικὴ τριάς.[267]

A similar trend of thought can be observed in Damascius' discussion concerning the three principles represented by the one-totality or simplicity or father (ἓν πάντα, ἁπλότης, πατήρ),[268] by the totality-one or multitude or power (πάντα ἕν, πολλά, πολλότης, πατρικὴ δύναμις),[269] and by the united being or one-being or totality or paternal intellect (ἡνωμένον, ἓν ὄν, παντότης, νοῦς πατρικός, νοῦς τοῦ πατρός).[270] Damascius distinguishes these three principles from each

προέχον, XIII.2 (227.6) πάντα ἑνιαίως, XIII.3 (228.6) προείληφε.

[265] Cf., e.g., *Pr.* 1 (i.3.10–2) πάντα καταπιόν ... πάντα, 1 (i.4.8), 5 (i.11.4–5) πάντα ἕν, 24 (i.60.21) πάντα ἕν, 29[1] (i.85.8–9) πάντα ἕν, 32 (i.94.10) ἓν πάντα, 35[1] (i.107.17) ἓν πάντα, 46 (ii.10.22) ἓν πάντα, 54 (ii.39.12) ἓν πάντα, 117 (iii.135.17) πάντα προείληπται. On these three correspondences between Dionysius and Damascius, see also my paper cited above (n. 253) 135–145.

[266] Cf. *DN* II.5 (128.8–10, 14–5), II.3 (125.19–20), and Gr. Nyss. *or. catech.* 3 (13.19, 22–3, 14.9–10) διακέκριται ... διακεκριμένον ... διάκρισις. Both passages of Dionysius are also cited above on p. 181.

[267] Cf. *DN* II.4 (126.15), and *Or. Chald.* fr. 27 τριάς, ἧς μονὰς ἄρχει.

[268] *Pr.* 54 (ii.39.12) ἓν πάντα, 1 (i.4.12), 13 (i.36.5, 37.17–8), 52[1] (ii.29.11–2), 54 (ii.39.10–1), 117 (iii.134.17) ἁπλότης, 117 (iii.134.14) πατήρ.

[269] *Pr.* 54 (ii.39.12–3) πάντα ἕν, 91[2] (iii.15.8–10) πολλά ... δύναμιν ἄπειρον, πατρικὴ δύναμις, 105 (iii.88.26) δύναμις, 117 (iii.134.14) πολλά ... δύναμις, 117 (iii.136.19) πολλότης.

[270] *Pr.* 54 (ii.39.25) ἡνωμένον, 68 (ii.92.22, 93.6–7) ἓν ὄν ... ἡνωμένον, ἓν

other (ἁπλότης–πολλότης–παντότης, πατήρ–δύναμις–νοῦς πατρικός).[271] The 'one', the first member of the triad, is in fact triadic[272]: not only does it contain in advance the triad in itself,[273] but it also manifests its threefoldness[274] by becoming a triad,[275] and can be counted only together with the other two principles.[276] The monads which compose the triad are not simple monads but monads of the triad.[277] This triad, however, is deeply marked by unity, which represents the common element of its three members.[278] Its nature consists in being unified.[279] It is in fact a monad which is the principle of every monad[280]; and it is a triad inasmuch as it is one.[281] It forms a unity (ἕνωσις).[282]

But the agreement between Damascius and Dionysius goes far beyond these remarks: neither the three highest principles of the former nor the Godhead of the latter can be adequately expressed by the two concepts of monad and triad, which remain far below their real nature. The textual correspondence between the two authors is

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ὄν ... ἕνωσιν τοῦ ἡνωμένου 69 (ii.96.6–7) ἓν ὄν ... κατὰ τὸ ἡνωμένον, 69 (ii. 96.11) ἓν ὄν, 69 (ii.97.13) ἡνωμένον, 105 (iii.88.13–5) ἡνωμένον ... ἓν ὄν, 111 (iii.114.2), ἡνωμένον κατὰ τὸν πατρικὸν νοῦν, 117 (iii.134.15) πάντα δὲ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ πατρός, 117 (iii.136.3) νοῦς ὁ πατρικός.

271 *Pr.* 117 (iii.136.19, 137.6.12–3).

272 *Pr.* 117 (iii.138.21) ἓν τριοῦχον (cf. *Or. Chald.* fr. 26), 117 (iii.139.1–5, 11, 13–4, 18–20, 140.1).

273 *Pr.* 117 (iii.139.12–3) προείληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἡνωμένου τριπλόην, 117 (iii.140.2) τὸ ἁπλῶς ἓν τὴν ὅλην τριάδα ἐκείνην προείληφεν. On the presence of this view in Synesius see p. 175 and n. 213 above.

274 *Pr.* 117 (iii.139.4–5) τὸ ἓν ... ἔχει τὸ τριπλοῦν ἐμφαινόμενον, 117 (iii.139.18–9) ὑποφαίνοντα δέ τι καὶ τριαδικόν. On Synesius see p. 175 above (with n. 213).

275 *Pr.* 117 (iii.133.3–5) σημαίνει ... ἡ τριὰς τοῦ ἡνωμένου τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὴν τελευτήν, 117 (iii.140.3) ἐτέλεσεν εἰς αὐτήν (*sc.* τὴν τριάδα). On Synesius and Gregory of Nazianzus, see p. 175 above.

276 *Pr.* 117 (iii.140.3–4) καὶ συνηριθμήθη ταῖς ἄλλαις ἁπλῶς ἀρχαῖς.

277 *Pr.* 117 (iii.138.6–7) οὐχ ἁπλῶς μονάδας ἀλλὰ τριάδος μονάδας.

278 *Pr.* 117 (iii.135.13–4) τὸ ... κοινὸν τῶν τριῶν ὡς τριάδος νοείσθω κατὰ τὸ ἓν τῆς τριάδος.

279 *Pr.* 117 (iii.133.13) τριὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα τὸ ἡνωμένον.

280 *Pr.* 117 (iii.133.18–19) μονὰς ἄρα ἡ τριάς ... μονὰς ... αἰτία μονάδος. Cf. *Or. Chald.* fr. 27, Gr. Nyss. *comm. not.* 21.19, Gr. Naz. *or.* 25.17 (*SCh* 284.198.3), 31.9 (*SCh* 250.292.17), 39.11 (*SCh* 358.172.19–20), *poem. dogm.* 3.60 (P.G. 37. 413A), Synes. *hymn.* I.212.

281 *Pr.* 117 (iii.137.18–9) οὕτω τριάς, ὡς τὸ ἓν τῆς τριάδος.

282 *Pr.* 117 (iii.137.21) τῆς ἑνώσεως ἐκείνης.

striking (*DN* XIII.3 [229.6–8], *Pr.* 117 [iii.133.22–3]).

A relevant difference must however not be forgotten: whereas Dionysius, as has been seen, regards the three hypostases as the expression of διάκρισις inside ἕνωσις (cf. n. 266 above), Damascius denies the presence of διάκρισις in the ἡνωμένον, the full expression of his highest triad (*Pr.* 68 [ii.93.15–6], 105 [iii.88.9–10], 117 [iii. 132.5–6]).[283]

(3) Dionysius' hypostases and Proclus' henads.

Appealing like Basil to two passages of the first epistle to the Corinthians (*1 Cor.* 8:6, 12:11), Dionysius stresses the unity of each hypostasis (*DN* XIII.3 [228.8–9], cf. II.11 [137.3–4]),[284] which is substantially a monad. We have noted the presence of this idea in Damascius' conception of the highest triad (see n. 277 above); but it is not hazardous to draw a comparison with Proclus' henads as well. The expression ἐναρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων, which occurs twice in the second chapter of *The Divine Names* (*DN* II.4 [127.3], II.5 [128.10]), seems to support this assumption. But what is more important to point out, is that the principle of 'unity-in-distinction and distinction-in-unity' governs not only the mutual relations between the three persons of the Trinity of Dionysius and the Cappadocians, but also those between the Procline henads, as some evidence found in the first pages of book VI of Proclus' commentary on the *Parmenides* clearly shows (cf. esp. *in Prm.* VI [14.18–9, 14.24–15.1, 15.3–7, 14-7, 16.1, 16–7, 17.8–9, 19–20, 18.17–9]). Like Proclus' henads and Synesius' second and third hypostases, the Son and the Holy Spirit of Dionysius are 'shoots planted by God, flowers and supra-essential lights' (βλαστοὶ θεόφυτοι ... ἄνθη καὶ ὑπερούσια φῶτα, *DN* II.7 [132.2–3]).[285]

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[283] On these points concerning Dionysius' and Damascius' trinitarian conceptions, see Lilla (above, n. 253) 146–149.

[284] Cf. Bas. *Spir.* XVIII.44 (*SCh* 17 bis 404.20–1), XVIII.45 (408.30–1), *hom.* 15.3 (P.G. 31. 469A12–3). The dependence of these three passages on *1 Cor.* 8:6 and 12:11 has not been noted in *SCh* 17 bis and P.G. 31. Basil lays emphasis on the monadic nature of the Holy Spirit: cf. *Spir.* XVIII.45 (408.29–30), *Eun.* III.7 (*SCh* 305.172.34–5), *hom.* 24.7 (P.G. 31. 616C1–2), passages quoted in Lilla (above, n. 102) 277 n. 102.

[285] Cf. Procl. *El.Theol.* 36 (40.3, where ἐκβλαστάνοντα can refer to the henads as well), *in Prm.* VI (16.20–1) ὑπερούσιοι ... ἑνάδες ... ἄνθη, *De Mal. Subs.* 2.11 (192.22–4) *unitates ... et velut flores et supersubstantialia lumina*. The correspondence between Dionysius and this last passage of Proclus has been noted by Koch (above, n. 199) 162–163; see also Theiler (above, n. 87) 275; H. Boese, *Procli Diadochi tria opuscula latine*

(4) The Father and Son of Dionysius, the 'one' of Plotinus and Proclus and the νοῦς of Plotinus.

For Dionysius the Father is the sole source of the divinity (*DN* II.5 [128.11–2], cf. II.7 [132.1]). This image of the 'source' is regularly used by Plotinus and Proclus when they attempt to illustrate one of the main properties of the 'one', that of bringing forth all beings by means of the effluence of its power.[286] Like the 'one' of Plotinus and Proclus, Jesus, the second hypostasis (*DN* I.4 [113.7–9], II.2 [125. 19–20], II.6 [130.6, 8]), considered in the transcendence of His μονή, receives some attributes pointing to His excellence: He is neither part nor whole (*DN* II.10 [134.8])[287]; He is devoid of form and above form (*DN* II.10 [134.12])[288]; He is the being which ranges over the whole being (*DN* II.10 [134.12–3])[289]; He is the measure of beings (*DN* II.10 [134.15])[290]; He is above eternity (*DN* II.10 [134.16]),[291] overfull (*DN* II.10 [134.16, 135.6]),[292] ineffable (*DN* II.10 [134.17])[293] and above intelligence, life, being (*DN* II.10 [134.17]).[294] Considered in His

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Guilelmo de Moerbeka vertente ... (Berolini 1960) 192 *app.*; Lilla, *Aug.* 13 (1973) 609; Suchla *app. font.* 132. On Synesius see pp. 178–179 above.

[286] On Plotinus see n. 57 above. For Proclus cf., e.g., *in Prm.* VI (10.18) τῆς πηγῆς τῶν θεῶν, VI (86.8) πηγὴ [πηγὴν Cousin] θεότητός ἐστιν, VI (86.13–4) πηγὴ θεότητος πάσης.

[287] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* VI.9.2 (308.21–309.23), Procl. *Theol.Plat.* II.2 (17.18–9, 18.4–5), *in Prm.* VI (48.23, 72.8, 81.5, 87.13–4), Pl. *Prm.* 137c5–6, d2–3.

[288] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* VI.9.3 (311.43–4), Procl. *in Alc.* 189.17, *in Prm.* IV (240.15), VI (44.21–2), Pl. *Prm.* 137d8.

[289] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* I.1.8 (56.9–10). Dionysius' words οὐσία τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας [ταῖς ὅλαις οὐσίαις Suchla] ... ἐπιβατεύουσα have however their exact counterpart in Dam. *Pr.* 88 (ii.198.2).

[290] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* I.8.2 (122.5), V.5.4 (344.13), VI.8.18 (299.3), Procl. *El.Theol.* 92 (82.32), 117 (102.28), *in Prm.* VI (105.18–9, 22), VII (212.7, 13–4, 16). The doctrine goes back to Plato, *Lg.* 716c4–5; see Dodds (above, n. 118) 248.

[291] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* VI.8.20 (303.25), Procl. *in Ti.* i.231.10, *El.Theol.* 87 (80.22–3), 88 (80.25, 27), 107 (96.8). In these Procline passages being is above αἰών; but the first 'one' is even above being (cf. the diagram in *Hel.* 29-30 [1989-90] 165).

[292] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* V.2.1 (290.9), Procl. *Theol.Plat.* II.8 (57.3), *El.Theol.* 152 (134.14).

[293] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* V.3.13 (322.1), Procl. *Theol.Plat.* I.3 (16.23), Pl. *Sph.* 238c10.

[294] Cf. Plot. *Enn.* I.6.7 (113.11–2), VI.9.9 (322.1–2), Procl. *El.Theol.* 115 (100.31), 138 (122.9, 12), *in Prm.* VI (84, 9-10), and Dam. *Pr.* 27 (i. 73, 4-5).

πρόοδος, instead, He is the formal principle (εἰδεάρχις, *DN* II.10 [134.12]), whole and part (*DN* II.10 [134.8–10]), eternity (*DN* II.10 [134.15]) and full (*DN* II.10 [134.16]). These last connotations are also properties pertaining to Plotinus' νοῦς, the πρόοδος of the 'one'.[295]

[295] Plotinus' νοῦς is εἶδος εἰδῶν, *Enn*. VI.7.17 (235.35, see also n. 190 above); it is the whole which comprehends all beings-ideas in itself, *Enn*. V.9.6 (418.9–10); it is intimately connected with αἰών, which is the full and uninterrupted life of being, *Enn*. III.7.3 (372.36–8), III.7.4 (372.2); and it is 'full', V.1.7 (279.30).

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A PROPOS DU PLATONICIEN HERMOGÈNE. DEUX NOTES DE LECTURE DE L'*ADVERSVS HERMOGENEM* DE TERTULLIEN*

JEAN PÉPIN

Surtout connu pour avoir été durement combattu par Tertullien, Hermogène eut une personnalité à plusieurs facettes : il a été tout ensemble un théologien chrétien tenu pour hérétique, un gnostique, un philosophe médio-platonicien. Je m'en tiendrai ici à ce dernier aspect, centré sur la doctrine de la matière. C'est une joie d'offrir ces quelques pages à John Whittaker, qui a tant travaillé à faire mieux connaître cette époque du platonisme.

1. *Materia coaequalis deo* (8.3 ; 9.1)

Plusieurs adeptes du moyen platonisme ont pensé, comme Plutarque, que la matière de l'univers « n'a pas commencé d'être, mais fut toujours à la disposition (οὐ γενομένην ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ) du démiurge pour être distribuée et mise en ordre ».[1] En d'autres termes, la matière est increéée, ἀγένητον.[2] On peut aussi envisager cette qualité sous l'angle de la durée; on dira alors que la matière est infiniment ancienne, et par conséquent aussi ancienne que Dieu :

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* Les pages qui suivent ont été suscitées par la lecture d'un important travail académique de M. Frédéric Chapot, encore inédit; l'essentiel, à savoir l'édition critique du *Contre Hermogène* de Tertullien avec une traduction française et un riche commentaire, en sera publié dans la collection *Sources chrétiennes*; dans l'attente de cette publication, que l'on souhaite prochaine, le manuscrit de M. Chapot peut être consulté à la Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne (Paris) et a fait l'objet d'un microfichage.

[1] *De animae procreat. in Tim.* 5 (*Mor.* 1014 b).

[2] Atticus, fr. 20.3, p. 74 des Places.

la matière a le même âge que Dieu, elle est *aequaeuum deo.*[3] Avec moins de relief, mais dans le même sens exactement, on dira qu'étant elle-même inengendrée, la matière est coéternelle au Dieu inengendré.[4]

La matière égale à Dieu en ancienneté, telle dut être aussi l'opinion du moyen platonicien Hermogène.[5] C'est ce qu'atteste l'hérésiologue Hippolyte de Rome, qui emploie à ce sujet l'adjectif grec σύγχρονος: « Un certain Hermogène ... a dit que Dieu a produit l'univers d'une matière contemporaine de lui-même et increéée (ἐξ ὕλης συγχρόνου καὶ ἀγενήτου) ».[6] Environ deux siècles plus tard, un recueil de notices hérésiologiques dû à Théodoret de Cyr présentera la même critique du « synchronisme » postulé par Hermogène entre Dieu et la matière; toutefois le mot favori d'Hippolyte s'efface maintenant au profit de συναγέννητος, « pareillement inengendré »: aux yeux d'Hermogène, « c'est de la matière dont il disposait, inengendrée comme lui, que Dieu fabriqua l'univers ».[7] On n'oubliera pas enfin l'adage des hérésiologues aux termes duquel les hérétiques ont les

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[3] Numénius, fr. 52.13–14, p. 95 des Pl. = Calcidius, *In Tim.* 295: « inornatum illud minime generatum aequaeuum deo ».

[4] Témoin Origène, *De princ.* II.1.4 Koetschau (*GCS* 22), p. 110.16–17: « ingenitam dicentes esse materiam deoque ingenito coaeternam »; de même I.3.3, p. 51.2. — Sur ce thème dans le platonisme, W. Theiler, *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1966) 23.

[5] Ses affinités avec les thèses rappelées à l'instant sont connues. Cf. J.H. Waszink, édit. de Calcidius cité, *ad loc.* (297.15), qui renvoie à Hermogène. Pour le second texte d'Origène, l'éditeur Koetschau, *ad loc.*, suppose que (comme le premier) il vise une thèse « gnostique », et mentionne Tertullien, *Adu. Marcionem* I.15.4: pour Marcion, le Dieu suprême, tout comme le Dieu créateur, « mundum ex aliqua materia subiacente molitus est innata et infecta et contemporali deo »; mais, comme l'a très bien montré le récent éditeur R. Braun (*Sources chrétiennes* 365 [1990]), *ad loc.*, 300, Tertullien transporte indûment au Dieu suprême de Marcion une opinion que celui-ci soutenait seulement pour le Dieu créateur; encore, poursuit Braun, ce dernier point est-il douteux: tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est que Tert. réédite ici une polémique déjà expérimentée contre Hermogène.

[6] Hippolyte, *Refut.* VIII.17.1 Wendland (*CGS* 26), p. 236.12–13; de même X.28, p. 284.4–5. En I.19.4 = Diels, *Doxogr.* 567.18, le même auteur attribue à Platon ὕλην ... σύγχρονον τῷ θεῷ. En IX.30.2, il note que les Juifs refusent cette thèse (avec le même mot). Dans son exposé de la vérité figure enfin l'idée que Dieu n'eut rien qui lui fût contemporain, σύγχρονον ἔσχεν οὐδέν (X.32.1, p. 288.8), formule qui se retrouve dans le *Contra Noetum* 10: μηδὲν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ σύγχρονον.

[7] Théodoret, *Haeretic. fabul. compendium* I.19, *PG* 83.369 B.

philosophes pour « patriarches »[8]; sans prétendre en rien que Platon soit l'inspirateur d'Hermogène, Hippolyte, on vient de le voir, permet de découvrir que l'erreur de celui-ci fut, en propres termes, soutenue auparavant par le philosophe; Épiphane, autre grand hérésiologue, rapporte quant à lui la même doctrine et le même vocabulaire à Zénon, fondateur du stoïcisme, mais aussi à Platon.[9]

De ce qui vient d'être dit ressortent deux points. Le premier, qui n'a rien de surprenant, est que l'orthodoxie chrétienne des premiers siècles refusa en général que les deux principes de l'acte créateur, la matière et Dieu, aient été dans la même condition relativement au temps; voilà précisément la thèse qui est repoussée comme une hérésie, alors que le caractère incréé de la matière n'en apparaît que comme une conséquence, également hérétique du reste. Presque toujours, cette communauté de rapport au temps, ainsi récusée, s'exprime par le mot σύγχρονος: la matière serait alors σύγχρονος à Dieu. Ce mot, qui abonde, on l'a vu, chez Hippolyte et Épiphane, est plus facile à comprendre qu'à traduire; il l'était déjà en langue latine, où les traductions que l'on a rencontrées (parmi d'autres), *aequaeuum* (Calcidius), *coaeternus* (Origène/Rufin), *contemporalis* (Tertullien), sont peu satisfaisantes. Seconde constatation: le seul reproche que les grecs Hippolyte et Théodoret adressent à Hermogène concernant la matière et Dieu est d'avoir conçu ces deux principes comme pareillement anciens et inengendrés.

Le témoignage de Tertullien mérite évidemment mille fois plus d'attention. Touchant la question qui nous intéresse, on peut dire en gros qu'Hermogène se bornait à attribuer à la matière la même ancienneté infinie qu'à Dieu, et la même absence de génération, et que Tertullien s'est évertué à montrer, malgré les protestations d'Hermogène, que cette thèse contraignait à faire de la matière l'égale de Dieu, un autre Dieu. Cette appréciation s'étant imposée, il est inutile ici de la justifier dans le texte. Mais elle est loin de supprimer tous les problèmes. Par exemple celui-ci: ce sont parfois les mêmes mots latins qui expriment l'égalité pure et simple et la stricte égalité d'âge; comment savoir s'ils entrent dans la vraie pensée d'Hermogène ou appartiennent seulement à l'amplification critique de Tertullien?

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[8] La formule est justement de Tertullien, *Adu. Hermog.* 8.3 (et *De anima* 3.1). Sauf rares exceptions, je prends pour norme l'excellente édition de J.H. Waszink, *Tertulliani Adversus Hermogenem liber.* Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia V (Ultraiecti/Antverpiae 1956).

[9] Dans Diels, *Doxogr.* 588.17–18 (= *SVF* I.87, p. 24.33–34: τὴν ὕλην σύγχρονον καλῶν τῷ θεῷ) et 29.

Pour formuler l'idée essentielle de son adversaire sur le synchronisme de la matière et de Dieu, l'identité de leur âge, Tertullien réunit à deux reprises deux adjectifs (peut-être figuraient-ils déjà chez Hermogène): *contemporalis* et *coaetaneus* (6.1; 7.4).[10] Il faudrait d'ailleurs se demander si les deux auteurs n'ont pas une autre façon familière de rendre la même thèse d'Hermogène, et qui serait simplement de dire, avec différentes variations, *materia cum deo.* Ainsi pourrait-on comprendre 1.4: Hermogène *inde*[11] *sumpsit materiam cum domino ponere*; 6.2: *ut et ipsa fuerit, sed cum deo*; 8.3: *ut et ipsa cum deo possit agnosci*; peut-être est-ce une considération de ce genre qui a déterminé un aussi grand connaisseur de Tertullien que fut Kroymann à corriger en 3.1 *fuisse itaque materiam semper* *<cum> deo domino.*[12]

Contemporalis et *coaetaneus,* en tout cas, ne prêtent pas à confusion: leur sens ne peut être que la coïncidence temporelle; aussi bien le premier de ces mots traduirait-il au mieux σύγχρονος, dont on a vu les Grecs user dans leur critique d'Hermogène. Il n'en va pas de même de l'adjectif *coaequalis*, présent en 8.3 et en 9.1[13] avec un

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[10] On a fait remarquer que, s'inspirant du traité antihermogénien perdu de Théophile d'Antioche, Tert. y trouvait peut-être dans cet emploi le verbe συναχμάζειν, litt. « avoir son *floruit* en même temps que » (sujet: la matière; complément: Dieu); car le mot figure deux fois, avec le même objet exactement, dans *Ad Autol.* du même auteur, II.4 (10) 4 Marcovich, p. 42, et II.10 (2) 1, p. 53; d'autre part, en II.4 encore, (14) 6, p. 42, Théophile reproche aux platoniciens, en faisant la matière incréée comme Dieu, de l'avoir faite « égale à Dieu », ἰσόθεος; on reconnaît l'argumentation de Tert. contre Hermogène, cf. 6.1: « Erit enim et materia *qualis deus* ». — Pour *contemporalis,* voir aussi Tert. cité *supra,* n. 5.

[11] Reprenant *in Academiam et Porticum* qui précède, *inde* s'accorde au témoignage d'Épiphane cité *supra*, p. 193 et n. 9, lequel, comme tenants de la même doctrine, associe les noms de Zénon et de Platon.

[12] J.H. Waszink, *Tertullian, The Treatise against Hermogenes* (trad. commentée). « Ancient Christian Writers » 24 (Westminster MD/London 1956) 29, hostile à cette correction, traduit néanmoins « together with God »! Voir les récentes analyses de A. Davids, « Hermogenes on Matter. A note on the first chapters of Tertullian's Treatise against Hermogenes », dans *Eulogia.* Mélanges A.A.R. Bastiaensen = *Instrumenta patristica,* XXIV (Steenbrugis 1991) 30, qui rejette d'ailleurs lui aussi la correction de Kr. au bénéfice de *semper deo domino* compris comme ablatif absolu.

[13] Il y en a une 3e et dernière occurrence en 40.2, dont le sens est certainement « identique ». Quant aux deux précédentes, il faut savoir que le *TLL*, III (1907) col. 1372, y voit deux acceptions différentes, « de aetate » en 8.3, « par » en 9.1. Pour sa part, Waszink (*supra*, n. 12), 37, choisit le sens « égalitaire » pour les deux occurrences: « as God's coequal

emploi dont on ne sait s'il intéresse l'égalité de substance entre la matière et Dieu, ou seulement leur commune perpétuité[14]; le débat est important, puisqu'il ne s'agit de rien de moins que de choisir entre la stratégie critique de Tertullien et le point de vue propre d'Hermogène.

Le §8.3 doit être lu à la lumière de la prosopopée de la matière (7.4), morceau de bravoure où le polémiste condense son argument: sa coéternité supposée avec Dieu rend radicalement impossible toute espèce de subordination de la matière à Dieu, *Quis me deo subicit contemporali coaetaneo?* Dès lors, dans les deux affirmations juxtaposées peu auparavant, *pares fuimus, simul fuimus,* « nous étions égaux, nous étions en même temps », la première est à entendre comme la conséquence inéluctable de la seconde. En 8.3, Tertullien observe avec dérision que la matière selon Hermogène s'accorde un bénéfice, qui est d'être connue *cum deo*, mais que l'hérétique est bien le seul à avoir eu cette connaissance! Il doit alors s'agir exclusivement d'une description des vues d'Hermogène, notamment les mots *coaequalis deo, immo et adiutrix,* qui sont donc à entendre: la matière « qui a l'âge de Dieu, davantage, qui est aussi son auxiliaire ». Argument complémentaire: *immo et* doit marquer une gradation, et *adiutrix* être plus que *coaequalis*; ce ne peut être le cas si *coaequalis deo* signifie que le matière est « l'égale de Dieu », l'autre Dieu: quel avancement recevrait-elle alors en devenant sa servante? Je ne pense pas du reste que, dans sa réfutation par l'absurde d'Hermogène, Tertullien ait jamais donné la matière pour l'*adiutrix* de Dieu, alors qu'il la dit *auctrix* et *domina* (6.2).

Voilà qui donne pleinement raison au rédacteur du merveilleux *Thesaurus.* Et il semble bien en aller de même pour le début du chapitre suivant: Hermogène « ne peut pas dire que c'est en qualité de Seigneur (*ut dominum*) que Dieu a usé de la matière pour l'œuvre du monde », *dominus enim non potuit esse substantiae coaequalis* (9.1); entendre « car il n'a pas pu être Seigneur d'une substance égale à lui » donne un sens excellent, dans le droit fil de la démarche critique de Tertullien. Du moins si l'on raisonne à l'intérieur des limites de ce paragraphe, en oubliant que l'auteur reprend ici pour peu de temps les termes d'un débat traité plus longuement au chap.

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and even as His helper » en 8.3, « for He could not be Lord of a substance which was coequal with Himself » en 9.1.

[14] La même ambiguïté affecte le simple *aequalis*; qu'il soit permis de citer Augustin, *Conf.* XII.15.20 début: « illa sapientia tibi, deus noster, patri suo, plane coaeterna et aequalis »; *Serm.* 361.16.16, *PL* 39.1608: « Hic autem, qui natus est aequalis, quia non natus ex tempore, sed sempiterno Patri sempiternus Filius ».

3, et dont voici les grandes lignes. En raison, peut-on penser, de son attachement à l'immutabilité de Dieu (2.2: *indemutabilem et eundem semper*; cf. 12.3), Hermogène soutenait que Dieu a toujours été Seigneur; mais il faut pour cela, ajoutait-il, qu'ait existé de tout temps derrière lui une chose dont il fût le Seigneur: c'est la matière (3.1). Tertullien se devait de réfuter cet argument dangereux; il le fait en avançant que Dieu ne devient Seigneur qu'au prix d'un décalage temporel: *dominus non ante ea quorum dominus existeret* (3.4); en rigueur de termes, cette affirmation s'accorderait à la thèse hermogénienne de Dieu Seigneur de la matière, à laquelle il n'est pas antérieur; mais ce n'est plus le cas de cette affirmation-ci: *ita et dominus per ea quae sibi seruitura fecisset* (3.4), où l'on voit qu'aux yeux de Tertullien Dieu n'est Seigneur que de choses auxquelles il est antérieur. Si l'on se rappelle cet axiome en lisant 9.1, le sens temporel de *coaequalis* s'impose alors à l'attention: « car Dieu n'a pas pu être Seigneur d'une substance du même âge que lui », entendons « coéternelle à lui », ce qui vise à disqualifier la matière comme objet justificatif de la Seigneurie de Dieu, et à ébranler d'autant la position d'Hermogène. On ajoutera que, sous l'angle stylistique, il paraît peu vraisemblable que l'écrivain Tertullien, à si peu de lignes de distance, ait donné au même adjectif *coaequalis* deux sens si différents.

2. *Terra rudis* (23–29 *passim*)

Hermogène lisait la Bible, et à l'occasion en tirait argument. Ainsi faisait-il de *Genèse* 1:1–2, où il voyait deux réalités distinctes désignées par le même mot « terre »: *Vult igitur duas proponi terras in ista scriptura, unam quam i n p r i n c i p i o d e u s f e c i t, aliam materiam ex qua fecit, de qua dictum sit: T e r r a a u t e m e r a t i n u i s i b i l i s e t r u d i s* (25:1). De plus, cet imparfait *erat* était à ses yeux l'indice que la matière, supposée désignée par *terra* de *Gen.* 1.2 a, existait en effet depuis toujours (23:1; 27:1).

Le mot *rudis*, introduit dans le texte latin de cette péricope, est propre à piquer la curiosité. Sauf dans ces quelques pages de l'*Aduersus Hermogenem*, il apparaît que Tertullien lisait, pour *Gen.* 1:2 a: *Terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita*; aussi bien le fait-il encore ici même, en 23:1. D'autre part, la variante *rudis* semble bien n'apparaître (7 fois d'affilée) que dans ces chapitres du traité contre Hermogène, et nulle part ailleurs dans toute la latinité.[15] C'est aux

[15] C'est ce qui ressort des apparats monumentaux de l'éd. de B. Fischer, *Vetus Latina*, 2. *Genesis* (Freiburg/Br. 1953) *ad loc.*, 6–7.

biblistes professionnels d'expliquer cette circonstance surprenante, et peut-être d'ailleurs l'ont-ils fait. Mais il n'est pas interdit de proposer ici quelques réflexions, suggérées par des faits de langue.

La formule *terra rudis*, présente dans la version atypique de *Gen.* 1:2 a, n'est pas rare en latin si l'on accepte les cas où *terra* fait place à un synonyme; ainsi *terram rudem* ou *in rudi terra*,[16] *rudis terra*,[17] *rudem agrum*,[18] *rudis campus*,[19] *rudis tellus*,[20] *rudi humo*,[21] *rude solum*[22]; il s'agit chaque fois d'une terre vierge, improductive, qu'elle soit inculte seulement depuis la dernière récolte ou mise en jachère pour bénéficier d'un répit. Un célèbre vers d'Ovide, au début des *Métamorphoses* (I.7), décrit le chaos primordial comme une masse brute et indifférenciée, *rudis indigestaque moles*. La réunion des deux adjectifs doit être soulignée. *Indigestus* rend négativement un état de choses que *rudis* doit exprimer de façon positive. Pline l'Ancien appliquera justement à la matière la dualité *indigestus/digestus*; c'est pour opposer l'uniformité indifférenciée d'une planche banale et l'imposition d'un dessin par les veines du bois.[23] Numénius enfin, sans doute un peu antérieur à Hermogène et adepte comme lui de l'éternité de la matière, réservait à Dieu une action distributrice, qu'en son nom Calcidius formulera en latin par les mots *digestor deus*.[24]

Il est très remarquable que Calcidius semble bien, en employant ce *digestor*, faire d'une certaine façon référence à la Bible, plus précisément à la péricope *Gen.* 1:2 a. Car il a cité celle-ci un peu plus haut dans son commentaire, dans une traduction latine (personnelle?) des versions grecques des Septante, d'Aquila et de Symmaque; voici, ainsi mise en latin, la dernière de celles-ci: *terra porro fuit otiosum quid confusumque et inordinatum*.[25] Ce qui donne à

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16 Varron, *Res rust.* I.27.2; 44.2.

17 Columelle, *Res rust.* II.1.5.

18 *Ibid.* III.11.1.

19 Virgile, *Georg.* II.211.

20 Ovide, *Metam.* I.87 et 429.

21 *Ibid.* V.646–647.

22 *Amores* III.6, 16.

23 Pline, *Nat. hist.* XII.98: « *materiae* surda et *indigesta* simplicitas aut platani foliorum modo *digesta* ».

24 Numénius, fr. 52.11, p. 95 = Calcidius, *In Tim.* 295 (297.13–14 Waszink): « a digestore deo »; cf. *supra*, p. 192 et n. 3.

25 *In Tim.* 276 (280.8–9 Waszink); texte grec correspondant, donné par Waszink en note *ad loc.*, dans les *Hexaples* d'Origène, p. 7 Field: Ἡ δὲ γῆ ἐγένετο (var. ἦν) ἀργὸν καὶ ἀδιάκριτον (var. ἀδιαίρετον). Plus récemment,

penser que cette traduction pourrait être son œuvre, c'est que Calcidius reprend plus loin la même citation dans des termes latins un peu différents: *Otiosa uero et indigesta nuncupatur* [sc. *silua*] *a Symmacho; quod quidem per se nihil ualeat, otiosa, quod uero habeat opportunitatem suscipiendi ordinis ab exornante semet deo mundum moliente, indigesta censetur.*[26]

La version symmachienne de la péricope et la traduction latine qu'on en lit chez Calcidius transportent dans un monde proche de celui d'Hermogène. Le grec ἀδιάκριτον, « indistinct », ou ἀδιαίρετον, « indivis », n'est pas mal rendu par *confusum et inordinatum*; il l'est mieux, bien que de façon ouvertement interprétative, par *indigesta* (*silua*), qui, à l'époque de Calcidius, est devenu une sorte de mot technique. *Otiosus* est, si l'on ose dire, la traduction canonique de ἀργός, malgré la structure bien différente des deux mots. Comme l'a rappelé J.C.M. van Winden,[27] l'application de cet adjectif grec à la matière était usuelle chez les moyens platoniciens; témoin Plutarque sur des points de doctrine platonicienne ou stoïcienne.[28]

La canonicité mise à part, *rudis* aussi serait une traduction possible pour ἀργός.[29] Car il faut savoir que cet adjectif grec, dont le sens général est « oisif » ou « inerte », est applicable à une terre laissée en jachère.[30] LSJ donnent sur ce point trois exemples qui ne laissent aucun doute: « voudrais-tu que ta terre, actuellement inculte (νῦν ἀργὸν οὖσαν γῆν), devienne cultivée? »[31]; « en raison de la

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J.W. Wevers, éditeur de *Gen.* dans les *Septuaginta* de Göttingen, t. I (1974) 75, apparat, reproduit le même texte sous le sigle σ', mais en excluant les variantes; c'est qu'il en prend la citation chez Jean Philopon, *De opif. mundi* II.5 (59.16 et 68.22–69.3 Reichardt). — On sait depuis Fabricius que tout le morceau de Calcidius doit provenir du commentaire perdu d'Origène *Sur la Genèse.*

[26] *Ibid.* 278 (283.3–6 Waszink).

[27] *Calcidius on Matter. His Doctrine and Sources.* Philosophia Antiqua 9 (Leiden[2] 1965) 54.

[28] *De animae procreat. in Tim.* 6 (*Mor.* 1015a): τὸ ἀργὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ. H. Cherniss (n. b *ad loc.*, p. 190) observe que ce vocabulaire est stoïcien, et cite *De Stoic. repugn.* 43 (*Mor.* 1054a): τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς; et aussi *De Iside* 56 (*Mor.* 374e), où l'auteur fait sienne une notion de la matière qui exclut l'opinion de quelques philosophes (entendons: stoïciens) pour lesquels elle serait un corps « de soi-même inerte et inactif », ἀργόν τε καὶ ἄπρακτον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.

[29] *Iners* en serait une autre; dans sa description du chaos, tout de suite après *rudis moles*, Ovide, *Metam.* I.8, redouble avec *pondus iners.*

[30] LSJ *s.v.* B.I.2a.

[31] Xénophon, *Cyrop.* III.2.19.

générosité de leur terre, ils en laissent inculte la plus grande partie », δι' ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας[32]; telle plante « aime les sols froids et incultes », χωρία ... ἀργά.[33] De ces échantillons incontestables, il ressort que ἀργός qualifie couramment la terre quand elle est en friche, improductive. Mais, comme on l'a vu il y a un instant, la même chose à peu près peut être dite de l'adjectif latin *rudis*.

Dans ces conditions, ayant à traduire ἀργόν de Symmaque, Calcidius, presque aussi valablement que *otiosum*, aurait pu choisir *rude*. Il se peut que ἀργόν de Symmaque ait été traduit je ne sais où par *rude*.[34] Ce pourrait être là, pourquoi pas, une explication de l'étrange version latine de *Gen.* 1:2 a: *Terra autem erat inuisibilis et rudis*, dont Tertullien fait usage à propos d'Hermogène, et de lui seul. Voilà certes, mises bout à bout, beaucoup de suppositions passablement gratuites.

Il est bien peu probable qu'Hermogène soit lui-même l'auteur de cette version. Il n'est pas impossible qu'il ait pu l'induire en quelque mesure, d'une façon que l'on est réduit à imaginer. Si tel ne fut pas le cas, il faut avouer qu'il a eu beaucoup de chance de l'avoir, toute prête, à sa disposition. Sans doute n'aurait-il pas pu en rêver une autre qui vînt davantage à l'appui de ses convictions relatives à la matière. Voici en effet ce qu'il pouvait lire sous la plume de son compatriote et contemporain Apulée:

> Quant à la matière, Platon rappelle qu'elle est inengendrée et incorruptible, ... capable de prendre des figures et toute disposée à être façonnée: c'est elle, encore brute et dépourvue de la qualité liée à l'imposition des figures (*adhuc rudem et figurationis qualitate uiduatam*), que le Dieu artisan informe dans sa totalité.[35]

J.H. Waszink[36] s'est plu à souligner les points de rencontre textuels, notamment pour la conception de la matière, entre Hermogène et Apulée.[37] Leur accord est impressionnant surtout sur l'essentiel aux

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[32] Isocrate, *Panég.* 132.

[33] Théophraste, *Hist. plant.* IX.12.2.

[34] La datation de Symmaque est très incertaine; d'après H.B. Swete-R.R. Ottley, *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* (Cambridge 1914) 50, il doit avoir vécu sous Marc Aurèle (162-180) ou sous Commode (180-192).

[35] *De Platone* I.5.191 (87.2–6 Thomas).

[36] « Observations on Tertullian's Treatise against Hermogenes », *VC* 9 (1955) 131–132.

[37] Ainsi sur la matière qui n'est ni corporelle, ni incorporelle (*Adu.*

yeux d'Hermogène, la matière inengendrée et incorruptible.

Rien n'assure que ce dernier ait lu Apulée. Mais ce n'est nullement invraisemblable. Leurs dates respectives sont mal assurées, mais Apulée est certainement antérieur; dans les années 160, il s'est illustré à Carthage, où sa réputation dut lui survivre au moins jusqu'à ce que, au plus tard en 200,[38] Hermogène, venant d'Orient, s'installe dans la même ville. Comment celui-ci, dans ces conditions, aurait-il ignoré un philosophe d'une certaine renommée, platonicien comme lui, et qui en outre défendait sur la matière des vues identiques aux siennes? S'il a lu le *De Platone*, les lignes qui viennent d'en être citées, tellement homogènes à sa propre thèse, ne lui ont pas échappé, y compris *materiam* ... *adhuc rudem*. Mais on sait d'autre part qu'à ses yeux, la matière était désignée par *terra* de *Gen.* 1:2 a. Avec quelle jubilation ne dut-il pas lire dans un texte latin du même verset biblique *terra autem erat* ... *rudis*!

Herm. 35.2 = *De Plat.* I.5 (87.10–11 Thomas); sur la matière infinie (38.2 = 87.6–7 Thomas); pour la notion (plus originellement cicéronienne) de *recta ratio* (35.2 = II.22 [125.18 Thomas]). En sens inverse, Waszink (*supra*, n. 36), 134 n. 11, relève qu'Hermogène, 38.3: *nec tota fabricatur materia*, n'est pas platonicien (on pourrait ajouter que c'est son côté gnostique; sur ce point, il se sépare également d'Apulée 87.2–6 Thomas, traduit à l'instant: « Materiam ... deus artifex conformat uniuersam », et I.8 [90.8–17 Thomas]).

[38] Cf. G. May, « Hermogenes—ein frühchristlicher Theologe zwischen Platonismus und Gnosis », dans *Studia patristica*, XV. *Texte und Untersuchungen*, 128 (Berlin 1984) 462.

11

PHANTASIA AND INSPIRATION IN NEOPLATONISM

ANNE SHEPPARD

Platonists distrust mere appearances, and by and large the Platonic tradition in ancient thought is very suspicious of *phantasia*, contrasting the apparent with the real and the imaginary with the true. Plato himself makes very little use of the term *phantasia*: in *Sophist* 264b he defines *phantasia* as 'a blend of perception and judgement (*doxa*)', and earlier, at 235ff., he uses the related adjective *phantastikos* of the lower of two kinds of imitation. In that passage he contrasts two types of image-making, 'eikastic' and 'phantastic'. Both are of low value but 'eikastic' image-making does at least produce accurate likenesses; 'phantastic' image-making is even worse since it makes deceptive likenesses which only appear to resemble the originals but do not really do so. In *Timaeus* 70eff., however, he describes the liver as a mirror which receives *eidola* and *phantasmata* from the mind and so is capable of divination, whether in sleep or at other times when it is inspired by the gods.[1] Neoplatonic accounts of *phantasia* on the whole combine a Platonist distrust of appearances with a psychology derived from Aristotle. *Phantasia* occupies a key position at the 'joint' of the soul where rational and irrational meet. As in Aristotle it has close links with perception, but it also plays a

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[1] Cf. also *Phlb.* 38c–d. For discussions of Plato on φαντασία see M.W. Bundy, *The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought* (Urbana IL 1927) 19–59; G. Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought* (Galway 1988) 1–13; A. Silverman, 'Plato on *Phantasia*', *Classical Antiquity* 10 (1991) 123–147.

role in helping us to comprehend mathematics.[2] Neoplatonists sometimes use the term *phantasia* in connection with rational activities other than mathematics, but it is rare for them to appeal to *phantasia* when referring to experiences such as prophetic and artistic inspiration which they regard as supra-rational. In this paper I propose to discuss some passages of Synesius, Iamblichus and Hermias which do use *phantasia* in this rare way. I shall argue that there is a strand in Platonist thought, derived from *Timaeus* 70eff., which these passages pick up and develop but that the development is not maintained. In Proclus and Olympiodorus *phantasia* is put firmly back into the box from which Iamblichus had allowed it to escape.

Historical accounts of the concept of *phantasia* regularly draw attention to a passage from Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*.[3] In 6.19 Apollonius is described as engaged in conversation with an Egyptian, Thespesion. When Apollonius ridicules the animal images of gods found in Egypt, Thespesion asks sarcastically whether Greek sculptors such as Pheidias and Praxiteles went up to heaven and copied the forms of the gods there. Apollonius replies that the Greek sculptures were made not by *mimesis* but by *phantasia*, for *phantasia* can fashion even things which it has not seen. The contrast made here between *phantasia* and *mimesis* opens up great possibilities for *phantasia*, not for being creative in the modern sense but for reaching a divine realm beyond the world of sense-perception. Gerard Watson has remarked that 6.19 'sounds extremely Platonic', although his own discussion of the philosophical background makes clear that an eclectic blending of ideas from all the main philosophical schools lies behind Philostratus' usage. In the end he sees Platonism and Stoicism as the most important elements in the mixture.[4]

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[2] I have discussed this elsewhere in '*Phantasia* and *Analogia* in Proclus', in D. Innes, H. Hine and C. Pelling, eds., *Ethics and Rhetoric* (Oxford 1995) 343–351, and in '*Phantasia* and mathematical projection in Iamblichus', forthcoming in *Syllecta Classica* 8 (1997). See also A. Charles, 'L'imagination, miroir de l'âme selon Proclus', *Le néoplatonisme* (Paris 1971) 241–251; W. Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen* (Frankfurt 1985) 256ff.; I. Mueller, 'Mathematics and philosophy in Proclus' commentary on Book I of Euclid's Elements', in J. Pépin and H.D. Saffrey, eds., *Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens* (Paris 1987) 305–318; D.J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford 1989) 132–134 and 166–169.

[3] See Bundy (above, n. 1) 112–116; Watson (above, n. 1) 60–64; J.M. Cocking, *Imagination* (London 1991) 43–47.

[4] Quotation from Watson (above, n. 1) 63. Discussion of the background in Watson (above, n. 1) 59–65. Cf. D.A. Russell, *Criticism in*

About a hundred years before Philostratus, another writer well versed in both Platonism and Stoicism also used the term *phantasia* in a context of contact with the divine. I mean Plutarch, who refers to *phantasia* in both the *De Pythiae oraculis* and the *De defectu oraculorum.* In both works Plutarch uses *phantasia* in the Stoic sense of 'impression' or 'presentation'; the faculty which receives such impressions, not mentioned in the *De Pyth. or.*, is called τὸ φανταστικόν or ἡ φανταστικὴ δύναμις in the *De def. or.* In the *De Pyth. or.* there is only a brief allusion to inspired *phantasiai* at 397c where Theon, one of the speakers in Plutarch's dialogue, is distinguishing the contribution of the god from the contribution of the Pythia:

> οὐ γάρ ἐστι θεοῦ ἡ γῆρυς οὐδ' ὁ φθόγγος οὐδ' ἡ λέξις οὐδὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀλλὰ τῆς γυναικός· ἐκεῖνος δὲ μόνας τὰς φαντασίας παρίστησι καὶ φῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· ὁ γὰρ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοιοῦτόν ἐστι.
>
> 'As a matter of fact, the voice is not that of a god, nor the utterance of it, nor the diction, nor the metre, but all these are the woman's; he puts into her mind only the visions, and creates a light in her soul in regard to the future; for inspiration is precisely this.'[5]

In the *De def. or.* 431bff. *phantasia* and inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμός) are linked together in a similar way. At this point in the dialogue Demetrius wonders how the demons responsible for oracles make the prophetic priests and priestesses κατόχους τοῖς ἐνθουσιασμοῖς καὶ φαντασιαστικούς. Babbitt, the Loeb translator, renders φαντασιαστικούς as 'able to present their visions'. Similarly at 433c Lamprias claims that certain streams τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικῶς διατίθησι καὶ φανταστικῶς τοῦ μέλλοντος and at 438a he declares that prophetic inspiration comes when, and only when, the φανταστικὴ δύναμις is in the right state:

> Ὅταν οὖν ἁρμοστῶς ἔχῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ὥσπερ φαρμάκου κρᾶσιν ἡ φανταστικὴ καὶ μαντικὴ δύναμις, ἐν τοῖς προφητεύουσιν ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν.
>
> 'Whenever, then, the imaginative and prophetic faculty is in a state of prophetic adjustment for attempering itself to the spirit as to a drug, inspiration in those who foretell the future is bound to come.'

Antiquity (London 1981) 108–110.

[5] Translations of Plutarch are from F.C. Babbitt's Loeb edition (Cambridge MA 1936).

Traditionally dreams were one way in which prophetic visions might be received. We have seen Plato making use of that tradition in the *Timaeus*, a dialogue which was much read by Middle Platonists. In Plutarch dreams are mentioned at *De def. or.* 432c and 437e. Plutarch was familiar with ideas from all the main philosophical schools, but his own allegiance was to Platonism. He wrote a substantial essay on the creation of the world-soul in *Timaeus* 35aff., and R.M. Jones, in his study of Plutarch's Platonism, notes that the *Timaeus* is the Platonic work which he quotes or refers to the most.[6] I suggest that the connections Plutarch makes between *phantasia* and prophetic inspiration represent a Middle Platonic tradition derived from *Timaeus* 70eff. Such connections are, as we shall see, taken further in Neoplatonic thought.

Before we come to Iamblichus one other thinker, Synesius of Cyrene, must be considered. Synesius was born some forty years after Iamblichus' death, but it is nevertheless appropriate to discuss his views of *phantasia* before those of Iamblichus for two reasons. First, it has been argued convincingly that his *De insomniis*, the work with which I shall be concerned, shows the influence of Porphyry rather than Iamblichus.[7] Secondly, Synesius as a writer is not unlike Philostratus and Plutarch: like them, he is someone philosophically educated and interested in ideas rather than a systematic thinker. Although the *De insomniis* contains a good deal of interesting material on *phantasia*, in my view it has sometimes been given too much importance in the history of the concept.[8] In this paper I shall treat it primarily as further evidence for the background against which the novel ideas of Iamblichus should be set.

Since Synesius presents his work as a treatment of dreams, he naturally focusses on the role of *phantasia* in dreams, including prophetic and divinatory dreams. In chapter 4 Synesius uses a Neoplatonic psychological scheme in which *nous* contains the Forms of

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[6] R.M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Menasha WI 1916) 108. On Plutarch's Platonism see also D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London 1972) 63ff. On the passages discussed here, Bundy (above, n. 1) 96–98.

[7] See W.M. Lang, *Das Traumbuch des Synesios von Kyrene* (Tübingen 1926) and C. Lacombrade, *Synésios de Cyrène, hellène et chrétien* (Paris 1951). There is a useful Italian commentary on the *De insomniis* by D. Susanetti (Bari 1992).

[8] For discussion of Synesius on *phantasia* see, in addition to the works cited above in n. 7, Bundy (above, n. 1) 147–153; Watson (above, n. 1) 110–115; Cocking (above, n. 3) 62–64; N. Aujoulat, 'Les avatars de la *phantasia* dans le *Traité des songes* de Synésios de Cyrène', *Koinonia* 7 (1983) 157–177 and 8 (1984) 33–55.

things that are (τὰ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων) while soul contains the Forms of things which come to be (τῶν γιγνομένων). Soul has all the Forms but projects the appropriate ones and mirrors them in the *phantasia*, through which the individual is able to grasp them.[9] Here *phantasia* is being given quite an important role in enabling us to grasp the Forms through images of them. The Forms it enables us to grasp, however, are only those of τὰ γιγνόμενα, and it is a long way away from the realm of *nous*. Synesius goes on to give an account of *phantasia* as a 'more holy' form of perception and then suddenly remarks that through it we often make contact with the gods who warn us, give us oracles and in other ways take care of us. There follows a rather miscellaneous list of benefits which we may receive as a result of dreams: finding treasure, becoming a poet after encountering the Muses in a dream, being informed of plots, being cured of an illness by sleep; finally sleep may open the way to the most perfect visions of reality (τὰς τελεωτάτας τῶν ὄντων ἐποψίας) and conjunction with the intelligible (συνάψαι τῷ νοητῷ). Synesius then quotes a couple of verses from the *Chaldaean Oracles* to back up the claim that *phantasia* can actually bring about such a conjunction (134b–135b). This idea that *phantasia*, as a higher form of perception, can help us to a vision of the divine, is further developed in chapters 5 and 6 of the *De insomniis*. By chapter 6 Synesius has moved to using the term φανταστικὸν πνεῦμα. When this is ill, it is liable to illusion, but once it is purified by philosophy and rites, it becomes inspired (136c–d).

So it seems that *phantasia* is not limited to the forms of τὰ γιγνόμενα after all. Some of the ideas presented by Synesius here come from long traditions about dreams in antiquity: the gods appear to Homeric heroes in their dreams, the dream which brings poetic inspiration goes back at least to Callimachus, if not to Hesiod,[10] and we have already met the idea that the *phantasia* must be in the right state before it can be inspired to foretell the future in Plutarch's *De def. or.* Synesius is setting these ideas within a Neoplatonic psychology and metaphysics where having visions of the gods and receiving their inspiration can be described as conjunction with the intelligible. At the same time he stresses the links between *phantasia* and perception and presents *phantasia* as a lofty kind of

[9] 134a–b, reading ἐνοπτρίζει τῇ φαντασίᾳ with Lang, Watson and Susanetti.

[10] Hesiod's encounter with the Muses was sometimes interpreted in antiquity as a dream: see M.L. West, ed., *Hesiod. Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 158–159.

perception. Synesius simply conflates several different functions of *phantasia*. By contrast Plotinus had actually distinguished between a higher 'image-making power' (φανταστικόν) which reflects the realm of *nous* and a lower one which retains images from sense-perception.[11] Although subsequent Neoplatonists did not follow his lead in postulating two different psychological faculties, they were on the whole much more precise than Synesius in distinguishing the different roles that *phantasia* could play.

When we turn to Iamblichus we find not only the idea that *phantasia* can receive inspiration but also a theory of the function of *phantasia* within which that idea finds a place. The evidence for that theory is sparse but suggestive. It is to be found in a passage from the commentary on the *de Anima* ascribed to Simplicius, which may in fact be by Priscian,[12] and in Priscian's *Metaphrasis in Theophrastum*. At Simplicius (?), *in de Anima* 214.18–20 Hayduck, the author says:

> καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ τὰς λογικὰς ἡμῶν, ὡς ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος βούλεται, ἀποτυποῦται ἐνεργείας πάσας, ὅμως κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπεικονίζεται εἴδη μορφωτικῶς καὶ μεριστῶς.
>
> 'For even if, as Iamblichus wants, it (i.e. *phantasia*) takes an impression of all our rational activities, nevertheless it produces images of Forms which have shape and parts in the manner of perceptible things.'

The description of *phantasia* as 'taking an impression of all our rational activities' sounds like an Iamblichean way of expressing what for Plotinus had been the role of the higher image-making power. It is taken further in a longer passage in Priscian's *Metaphrasis* 23.13–24.20 Bywater, where Priscian presents as 'the views of Iamblichus' (τὰ Ἰαμβλίχεια) the idea that *phantasia* has a dual

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[11] Plotinus IV.3.29–32. For discussion of Plotinus on φαντασία see Bundy (above, n. 1) 117–130; H.J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 88–95; J. Dillon, 'Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination', in J.P. Mackey, ed., *Religious Imagination* (Edinburgh 1986) 55–65 (reprinted in J. Dillon, *The Golden Chain* [Aldershot 1990] XXIV); Watson (above, n. 1) 97–103.

[12] The case for Priscian's authorship was argued by F. Bossier and C. Steel, 'Priscianus Lydus en de "In de anima" van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius', *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 34 (1972) 761–822. See also C. Steel, *The Changing Self* (Brussels 1978). For some arguments on the other side see I. Hadot, *Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris 1978) 193–202. For further contributions to the debate see *Simplicius. On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4*, trans. J.O. Urmson, with notes by P. Lautner (London 1995) 2–10.

role. On the one hand it awakens reflections (ἐμφάσεις) from perception to *doxa*, and on the other it holds out secondary reflections of *nous* to *doxa*. According to Priscian, Iamblichus saw *phantasia* as existing as a subsidiary to all the faculties of the soul (πάσαις ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς παραπέφυκεν) and as characterised by its power to form images.[13]

If *phantasia* can form images of any other faculty in the soul, this explains not only the link with perception, which the Neoplatonists took over from Aristotle, but also the role of *phantasia* in mathematics[14] as well as the tradition which connected *phantasia* with inspiration. Iamblichus picks up that tradition in a relatively well-known passage of the *De Mysteriis*, III.14. Here Iamblichus is replying to some remarks of Porphyry about those who prophesy in a state of inspiration κατὰ τὸ φανταστικόν. As always in the *De Mysteriis* Iamblichus is concerned to claim a divine origin for the phenomena under consideration. He describes this kind of prophecy as φωτὸς ἀγωγή, because in it the luminous vehicle of the soul is illuminated by divine light, ἐξ οὗ δὴ φαντασίαι θεῖαι καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν φανταστικὴν δύναμιν. The connection between *phantasia* and the vehicle of the soul, also found in Synesius, goes back at least to Porphyry.[15] Iamblichus here uses that connection to explain how the φανταστικὴ δύναμις can become inspired by the gods. Like Plutarch he uses φανταστικὴ δύναμις or, a little later, τὸ φανταστικόν for the faculty within us, reserving the term φαντασία for the images which we receive from the gods.

At what level are these gods? Synesius in the *De insomniis* appears to equate visions of the gods with conjunction with the level of *nous*, but Synesius does not present us with anything very sophisticated in the way of Neoplatonic metaphysics. In the passage discussed above from Simplicius (?), *in de Anima*, *phantasia* is said to take an impression of all our rational (λογικάς) activities, but the statement in Priscian's *Metaphrasis* that *phantasia* exists as a subsidiary to all the powers of the soul leaves open the possibility

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[13] For some discussion of this passage see P.M. Huby, 'Priscian of Lydia as Evidence for Iamblichus', in H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark, eds., *The Divine Iamblichus* (Bristol 1993) 6–7.

[14] Cf. n. 2 above.

[15] On the vehicle in general see R.C. Kissling, 'The ὄχημα-πνεῦμα of the Neoplatonists and the *De insomniis* of Synesius of Cyrene', *AJPh* 43 (1922) 318–330; E.R. Dodds, ed., *Proclus. The Elements of Theology* (Oxford[2] 1963) 313–321; A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition* (The Hague 1974) 152–158; J.F. Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul* (Chico CA 1985).

that if there are supra-rational powers in the soul, *phantasia* could form images of those also.[16] In the multi-layered Iamblichean universe, gods are present at many levels. It may well be that the gods of III.14 are gods at the level of *nous.* Similarly *Myst.* III.2–3 discusses divination in dreams and argues that the soul receives purer φαντάσματα of gods, incorporeal substances and the intelligibles when it is asleep and only its intellectual and divine part is active.

If I have interpreted Iamblichus correctly, he is claiming in the *De Mysteriis* that the human power of *phantasia* can be directly inspired by the intelligible gods. That claim should be seen in the context of the wider theory of *phantasia* reported by the commentator on the *de Anima* and by Priscian. It is an unusual claim for a Platonist philosopher to make. In making it, Iamblichus is picking up ideas about the ability of *phantasia* to make contact with the divine which we have seen in Philostratus and Plutarch and which are also picked up and developed, in a less coherent way, by Synesius. *Timaeus* 70eff. could provide these ideas with Platonic backing.[17]

The only other Neoplatonist, to my knowledge, who explicitly links *phantasia* and inspiration is Hermias in the fifth century. Hermias' commentary on the *Phaedrus* is largely a report of the lectures of his teacher, Syrianus. It includes Iamblichean material, probably transmitted via Syrianus.[18] *In Phaedrum* 85.19ff. Couvreur approaches the connection between *phantasia* and inspiration in a rather different way from Iamblichus. Hermias has just been arguing that inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμός) properly so called belongs to 'the one in the soul' but in 85.19ff. he goes on to say that there are other kinds of inspiration which concern the other parts of the soul, caused by demons or by gods not without demons. *Dianoia* can be inspired when it makes a sudden intellectual discovery, and *doxa* and *phan-*

[16] The later Neoplatonic doctrine of the 'one in the soul' is already present to some extent in Iamblichus: see J.M. Dillon, ed., *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden 1973) 253–254; G. Shaw, *Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus* (University Park PA 1995) 118–126.

[17] I am not claiming that Iamblichus is directly influenced by Philostratus or Plutarch but that these two authors bear witness to ideas current in Platonist circles in their time.

[18] See K. Praechter, *ByzZ* 18 (1909) 524 n. 4, and *RE* VIII.1 732–735, *s.v.* 'Hermeias'; A. Bielmeier, *Die neuplatonische Phaidrosinterpretation* (Paderborn 1930); L.G. Westerink, ed., *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam 1962) x n. 6; B.D. Larsen, *Jamblique de Chalcis, exégète et philosophe* (Aarhus 1972) 362.

tasia are said to be inspired when they discover *technai* and produce remarkable works (παράδοξα ἔργα), as did Pheidias the sculptor and the maker of Heracles' baldric referred to in Homer, *Odyssey* 11.612. Hermias goes on to explain how *thumos* and even *epithumia* can be inspired. There is no mention here of *phantasia* taking an impression of rational activities or forming images of higher powers of the soul. The implication is rather that the gods or the demons can come down to all the levels of the soul, even the lowest, and cause inspiration or something akin to it. *Phantasia* is firmly slotted in at the same level as *doxa*, just above the irrational powers of *thumos* and *epithumia*. Nor is Hermias interested in the role of *phantasia* in prophecy and divination. His examples of 'inspired' *phantasia* come from the visual arts. If Pheidias, the stock example of the supreme sculptor, can produce statues which portray the gods as they really are, it is not, as in Philostratus, because his *phantasia* has reached up to heaven, but because something of heaven has come down to him. Hermias—or rather Syrianus—may be seen as reconciling the Iamblichean talk of *phantasia* as inspired (ultimately based on the *Timaeus*) with a strictly orthodox Neoplatonist psychology which keeps *phantasia* where the Plato of the *Sophist* would have wanted to keep it.

In Hermias' contemporary and fellow-student Proclus, *phantasia* and inspiration are kept firmly apart. In Proclus' psychology *phantasia* clearly belongs at much the same level of the soul as *doxa*, just as it does in the Hermias passage considered above.[19] It is given a significant role in mathematics as the power which reflects images of higher principles, and it has a parallel role in the production of language and in the making of 'blueprints', such as the image of a ship in the mind of the first shipbuilder. In all these contexts Proclus usually employs the terms εἰκών and παράδειγμα to suggest the analogical relationship between the images projected in the *phantasia* and their models at a higher level.[20] In his commentary on the *Timaeus* Proclus mentions Pheidias' Zeus as imitating not the world of becoming but the Homeric concept of Zeus: if Pheidias had been able to reach the intellectual god himself (αὐτὸν ... τὸν νοερὸν ... θεόν) he would certainly have produced something finer. Nothing is said

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[19] On the relationship between *phantasia* and *doxa* in Proclus see H.J. Blumenthal, 'Plutarch's Exposition of the *De anima* and the Psychology of Proclus', in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (Entretiens Hardt 21) (Geneva 1975) 123–147, and 'Proclus on Perception', *BICS* 29 (1982) 1–11; also G. Watson, 'Unfair to Proclus?', *Phronesis* 27 (1982) 101–106.

[20] See Proclus *in Cra.* 8.10 and 18.27ff. Pasquali, and *in Ti.* I.320.5–10 Diehl, all discussed in my '*Phantasia* and *Analogia* in Proclus' (above, n. 2).

here about either *phantasia* or inspiration.[21] However, when Proclus develops a classification of types of poetry, inspired poetry is the highest type while the poetry of φανταστικὴ μίμησις, described in terms which explicitly recall *Sophist* 235dff., is the lowest of the low.[22] Elsewhere Proclus describes *phantasia* as the childish part of the soul, unable to comprehend the true, allegorical meaning of myths.[23] Similarly Olympiodorus in the sixth century regards *phantasia* and inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμός) as opposing principles[24] and, like Proclus, regards *phantasia* as a childish element which enjoys the surface story presented by myths.[25]

The tradition which links *phantasia* and inspiration is a tradition of discussing prophecy and divination in dreams. That link might have been used to offer accounts of poetic and artistic inspiration also, but it is clear from the way in which Hermias treats the inspiration of *phantasia* as not inspiration in the strict sense that there was little room for such a development within mainstream later Neoplatonism. If the *Timaeus* opened the way to magnifying the role of *phantasia* in divination, the *Sophist* made it impossible to give *phantasia* a significant role in art. In the story told here Iamblichus stands out as a thinker with a novel concept of *phantasia* as a subsidiary to all the powers of the soul. His successors, operating with a more rigid psychological scheme, could not allow *phantasia* so much freedom.

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[21] *in Ti.* I.265.18ff. Diehl. Behind this passage lie both the tradition of claiming that the sculptor can imitate the Forms directly and the *topos* that Pheidias was dependent on Homer. For the former see Cicero, *Orat.* 2.8–3.10, Seneca, *Ep.* 65.7–10, Plotinus V.8.1; for the latter Polybius 30.10.6, Strabo 8.3.30, Dio Chrysostom 12.44ff., with Watson (above, n. 1) 71ff. The language of εἰκών and παράδειγμα suggests that Proclus could have said Pheidias was using φαντασία in the same way as the first shipbuilder (cf. n. 20 above), but this for him does not involve inspiration.

[22] *in R.* I.177.7–196.13 Kroll, discussed by Bundy (above, n. 1) 140–143, by me in *Studies on the 5th and 6th Essays of Proclus' Commentary on the Republic* (Göttingen 1980) 162–202, and by R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1986) 188–197.

[23] See *in R.* I.80.23–81.10 and II.107.14–109.3 Kroll.

[24] Olympiodorus, *in Phd.* 6.2, 97–8 Westerink, 6.12, 103 Westerink, and *in Alc.* 8.11–14, 9 Westerink. Cf. Bundy (above, n. 1) 144.

[25] Olympiodorus, *in Grg.* 237.14–23 and 239.12–30 Westerink.

III

Texts and Their Transmission

12

SOME NOTES ON THE TEXT OF PSEUDO-SIMPLICIUS' COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA*, III.1–5

H. J. BLUMENTHAL

The Author

As often, the title of this paper needs a word of explanation, since some readers, though not our dedicatee, might wonder who the author I call Ps-Simplicius might be. Those whose interests lie in Aristotle rather than his Neoplatonic commentators may not all be aware that there is a serious problem about the authorship of the *de Anima* commentary which they know as the work of Simplicius. This is not the place to discuss this problem, which I and others have discussed elsewhere,[1] but the fact, as I think one must now take it to

[1] The first was F. Piccolomini, *Commentarii in Libros Aristotelis De Coelu, ortu et interitu; adiuncta lucidissima expositione, in tres libros eiusdem de anima* (Mainz 1608) 1001–1002, whose work was to be ignored for more than two and a half centuries (the *de Anima* was published at Venice in 1602: I have not seen that edition). The question was re-opened and, as they thought, solved by F. Bossier and C. Steel, 'Priscianus Lydus en de "in de Anima" van pseudo(?)-Simplicius', *Tidschrift voor Filosofie* 34 (1972) 761–822. An updated version of this article, in English, will appear in Priscian, *On Theophrastus on Sense Perception*, translated by Pamela Huby and 'Simplicius', *On Aristotle on the Soul* 2.6–12, translated by Carlos Steel. Notes by Peter Lautner (London/Ithaca 1997). A critique of their work by I. Hadot is printed as an appendix to *Le problème du Néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris 1978) 193–202: Hadot argues that while the language of the *de Anima* commentary is indicative of an author other than the real Simplicius the doctrines are not different from his, and concludes by stressing this fact while agreeing that the attribution to Priscian is probably correct. For a more agnostic view of the identity of the author cf. my *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in late antiquity. Interpretations of the* de Anima (London/Ithaca 1996) 65–71, reprinted with some modifications

be, that our author is not the real Simplicius, has an important implication for any study on the text of this work. That is that the substantial corpus of work by Simplicius himself cannot be used to corroborate—or undermine—readings in our work, and one cannot appeal to it for support for a conjecture. This is the more so since one of the stronger arguments for denying authorship to the real Simplicius is that the language of the *de Anima* commentary is so different from his as to put it beyond the bounds of possibility that we are dealing with two different kinds of writing from one and the same hand.[2] If, as some think, the author was Priscian of Lydia, author of the *Metaphrasis in Theoprastum*, we could occasionally appeal to that work, though it is short—a mere thirty-seven pages of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.*[3] But I think there are difficulties about that identification which are sufficient to require at least a degree of ἐποχή, and that all that one can safely say is that this commentary comes from the same intellectual area as the works of Simplicius, Priscian and Damascius, all Neoplatonists who worked in Athens at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the sixth. Hence the label Ps-Simplicius, a counsel of prudence if not quite despair: not quite because a solution is possible in principle, though I suspect that we may never arrive at it.

The Text

As for the text itself, let it be said that its condition is not satisfactory. Though the work had some vogue in Renaissance Italy we have only one complete manuscript, the thirteenth or fourteenth century *Laurentianus* 85.21, labelled A by the *CAG* editor, M. Hayduck: the only other complete text is the Aldine *editio princeps*, produced by F. Asulanus (Francesco Torresano d'Asola) in 1527, to which Hayduck attributes the authority of a manuscript (his a). I have not been able to use this edition, but it appears to be reflected in the Latin translation of another scholar from Asola, Evangelista Longo, also and confusingly referred to as Asulanus (Venice 1553): this translation was preceded by that of Giovanni Faseolo (Faseolus) also published at Venice, in 1543. At the points where I have checked it, that is

in 'Simplicius', *On Aristotle on the Soul* 3.1–5 translated by H.J. Blumenthal (London/Ithaca 1997).

[2] An explanation I once thought possible, cf. e.g. my 'The psychology of (?) Simplicius' commentary on the *De anima*', in H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd, eds., *Soul and the Structure of Being in late Neoplatonism* (Liverpool 1982) 73.

[3] Hereafter *CAG*.

those where there is a difficulty about the printed *CAG* text, Hayduck's reporting of A is not always reliable. The unreliable reports seem not to be isolated, but to be concentrated on a few pages at a time: an archaeologist of textual criticism might suggest the hypothesis that these were pages assigned to a less than entirely competent—or careful—*Hilfskraft*.

The Lemmata

Unlike those in the real Simplicius' commentaries, which are generally either complete, or give a catchword after ἕως τοῦ to identify the extent of the text on which he is commenting, this commentary frequently gives incomplete lemmata, citing only the first few words of what may be several lines of Aristotle that are to be discussed. Yet the commentary, as is not always the case with others, corresponds closely to the wording of the lemmata as we have them, which suggests that they were not subsequently inserted in some mechanical fashion from a text of Aristotle which did not always correspond to the one that the commentator used.[4] Asulanus, either because he worked from a manuscript that was more generous in this respect, or because he did fill in missing text, provides much fuller lemmata than are to be found in A and so in Hayduck.

What may be of interest to students of Aristotle is that the text from which the lemmata come was, in terms of the Aristotelian tradition, probably rather conservative. Thus it often corroborates the readings of the less innovative editions of the *de Anima* and, for Anglophone scholars in particular, it frequently serves to draw attention to the somewhat arbitrary and idiosyncratic nature of some of the textual choices, and emendations, made by Ross.[5] For this reason I have looked at some of the differences between the lemmata as given by Hayduck and the Ross text of the *de Anima* with which they should, but do not always, coincide.

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[4] As in the case of Simplicius' *de Caelo* commentary, cf. P. Moraux, 'Notes sur la tradition indirecte du "de Caelo" d'Aristote', *Hermes* 82 (1954) 151–154. For yet further complications in the history of the lemmata to that commentary see F. Bossier, 'Le problème des lemmes du *De caelo* dans la traduction latine du commentaire *In De caelo* de Simplicius', in *Les problèmes posés par l'édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux* (Louvain-la-Neuve 1992) 361–397.

[5] I refer to the text printed in his last work on the *de Anima*, *Aristotle De Anima*. Edited with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford 1961).

These Notes

What follows is a miscellany of observations and suggestions which will, I hope, contribute to the understanding of this part of the commentary and also, may one hope, to the establishment at some future date of a more satisfactory text than the one we now have. Sometimes, incidentally, they may throw some light on the text of the *de Anima* itself.

174.22–3 οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ γῆς διὰ τὸ ἀκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθὲς καὶ δυσμετάληπτον κτλ.

δυσμεταληπτικὸν should be read for δυσμετάληπτον: the latter is unattested even in the simpler form without δυσ-, and while that in itself is insufficient reason for removing it from the text, both context and syntax clearly require an active rather than a passive form here. While δυσμεταληπτικός would also be a *hapax*, in Simplicius as well as Ps-Simplicius, μεταληπτικός appears three lines below, if nowhere else in the *de Anima* commentary: it does appear three times, all on two pages, at 541.2 and 13, 542.10, in Simplicius' *Physics* commentary.

174.23–4 τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐντελεχειῶν

I suspect στοιχείων should be read in place of ἐντελεχειῶν. The previous twenty lines, from 174.2, have been about the relation of the elements to the sense-organs, a discussion which continues for a further fifteen, down to 174.38, and entelechies would seem to have no place in it.

175.26–7 Lemma (*de An.* $424^{b}24$–6) εἰ γὰρ παντός, οὗ ἐστιν αἴσθησις ἁφή, καὶ νῦν ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ᾗ ἁπτὸν πάθη τῇ ἁφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν.

Read (πάντα γὰρ ... αἰσθητά ἐστιν), adding the parentheses, as in editions of Aristotle, and substituting a comma outside them for the colon after αἴσθησιν. With the colon, as printed by Hayduck, the sentence structure is disrupted, since εἰ clearly introduces the protasis to the apodosis beginning at ἀνάγκη, which begins the next lemma at 176.28. Aristotle manuscripts are divided about the order of ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν: it makes no difference.

175.31–2 ὡς ἁπτὰ ταῖς παθητικαῖς χαρακτηρίζεται ποιότησιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ τῆς Φυσικῆς ὑπέμνησται ἀκροάσεως.

παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, qualities that can undergo affections, the sub-

ject of this part of the discussion, are not mentioned in *Physics* 8, or elsewhere in the *Physics* apart from book 7, 244^{b}5a, in a sentence restored to the text by Prantl from Simplicius, who quotes it at *in Phys.* 1057, 24–6. Therefore ἑβδομόῳ should be read for ὀγδόῳ, unless, of course, Ps-Simplicius gave the wrong reference himself, not a thing he generally does.

177.7–9 ... ταῦτα ... αἰσθητικά· ἦν γάρ τις ἐν τῇ τελείᾳ ζωῇ καὶ ἡ χρωμένη αὐτὴ δύναμις.

Read αὐτοῖς for αὐτή: the latter is inconsistent with τις, while χρωμένη needs an object.

177.12–13 ὅταν τὸ ἀνάπαλιν καὶ παρούσης τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ ὄργανον ἐκλείπῃ.

Delete τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. It makes no sense, since the clause in which it comes explains the previous words and does not set out a view at variance with them. Perhaps it has climbed up a manuscript page from line 14, where it is appropriate.

177.36 ὧν αἰσθητῶν μὴ αὐτῶν ἀπτόμενα αἰσθάνεται

I cannot construe this clause as it stands and suggest reading ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μὴ αὐτῶν ἀπτομένη: the incidence of other words ending in -ων and -α in lines 35–7 would have facilitated the other changes if the ἡ had dropped out.

178.19–20 ἄμφω δὲ ὅμως καὶ δι' ἀέρος ὡς καὶ δι' ὕδατός ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αἰσθητόν.

Read ὁμῶς, 'in the same way', for ὅμως, 'nevertheless': the sentence explains that objects perceived through different media are *still* sense objects. It is not necessary to say *that* they are sense objects since that has been said by using the terms ὁρατόν and αἰσθητόν in the previous clause.

181.16–18 μήποτε δὲ οὐκ ἀκριβὴς ἡ αἰτία, ἐπακολούθουσαν ποιοῦσα τὴν πρόνοιαν ἡγουμένην καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ἑκάστοις ἀγαθοῦ.

I suggest τὴν πρόνοιαν <τὴν> ἡγουμένην: the second article could easily have dropped out after the first and without it it is difficult to make sense of the sentence.

181.22 μετέχειν δὲ τῆς ὡς διὰ χιτώνων

Read αὐτῆς for τῆς, an article with no noun. The pronoun is required to pick up τῆς ὁρατικοῦ δυνάμεως from the previous line.

183.4 ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα

Ps-Simplicius attests the κινήσει excised as a gloss from *De An.* 425ᵃ17 by Ross, against the testimony of both mss. and commentaries.

183.17 οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει

These words do not belong with what goes before, and should be printed as a new lemma, as indicated in A.

183.21 Lemma (*de An.* 425ᵃ17–18) ὥστε καὶ τὸ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι καὶ τὸ σχῆμα.

The printed lemma has καὶ τὸ twice. Editors of Aristotle follow family **E** in omitting the first τὸ and the second καὶ, which is also missing from Ps-Philoponus' citation, *in de An.* 458.24, but is reported by Ross and others as being in 'Simplicius'' lemma. It does not appear in A, so unless Hayduck found it in another ms. and omitted to report the discrepancy—unlikely since he notes the difference from the text of Aristotle *in apparatu*—it is simply a mistake on his part. Omitting the first τὸ is supported by the previous οἷον μέγεθος.

183.37–8 οὕτω δέ, ὡς τὸ πλῆθος συνεισάγειν ἅμα τὸ ἓν τὸ συνεχὲς κτλ.

Read συνεισάγει for συνεισάγειν, though the final syllable is represented in A by a standard abbreviation for -ειν. This ms. does not usually use this abbreviation, which might therefore have been wrongly inserted by its own hand, or by a previous hand.

183.38 The reading of A is τὸ (συνεχὲς), not τῷ as reported by Hayduck.

184.11 προηγουμένως τὸ ἴδιον ἓν τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχον, οἷον ὡς ἐν ὄψει

I suspect ἐν has dropped out after ἓν, cf. ἐν ὄψει, followed in the next line by ἐν ἀκοῇ and ἐν ἀφῇ, all parallel and going with ὑπάρχον. While τῷ εἴδει could be construed as a simple possessive dative after ὑπάρχον, one would then expect all the other datives to depend directly on it rather than having an ἐν going with each.

187.2 τοῦ μεγέθους γρωριστική, καὶ αὐτὴ λευκοῦ

Hayduck reads αὐτὴ, but A, as well as the best mss. of Aristotle, has αὕτη, which should be retained. γρωριστική is clearly a simple misprint for γνωριστική.

187.27–8 τὸ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἀνθρώπου μοι μόνον ἴδιον εἶναι δοκεῖ.

Though it makes little difference to the meaning perhaps μόνου should be read for μόνον.

190.34 Lemma (*de An.* 425^{b}26–7). Hayduck prefers the Aldine's (a's) ταὐτὸν to the τὸ αὐτὸ of A and the **E** family of Aristotle, which I would restore. I cannot detect why he prints ταὐτόν, oxytone, presumably deliberately since it occurs in both text and apparatus.

192.4 Lemma (*de An.* 426^{a}1) ὧν εἴποι ἄν τις κτλ.

εἴποι should probably be restored to the text of the *de Anima*, where Hicks and Ross print the impossible form *εἴπειεν, weak aorist optative ending on a strong aorist stem, from C, presumably preferred as *lectio difficilior* to the εἴποι of Ps-Simplicius' lemma. Other mss. have εἴποιεν, inappropriately plural, and the equally impossible φήσειεν. Of editions of the *de Anima* which I have seen only the Budé has εἴποι, apparently an emendation by its editor, A. Jannone.

193.31ff. Lemma (*de An.* 426^{a}27) εἰ δ' ἡ συμφωνία φωνή τίς ἐστιν.

Though the ms. is not quite clear, this should probably be read as εἰ δὴ in A, 'if indeed ...', and not εἰ δ' ἡ, 'if the ...', as in our texts of Aristotle. The commentary that follows shows that the latter was not what Ps-Simplicius thought the text ought to be, but the one in front of him may have divided the words in this way, and so provided his starting point. He may, of course, have found it in Plutarch's commentary, together with the comments he reports: Plutarch, according to Ps-Simplicius, 193.32–5, maintained that there should be two words and not three, and the two word version is apparently an emendation by Plutarch (i.e., to εἰ δὴ), which Ps-Simplicius approves. This gives better sense with the word order Ps-Simplicius has, viz. συμφωνία φωνή τίς, since Aristotle has so far been talking about sound and not combinations of sounds. His order is the same as that of the mss. of Aristotle; the order printed by Ross, φωνὴ συμφωνία τίς, is based on Ps-Philoponus and Sophonias, but is unnecessary if Plutarch's reading is accepted. The matter is discussed at length by Hicks *ad loc.*

194.33–4 ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ οὖσα τῷ αἰσθητῷ

Omit the article with αἰσθητῷ in line 34, with a, the Aldine edition. The meaning is clearly that the sense coincides with the sense-object underlying the act of perception, which is what ὑποκείμενον means.

197.5–8 τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἀτόμων ἡ αἴσθησις ἀντιληπτική, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ὡς ἄτομα λέγῃ, ἡ δι' αἰσθήσεως, ἐὰν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου ἀναδράμῃ, ἢ ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἄτομα λέγῃ, μετὰ φαντασίας ἐνεργοῦσα.

It is very difficult to make sense of these lines as they stand. With Hayduck's text a translation would be something like this: 'For it is sense-perception that cognises individual sense-objects, since opinion apprehends them together with sense-perception whenever it announces them as individuals, or does so through sense-perception, if it goes up from them to the universal or, when it also identifies individuals, it is operating together with imagination'. But:

(1) there is no obvious difference between opinion working with or through sense-perception, μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως;

(2) I see no clear meaning for opinion identifying individuals by opinion with sense-perception, since identification is not what sense-perception does;

(3) that is a function where imagination is necessary because (a) it presents information to the higher soul and (b) it is the basis of memory.

I therefore propose to delete ὅταν ὡς ἄτομα λέγῃ in line 6, where it makes little sense, as a doublet for the virtually equivalent ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἄτομα λέγῃ in lines 7 and 8. The text as amended could then be translated as follows:

'For it is sense-perception that cognizes individual sense-objects, since opinion apprehends them (understanding ἀντιλαμβάνεται or ἀντιληπτική ἐστιν) together with sense-perception or through sense-perception, if it goes up from them to the universal or, when it also identifies the individual sense-objects, it is operating together with imagination'.

199.11–12 κατὰ διάφορα δὲ μόρια ὑπ' αὐτῶν ταύτης πασχούσης

In ταύτης πασχούσης, ταύτης is out of place and anyhow redundant, so perhaps one should read ταῦτα, referring to the opposite sensations which are being discussed.

199.37 ἐπήγαγεν οὐ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι φήσας

Delete οὐ, since this is neither what Aristotle says nor part of the point that Ps-Simplicius is making. There could be further corruption: τῷ δὲ εἶναι ... ἀλλὰ, for example, may have dropped out.

200.18–19 μόνη δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ φορὰ εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦ ἐνύλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδε τοῦ εἰδοπεποιημένου.

ἐνύλου, 'in matter', makes no sense here, since locomotion, even circular, does not belong to immaterial being. I suggest ἀύλου, 'without matter'.

200.26 στιγμῇ τοίνυν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἀπείκασται ψυχὴ ... (l. 30) καὶ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ... (l. 32) οὐ πάθην οὖσαν οὐδὲ κίνησιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἔξωθεν εἰσδοχήν, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαν ἀμέριστον ἔνδοθεν προιοῦσαν, (l. 34) οὐ ποιητικὴν ἀλλὰ γνωριστικὴν κτλ.

By line 32 either the writer or more probably a scribe has lost track of the syntax, and follows ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή, still the subject at the end of the sentence, with a string of accusatives: read πάθη οὖσα ... κίνησις ... εἰσδοχή ... ἐνέργεια ... προιοῦσα ... ποιητικὴ ... γνωριστική.

201.13–14 Lemma (*de An.* 427ᵃ13–14) ᾗ μὲν οὖν δυσὶ χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει, καὶ κεχωρισμένα ἐστὶν ὡς κεχωρισμένοις

Ross accepts Trendelenburg's δὶς (a conjecture which he did not admit to his text, and one of two alternatives he offered, the other being ὡς δυσὶ) against the ms. consensus δυσὶ, which is also in Ps-Simplicius's lemma. Since the whole discussion is about using one thing as two, δυσὶ is almost certainly correct and should be restored to the text of Aristotle. δίς would undermine the argument, since the whole point of it is that two things should be perceived at the same time, cf. 426ᵇ26-9.

At the end of the lemma κεχωρισμένοις should be replaced by κεχωρισμένως, the reading of A and some mss. of Aristotle. κεχωρισμένοις is Hayduck's emendation to make it conform with the κεχωρισμένοις in line 19, but comments do not have to reproduce the text: if they are incompatible with it that is another matter.

201.21 Lemma (*de An.* 427ᵃ14) ᾗ δ' ἕν, ἑνὶ καὶ ἅμα

ἕν, ἑνὶ, as in Ps-Simplicius, is to be preferred to Ross' ἑνί, ἓν, which has no ms. authority. The ἕν naturally picks up the preceding δύο in 'it judges two things', cf. the previous lemma. 'But in so far as it (what judges) is one ...'.

201.23 ἐνί τε χρῆται πέρατι αὐτῇ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ψυχῇ

Read αὐτὴ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ for the datives which would depend on χρῆται: since the sensitive soul is the subject of this verb it cannot be its object too.

201.32 Lemma (*de An.* 427ᵃ18) ... καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ τῷ κρίνειν

The majority of mss. of Aristotle, as well as Ps-Philoponus, have κρίνειν or τῷ κρίνειν here. Nevertheless Ross follows those which have τῷ φρονεῖν, 'by understanding', presumably because φρονεῖν occurs more often than κρίνειν in the following lines of the *de Anima*, but, probably rightly, omits the article. Perhaps κρίνειν should be restored in the *de Anima*.

206.4 Lemma (*de An.* 427ᵇ16–17) ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν

Ross following Madvig excises νόησις, against the agreement of the Aristotle mss., Ps-Simplicius and Ps-Philoponus (A has νόησις after ὑπόληψις: Hayduck restored it to the position it has in the direct tradition presumably on the grounds that Aristotle should be stressing that ὑπόληψις, 'belief', is not the same as imagination, perhaps reinforced by the singular τοῦτο μὲν τὸ πάθος in Aristotle, which actually refers to imagination, as the commentator sees. Ps-Simplicius has an explanation for νόησις, but in terms Aristotle would almost certainly not have understood, since it is based on the late Neoplatonic interpretation of νοῦς παθητικός, 'passible intellect', as imagination. Perhaps the right answer is Jannone's αὕτη giving ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἐστιν αὕτη νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις, 'that this (i.e. imagination) is not thinking or belief'.

206.21 Lemma (*de An.* 427ᵇ18–19) πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι

Aristotle mss. are divided between ἔστι ποιήσασθαι and ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι. A has the former. The extra τι could just as easily have fallen out after the final -τι of ἔστι,[6] as it could have been inserted by dittography because of it. The sense requires it, but if it does not belong in the text it can easily be understood.

208.19 δύναμιν δὲ ἢ ἕξιν should be printed as a separate lemma. A marks these words as a lemma. Even though they are in the accusative rather than the nominative of Aristotle's text, they are not part

[6] Or, as Prof. Joyal, before the initial π of ποιήσασθαι.

of the syntactical structure of what follows. They should be detached and the nominatives restored.

209.2 οὐ τῷ ζῴῳ μήτε τῆς ἐνεργείας μήτε τῆς δυνάμει ὑπαρχούσης αἰσθήσεως

A's ἐνεργείᾳ (dative), 'in act', is clearly correct. Hayduck's genitive, ἐνεργείας, which would have to be understood as 'the activity of sense-perception', appears to be simply a mistake.

209.11 προσγεγένησθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν

Restore A's προγεγένησθαι. Hayduck's προσγεγένησθαι, 'to have taken place in addition', gives the wrong sense, and is apparently another mistranscription. Was this one of the sections assigned to an incompetent assistant?

209.20–22 ὥσπερ κυνὶ ὁμολογουμένως ... μύρμηκι δὲ καὶ μελίσσῃ καὶ ἐναργεστέρως σκώληκι οὐχὶ ὡρισμένους.

ὡρισμένως, again the reading of A, must replace the untranslatable ὡρισμένους, yet another Hayduck mistake.

211.16–18 Lemma (*de An.* 428ᵃ22–4) ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δὲ οὐ.

Ross follows Biehl in bracketing these words as a repetition of the content of 428ᵃ19–22, but they were in Ps-Simplicius' text, and do not, as the commentator explains, simply repeat what has just been said. Most modern editors retain them: perhaps the strongest reason for doing so is one that the commentator does not stress, the additional point that animals cannot have the conviction that goes with opinion because they do not reason.

212.9–10 ἀλλὰ σωζομένων μὲν εἰλικρινῶν, ὅσον δὲ ὅλης ἑκατέρας δι' ὅλης διαβαινούσης

Read οἷον for ὅσον: ὅσον makes little sense, while it is appropriate to indicate that the Stoic-type mutual interpenetration of one material object by another is only an inexact parallel to what happens when immaterial entities or, as here, activities, are 'mixed'.

212.19–20 τῆς δὲ ἑπομένης ἡ φαντασία εἴη. διά τε ταῦτα καὶ δι' ὃ νῦν ἐπιχείρημα.

Repunctuate with a comma instead of the stop after εἴη: the follow-

ing words cannot stand on their own, but they do refer back to arguments already used to make the point of the sentence at the end of which they come, and then introduce the next one.

212.28 Lemma (*de An.* 428^{a}27) καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἡ δόξα

Ross writes διότι, 'because', for the mss. and Ps-Simplicius' δῆλον ὅτι, 'it is clear', a perhaps unnecessary improvement to the *de Anima*. The first word of the commentary, ἐναργὲς, 'clear', would seem to corroborate the traditional reading.

215.11–13 τὰ δὲ μερικὰ καὶ σωματοειδῆ δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστι πρώτως γνωστά, ὅτε οὐδὲ εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἡμῖν ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἡ ἀναφορά.

Read ὅτι, 'because', as does the Aldine and Asulanus' translation: A's ὅτε, 'when', which Hayduck prints, gives no good sense. It is the necessity for sense-perception as a prerequisite to referring the data to higher faculites that explains why they must first be cognised by it.

216.38–9 καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα (*de An.* 429^{a}4–6) should be printed as a separate lemma. In A these words appear to be marked as such at the beginning, but not at the end.

216.22 ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθητικόν

To say that error arises when the sensitive faculty is at a distance does not fit well in a context where the effects of sense-objects are at issue, so it would be better to import αἰσθητόν, 'sense-object', from the mss. of Aristotle: cf. 216.3–4, where the distance of the object has already been mentioned.

218.15 ὁπότε καὶ σαφῶς διορίζεται

I would propose ὅτι, 'which', referring back to the previous sentence, rather than the inappropriate ὁπότε, 'when', of mss.—probably preceded by Asulanus who translates with *quod*.

218.42 ὡς εἶναι διττὸν τὴν πρώτην τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λόγον

The text of A, printed by Hayduck, looks like a simple grammatical error: the feminine article and adjective τὴν πρώτην cannot agree with the masculine τὸν λόγον. The error may have arisen from the feminines in the following words τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λόγον. So the text should be

corrected to the masculines τὸν πρώτον, a correction already implicit in Asulanus' translation.

219.24–5 διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥοπὴν ὅλως καὶ αὐτός, ὡς οἷόν τε τῷ λόγῳ, τοῦ ἔξω γινόμενος

Repunctuate with a comma after ὅλως, and none after αὐτός (therefore αὐτὸς) and λόγῳ.

220.12–13 ὡς μήτε μένειν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, ὡς τῷ Πλάτωνι δοκεῖ

Πλωτίνῳ should almost certainly be read for Πλάτωνι. Neoplatonic commentators do not simply contradict Plato, and while the beginning of the discussion to which Hayduck refers at *Phaedo* 79cff. could be taken to mean that the soul remains permanently unchanged, the rest of it merely says that it is *like* what remains permanently unchanged, namely the Forms. The view to which Ps-Simplicius objects is, on the other hand, an appropriate characterization of Plotinus' notorious and admittedly unorthodox postion that the individual human soul has a part permanently in the intelligible (cf. e.g. *Enn.* IV.8.8.1–3), a position to which he has already objected at the beginning of the commentary, cf. 6.12–15, where virtually the same words are used to describe it: μένειν τι αὐτῆς ... ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως.

220.25 ἀλλὰ νοῦς, φασίν, ἡ κρείττων ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία

Delete ἡ: there should be no article with the complement.

222.13–14 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα ἤδη τῆς ψυχῆς μόρια, τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ φανταστικόν.

It seems odd that the sensitive faculty is not included here: has the word for it, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, simply dropped out by *homoioteleuton*?

224.12–13 εἰκότως ἀπὸ τοῦ νοεῖν εἰς τὴν περὶ τῆς τοῦ οὕτω νοοῦντος ἡμᾶς προβιβάζειν θεωρίαν.

One would expect τῆς to be followed by a feminine noun in the genitive after νοοῦντος. Though one could understand οὐσίας from the causal clause with which the sentence opens, that would be unusual, and perhaps τῆς should simply be deleted, giving the meaning '... take us on to the investigation of what thinks in this way'.

230.30–33 Lemma (*de An.* 429^{b}10–13) ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὸ ὕδατι εἶναι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων

πολλῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα· ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει.

At first sight it would appear that the words from οὕτω δὲ καὶ down to ταὐτόν ἐστι should be put in parentheses, as they are by editors of Aristotle but not by Hayduck. They are not part of the structure of the sentence, while the words that follow them are clearly the main clause to the causal clause introduced by ἐπεὶ. The colon after τὸ ὕδατι εἶναι would then be be replaced by a comma after the parenthesis, and that after καὶ σάρκα removed. This gives punctuation etc. as follows: τὸ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλῳ κτλ. With Hayduck's punctuation the text would be saying that in some cases flesh and the essence of flesh are the same, which makes no sense, and is inconsistent with what has just been said about water. The cases where a thing and its essences are the same are ones where matter is not involved, cf. *Metaph*. Z, 1033^a33–$^b7$. Nevertheless Ps-Simplicius' comments at 231.38–40 show that he did have his text punctuated as Hayduck prints it, since he complains precisely about the inappropriateness of the example, and has difficulty in making some sense of this lemma as he has it.

231.15–16 ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς εἴδεσιν, εἰ καὶ πορρώτερον ᾖ ἡ ἐν αὑτῇ εἰλικρίνως μείνασα

I think one must assume that one of three succesive *eta*s has dropped out, and restore it, reading ᾖ ἢ ἡ for ᾖ ἡ, otherwise the remark gives the wrong sense, since the soul which stays in itself is closer to the Ideas and not further from them, as is that which proceeds: it is the latter that is the subject of the whole sentence.

235.34–5 Lemma (*de An*. 429^b29–430^a2, lines $^b30$–$^a1$) δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον·

Hicks, followed by Ross, adopted a conjecture of Cornford's, reading δ<υνάμ>ει, 'potentially', for δεῖ, universally read by mss. of Aristotle and accepted by his editors. But to say that the tablet has nothing *potentially* written on it would weaken the point. Moreover the commentator says nothing about that, though one might expect that he would have done so had his text presented him with that additional problem.

239.1 Lemma (*de An*. 430^a6–7) ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει μόνον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοητῶν.

μόνον, which appears in only y of the mss. of the *de Anima*, is per-

haps therefore a gloss, even if a perfectly sensible one which actually clarifies the point.

239.28 Lemma (*de An*. 430ᵃ8–9) ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει

Texts of Aristotle have the singular ἐκείνῳ, but the reading ἐκείνοις is secured for Ps-Simplicius by the following comments, which are about plural intellects.

242.26–8 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη πρὸς τοῦ μονίμου καὶ χωριστοῦ μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ φῶς καὶ ἡ ἕξις πρὸς τοῦ ἀχωρίστου καὶ συμπλεκομένου τοῖς δευτέροις·

Perhaps all these genitives should be accusatives, πρός with the genitive being just possible, but only just. Plato, *Grg*. 459c8, quoted by LSJ *s.v.* πρός A.IV, is also suspect, cf. Dodds *ad loc*. Dodds there prints the accusative.

243.4 ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ παθητικῷ οὕτως ἦν δυνάμει ὡς πάντα ἀνύπαρκτα, ἀλλ' ὡς ὄντα μὲν ἄγνωστα δέ.

Read παντῇ (or πάντῃ), as in A. Hayduck's πάντα is wrong, and in any case the following words show that the adverb is needed.

245.3–6 Lemma (*de An*. 430ᵃ19–23) ἡ αὐτὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δέ ἐστιν μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί.

Where Ps-Simplicius' lemma reads ἡ αὐτὴ δέ ἐστιν all mss. of Aristotle have τὸ αὐτὸ δ' ἐστιν (or τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν). There is little or no difference in the meaning, but the text our commentator has is a more direct way of putting the point. Ross wants to excise almost all of this lemma, down to the words ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, on the grounds that they occur again in ch. 7, 431ᵃ1–3: in fact the words ἀλλ' οὐχ (see next note) ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ do not occur there. In any case Ps-Simplicius' commentary makes it quite clear that his text had all the words in the lemma.

245.5 The ensuing exposition is clearly based on the text as printed by Hayduck, viz., ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ. Most mss. of Aristotle begin the sentence with a negative, ἀλλ' οὐχ, 'it is not the case that ...', assumed also, according to Ross, in the discussions reported by Ps-Philoponus 535.1ff., and by that commentator himself. In fact some of the views reported there seem to be based on the text without the negative. In any case it is probably (probably, because there is a doubt as to the subject of the verbs) the positive

version that post-Porphyrian Platonists would have wished to read, since the negative would entail either Plotinus' view that the human intellect has not descended, or have to be read as a reference to the intellect above ours, which Ps-Simplicius in this part of the commentary and elsewhere repeatedly says is not what Aristotle was talking about, cf. e.g. 244.39–41. Hence presumably Torstrik's view that the negative had been removed by Platonists for doctrinal reasons, a view that perhaps underestimates these commentators' ability to find the meaning they wanted in more or less any text! Further there is a contrast between the state of intellect envisaged in this sentence, and the next which considers it when it has been separated: intellect in that state would be the first to be a candidate for being described as having permanent intellection.

245.22–3 μήπω γὰρ χωρισθεὶς ὁ ἡμέτερος αὐτῇ τῇ ἀχωρίστῳ πρὸς δευτέραν γνώσει οὐδὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ἐνίζει κτλ.

It is difficult to supply an appropriate noun for A's δευτέραν, the feminine singular adjective. I suggest reading δεύτερα, neuter plural and meaning 'secondary things', the focus for the activity of the intellect that is no longer fully separate, cf. e.g. 218.42–219.11. The only way of rescuing the text as it stands would be to understand γνῶσιν, giving a meaning something like '... cognition unseparated in respect of the second kind of cognition': that would not be easy to explain.

247.36–8 ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ κρειττόνως ὂν συναίρεσιν τῆς χωρισθείσης ψυχικῆς οὐσίας, εἰς ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὴν προελθοῦσαν ἀναστελλούσης ζωήν

Insert a comma after συναίρεσιν, and remove the one Hayduck prints after οὐσίας. To take the genitives τῆς ... ψυχικῆς οὐσίας with the previous words makes no sense, while ἀναστελλούσης requires a subject.[7]

[7] The first two chapters of the commentary on book III have been read at meetings of the Liverpool-Manchester Ancient Philosophy Seminar. I should like to thank its members for a variety of helpful comments on some my proposals. I should also like to thank Dr. Anna Lenzuni, Director of the Manuscripts Department at the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana for arranging to supply me with photographs of *Laurentianus* 85.21, and the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project for making funds available for this purpose.

13

TRACES DE LIVRES ANTIQUES DANS TROIS MANUSCRITS BYZANTINS DE PLATON (B, D, F)

JEAN IRIGOIN

Dans plusieurs de ses travaux, John Whittaker a manifesté son intérêt pour les manuscrits philosophiques et fait connaître le profit qu'on peut tirer de leur histoire. Il m'a donc paru judicieux, dans ce recueil destiné à célébrer ses mérites, d'entreprendre une démarche en sens contraire pour montrer comment certains manuscrits de Platon ont conservé, avec le texte lui-même, quelques traces des livres, beaucoup plus anciens, dont ils descendent. Depuis le temps du philosophe jusqu'à la Renaissance, la chaîne continue qui nous a transmis ses dialogues — à partir des tablettes de cire où Platon en inscrivait le texte jusqu'aux manuscrits de parchemin ou de papier, en passant par les rouleaux de papyrus — est constituée d'une série de maillons dont la plupart ont disparu, mais dont quelques-uns ont laissé des traces, datables ou non.

1. *Stichométrie marginale*

Dans la librairie antique, les œuvres de prose ont fait l'objet d'une division en stiques, c'est-à-dire en éléments d'une longueur moyenne correspondant à celle de l'hexamètre homérique. Dans un rouleau où le texte était disposé en colonnes parallèles, chaque centaine de stiques était signalée, à gauche du texte, par une lettre de l'alphabet, de A à Ω, soit de 100 à 2400 stiques, contenu maximal d'un rouleau. A la fin du rouleau, une souscription chiffrée en notation acrophonique récapitulait le total des stiques, par exemple XXHΔΔ (2120).[1]

[1] Ch. Graux, « Nouvelles recherches sur la stichométrie », *Rev. de Philologie* 2 (1878) 97–143 (reproduit dans, du même, *Les articles*

Plusieurs manuscrits d'auteurs classiques copiés au IXe ou au Xe siècle ont conservé de telles souscriptions. C'est le cas, entre autres, de plusieurs livres d'Hérodote dans les manuscrits A (*Laurentianus* 70.3) et B (*Angelicanus gr.* 83), et de beaucoup de discours de Démosthène dans le manuscrit S (*Parisinus gr.* 2394) et dans quelques autres témoins de l'orateur.

Aucun manuscrit byzantin de Platon ne comporte de souscription stichométrique. En revanche deux d'entre eux ont conservé des restes importants d'une stichométrie marginale dans deux dialogues, le *Cratyle* et le *Banquet.*[2] Il s'agit du *Bodleianus Clarke* 39 (sigle B), daté de 895, et du *Marcianus gr.* 185 (sigle D), sensiblement plus tardif.

Le tableau suivant[3] met en correspondance les deux manuscrits, avec l'indication des folios où apparaissent les lettres de la stichométrie; celles qui manquent sont placées entre crochets obliques:

B		**D**	
		Cratyle	
	<A>		<A>
	<B>		<B>
f. 61^{r}	Γ	f. 54^{v}	Γ
	<Δ>		<Δ>
f. 63^{v}	E	f. 56^{v}	E
f. 64^{v}	Z	f. 57^{r}	Z
f. 65^{v}	H		<H>

originaux publiés dans divers recueils [Paris 1893] 71–124); cette étude a donné le branle à une série de recherches, dont les plus importantes sont citées à la note suivante. K. Ohly, *Stichometrische Untersuchungen* (*Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* 61 [Leipzig 1928]), tient compte du témoignage des papyrus littéraires, encore inconnus du temps de Graux.

[2] Ces restes ont été signalés par M. Schanz, « Zur Stichometrie », *Hermes* 10 (1881) 300–315. L'année suivante, K. Fuhr relevait la présence du même système dans l'*Urbinas gr.* 111 d'Isocrate (« Stichometrisches », *RhM* 37 [1882] 468–471). La même année, W. Christ, dans *Die Attikusausgabe des Demosthenes* (*Abh. bayer. Akad.* 16.3 [1882] 153–234), notait son emploi dans les manuscrits de Démosthène pourvus, comme l'*Urbinas* d'Isocrate, d'une récapitulation stichométrique en notation acrophonique, absente des deux manuscrits de Platon.

[3] Ce tableau a été établi à partir des données (plus précises car elles indiquent la ligne pour le *Clarkianus* B) fournies par K. Ohly (*supra*, n. 1) 77–78.

f. 66^{v}	Θ	f. 59^{r}	Θ
	<I>		<I>
f. 68^{v}	K	f. 60^{v}	K
f. 70^{r}	Λ	f. 61^{v}	Λ
f. 71^{r}	M	f. 62^{v}	M
f. 72^{r}	N	f. 63^{r}	N
	<Ξ>	f. 64^{r}	Ξ
	<O>	f. 65^{r}	O
f. 75^{r}	Π	f. 65^{v}	Π
f. 76^{r}	P	f. 66^{v}	P
f. 77^{r}	Σ	f. 67^{v}	Σ
	<T>		<T>
f. 79^{r}	Y	f. 69^{r}	Y
f. 80^{r}	Φ		<Φ>
f. 81^{r}	X	f. 71^{r}	X
f. 82^{r}	Ψ	f. 72^{r}	Ψ

BANQUET

	<A>		<A>
f. 201^{r}	B	f. 181^{v}	B
f. 202^{r}	Γ	f. 182^{v}	Γ
	<Δ>		<Δ>
	<E>	f. 184^{r}	E
	<Z>		<Z>
	<H>	f. 185^{v}	H
f. 207^{r}	Θ	f. 186^{v}	Θ
f. 208^{r}	I	f. 187^{v}	I
f. 209^{v}	K		<K>
f. 210^{v}	Λ		<Λ>
f. 211^{v}	M		<M>
f. 212^{v}	N		<N>
f. 213^{v}	Ξ	f. 192^{r}	Ξ
	<O>		<O>
	<Π>		<Π>

f. 216v	P	<P>
f. 217v	Σ	<Σ>
f. 218v	T	<T>
f. 220r	Y	<Y>
f. 221r	Φ	<Φ>
f. 222r	X	<X>
f. 223r	Ψ	<Ψ>

Comme ce tableau le fait apparaître, certaines lettres manquent dans les deux manuscrits (*Cratyle*: ΑΒΔΙΤΩ; *Banquet*: ΑΔΖΟΠΩ): pour l'oméga, son omission est due à ce que l'un et l'autre dialogues comptent un nombre de stiques compris entre 2300 et 2400[4]; l'absence des autres lettres est l'effet de l'inattention du copiste dans un ancêtre commun de B et D. Plus instructive est l'absence de certaines lettres dans un manuscrit et non dans l'autre. Dans le *Cratyle*, D a Ξ et O qui manquent dans B; mais B a H et Φ absents de D. Dans le *Banquet*, D a E et H qui manquent dans B; mais B a deux séries, ΚΛΜΝ et ΡΣΤΥΦΧΨ, qui n'apparaissent pas dans D. Il s'ensuit que B et D, comme l'étude du texte lui-même le montre, sont des témoins descendant indépendamment d'un ancêtre commun. Pendant la période assez longue où D était considéré comme une copie de B, le seul examen des notes stichométriques aurait pu suffire à montrer son indépendance.

Des particularités stichométriques de B et D, limitées au *Cratyle* et au *Banquet*, il ressort que la collection des dialogues de Platon contenue dans ces deux manuscrits n'est pas homogène. Certes les dialogues sont classés dans l'ordre tétralogique, les six premières tétralogies dans B, les quatre premières, plus le *Clitophon* et la *République* dans D. Mais la présence de la stichométrie marginale dans deux dialogues seulement, le *Cratyle* (2e tétralogie) et le *Banquet* (3e tétralogie), montre que des rouleaux d'origine diverse ont été rassemblés au moment où l'œuvre de Platon a été transcrite sur des livres en forme de codex. L'unité que représente, à l'époque byzantine, le tome I (tétralogies I–VI) de Platon copié pour Aréthas n'est qu'une apparence; elle recouvre une variété de sources dont les notes stichométriques de deux dialogues nous aident à prendre conscience.

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[4] Dans le manuscrit D, le *Cratyle* se termine au f. 72r, sur la page même où figure le chiffre Ψ.

2. *Les réclames dans la* République

Parmi les *recentiores non deteriores*, le manuscrit F (*Vindob. suppl. gr.* 39) de Platon, copié au début du XIVe siècle,[5] tient une place éminente que J. Burnet a été le premier à reconnaître[6]: il remonte, directement ou indirectement, à un modèle écrit en majuscule, que E.R. Dodds a proposé de dater du IIIe siècle de notre ère.[7] Il sera de nouveau question de ce manuscrit dans la troisième partie de cet article, mais pour l'instant c'est le texte de la *République* (ff. 81^r–210^v) qui retiendra notre attention.

À la fin de plusieurs des dix livres de ce long dialogue, le copiste a écrit la phrase initiale du livre suivant, phrase qu'il reproduit ensuite au début du livre concerné, après un titre souvent réduit au numéro du livre. Il ne faudrait pas croire qu'entraîné par son élan le copiste ait commencé à tracer ces mots avant de s'apercevoir de son erreur et de les écrire une seconde fois, à leur vraie place. C'est ce que paraît indiquer la notice du catalogue du Supplément grec de Vienne publié tout récemment (1994) par H. Hunger (74): « in fine libri copista primam sententiam libri sequentis falso add. ». En fait, le copiste n'a pas fait un doublet, qu'il aurait assurément raturé une fois reconnue son erreur. Il s'est contenté de reproduire avec fidélité son modèle. Et ce modèle, direct ou indirect, était fait de dix rouleaux de papyrus — un par livre — dont chacun portait à la fin les premiers mots du rouleau suivant, en fonction de « réclame » (*catchwords*),[8] tout comme dans les manuscrits grecs de la Renaissance, à la fin de chaque cahier, les premiers mots du cahier suivant étaient reproduits au-dessous du texte, pour permettre un contrôle rapide du classement des cahiers quand le manuscrit était cousu en vue de sa reliure; ce

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[5] Je reproduis la date proposée par H. Hunger (« 14. Jh. [Anfang] »), dans le catalogue cité un peu plus bas, pour ce manuscrit fait de papier oriental (format: 272 x 175 mm); mais le dernier tiers du XIIIe siècle reste possible et j'écrirais volontiers XIIIe-XIVe siècle.

[6] Voir *infra*, n. 10.

[7] Voir *infra*, nn. 12 et 13.

[8] A. Diller, qui a relevé le même procédé dans plusieurs manuscrits de Strabon (*The Textual Tradition of Strabo's Geography* [Amsterdam 1975] 29), cite d'autres auteurs dans la tradition médiévale desquels la même pratique apparaît (30 n. 8), mais Platon ne figure pas dans sa brève énumération. — Sur l'intérêt de l'étude des réclames, voir J. Jouanna, « Remarques sur les réclames dans la tradition hippocratique. Analyse archéologique et texte des manuscrits », *Ktêma* 2 (1977) 381–396. Les conclusions de S. West, « Reclamantes in Greek papyri », *Scriptorium* 17 (1963) 314–315, sont décevantes.

procédé, fort pratique, se poursuivra plusieurs siècles dans le livre imprimé.

Dans le manuscrit F de Platon, les réclames[9] apparaissent à la fin du livre III de la *République*: καὶ ὁ 'Αδείμαντος ὑπολαβών (plus un petit dessin décoratif), suivi de la souscription τρίτος.

A la fin du livre IV, ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν.

A la fin du livre V, οἱ μὲν δὲ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

A la fin du livre VI, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον.

Enfin, le livre IX se termine par καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Une telle mention fait défaut à la fin des livres I, II, VII et VIII, le livre X, final, n'entrant évidemment pas en ligne de compte.

Le scribe qui a transcrit sur un codex les dix rouleaux de papyrus dont cinq étaient pourvus de leurs réclames a respecté la présentation de ses modèles. Et il n'a pas donné de titre général à la collection, dont chaque livre, comme chaque rouleau, porte un titre particulier, soit

f. 81^r	Πολιτείας πρῶτον:	(titre du livre I)
f. 95^r	Πολιτείας β':	(titre du livre II)

puis:

f. 108^v	δεύτερον	(souscription du livre II)
	τρίτον	(titre du livre III)
f. 124^r	τρίτος	(souscription du livre III)
	τέταρτος	(titre du livre IV)
f. 138^r	Δ'	(souscription du livre IV)
		(pas de titre du livre V)
f. 153^r	+ἕκτος+	(titre du livre VI)
f. 166^r	Z	(titre du livre VII)
f. 178^r	Πολιτεία (*sic*) Z'	(souscription du livre VII)
	Πολιτεία (*sic*) H'	(titre du livre VIII)
f. 190^r	Πολιτείας H'	(souscription de livre VIII)
	Πολιτείας Θ	(titre du livre IX)
f. 199^r	Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας ϊ ': +	(titre du livre X)

[9] Trois de ces réclames sont signalées, sans être citées, dans le catalogue de H. Hunger. Mon relevé a été fait sur une reproduction photographique de F, exécutée dans les années vingt à l'intention des éditeurs de Platon dans la Collection Budé.

Ces variations dans la désignation des livres s'accordent en partie avec la présence ou l'absence des réclames :

— pas de réclame à la fin de I et de II, qui ont Πολιτείας dans leur titre ;

— réclame à la fin de III, IV, V et VI, où Πολιτείας ne figure pas dans le titre ;

— pas de réclame à la fin de VII et VIII, dont le titre ou la souscription porte Πολιτεία(ς) ;

— réclame à la fin de IX, précédant le titre du livre X où le nom de l'auteur, Platon, est enfin mentionné.

Là encore, le manuscrit F a gardé, dans ces variations, la trace de l'origine variée des rouleaux utilisés pour la copie de la *République* transférée sur un codex.

3. *Les lacunes du manuscrit F et la reconstitution du modèle accidenté*

Dans les trois premiers dialogues (ff. 1^{r}–34^{r} : *Gorgias* ; ff. 34^{r}–47^{v} : *Ménon* ; ff. 47^{v}–59^{v} : *Hippias majeur*), soit un peu moins du quart du volume, le manuscrit F présente des lacunes, c'est-à-dire des espaces laissés en blanc correspondant à des lettres ou des mots absents du texte ; on n'en constate plus par la suite, de l'*Hippias mineur* (ff. 59^{v}–65^{r}) à la fin du manuscrit. Ces lacunes ont été comblées ultérieurement d'après d'autres manuscrits de Platon. Leur retour à des intervalles réguliers montre qu'elles correspondent à des accidents matériels subis par un ancêtre de F, immédiat ou plus lointain.

Or, dès le début de notre siècle, dans deux brefs articles préliminaires à son édition de Platon, J. Burnet avait remarqué que cet ancêtre de F était écrit en majuscule, compte tenu du nombre important de fautes dues à des mélectures de lettres de type oncial ; il s'ensuivait que le modèle utilisé était écrit en majuscule et donc antérieur de plus d'un demi-millénaire à sa copie, d'où les dégradations qu'il avait subies.[10] Une vingtaine d'années après Burnet, E. Deneke confirmait et précisait ses observations.[11] Enfin, dans un article[12] préliminaire à son édition commentée du *Gorgias*, puis dans

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[10] J. Burnet, « A neglected manuscript of Plato », *CR* 16 (1902) 98–101 ; *id.*, « Vindobonensis F and the text of Plato », *CR* 17 (1903) 12–14.

[11] E. Deneke, *De Platonis libri Vindobonensis F memoria* (Diss. Göttingen 1922).

[12] E.R. Dodds, « Notes on some manuscripts of Plato », *JHS* 77 (1957) 24–30.

son édition elle-même,[13] E.R. Dodds, après avoir fait les mêmes constatations, a cherché à décrire et à dater ce qu'il appelle l'*exemplar* de F. L'examen des lacunes, fait sur photographies, lui a permis de restituer la longueur des lignes (38 lettres en moyenne)[14] et le nombre des lignes (un peu plus de 30) à la page ou à la colonne dans cet *exemplar*. Peu après Dodds, R.S. Bluck, qui avait travaillé sur l'original, faisait des constatations du même genre dans son édition commentée du *Ménon.*[15] Enfin, tout récemment, B. Vancamp, travaillant lui aussi sur l'original, aboutit aux mêmes résultats pour l'*Hippias majeur*, d'abord dans un article,[16] puis dans son édition critique des deux *Hippias.*[17] Les trois éditeurs sont d'accord aussi bien sur le fait que l'*exemplar* était écrit en majuscule que sur les conclusions codicologiques à tirer de l'examen des lacunes. En effet, les fautes de copie dues à des mélectures de lettres majuscules ou à des mécoupures de mots dans un texte en *scriptio continua* dépourvu d'accentuation, sont très fréquentes dans chacun des trois dialogues. On peut donc en déduire que la présentation de l'*exemplar* était identique dans ces trois parties. Quant aux lacunes, elles surviennent en moyenne toutes les 22 lignes du manuscrit F, soit une fois ou deux dans ces pages qui comptent de 32 à 37 lignes[18] d'une soixantaine de lettres ; leur fréquence est la même dans les trois dialogues, confirmant ainsi l'identité de mise en lignes et de mise en colonnes ou en pages du modèle, direct ou indirect, de F.

Il vaut la peine d'examiner de près de quelle manière se présentent les lacunes. Certaines portent sur quelques lettres, d'autres concernent deux ou trois lignes consécutives. D'autre part il arrive que la lacune attendue après 22 lignes n'apparaisse pas ; mais dans ce cas la lacune suivante se manifeste après un nombre de lignes qui est toujours un multiple de 22, plus ou moins approché.

Voici quelques exemples de ces deux phénomènes. Je reproduirai

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[13] E.R. Dodds, *Plato, Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 45–47 (« The exemplar of F »).

[14] Déjà A.C. Clark (*The Descent of Manuscripts* [Oxford 1918] 414–417), en se fondant sur les omissions dans F, avait estimé à 35 lettres le contenu moyen des lignes dans un ancêtre de F.

[15] R.S. Bluck, *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge 1961).

[16] B. Vancamp, « Le texte de l'*Hippias majeur* de Platon dans le Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 39 (F) », *Philologus* 139 (1995) 238–250.

[17] B. Vancamp, *Platon, Hippias maior - Hippias minor.* Palingenesia 59 (Stuttgart 1996) 31–33.

[18] Le catalogue de H. Hunger (74) resserre un peu l'écart : « 33–36 Z. ».

d'abord les données publiées par Vancamp pour l'*Hippias majeur*,[19] où leur fréquence va en diminuant; j'ai seulement modifié l'ordre de présentation des données:

Page de l'édition Estienne	Folio et ligne(s) du manuscrit F	Nombre de lignes entre deux lacunes successives	Nombre de lettres omises
281b3	f. 48^r, l. 3	20 (depuis la dernière lacune du *Ménon*)	3
282a7	f. 48^r, l. 27	24	6
282e1	f. 48^v, l. 17	24	16 + 5
283c3–4	f. 49^r, l. 6–7	22	26[20]
284a7	f. 49^r, l. 28–29	21	20
286b1	f. 50^r, l. 25–26	66 (3 x 22)	7 + 5
288b4	f. 51^r, l. 23	64 (~ 3 x 22)	9
288e9	f. 51^v, l. 11	22	3
291c7–8	f. 52^v, l. 31–32[21]	87 (~ 4 x 22)	11 + 5
295c2–3	f. 54^v, l. 31–32	132 (6 x 22)	2 + 2[22]
296d7	f. 55^v, l. 5	41 (~ 22 x 2)	6
301c5	f. 57^v, l. 30	158 (~ 7 x 22)	8

Une première constatation s'impose: dans la moitié des cas, les lacunes apparaissent à un intervalle qui est un multiple de 22, de deux fois à sept fois.[23] Seconde constatation, le nombre de lettres

[19] Vancamp (*supra*, n. 16) 240; le tableau complète les indications que Bluck avait données pour ce dialogue dans *Plato's Meno* (*supra*, n. 15) 137–138.

[20] Il n'y a pas dans F une deuxième lacune de deux lettres, après la longue lacune de 26 lettres, comme l'indique Vancamp.

[21] Vancamp (*supra*, n. 16, 240), après Bluck (*supra*, n. 15, 138 n. 1), fait justement remarquer que « au fol. 53^r, l.1 dans un passage qu'il répète par erreur (291c7 (ὡς) à c9 (εἶναι)), le scribe a reproduit la lacune du fol. 52^v, preuve supplémentaire qu'il lisait bien un texte lacunaire dans son modèle ».

[22] Une lacune de deux lettres, restée telle, suit le mot ἡμῖν, dont la lettre finale semble avoir été ajoutée par la suite.

[23] On ne peut exclure que certaines lacunes aient échappé à l'un ou l'autre des trois éditeurs. On doit en principe faire confiance à Bluck et Vancamp, qui ont, à la différence de Dodds, examiné directement le manuscrit F. Et pourtant, en consultant les photographies mentionnées plus haut, j'ai eu l'impression qu'au f. 50^r ligne 4 de F, en 285c7 de l'*Hippias majeur*, les mots ἀλλὰ δῆτα ont été écrits par une main plus récente dans une lacune de F; ces mots sont situés à 45 lignes (~ 22 + 22) de la lacune de 284a7 et à 21 lignes de celle de 286b1.

correspondant à la lacune est très variable, de 2 à 26. Enfin, lorsque la lacune porte sur deux lignes consécutives, le nombre des lettres manquantes va en décroissant (16 + 5; 7 + 5; 11 + 5) ou est égal (2 + 2), mais jamais il n'augmente. Ces observations, qui réclameront un commentaire, sont confirmées par l'état du *Gorgias*, dont voici, tiré de l'édition Dodds, un spécimen présenté de la même manière et contrôlé sur photographies :

Page de l'édition Estienne	Folio et ligne(s) du manuscrit	Nombre de lignes entre deux lacunes successives	Nombre de lettres omises
496a2	f. 20^{v}, l. 5–6	22	5
496e7–8	f. 20^{v}, l. 28–29	24	16 + 6
497d5–6	f. 21^{r}, l. 16–17	22	12 + 5
498c7	f. 21^{v}, l. 3–4	24	12
499b2–3	f. 21^{v}, l. 21	24	14
499e8	f. 22^{r}, l. 8	23	10
500c8–d1	f. 22^{r}, l. 26–27	18	18 + 3
501b4–5	f. 22^{v}, l. 9–10	21	23 + 5
501e10	f. 22^{v}, l. 29	19	4
502d6	f. 23^{r}, l. 16	22	10
503b7–8	f. 23^{v}, l. 1–2	21	13 + 5
504a4–5	f. 23^{v}, l. 23–24	23	15 + 11
505c8–10	f. 24^{r}, l. 34–35	44 (2 x 22)	8 + 6
506b3–4	f. 24^{v}, l. 19–20	22	8 + 5
506e5–6	f. 25^{r}, l. 6	22	14
507d2	f. 25^{r}, l. 28	22	8

Les omissions reviennent régulièrement dans le manuscrit F, avec un écart moyen de 22 lignes, comme dans l'*Hippias majeur*; une seule exception, entre les pages 504a4–5 et 505c8–10, correspond à un écart double, de l'ordre de 44 lignes. Dans d'autres parties du *Gorgias*, les écarts doubles ou même triples sont plus fréquents, par exemple entre 485a7 et 495a9–b2 :

485a7	f. 16^{r}, l. 2–3	21	16
485e8–486a1	f. 16^{r}, l. 25–26	23	11 + 8
487c5–6	f. 16^{v}, l. 32–33	42 (~ 2 x 22)	17 + 8
489a2–4	f. 17^{v}, l. 9–11	45 (~ 2 x 22)	17 + 9
491b6–8	f. 18^{v}, l. 9–11	71 (~ 3 x 22)	21 + 9 + 11
492a4–7	f. 18^{v}, l. 33–34	22	6 + 24 + 17 + 7 + 8
494b7	f. 19^{v}, l. 32	71 (~ 3 x 22)	9 + 2
495a9–b2	f. 20^{r}, l. 20–21	24	11 + 8 + 6

Lorsque la lacune porte sur deux ou trois lignes successives, le nombre des lettres manquantes va en diminuant, comme on l'a constaté plus haut à propos de l'*Hippias majeur*, le cas de 492a4–7, passage qui comporte cinq lacunes successives, est exceptionnel par son étendue et par la présence, en première position, d'une lacune plus courte que les quatre suivantes. Isolé en apparence, ce cas confirme, par la décroissance des lacunes suivantes, qu'on a affaire, dans le *Gorgias* comme dans l'*Hippias majeur*, à un accident qui atteint la partie supérieure de la colonne ou de la page.

Des constatations analogues ont été faites par Bluck dans le *Ménon*; on en trouvera la détail dans son introduction et dans l'apparat critique de son édition.

Que nous apprennent ces accidents? Tout d'abord que l'*exemplar* de F en majuscule, fort ancien, se confond avec le modèle, détérioré à cause de son âge, dont le scribe de F a reproduit les lacunes. Il ne s'ensuit pas nécessairement que ce scribe ait disposé lui-même de l'*exemplar*, car on ne peut exclure l'hypothèse d'une copie intermédiaire.[24] Quoi qu'il en soit, il est assuré, sans contestation possible puisque les lacunes de F n'ont été comblées que postérieurement à sa transcription, qu'on a affaire au texte même de l'*exemplar*, avec de nombreuses fautes de copie, mais sans l'intervention d'un autre manuscrit de Platon qui aurait servi à combler les lacunes (comme il sera fait un peu plus tard) et à corriger les fautes. Entre la copie de l'*exemplar* et celle de F, le texte de la seconde famille des manuscrits de Platon n'a pas subi de contamination, à la différence de ce qui s'est passé pour la première famille, représentée par BTW et d'autres témoins, pour les trois dialogues concernés.

Il est donc important de dater l'*exemplar* lui-même. Ecrit en majuscule, il est nécessairement antérieur à la période des premières translittérations, au IXe siècle. Se situe-t-il juste avant, comme certains manuscrits du VIIIe siècle ou du VIIIe – IXe siècle qui nous sont parvenus? précède-t-il de peu les années sombres de l'iconoclasme? remonte-t-il au début du VIe siècle, avant la fermeture de l'Ecole philosophique d'Athènes? peut-on même voir en lui un livre du

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[24] Dodds (*supra*, n. 13, 45), suivant Deneke, pense que F est une transcription directe ou presque directe d'un manuscrit antique. Vancamp croit reconnaître des fautes dues à la confusion de lettres minuscules, ce qui exclurait la copie directe (*supra*, n. 16, 245–246); mais les quatre exemples qu'il allègue et ceux qu'il relève dans le *Gorgias* (246 n. 22) ne me paraissent pas convaincants. Quoi qu'il en soit, ce qui est important, c'est l'absence de toute intervention extérieure sur le texte entre l'*exemplar* et le manuscrit F.

IIIe ou IVe siècle, séparé de sa copie, le manuscrit F, par un millénaire?

Les données paléographiques fournies par l'examen des fautes de majuscule et des mécoupures présentes dans F ne permettent pas de répondre à ces questions. C'est à la codicologie que Dodds a fait appel pour proposer une datation vraisemblable.[25] Admettant que les dégradations de l'*exemplar* sont dues au travail des vers,[26] il fait sienne la proposition du papyrologue C.H. Roberts: l'*exemplar* serait un codex de papyrus, type de livre bon marché courant aux IIIe et IVe siècles. Cette datation est confirmée, pour le *Gorgias*, par les accords du texte de F avec des papyrus platoniciens des IIe et IIIe siècles,[27] et avec des citateurs comme Eusèbe (IVe siècle) et Stobée (Ve siècle).[28]

L'argumentation philologique de Dodds est solide et ses conclusions ont été adoptées par tous ceux qui ont étudié, après lui, le manuscrit F, de Bluck à Vancamp, en passant par Slings (*Clitophon*, 1981), Jonkers (*Timée* et *Critias*, 1989) et Boter (*République*, 1989). En revanche, sa reconstitution d'un codex[29] de papyrus soulève des difficultés que j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de relever et sur lesquelles je vais revenir d'une manière plus précise.

Les données du problème fournies par les tableaux reproduits plus haut,[30] sont de deux types différents. Le retour des lacunes, en moyenne toutes les 22 lignes du manuscrit F, est régulier, même s'il arrive que leur écart soit quelquefois un multiple de 22. En revanche, l'importance des lacunes paraît aléatoire, tant en ce qui concerne le nombre des lettres manquantes que la répétition d'un espace vide à la même ligne ou à la ligne suivante. Du début d'une lacune au début de la lacune située 22 lignes plus loin dans F, le nombre moyen des lettres a été estimé à $\pm$ 1200 par Dodds, ce qui représente le contenu d'une colonne ou d'une page de l'*exemplar*.

Pour déterminer la longueur des lignes, et donc leur nombre à la colonne ou à la page, on dispose de deux éléments:

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[25] Dans son article de 1957 comme dans son édition du *Gorgias* (45–47).

[26] Bluck (*supra*, n. 15, 138 n. 3) attribue à l'humidité les dégradations subies par l'*exemplar*.

[27] Voir l'introduction du *Gorgias* de Dodds (*supra*, n. 13) 56–58.

[28] Dodds (*supra*, n. 13) 62–66.

[29] « Accidents matériels et critique des textes », *Revue d'Histoire des Textes* 16 (1986) 1–36 (ici 28–29).

[30] Voir *supra* 237–238.

— le nombre des lettres des omissions qui sont dues non pas à un saut du même au même (homéotéleute), mais au saut d'une ligne du modèle; Clark a relevé plusieurs cas de 33 à 38 lettres, et Dodds mentionne en 506cl–2 une omission remarquable de 38 lettres (plus un iota adscrit?) ἐξελέγχ[ῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγ]ιστος;

— l'écart qui sépare deux lacunes consécutives situées à la même page du modèle sur deux lignes qui se suivent; pour le calcul, on admettra que les milieux des deux lacunes étaient alignés verticalement; ainsi l'addition des lettres de la moitié de chacune d'entre elles avec les lettres du texte qui les sépare fournira le contenu approché d'une ligne de l'*exemplar*.

Voici quelques exemples de ce calcul à partir du tableau de l'*Hippias majeur* (237) et du début du second tableau du *Gorgias* (238); l'écart est indiqué entre crochets droits:

Hippias Majeur		Nombre de lettres à la ligne
282e1	16 [33] 5	43½
286b1	7 [31] 5	37
291c7–8	11 [32] 5	40
Gorgias		
485e8–486a1	11 [27] 8	36½
487c5–6	17 [31] 8	43½
489a2–4	17 [75] 9	88 = 2 x 44[31]
491b6–8	21 [20] 9 [26] 11	71 = 2 x 35½

Les variations du nombre de lettres par ligne—de 35½ à 44—ne sont pas surprenantes. Elles pourraient être amplifiées ou diminuées selon que la deuxième lacune, éventuellement la troisième, serait alignée sur le début ou sur la fin de la première, et non centrée sur elle comme il a été admis dans ces calculs. En tout cas, le résultat moyen est très proche de celui qu'avait obtenu Dodds et qui s'en trouve ainsi confirmé: la colonne ou la page de l'*exemplar* comptait une trentaine de lignes d'une quarantaine de lettres.

Mais s'agissait-il de colonnes d'un rouleau de papyrus ou de pages d'un codex? Selon Dodds, comme il a été rappelé plus haut,

[31] Tout se passe comme si l'accident avait atteint deux lignes non consécutives, à moins qu'un complément correspondant à une lacune de la ligne intermédiaire n'ait pas été reconnu comme tel par Dodds.

l'*exemplar* serait un codex de papyrus ; les lacunes correspondraient à des parties, porteuses de texte, disparues du fait des vers. Cette hypothèse séduisante se heurte à plusieurs difficultés.

La première est celle de l'ampleur des dégâts causés par les vers. Dans les livres faits d'une matière végétale (papyrus, papier), les vers (les vrillettes entre autres) font de véritables galeries qui traversent plusieurs feuilles successives; leur passage laisse des traces de même forme sur ces feuilles. Il est donc surprenant que sur deux folios successifs de l'*exemplar* les dégâts — représentés par les lacunes de F — soient de dimensions très différentes. Prenons la partie contenant l'*Hippias majeur*, dont le tableau dû à Vancamp a été publié ci-dessus (237). Les cinq premières lacunes, séparées par des intervalles de 20 à 24 lignes, correspondent respectivement à des omissions de 3, 6, 16 + 5, 26 et 20 lettres; la lacune suivante, de 7 + 5 lettres, n'apparaît qu'après un écart triple de 66 lignes,[32] et elle est séparée de la suivante, 9 lettres, par un autre écart triple de 64 lignes. Comment expliquer de si fortes différences dans l'étendue des détériorations, qui vont de 3 à 26 lettres d'un seul tenant? Et, seconde difficulté, comment expliquer qu'elles n'aient pas à peu près la même ampleur sur deux pages successives, c'est-à-dire sur les deux faces, recto et verso, d'un même folio?[33] Il faut enfin observer que jamais le copiste de F n'a reproduit les lettres du folio suivant ou celles du folio précédent visibles à travers la fenêtre ouverte dans le folio accidenté.[34]

Tenant compte de ces difficultés, j'ai suggéré, voici déjà dix ans, en me référant aux relevés de Dodds, que l'*exemplar* de F pour le *Gorgias* était non pas un codex de papyrus, mais un volumen dont la marge supérieure avait été détériorée. La dégradation, d'origine mécanique, s'étant faite sur le volumen roulé, elle n'atteignait pas, à chaque tour, la même partie du haut des colonnes de texte et tombait donc de temps en temps, totalement ou partiellement, dans l'espace vide — la marge — qui sépare les colonnes. Ainsi s'expliqueraient à la fois les fortes différences dans l'ampleur des lacunes de F, et l'absence de correspondance entre ce qui serait, dans l'hypothèse d'un codex, le recto et le verso d'un folio.

Mais cette hypothèse du rouleau de papyrus se heurte à son tour à une difficulté majeure. Les lacunes constatées, à intervalle régulier,

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[32] Voir cependant la n. 23, *supra*.

[33] C'est un argument que j'avais fait valoir dans l'article cité *supra* (n. 29) à propos du *Gorgias* et des lacunes qui s'étendent de 496e7–8 à 501b4–5 (voir plus haut le tableau de la p. 238).

[34] Sur ce type de faute, voir mon article cité à la n. 29, 19–21.

dans le manuscrit F s'étendent sur les 57 premiers folios, soit le *Gorgias*, le *Ménon* et l'*Hippias majeur*. Le reste du manuscrit, de l'*Hippias mineur* au *Minos*, en passant notamment par la *République* et le *Timée*, n'en souffre pas. On pourrait donc considérer que la partie détériorée formait primitivement un tout, indépendant de la suite du texte transcrit dans l'*exemplar*. Mais cet ensemble, qui occupe les 57 premiers folios de F, correspond à environ 175 colonnes de 33 ou 34 stiques, soit beaucoup plus que le contenu d'un rouleau usuel.[35]

Pour tenter de sortir de ce qui paraît être une impasse, il faut poser le problème d'une manière différente, en partant du cas de la *République*.

On a vu plus haut, dans la deuxième partie de cet article, que l'*exemplar* de F pour la *République* était constitué par une suite de dix rouleaux de papyrus dont la moitié était pourvue de réclames assurant la continuité de la lecture. Chacun de ces rouleaux contenait un livre du dialogue, soit en moyenne 27 pages de l'édition d'Henri Estienne, avec comme extrêmes 21 pages (livre IX) et 31 pages (livre V), les huit autres livres se situant entre 26 et 29 pages. Si l'on compare ces chiffres à ceux des trois dialogues comportant des lacunes dans F, on constate que le *Gorgias* occupe 80 pages dans la même édition, le *Ménon* 31, et l'*Hippias majeur* 24. Il s'ensuit que ces deux derniers dialogues correspondaient chacun à la capacité d'un rouleau alors qu'avec la même présentation il en faudrait trois pour le *Gorgias*. L'identité de fréquence — toutes les 22 lignes — des lacunes dont le manuscrit F souffre dans les trois dialogues considérés implique:

— ou bien que cet ensemble était déjà transcrit, avant la dégradation, sur un livre en forme de codex, dont la capacité est souvent considérée comme le quintuple de celle du volumen (qu'on pense aux pentades et aux décades des historiens grecs et latins!); mais alors comment expliquer l'extension si irrégulière des lacunes?

— ou bien il faut admettre que les trois dialogues appartenaient à une même collection transcrite sur des rouleaux comportant une mise en colonnes uniforme (même nombre de lignes; même nombre de lettres à la ligne) et conservés dans un récipient où des détériorations

[35] La moyenne des lettres d'un stique étant de 35,5, les 1200 lettres d'une colonne (selon le calcul de Dodds fait pour une page) correspondent à 33 ou 34 stiques. Avec un total situé, d'après la stichométrie marginale étudiée dans la première partie de cet article, entre 2300 et 2400, le *Cratyle* ou le *Banquet* occuperait environ 70 colonnes de cette importance.

auraient affecté la seule partie supérieure des rouleaux ainsi abrités.[36]

Quoi qu'on pense de cette dernière tentative d'explication, il reste que les manuscrits byzantins de Platon peuvent faire l'objet d'une véritable exploration archéologique, riche d'enseignements pour l'éditeur d'aujourd'hui.

[36] On rejoint là le cas des neuf tragédies d'Euripide dites alphabétiques, que B. Snell a cherché à réunir en des groupes de cinq (« Zwei Töpfe mit Euripides-Papyri », *Hermes* 70 [1935] 119–120; reproduit dans, du même, *Gesammelte Schriften* [Göttingen 1966] 176–177).

14

NOTES ON THE *DIDASCALICUS*

JAAP MANSFELD

John Whittaker has put all of us into his debt with his studies in Greek philosophy, especially in the Platonic traditions. Pride of place should perhaps be awarded to his splendidly annotated critical edition of Alcinous' *Didascalicus*, which has immensely furthered the study of this treatise.[1] It is with some trepidation that one ventures into these territorial waters; accordingly, the marginalia that follow are to been seen as feeble attempts to supplement rather than criticize.

1. *Divisions of philosophy* (ch. 3, p. 154.5–6): At the end of the chapter on the division of philosophy we find the clause τῆς δὲ διαιρέσεως τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἰδῶν. This is a bit opaquely translated by Louis: 'telle est la distinction et la division des différentes formes de la philosophie'.[2] We may note, first, that the term μερισμός (Latin *partitio*) occurs only here in the *Did.* and is not found in the section on division (διαίρεσις) in ch. 5, p. 156.24–157.10. Furthermore, a diaeresis into species and sub-species contains a limited number of items, whereas a *partitio* of constituent items is in principle unlimited[3] though in actual fact it of course never is.

[1] J. Whittaker, ed., *Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon*, Coll. Budé (Paris 1990), with French translation by P. Louis.

[2] J. Dillon, in his most useful translation with commentary of the *Did.* (Alcinous: *The Handbook of Platonism* [Oxford 1993]; paperback 1995[2]) translates 'the divison and partition of the various sorts of philosophy', which is better, though 'various sorts' is still a bit unsatisfactory.

[3] See K. Ierodiakonou, 'The Stoic division of philosophy', *Phronesis* 38 (1993) 64ff.

One rarely meets διαίρεσις and μερισμός linked together as they are here. Now compare the standard account of division below in the logical chapter ch. 5, p. 156.34–5 where the first type of διαίρεσις is said to be of a genus into species and the second of a whole into parts (μέρη). The main differences between these two kinds of division are of course (a) that one can take away a species without destroying the genus, but cannot eliminate a part without destroying a whole, and (b) that though a species is (in a sense) a part of its genus, a part is by no means always a species of its whole (standard example: hand is not a species of man, and 'man' cannot be predicated of 'hand').[4] Consequently the terms εἴδη and μέρη may be used interchangeably also when we are dealing with divisions of philosophy. According to Diogenes Laertius 7.39–40, for instance, the Stoics divided philosophy[5] into three *parts* (μέρη), called τόποι, 'locations', by Apollodorus,[6] εἴδη, 'species', by Chrysippus and Eudromus, and γένη, 'genera', by others (no names given). The terms εἴδη and γένη are of course equivalent to a degree, because its relational position in a diaeretic stemma determines whether a term is viewed as a species or a genus: it is the genus of what is below and a species of what is above it. So when the three main parts of (the *logos* pertaining to) philosophy are called species they are considered in relation to their genus, i.e., philosophy, and when they are called genera they are considered in relation to their further subdivisions. When they are called μέρη the division is not primarily of a genus into species (and sub-species) but

[4] See my account of the various forms and applications of the diaeretic method at *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus'* Elenchos *as a Source for Greek Philosophy*. Philosophia Antiqua 56 (Leiden etc. 1992) 79ff. (on Alcinous and Clement), 326ff. (general overview), where evidence is cited both for the distinction between the division of genus into species and the whole into parts, and for the indiscriminate use of the terms 'parts' and 'species'.

[5] Actually 'the *logos* pertaining to philosophy', which presents a special problem (see Ierodiakonou [above, n. 3]) I cannot deal with here. Note that according to Diogenes Laertius 7.41 Zeno of Tarsus said that the parts (μέρη) are not of the *logos* but of philosophy itself.

[6] Numerous parallels for τόπος in this sense in Diogenes Laertius at K. Janáček, *Indice delle Vite dei filosofi di Diogene Laerzio* (Firenze 1992) 253f.; cf. further e.g. Strabo 8.1.1 (= Posid. T 77 E-K), Sext. *M*. 7.12; quite a few examples in the excerpts from Philo of Larissa and Eudorus in the ethical doxography A (see below, n. 19) *ap*. Stob. *Ecl. eth*. 2.7.2 (39.20, 40.21, 41.17, 44.2, 44.3, 44.7, 44.22 and 45.2 W.), where the term is used interchangeably with λόγος (41.2, 41.8, 41.23, 44.26 W), εἶδος (42.16 W) or γένος (44.12 W), and μέρος (42.22 W.). Of especial interest is 43.14ff. W. ὁ ... λόγος εἰς τοσούτους τόπους γενικοὺς τέμνεται.

of a whole, into parts. Apollodorus' reason for calling the parts τόποι is not, I think, a profound one[7]: what he does is to divide up the genus philosophy (or its *logos*) as to the 'locations' of the species, or parts: physics pertains to nature, ethics to action, logic to speech, semantics, etc. This type of division, as we shall see, is also called μερισμός.[8] Of the famous Stoic similes for philosophy and its main parts (D.L. 7.40, revised version at Sext. *M.* 7.17–8) the one likening it to an egg (the shell being ἐκτός, the white next, and the yolk ἐσωτάτω) certainly is about the order of location of the parts of the whole.

The parallel in Diogenes presumably shows that Alcinous—or the tradition he is following in ch. 3—sees philosophy as a genus to be divided into species and sub-species, which actually is what he has done. So why did he add the term μερισμός? The division (and sub-division) of a genus need not be complete; some of the divisions of philosophy according to the Stoics provided by Diogenes for example are not. A partition, which may tend to be quite selective, as a rule provides the relevant items in an effective sequence. Alcinous, I think, says that what he has given us is both a division and a 'partition' (or 'allocation', 'enumeration', 'listing'),[9] in order to inform us that he has listed the species and sub-species *in their proper order and place*, and that in the present case the enumeration is coextensive with the division.

The division of the parts, or species, as presented in *Did.* ch. 3 therefore is according to their order of importance: physics/theology first, ethics second, logic third, and the same holds for the sub-divisions of each part. The didactic order followed in the treatise itself is different: logic, theology/physics, ethics.[10] That the hierarchical and the didactic orders may differ is a quite common phenomenon,[11] and

[7] Thus disagreeing with the explanation of Ierodiakonou (above, n. 3) 67.

[8] Below, text to n. 12.

[9] *Partitio* is also a rhetorical term, see e.g. *Rhet. ad Her.* 1.4; 1.17 (with subdivision into *enumeratio* and *expositio*); Cic. *De inv.* 1.31 ('in the second form [of partition] the matters we intend to discuss are listed in a *methodical* way'), with the comments of B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford 1988) 68ff. Cf. also Aelius Herodianus, *De figuris* 94.22, μερισμὸς δὲ πράγματος ἑνὸς εἰς πολλὰ διαίρεσις εἰς δήλωσιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οἷον "ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, πόλιν δέ τι πῦρ ἀμαθύνει / τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσι βαθυζώνους τε γυναῖκας".

[10] See M. Baltes, review of Göransson [see below, n. 29], *GGA* 248 (1996) 98.

[11] See e.g. Dillon (above, n. 2) 58, and my *Prolegemena: Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text.* Philosophia Antiqua 61 (Leiden 1994) 242f., index *s.vv.* 'systematic organisation' and 'order of study'. For the Stoics see D.L. 7.60–1: overview of various systematic and didactic

in fact a particular order of teaching which is independent of the hierarchy of the parts is what one expects in a treatise which in its opening sentence describes what is to follow as a τῶν κυριωτάτων Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ... διδασκαλία.

2. *Division of soul* (ch. 5, p. 156.34–7): the instantiation of the division of the genus into species has either dropped out in the course of the transmission, or been omitted by Alcinous. The former is more likely than the latter, so the text should presumably be restored *ad probabilem sententiam*. The example provided, that of the division of soul into the rational and the passionate, and the subdivision of the passionate into the irascible and the concupiscent, is one of a whole into its parts and sub-parts. Though the soul is the genus of its parts in the sense that 'soul' can be predicated of each of them, according to the doctrines found elsewhere in the *Did.* the concupiscent etc. is not a species of soul but a part. The standard example of the division of a genus (living being) into species is found a little later, 5.157.5ff.

3. *Division and the good(s)* (ch. 5, p. 156.39–41, and ch. 27). Alcinous' fourth type of division is that of 'accidents according to subjects'. The example given is τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. This is what the Stoic Crinis *ap*. D.L. 7.62 called μερισμός and stated to be an 'orderly arrangement of a genus according to locations' (γένους εἰς τόπους κατάταξις).[12] Crinis' formula (as transmitted?) is elliptical because one can only distribute *parts* of a genus over various locations. In Diogenes Laertius his definition is cited immediately after the Stoic definitions at 7.61 of διαίρεσις, the cutting up of a genus into its proximate sub-species (example: τῶν ζῴων τὰ μέν ἐστι λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα), ἀντιδιαίρεσις, the cutting up of a genus into a species by contraries, as by means of negation (example: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθά), and ὑποδιαίρεσις, a (further) division following a division (the example given is the ὑποδιαίρεσις of an ἀντιδιαίρεσις, viz. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθά, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα). All these types are therefore illustrated by instances of dichotomous division.

The first part of Alcinous' example of what Crinis call μερισμός is the same as the latter's τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, but Alcinous, as we have seen, adds the external goods as a

orders of the parts of philosophy.

[12] We have noticed above that at *Did.* 3.154.6 διαίρεσις and μερισμός are put on a par, and that this is far from common practice.

third class. Crinis or an intermediate source may have omitted the external goods to make this division dichotomous, just as in the three previous examples.[13] But there may also be another and better reason: Crinis' position is idiosyncratic to the extent that he allows for *goods* (rather than things to be *preferred*, e.g. health)[14] in relation to the *body*. What appears to be a standard Stoic tripartite division of goods into those pertaining to the soul, what is external, and what pertains to neither (περὶ ψυχήν, ἐκτός, οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ' ἐκτός) but excludes those of the body is found at Sext. *M.* 11.46 (who is explicit about this exclusion), D.L. 7.96 (cf. 7.98),[15] Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.5[e] (70.8 ff. W.). The external goods here are friends, or acquaintances. It is therefore more likely that the external goods were left out in Crinis' partition because the remarkable—indeed from a Stoic point of view quite heterodox—inclusion of the bodily goods could lead to the misunderstanding that the external goods are not friends etc., but wealth etc.[16] We should take into account that the example provided for Crinis' *partitio* may have been been influenced by the wording of Platonizing and Aristotelianizing formulas.

As a rule this particular threefold nature of goods is in fact, and correctly, attributed to Aristotle and the Peripatetics, but also (as here in Alcinous) to Plato, in whose work proof-texts are indeed to be found, though not in prominent positions.[17] These Platonic passages only became important by hindsight, at the time that the Peripatic tripartite division had become a scholastic byword and the first attempts to harmonize the positive doctrines of the Academy and Peripatos were made, viz., in the first century BCE (see below, on Cicero and Antiochus). Diogenes Laertius provides an excellent

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[13] Note that the Stoic examples for this ἀντιδιαίρεσις elsewhere are trichotomous, i.e., the ἀντιδιαίρεσις includes, or is coalesced with, its ὑποδιαίρεσις: D.L. 7.102, Chrysippus *ap.* Sext. *M.* 11.11, Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.7.5[a] (57.19 W.), Epict. *Diss.* 2.9.15, 2.19.3.

[14] Tripartion of προηγμένα into those περὶ ψυχήν, περὶ σῶμα, and ἐκτός at Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.7.7[b] (80.22ff. W.), paralleled at D.L. 7.106.

[15] O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik* (Berlin 1933) 34 n. 1, has seen that this is a μερισμός (note the misprint: 'D.L. 7. 61' instead of 7.62).

[16] Sext. *M.* 11.45 (partly quoted below, p. 252), attributing the tripartion of goods to the Academics and the Peripatetics, says that according to them what is ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος are wealth, fatherland, parents, children, friends etc. This lumps together what according to some Stoics (above, text to n. 15) is ἐκτός and what is οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτ' ἐκτός, but agrees with the list of externals goods attrituted to the Peripatetics at Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.7.19 (136.13ff. W.).

[17] See e.g. below, n. 21.

instance of the follow-up of this procedure, for it is precisely this division of goods which is the first of the series of diaereses with which his Plato book ends; these, so he claims, were made *by Plato* according to Aristotle (3.80–1). Another example which goes even further is the attribution of such a series of divisions to the Pythagoreans by Iamblichus.[18] We should note that although Alcinous' scholastic example does not correspond point for point with the doctrine of the good(s) set out in ch. 27, the latter is certainly not incompatible with it (see below).

In the first ethical doxography (dox. A)[19] at Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.7.4[a] (55 W.), various divisions of the good are attributed to Plato (said 55.6 W. to be πολύφωνος, not πολύδοξος as some have opined), viz., a dichotomous one, a tripartite one, and a third one into five sections, and Stobaeus' source contends that Plato uses these mostly in the first book of the *Laws*[20] and in the *Philebus*. Now Plato's tripartite division, like Crinis' dichotomous μερισμός, is said to be 'according to locations' (55.11ff. W.): τριχῶς δὲ τοῖς τόποις· τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰς μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τὰς δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰς δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀρετὰς εἴποις ἂν καὶ εὐεξίας καὶ εὐπορίας.[21] A little later the author of doxography A adds that Aristotle used the same division 'according to locations' as Plato (56.8f. W.): Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν μὲν τριάδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὐτὸς

[18] The so-called *Divisiones aristoteleae* have also been transmitted separately, in various versions, see T. Dorandi, 'Ricerche sulla trasmissione delle Divisioni aristoteliche', in K.A. Algra, P.W. van der Horst, D.T. Runia, eds., *Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy*. Philosophia Antiqua 72 (Leiden etc. 1996) 145ff. Mutschmann's *Teubneriana* of 1906 of this scholastic tract is out of date as an edition, but still most useful for its rich *apparatus parallelorum*. For the division of goods see Mutschmann, *op. cit.*, 1f., and his introduction, 28f., where he points out that Iambl. *Protr.* ch. 5 attributes such a series of divisions (which 24.22ff. Pistelli begins with the tripartition of goods which is also first in Diogenes Laertius). Iamblichus' version as worked out in what follows is interspersed with exegetical comments, but should be taken into account by a future editor of the *Div. ar.* nevertheless.

[19] The convenient designation doxographies A, B, and C is taken over from D.E. Hahm, 'The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus', *ANRW* II.26.4 (Berlin/New York 1990) 2945 and *passim*.

[20] This is because at *Ecl. eth.* 2.7.4[a] (54.10–55.4 W.) the dichotomous division of goods into divine and human is quoted verbatim from *Lg.* 1.631bd; the opening words of this passage are cited (with explicit reference to *Lg.* 1) at *Did.* ch. 27 p. 181.1–2.

[21] Wachsmuth *ad loc.* moreover refers to *Lg.* 3.697b, τιμιώτατα καὶ πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθά ... δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα. Cf. also the interlude at Plato *Euthd.* 279a–282a.

ὁμοίως Πλάτωνι κατὰ τοὺς τόπους. Presumably the formula 'according to locations' in these formulas is originally Peripatetic, or at any rate deriving from a type of doxography which uses Aristotelian categories to impart structure to an account.[22] In the present case we are dealing with the category, or rather question-type, of the 'where?'. Furthermore, this section of doxography A is very much concerned with harmonizing the views of Plato, Aristotle and even the Stoics, so has a Middle Platonist flavour. In Stobaeus' doxography C which deals with the Peripatetics and actually is by Arius Didymus, we find the usual division τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἐκτός (*Ecl. Eth.* 2.7.19, 136.9f. W.), though no reference to the locations is given here. Our conclusion must be that Alcinous' formula belongs with a Middle Platonist tradition.

Atticus, ever on his guard against intrusions from the Peripatos, disagreed. He argued that according to Plato the only good things are those of the soul, e.g. Atticus, fr. 2.9ff. des Places *ap.* Eus. *P.E.* 14.4.2–3; cf. also Hippol. *Ref.* 1.20.5. But in the passage in the Stobaean doxography A discussed above we next find an alternative view (ἄλλως) attributed to Plato, or at least a compromise one, which to some extent is comparable to the position advocated by Atticus. This starts with the Stoic (!) maxim μόνον ... τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν (55.22ff. W.).[23] Nothing can be good unless it participates in virtue, as iron or whatever is to be hot has to partake of fire.[24] The text of what follows is in part corrupt, but what is clear is that also the bodily and external things should participate in virtue.

Yet the particular scholastic division of goods encountered in Alcinous ch. 5 is a bit less common than one might be inclined to believe (even more importantly, I have not come across another

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[22] This has been noticed by M. Giusta, *I dossografi di etica* (Torino 1974-77) 2.124ff., though he fails to discuss the division of goods at *Did.* ch. 3. At Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.72 (42.1–4 W., Giusta's chief witness, see *op. cit.* 2.12) only four categories are listed (substance/essence, quality, quantity, relative). The list of categories in Clement's account of division, *Strom.* 8.6.20.2 is better evidence: a species may either be a substance or a quantity or a quality or a relative or a where or a when, etc.

[23] The Platonic formula (*Ti.* 87c) is πᾶν ... τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν. But observe that already the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus wrote a treatise in three books (no doubt enlisting Plato for the Stoic cause against Carneades) entitled "Ὅτι κατὰ Πλατώνα μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, cited by Clement in a section dealing with this theme at *Strom.* 5.14.6.

[24] Wachsmuth *ad loc.* correctly refers to *Grg.* 506d. For the parallel in Alcinous see below, text to n. 26.

instance of this division of goods as one of attributes according to subjects). I have found the following instances, all of which are compatible with the hypothesis of a Peripatetic and then Middle Platonist origin: Aspas. *in EN* 21.27f. τριχῇ γὰρ διοριζομένων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῶν μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τῶν δὲ περὶ σῶμα, ** ; Galen, *Protr.* 11, *Scr. min.* 1, 121.3ff. ἀγαθῶν οὖν τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων τῶν δὲ περὶ σῶμα τῶν δ' ἐκτός, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου γένους ἀγαθῶν ἐπινοουμένου; Sext. *M.* 7.235 ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅταν διαιρούμενοι φάσκωμεν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα τὰ δ' ἐκτός, *M.* 11.45 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς 'Ακαδημίας καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου τρία γένη φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἃ μὲν περὶ ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἃ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, ἃ δὲ ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος; Orig. *Philocal.* 26.1 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οἴονται τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, Orig. *in Ep. ad Rom. (III.5–V.7)* 130.2ff. Scherer ἐν οἷς τρία γένη ἀγαθῶν εἶναι λέγεται, τ<ὰ μ>ὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ ἐκτός, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμ<ονία>ν συμπληροῦσθαι οἱ τοιοῦτοι διδάσκουσι<ν> ἐκ τῆς τριγε<νείας αὐτῶ>ν, Orig. (?) *Fragm. in Psalmos*, *PG* 12, 1152.28ff. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οἴονται τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχήν, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἐκτός. Finally, the division is also known to Theon, *Progymn.* 109. 29ff. Spengel τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχήν τε καὶ ἦθος, τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ τρία ἂν εἴη ταῦτα.

For the τριγένεια (as it is often called in Greek texts) of goods according to Platonists and Peripatetics according to Antiochus see e.g. Cic. *Ac. po.* 1.22, and Sext. *M.* 11.45, quoted above. Most of the time it is attributed to the Peripatetics alone, e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.85, *De fin.* 3.41, 43, 48, 5.12–4, Sext. *P.* 3.180–1, Sen. *Ep.* 88.5, Clem. *Strom.* 2.128.5, 129.10, D.L. 5.30 (cf. already Arist. *Polit.* 1323^{a}21ff.). Sometimes, as we have seen, it is strongly contrasted with Plato's doctrine. Alcinous' division of good things is qualified in the Platonizing sense required by Atticus and others (see above) at ch. 27, p. 180.5–15, where he follows a somewhat different approach than in ch. 5 (we have seen above that doxography A in Stobaeus likewise preserves different approaches, grounded in different passages in the Platonic corpus). This time the only true human goods are said to be 'intellect and reason' (νοῦν καὶ λόγον), whereas the things people call good depend on the 'use of virtue' for their being good. Whittaker *ad loc.* cites Aristotelian parallels and one from a section on Plato at Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 2.7.3^{f} (50.5f. W.),[25] and in his *apparatus parallelorum* proof-texts from the *Timaeus* and *Nomoi.* But (an interpretation of) the passage *Grg.* 506d, already quoted above, must also be at issue.

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[25] Whittaker (above, n. 1) 53 n. 453.

Here Plato says that people can only be good because of the presence of some virtue, and that the same holds for each individual thing, be it an instrument, a body, or a soul. Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 55.22ff. W. (also quoted above), using a slightly different metaphor, says that iron can only become *hot* when partaking of fire, and adds that it is the prerogative of men to be able to profit from the things divine. Alcin. *Did.* 27.180.1ff. argues that human goods are called what they are by participating in the first, i.e., divine, good, just as sweet and *hot* things are called what they are by participating in their 'firsts' (*sc.* Sweet and *Hot*).[26]

The examples of inferior goods given by Alcinous are 'health, beauty, strength, wealth and so on' (180.9ff.). Of these the first three are goods of the *body*, while the others are *external* goods. The second and third kinds of goods are lumped together because the Plato passages echoed here by Alcinous do so (the first of these, *Lg.* 2.662a, explicitly acknowledges that health, beauty and wealth, in that order, are traditional goods according to *hoi polloi*). For strength and beauty as goods of the body in other texts see e.g. Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 56.14f., 122.22ff., 136.12–3 W., for strength and health e.g. Cic. *Ac. po.* 1.19, [Plu.] *De Hom.* II 137.1, Sext. *M.* 11.45, and *Div. ar.* 1, 2.1–4 Mutschmann. For wealth etc. as external goods see e.g. Arist. *Rhet.* 1360^{b}20ff., Cic. *Ac. po.* 1.21, Stob. *Ecl. eth.* 129.15f., 136.14f. W., D.L. 7.106, and *Div. ar.* 1, 2.4–6 Mutschmann. What are in fact the goods of the *soul* (the word itself does not occur in this context) are treated quite extensively, and absolutely *more platonico*, at *Did.* ch. 27, p. 179.29–80.9.

Text-critical addendum. In his apparatus to 27.180.9 †δαιμονίως προσκαλούμενον† Whittaker states 'locus desperatus necdum sanatus', citing Witt's conjecture which with some hesitation is accepted by Dillon.[27] Once you have seen it the correction turns out to be very simple indeed: read δαιμονίως πρὸς καλοῦ <γινό>μενον ('being to one's advantage in a divine way'), cf. a few lines down, 180.14, πρὸς κακοῦ γινόμενα. See LSJ *s.v.* πρός, A iv *ad fin.* For πρὸς καλοῦ cf. Orig. *Philoc.* 21.16 = *De princ.* 3.1.171, ἐνίοτε τὸ τάχιον θεραπευθῆναι οὐ πρὸς καλοῦ γίνεται τοῖς θεραπευομένοις, Eus. *in Psalm.*, *PG* 23, 1253.18–9 οὐ γάρ μοι πρὸς καλοῦ ἔσται τὸ σβεσθῆναι τὸ φῶς ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ἡμερῶν μου, Basil. *Homil. super Ps.*, *PG* 29, 456.34, πρὸς καλοῦ γίνεται τῷ δικαίῳ ἡ πενία. Numerous examples in Didymus Caecus, e.g. *in Eccles. (5-6)*, 162.12 Kramer πρὸς καλοῦ αὐτῷ ἔσται, *ibid. (9.8–10.20)* 285.10 πρὸς καλοῦ αὐτοῖς γίνεται, *in Zacch.* 3.96.1–2

[26] See above, text to n. 24.

[27] Dillon (above, n. 2) 168.

πρὸς καλοῦ γὰρ τῇ Τύρῳ ἔσται, *in Psalm. 20–21*, 34.7–8 Doutreleau *et al.* πρὸς καλοῦ δὲ ἡ τῆξις γίνε|ται, *ibid. 29–34*, 178.24 Gronewald, πρὸς καλοῦ, φησίν, γέγονεν, *ibid.* 229.30–1 πρὸς καλοῦ δὲ αὐτοῖς γίνεται τοῦτο, *Frr. in Psalm.* fr. 420.3 Mühlenberg πρὸς καλοῦ αὐτοῖς γενησομένης. Cf. also *Suda* Π 2176 Πρὸς καλοῦ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ, and in general the gloss *ap.* Eustath. *in Iliad.* 1.178.17ff. van der Valk ὁπηνίκα δὲ εἴπῃ τις "πρὸς καλῶν" ἢ "πρὸς κακῶν εἶναί τι", ἑτεροῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστὶ σημαινόμενον τῆς προθέσεως. The *Did.* provides the earliest instance of the expression πρὸς καλοῦ, whereas πρὸς κακοῦ occurs not only more often but also earlier: [Pl.] *Ax.* 366a τὸ δὲ σκῆνος τουτὶ πρὸς κακοῦ περιήρμοσεν ἡ φύσις, Ariston of Chius *ap.* Sext. *M.* 7.12 (*SVF* I.356), Cleanthes *ap.* Stob. *Flor.* 1.6.66 (*SVF* I.556). Cf. also πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ in the same sense as πρὸς καλοῦ, already to be found at D.H. *Ant.* 19.7.1 and *Thuc.* 44, Strab. 5.3.11, 17.1.6, and Flav. Jos. *Ant.* 19. 345.

4. *Question-types in physics* (ch. 7, p. 161.3–7): the themes (not parts!) of physics, unlike those of theology and mathematics, are formulated as problems, or questions. This is as it should be,[28] and shows that Alcinous is indebted to a widespread tradition which is by no means limited to Platonism. The first problem is: 'what is the nature of the all?' For the formula 'nature of the all' Whittaker adduces Arist. *De cael.* 268^{b}11, but we also need a parallel for the question itself as a leading one in physics. This (*mutandis mutatis*) is provided by the title of the first chapter of Aetius, viz. 1.1 Diels (ps.-Plutarch only, *Plac.* 875a) τί ἐστι φύσις. Ps.-Plutarch adds an explanation: 'because our aim is the study of physics, it is, I believe, necessary to explain first what φύσις is'. We may perhaps also refer to the title of Aët. 1.5 Diels Εἰ ἓν τὸ πᾶν.

The second problem is twofold: '(a) what sort of living being is man, and (b) what place does he hold in the cosmos?' This cannot be paralleled *disertis verbis* from the *Placita*, though Aët. 4.2 Diels–the end are about man. For the expression χώραν ἔχων Whittaker refers to Plato *Ti.* 52b which is about the necessity for anything that exists to be in some place (ἔν τινι τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά). The cosmos however is not mentioned here. Parallels for the formula 'to hold a place in the cosmos' are few. The earliest I have found is in Philo's allegorical explanation of the robes of the high priest, *Mos.* 2.120: the

[28] See e.g. my paper '*Physikai doxai* and *problemata physika* from Aristotle to Aëtius (and beyond)', in W.W. Fortenbaugh, D. Gutas, eds., *Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings*, RUSCH 5 (New Brunswick/London 1992) 63ff.

pomegranades, flowers and bells are near the hem and so symbolize 'earth and water, which occupy the lowest place in the cosmos' (οὕτως καί τά ὧν ἐστὶ σύμβολα τὴν κατωτάτω χώραν ἔλαχεν ἐν κόσμῳ, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ). Marc. Aur. 10.9 admonishes himself to consider 'what each thing is in its being and what place it holds in the cosmos (τί τε ἐστὶ κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ τίνα χώραν ἔχει ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ), how long it naturally persists and of what it is compounded', etc. Alcinous' formula 'man's place in the cosmos', which to the modern reader has such a familiar ring, thus appears to be quite unique in ancient literature.

Epictetus has an answer to the first part of Alcinous' question, *Diss.* 1.29.59, ἔστι ... φιλοθέωρόν τι ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. But this part of the question reminds one especially of the title Porphyry gave to the treatise which is number fifty-three in order of composition, but which nevertheless he chose to begin the *Enneads* with: 1.1 [53] Τί τὸ ζῷον καὶ τίς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. To Porphyry, apparently, this was a simple issue in the domain of ethics. But when we look at the contents of 1.1 [53] we see that this is far from evident. Plotinus discusses man's composite nature, viz., his being something which consists of both soul and body, and the difficulties that arise when one attempts to gauge the nature of their relationship; he of course comes out strongly in favour of the priority of soul. To Alcinous the issue is one in physics, and we should note that in the *Did.* psychology is part of physics, that is to say that near the end of the physical section of the treatise we have three long chapters which are concerned with the immortality of the human soul, and with its three parts.

The third question, 'whether god exercizes providence over the whole of things', can again be paralleled from the *Placita*. Aët. 2.3 Diels (in both ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus), as its title shows, has been coalesced from two different chapters in its predecessor(s): 'whether the cosmos is ensouled and administered by providence' (Εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ κόσμος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος). In this chapter of the *Placita* the main options are briefly listed, but Plato's name is not mentioned. The issue itself is of course a quite common one, think for instance of the debate in Cicero's *De natura deorum*.

These first three questions are quite general; the two that follow are more particular, i.e., specifically apt in a Platonic context. The fourth, '(whether) any other gods are under his command', cannot be paralleled *disertis verbis* from the *Placita*, and neither can the fifth question, 'what is the (proper) attitude of men towards the gods'. But we may note that in the Aëtian chapter entitled 'what is the god?' the fourth question is answered in the Plato lemma: the other gods

subordinate to and descended from the first God are listed (Aët. 1.7. 31 Diels; in Stobaeus only). This echoes the doctrine of the *Timaeus*.

One may well ask what is the relation between this catalogue of issues and the exposition of the doctrines in the *Didascalicus*, because the questions themselves are not repeated verbatim. The first issue, viz., what is the nature of the all, corresponds *ad sententiam* to *Did*. chs. 12–15. The issue what kind of living being is man, and what place does he hold in the cosmos, in the same way corresponds to *Did*. chs. 12–25; more specifically, in ch. 16 we are told that man is a mortal being living on land, and that of all living beings he is most closely related to the gods (172.4 τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ὡς συγγενεστάτου θεοίς). The latter helps explain the prominent position of the chapters on the human soul. The third issue, whether god exercizes providence (προνοεῖν) over the whole of things, to some extent corresponds to *Did*. ch. 26, 'on fate', though the word providence does not occur in this chapter. In fact, the verb προνοεῖν only occurs in the passage just quoted, while the substantive πρόνοια too occurs only once, viz., ch. 12 p. 167.13, in a section of the account of the creation of the world. The fourth issue, whether there are other gods subordinate to the first god, corresponds to *Did*. ch. 15, which is about other gods, and more specifically about the children of the first god of the *Timaeus*, who follow his orders and imitate his activity. The fifth issue, that of the proper attitude of men towards the gods as belonging with *physics*, corresponds with *Did*. ch. 28, on becoming like god as the *telos*—though this chapter is part of the *ethics* section of the treatise, not of the physics.

One can only conclude that the relation between the five physical issues listed in ch. 7 with the main body of the physcis section of the treatise is quite a loose one. One of the reasons probably is that in the physics section Alcinous follows the account in the *Timaeus* rather closely, though he does not always treat the topics in the same order as the dialogue. Furthermore, the account of the immortality of the human soul leans heavily on the *Phaedo*, whereas the final chapter of the section, ch. 26 'on fate', is a sort of appendix, comparable to the position of ch. 11, which deals with the incorporeality of the qualities, as an appendix at the end of the theoretical section. But the lack of more precise correspondences between the main physical issues as precisely formulated in ch. 7, and the actual exposition of physics which follows, is perhaps best explained on the assumption that Alcinous, as is only to be expected, is indebted to a variety of exegetical traditions. The list of ch. 7 is not meant to serve as a table of contents for chs. 12–26.

This does not entail (though certainly it does not preclude either) that Alcinous used different sources according to the traditional analysis of *Quellenforschung*, i.e., jumps from one source to another. In a most stimulating recent study, however, Göransson actually argues that this is what he did.[29] I limit myself to his argument about the various sub-divisions of philosophy as a whole and the various orders of its parts set out in the early chapters, as compared to the actual layout of the argument in the rest of the work. Göransson is certainly right in pointing out the differences among these divisions and sequences themselves as well as with what follows. But he fails to take into account that Alcinous' introductory chapters, and especially his divisions and sub-divisions of philosophy, should not be taken as a table of contents of what is to follow.[30] It is sufficient, as argued above for the issues in the domain of physics, if they provide a general idea of what is to follow in the rest of the treatise. Parallels can be cited; I only give two. The list of the characteristic 'signs' of Being at Parmenides 28 B 8.1–4 DK is not fully commensurate with the explanation and ordering of the 'signs' that follows. The lists of the successions in the prologue of Diogenes Laertius (1.14–15) do not entirely correspond with the successions as set forth in the treatise itself, because in several cases the succession in a book dealing with a particular sect contains more persons than were announced in the prologue.[31] As to Diogenes Laertius it may perhaps be argued that the inconsistencies are there because his work never received the finishing touch. True, but this still does not explain the discrepancy between the proem and what follows, for these various bits of information concerning successions are obviously indebted to the same 'source'. It evidently was sufficient if a prologue, or introduction, provided a general idea of what was to come. Alcinous' treatise, on the

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[29] T.Göransson, *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus.* SGLGoth 61 (Göteborg 1995) 106ff.

[30] As has been trenchantly pointed out by Baltes (above, n. 10) 98.

[31] In the proem one branch of the Ionian succession *disertis verbis* ends with Theophrastus, while book V also treats Strato, Lyco, Demetrius, and Heraclides at considerable length. The section of book VII which treated Stoics later than Chrysippus (the last representative of another branch of the Ionian succession according to the proem) has been lost, but its contents are known from the list in *Parisinus gr.* 1759, see my paper 'Diogenes Laertius and Stoic Philosophy', *Elenchos* 7 (1986) 310ff. (reprinted with original pagination in my *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy* [Assen/Maastricht 1990]), and T. Dorandi, 'Considerazioni sull'*index locupletior* di Diogene Laerzio', *Prometheus* 18 (1992) 121ff., who usefully reprints the whole table on the basis of a 'rinnovata autopsia' of the ms.

other hand, is certainly not an unfinished product.[32] The author did not write for classsical philologists, and he clearly saw no harm in the discrepancies between his scholastically formulated account of the issues in physics and his detailed treatment of these issues in the body of his work.[33]

5. *Theological proofs concerned with incorporeality and partlessness* (ch. 10 p. 166.7–14, 165.34–7): At the end of the theological chapter proofs are found which establish that God is incorporeal, or immaterial. No comments on the final passage (166.7–14) in Whittaker, while Dillon characterizes the concluding arguments of ch. 10 as 'banal'.[34] I am inclined to disagree with this judgement. Cic. *ND* 3.29–52 and Sext. *M.* 9.138–190 have preserved a volley of Academic arguments concerned with theology. Both these sources—we may note in passing that Sextus presumably is a near-contemporary of Alcinous—mention Carneades' name[35] and ascribe specific arguments to him. One of the lines of attack is to undermine the tenet, held and argued by Stoics as well as Epicureans, that the gods are living beings. Two counter-proofs are pertinent in our present context. God is a body according to both Epicureans and Stoics, but nothing that is corporeal can be immortal; Carneades argues that the diviny body must consist either of one element (water, air, fire, earth) or a combination of these. But this leads to consequences which are incompatible with the original assumption.

Let us compare the texts. Assume that God is a body (*corpus*); since *omne corpus* ***aut aqua aut aer aut ignis aut terra est, aut id quod est concretum ex his*** *aut ex aliqua parte eorum* (Cic. *ND* 3.30–1), that God must be either water or air etc. But all these are perishable, because they are divisible (*nam et terrenum omne dividitur* etc.), or change into each other. In the preceding paragraph Cicero had pointed out that no living being can be imperishable since no living being is indivisible (3.29 *si omne animal secari ac dividi potest, nullum est eorum individuum, nullum aeternum*). Sextus provides quite a good parallel for Cic. *ND* 3.30–1[36] at *M.* 9.180–1. Taking

[32] That the little treatise has been carefully written and is in fact well composed is convincingly argued by Baltes (above, n. 10) 97ff.

[33] More research on the relation between introductory sections and what follows in ancient works is needed.

[34] Dillon (above, n. 2) 111.

[35] Cic. *ND* 3.29, 44; Sext. *M.* 9.140, 181, 190.

[36] Duly noted by Pease *ad loc.*, who uncharacteristically has missed the parallel in Alcinous.

up his antinomy at 9.150 that God should be either incorporeal or a body, he argues: εἰ δὲ σῶμα ἐστιν [*sc.* God], ἤτοι σύγκριμα ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν στοιχείων ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν καὶ στοιχειῶδες σῶμα. ... εἰ δὲ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν σῶμα, ἤτοι πῦρ ἐστιν ἢ ἀὴρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ. But combinations dissolve and so are perishable, while the individual elements are without soul or reason. Finally Alcinous, 166.8–10: εἰ σῶμα ἐστιν [*sc.* God], ἐξ ὕλης ἂν ὑπάρχοι· ἢ πῦρ ἂν οὖν εἴη ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ ἢ ἀὴρ ἤ τι ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἕκαστόν γε τούτων οὐξ ἄρχικον.

The Academic argument that God cannot be a body, or one half of the Academic-Neopyrrhonist argument that God can be neither incorporeal nor a body, which originally served to prove the conclusion that the gods of the Stoics and Epicureans, or of the dogmatists in general, do not exist, has been adapted to prove that God is incorporeal since he cannot be a body, neither a simple nor a compound one. The verbal similarities are striking, while the fact that the elements each time are listed in a different sequence is immaterial. To be sure, the argument as in Alcinous has also been modified in other ways, *modo platonico-aristotelico*: the matter/form distinction has been introduced, and the elements are said to be unsuitable because they are not primary. But there is nothing banal about converting one's opponents' argument *contra* into one in favour of one's own view.

Even Cicero's point about divisibility,[37] cited above, can to some extent be paralleled in Alcinous. What is divisible can be divided into parts. Part of the concluding section of *Did.* ch. 10 is concerned with the fact that God is partless (165.34–7). Alcinous' argument has Platonic and Aristotelian antecedents, as Whittaker and Dillon *ad loc.* do not fail to point out; yet one may argue that the argument about partlessness also takes an Academic predecessor into its stride (itself presumably indebted to the arguments about partlessness in Plato and especially Aristotle), which served a different purpose. Opposite inferences may be drawn from the same premise, depending on the aim that is pursued.*

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[37] Commentators *ad loc.* point out that this argument as reported by Cicero is unclear; this is of no importance in our present context.

* These marginalia are selected from notes made in prepration for the study of the *Did.* to which May Week, Cambridge 1995, was devoted. I am grateful to have been invited to attend these memorable sittings.

15

THE TEXT OF THE PLATONIC CITATIONS IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

DAVID T. RUNIA

I Introduction*

Some years ago the recipient of this Festschrift wrote an article which should be compulsory reading for all scholars and students working in the area of later ancient texts.[1] In it he argues against the conventional view that indirectly transmitted texts (i.e., texts cited by a later ancient author) differ so often from their directly transmitted counterparts (i.e., texts preserved in a manuscript tradition) because the author recording them was quoting from memory or taking the wording over from an anterior inaccurate source. Against this view he advocated the thesis that ancient authors were not constrained by the practice of accurate quotation that has become mandatory in modern times, but rather practise the 'art of misquotation', i.e., when citing a text they not seldom deliberately introduce alterations for various reasons consonant with their own concerns. Consequently the indirect tradition, while undoubtedly remaining interesting and valuable in its own right, is of restricted usefulness in the establishment of the original text.[2]

* My thanks to Gijs Jonkers, who gave me access to his complete list of the indirect tradition of the *Timaeus*, Milko van Gool and Bert van den Berg, who read through the manuscript and made valuable comments, and also to the editor of this volume for his encouragement and pertinent comments.

[1] Whittaker (1989), largely based on research done for his magnificent edition of Alcinous, Whittaker-Louis (1990), where see esp. xvii–xxx.

[2] See the conclusion in Whittaker (1989) 94. More research needs to be done on the method of quotation and citation practised in antiquity. I have also been aided by a forthcoming paper by Ian Kidd (St. Andrews)

In the present contribution, offered to our honorand as a small indication of the great esteem in which I hold him both as a scholar and as a friend, I shall apply this insight to and test it for the collection of citations of the writings of Plato found in the extensive *œuvre* of the Jewish exegete and philosopher Philo of Alexandria (ca. 15 BCE–50 CE). How does Philo quote the Platonic material he appropriates? How closely does he adhere to the received Platonic text? What have editors (both of Plato and of Philo himself) done with this material? Before I begin my task I need to say a little more about this collection and the method that I will be using.

One of the corollaries of Whittaker's thesis is that it is in principle not possible to make a rigorous distinction between verbatim quotations which adhere conscientiously to the original text and looser paraphrases and references which take considerable liberties with the text in question. Of course there are great differences in fidelity and accuracy, but we have to do with a sliding scale. Even an author such as Eusebius who claims to quote πρὸς λέξιν is not averse to introducing slight alterations into his text.[3] The criterion that I have employed for determining the extent of my collection is that the author should *himself indicate* that he is citing another work. In the case of Philo's Platonic quotations this yields 32 separate texts.[4] Of these we shall disregard nine, because they only survive in an Armenian translation, therby preventing us from making an exact analysis of how they relate to the Platonic text.[5] In the remaining 23 texts Plato is either referred to by name or cited by means of an anonymous phrase.[6]

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on Plutarch's method of quoting other texts and making use of them in his argumentation (Plutarch is perhaps the best author to compare with Philo in this regard).

[3] An example at Mansfeld-Runia (1997) 134ff., where it is shown that changes are introduced in the text of ps.-Plutarch to accommodate his own theological views.

[4] List based on Leisegang (1926-30) 19–20, Theiler (1964) 391, Runia (1986) 367f.

[5] These are: *Prov.* 1.20 (*Ti.* 38b6–7), 1.21 (*Ti.* 28b4–c2), 1.21 (*Ti.* 29b1–2), Terian's fragment (*Ti.* 35b4–5), *Prov.* 2.43 (*Phdr.* 245a), *QG* 1.6 (*Ti.* 29e), *QG* 3.3 (*Phdr.* 246e), *QG* 4.159 (*Phd.* 60b, but see below on *Ebr.* 8), *QE* 2.118 (*Ti.* 75c–d). On Terian's fragment, perhaps a section of Philo's lost Περὶ ἀριθμῶν, see Terian (1984), Runia (1986) 203. For the abbreviations of Philo's treatises used see Runia (1986) xi–xii.

[6] I leave out the more general references to the *Symposium* at *Contempl.* 57–63.

In the main body of the article the 23 Philonic texts are quoted in the original Greek as found in the *editio maior* of Cohn, Wendland and Reiter (1896-1915).[7] This, note well, is not necessarily the text that I would prefer to print. It is to be taken as a starting-point only. In the quoted text the phrase indicating Platonic authorship, whether explicitly or implicitly, is underlined. In smaller print relevant textual variants in the mss. and printed editions will be noted (the sigla are those of the *editio maior*). Thereafter I shall first indicate the Platonic text which is being cited and in some cases record the differences compared with the established critical text of Plato (i.e., the OCT text).[8] After this some brief comments will be added on Philo's use and adaptation of Plato's text and especially on the differences between his rendering and what we find in the original. For reasons of space other aspects of the Philonic text can only be given very limited treatment.[9] For the same reason references to other authors who cite the same Platonic texts will have to be severely restricted. In accordance with Whittaker's methodology I shall refrain from using any quotation marks in the quoted texts (here I depart from the *editio maior*). These are of course a modern addition. Not only are they usually misleading, but also unnecessary, because an ancient author makes clear by the wording of his text where a citation begins and ends.[10] But since it is necessary to indicate the dependence on the Platonic text in some way or another, I shall print the text of the citations in *Sperrdruck*, following the example of the honorand in his edition of Alcinous.[11]

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[7] The sequence in which they are presented also follows this edition. Reference will also be made to the other major editions of Philo, the *editio princeps* Turnebus (1552) and Mangey (1742). *Textus vulgatus* (or vulg.) refers to the editions based on Turnebus published in the seventeenth century; on these cf. Goodenough-Goodhart (1938) 188 ff.

[8] For vol. 1 Duke-Hicken-Nicoll-Robinson-Strachan (1995), for the rest Burnet (1899-1908).

[9] Various relevant comments have been made by translators and commentators of Philo, esp. in the Loeb Classical Library edition of Colson, Whitaker and Marcus (abbreviated LCL). In the case of Philo's use of the *Timaeus* detailed analyses have already been given in Runia (1986).

[10] A special case is formed by lemmata of the text commented on in a commentary (e.g. below no. 10). Here I have used 'guillemets'. But even here the situation is far from simple; cf. for example the analysis of the biblical quotations in *Gig.–Deus* by Gooding-Nikiprowetzky (1983).

[11] Note that the words printed in *Sperrdruck* go back to the Platonic text, but are not necessarily found there in exactly the same form. For example in text no. 1 εἶναι is derived from ἦν at 29e1. In this I also follow

A brief word needs to be said about the changes we should be looking for. Here Whittaker's article can give us guidance. Four general categories can be discerned[12]:

(a) *inversion* (and *dislocation*): when words in the original text are reversed or moved around.

(b) *addition*: when extra words are added to the original.

(c) *subtraction*: when words are removed from the original.

(d) *substitution*: when words in the original are replaced by synonyms or other related terms.

In describing the changes we are looking for in these terms, I have avoided any kind of value-judgment. Of course there are many reasons why an author might wish to alter a text. He may want to make it clearer or more in line with contemporary terminology. He may want to show off a bit by introducing variations that the reader has to pick up. A special category is formed by those changes which have a deliberate or even tendentious character, i.e., the quoter alters the text so that it says what he wants it to mean. Whittaker calls these 'tamperings', and the same term is used by Dillon in an article on ideological emendation of the *Timaeus.*[13] I shall make some more comments on this practice at the end of my article.

Finally we should note one more important phenomenon that we will be studying in this article. Frequently, when Philo cites a Platonic text more or less verbatim, editors are tempted to correct the text of the manuscripts on the basis of the received Platonic text. I have labelled this special kind of emendation 'retro-correction'. Whenever it occurs it will demand our special attention.

Whittaker's practice. It is not possible to be very exact.

[12] See esp. Whittaker (1989) 71.

[13] Whittaker (1989) 80, Dillon (1989); for a similar study in the area of New Testament text criticism see Ehrman (1993). For the practice in Patristic texts see a brief discussion in Riedweg (1994) 78ff., who cites an interesting quotation from Hierocles of Alexandria (found in Photius *cod.* 251, 7.191 Henry = Ammonius Saccas test. 15 Schwyzer), in which he accuses early Platonists and Aristotelians of τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν οἰκείων νοθεῦσαι διδασκάλων εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδεῖξαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀλλήλοις μαχομένους.

II The collection of 23 Philonic texts

1. *De opificio mundi* 21

εἰ γάρ τις ἐθελήσειε τὴν αἰτίαν ἧς ἕνεκα τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐδημιουργεῖτο διερευνᾶσθαι, δοκεῖ μοι μὴ διαμαρτεῖν σκοποῦ φάμενος, ὅπερ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἶπέ τις, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητήν.

Cf. *Ti.* 28c3 τὸν ... ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα, 29e1 ἀγαθὸς ἦν.

Philo conflates two of the best-known phrases in all of Plato, expecting his reader to identify the anonymous attribution. The Platonic order of the two epithets used for the demiurge is reversed, as happens in 20 of 41 occasions when Philo cites the phrase; see further Runia (1986) 108.

2. *De opificio mundi* 119

πάλιν δ' αὖ τὸ ἡγεμονικώτατον ἐν ζῴῳ κεφαλὴ τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις ἑπτὰ χρῆται, δυσὶν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἀκοαῖς ἴσαις, αὐλοῖς μυκτῆρος δυσίν, ἑβδόμῳ στόματι, δι' οὗ γίνεται θνητῶν μέν, ὡς ἔφη Πλάτων, εἴσοδος, ἔξοδος δ' ἀφθάρτων· ἐπεισέρχεται μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ σιτία καὶ ποτά, φθαρτοῦ σώματος φθαρταὶ τροφαί, λόγοι δ' ἐξίασιν ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς ἀθάνατοι.

Cf. *Ti.* 75e1–5 τὴν μὲν εἴσοδον τῶν ἀναγκαίων μηχανώμενοι χάριν, τὴν δ' ἔξοδον τῶν ἀρίστων· ἀναγκαῖον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν ὅσον εἰσέρχεται τροφὴν διδὸν τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ λόγων νᾶμα ἔξω ῥέον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν φρονήσει κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον πάντων ναμάτων.

A loose paraphrase of what had become a *bon mot* (also used in *QE* 2.118).[14] The key terms εἴσοδος and ἔξοδος are retained. Plato's contrast between ἀναγκαῖα and ἄριστα is altered to the more precious antithesis θνητά/ἄφθαρτα. Philo's ἐπεισέρχεται clearly picks up the Platonic εἰσέρχεται. On substitution of various compound forms of verbs in later citations see Whittaker (1989) 83f.

3. *De opificio mundi* 133

οὐ γὰρ γῆ γυναῖκα, ὡς εἶπε Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ γυνὴ γῆν μεμίμηται κτλ.

1 μεμίμηται, μιμεῖται M

Cf. Plato *Menex.* 238a4–5 οὐ γὰρ γῆ γυναῖκα μεμίμηται κυήσει καὶ γεννήσει, ἀλλὰ γυνὴ γῆν.

[14] The Platonic quotation is not found in the arithmological texts parallel to Philo; cf. Staehle (1931) 48.

Though no more than a literary allusion, the citation is rather accurate. Philo leaves out the phrase κυήσει καὶ γεννήσει as not so relevant for his example of Demeter (though note γεννησομένῳ a few lines earlier and γενέσεως a few lines later). The verb μεμίμηται is relocated to the end to balance the attributory clause inserted in the middle, but otherwise Philo retains the original word order. The forms of the words, too, are identical to the Platonic text.

4. *De plantatione Noe* 17

ἐξαιρέτου δὲ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἔλαχεν ἄνθρωπος· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων τὰς ὄψεις περιήγαγε κάτω κάμψας, διὸ νένευκε πρὸς χέρσον, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἀνώρθωσεν, ἵνα τὸν οὐρανὸν καταθεᾶται, φυτὸν οὐκ ἐπίγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ὑπάρχων.

Cf. *Ti.* 90a5–6 ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον, ὀρθότατα λέγοντες.

Another famous phrase from one of the best-known sections of Plato's dialogue on the cosmos and man. In spite of the rather vague attribution, the phrase is fairly accurately reproduced. Philo substitutes ἐπίγειος for Plato's ἔγγειος. This we may take as a modernization or adaptation to Philo's own vocabulary. He uses the latter term only once (*Her*. 208), whereas the former is rather common. This leads him to ignore Plato's distinction at *R*. 546a4 between φύτα ἔγγεια and ζῷα ἐπίγεια. Philo's text gives the elision ἀλλ' whereas Plato retains an hiatus. In the later dialogues Plato is notoriously strict in this regard (cf. Cherniss [1957] 344ff.), but this time the less strict Philo overtakes him. Moreover the mss. of both writers are not a very reliable guide to such textual finesses.[15]

5. *De plantatione Noe* 131

τοῦτο ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ μελετῶμεν διὰ φωνῆς καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων ἀστείων καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιλείπωμεν μήτε λόγους ἐγκωμιαστικοὺς μήτε ποιήματα συντιθέντες, ἵνα καὶ ἐμμελῶς καὶ χωρὶς μέλους καὶ καθ' ἑκατέραν φωνῆς ἰδέαν, ᾗ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ ᾄδειν ἀποκεκλήρωται, ὅ τε κοσμοποιὸς καὶ ὁ κόσμος γεραίρηται, ὁ μέν, ὡς ἔφη τις, ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων, ὁ δὲ τελειότατος τῶν γεγονότων.

6 αἰτίων, αἰτιῶν M

Cf. *Ti.* 29a5–6 ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων.

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[15] As Mark Joyal reminds me in a comment on my paper.

Once again Philo adheres fairly close to the well-known Platonic phrase. Two changes are made. First, the two phrases are reversed. Philo retains the sequence creator-cosmos which he had used in the phrase used to introduce the quotation. Previously (Runia (1986) 155), I suggested the reason for the change was that it was more reverent to mention the creator before his product. If, however, he had retained the Platonic order, the naming of the best of causes would have made a fitting climax. Secondly, τελειότατος replaces Plato's κάλλιστος. In my previous discussion (*ibid.*) I followed Pouilloux (1963) 83, who argued that Philo relies on his memory, and mistakenly imports the superlative from elsewhere in the *Timaeus* (68e3, 92c8). Following Whittaker's lead, however, we might now prefer to see here a case of deliberate *variatio*. In *Abr.* 74 Philo describes the cosmos as τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ μέγιστον καὶ τελεώτατον ἔργον, using three of the four superlatives in 92c7–8. It is difficult, however, to give a specific reason for Philo's change.

6. *De plantatione Noe* 171

ὁ γὰρ ἄκρατος τὰ τῇ φύσει προσόντα ἐπιτείνειν καὶ σφοδρύνειν ἔοικεν εἴτε καλὰ εἴτε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία, καθάπερ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐπεὶ καὶ χρήματα αἴτια μὲν ἀγαθῶν <ἀγαθῷ>, κακῷ δέ, ὡς ἔφη τις, κακῶν· καὶ πάλιν δόξα τοῦ μὲν ἄφρονος τὴν κακίαν ἐπιφανεστέραν, τοῦ δὲ δικαίου τὴν ἀρετὴν εὐκλεεστέραν ἐπιφαίνει.

3 αἴσια MGFH αἴτια U et vulg. | coni. C-W, ἀγαθῶν MGFH, ἀγαθόν U, ἀγαθῷ ἀγαθῶν Turnebus Mangey | κακῷ coni. Turn., κακά codd.
4 κακῶν GFH κακόν U, om. M.

Cf. [Plato], *Eryxias* 397e3–8 ἠρώτα γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸ μειράκιον πῶς οἴεται κακὸν εἶναι τὸ πλουτεῖν, καὶ ὅπως ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ὑπολαβών ... ἔφη, τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις ὅπου δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς χρήμασι, τούτοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ μοχθηροῖς καὶ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν κακόν. ἔχει δ', ἔφη, καὶ τἆλλα πράγματα οὕτω πάντα κτλ.

This time we have, it would seem, a very loose allusion. The noun χρήματα replaces the verbal phrase τὸ πλουτεῖν. Philo appears to turn the remark into a much more pointed expression. I say 'appears to' because there is much confusion in the mss. Certainly the combined conjectures of Turnebus and Wendland produce a smooth and pointed text. The contrast is then, however, between two datives and two genitives, whereas in ps.-Plato's text it is between two datives and two accusatives. These accusatives *are* retained in ms. U. One might consider reading ἐπεὶ καὶ χρήματα αἴσια μὲν ἀγαθόν, κακὰ δέ, ὡς ἔφη τις, κακόν. But many objections can be raised. Such a reading

is also not found in any ms. The phrase χρήματα αἴσια (auspicious money) is forced: Philo usually uses αἴσιος in mantic or religious contexts, e.g. of a dream or prayer or result of an action. The contrast is between two types of people, so a dative is needed. In the emended text retro-correction plays a rather limited role. The distance from the Platonic model is in fact still quite large. It seems to me, however, that the mss. readings allow little alternative. Perhaps one might quibble about whether <ἀγαθῷ> is absolutely necessary, but it certainly helps the contrast.

7. *De ebrietate* 8

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα φύσει μαχομένας, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, εἰς μίαν κορυφὴν συνάψας ὁ θεὸς ἑκατέρας αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἐν ταὐτῷ, διαλλάττουσι δὲ χρόνοις ἐνειργάσατο κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν τῆς ἑτέρας κάθοδον τῇ ἐναντίᾳ ψηφισάμενος, οὕτως ἀπὸ μιᾶς ῥίζης τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τά τε ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας διττὰ ἀνέδραμεν ἔρνη μήτε βλαστάνοντα μήτε καρποφοροῦντα ἐν ταὐτῷ·

Cf. *Phd.* 60b8–c1 ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω δύ' ὄντε, c2–4 ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς κτλ.

Philo here illustrates the thesis that excellence and badness cannot coexist with an allusion to Socrates' famous remark about the alternation of pain and pleasure felt by his chained and unchained leg (Philo's ἡδονή and ἀληγδών replace Plato's τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ λυπηρόν, but note also τὸ ἀλγεινόν, τὸ ἡδύ at c6–7). The phrase ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος is rather vague (it is also used by Philo elsewhere, e.g. in no. 4), and could refer either to Socrates as the teller of the tale or to Plato as the source. Philo rather neatly conflates Plato's two phrases, the single head of 60b8 not illogically replacing the two heads in c4. The words συνάψας ὁ θεός clearly pick up ὁ θεὸς ... συνῆψεν in the Platonic text (not noted by Colson LCL in his note *ad loc.*). Philo's μαχομένας replaces with a synonym Plato's πολεμοῦντα, while φύσει perhaps is inspired by πέφυκε at *Phd.* 60b4. Plato's contrast between the god's will and his power is predictably deleted by Philo, who generally prefers to stress God's omnipotence (e.g. at *Spec.* 4.187).

A parallel passage is found in *QG* 4.159, where the idea of pleasure and pain stemming from a single root (cf. ἀπὸ μιᾶς ῥίζης in *Ebr.* 8) is attributed to 'the poet' (*ut poeta ait* in Aucher's translation, *secundum poeticum carmen* in the Old Latin version). The two

translations have obscured Philo's original text, and it is difficult to say whether a reference to Plato is meant.[16]

8. *De ebrietate* 61

λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἀμήτωρ γενέσθαι τὴν ἐκ πατρός, οὐ πρὸς μητρός, αὐτὸ μόνον κληρωσαμένη συγγένειαν, θήλεος γενεᾶς ἀμέτοχος. εἶπε γάρ πού τις· « καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἀδελφή μού ἐστιν ἐκ πατρός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ μητρός » (Gen. 20, 12)· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης τῆς αἰσθητῆς συνισταμένης ἀεὶ καὶ λυομένης, ἣν μητέρα καὶ τροφὸν καὶ τιθήνην τῶν ποιητῶν ἔφασαν, οἷς πρώτοις σοφίας ἀνεβλάστησεν ἔρνος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου καὶ πατρός.

Cf. *Ti.* 49a6 τιθήνην, 50d3 μητρί, 51a4 μητέρα, 52d2 τιθήνην, 88d6 τροφὸν καὶ τιθήνην.

The allegorical interpretation of Sarah as essentially masculine assumes the Middle Platonist doctrine of two principles (cf. Dörrie-Baltes (1996) 441ff.) and dissociates her from sense-perceptible matter which *is* considered feminine. The description of the source here is very vague. We have to do here not so much with a reference to the text of the *Timaeus* but to a list of attributes of ὕλη distilled from that text. Compare the list in the Middle Platonist handbook of Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 8, 162.29–31 Whittaker: ταύτην (*sc.* ὕλην) τοίνυν ἐκμαγεῖόν τε καὶ πανδεχὲς καὶ τιθήνην καὶ μητέρα καὶ χώραν ὀνομάζει. The first and third of Philo's epithets are indeed commonly listed (cf. also Aëtius 1.9, Ti. Locr. 4, Plu. *Mor.* 1015d, Calc. 277.17). The second ('nanny') is rather exceptional and is derived from a much less well-known passage of the *Timaeus*. I have not been able to find any similar references in Platonist handbooks and commentaries.[17]

9. *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 181

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχή, τὸ κήρινον, ὡς εἶπέ τις τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἐκμαγεῖον, σκληρὰ μὲν οὖσα καὶ ἀντίτυπος ἀπωθεῖ καὶ ἀποσείεται τοὺς ἐπιφερομένους χαρακτῆρας καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἐξ ἀνάγκης διαμένει, πειθήνιος δ' ὑπάρχουσα καὶ μετρίως ὑπείκουσα βαθεῖς τοὺς τύπους δέχεται καὶ ἀναμαξαμένη τὰς σφραγῖδας ἄκρως διαφυλάττει τὰ ἐνσημανθέντα ἀνεξάλειπτα εἴδη.

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[16] Marcus LCL *ad loc.* refers to a Sophoclean fragment and Petit (1973) 2.14 to an earlier source behind Sophocles and Plato, but both suggestions are speculative.

[17] On Philo's relatively infrequent references to Plato's receptacle see further Runia (1986) 283–287.

1 ως γαρ η pap, ἡ γὰρ codd., καὶ γὰρ ἡ Cohn | κήρινον pap et coni. Mangey in adnot., καίριον codd.
2 οὖσαν pap
5 ἄκρως pap, ἀκριβῶς codd. et Turnebus Mangey

Cf. *Tht.* 191c8–d1 θὲς δή μοι ἕνεκα λόγου ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον ... καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ.

Although the Coptos papyrus discovered in 1889, which contains the text of the entire treatise, is not in all cases reliable, it certainly preserves the correct reading in the case of the Platonic citation here, demonstrating how an erudite allusion may disappear in the manuscript tradition because it is not understood. The reference to Plato as the source of the famous image of the soul as wax-tablet is straightforward enough. Indeed Philo perhaps keeps it anonymous in order to avoid the obvious, since every educated reader would be expected to be able to identify the allusion (cf. the handbook reference at Alcinous *Did.* 4, 155.12). A difference between the two texts is that Philo simply identifies the soul with the wax-tablet, whereas Plato posits an ἐκμαγεῖον *in* the soul, i.e., memory as a faculty. Philo's descriptions of the resistant and retentive souls bear faint traces of the Platonic passage (for σκληρά cf. c10 σκληροτέρου, for μετρίως ὑπείκουσα cf. d1 μετρίως ἔχοντος), but his terminology here in fact reminds us more of the language used to describe the way matter receives the ideas in the formation of the cosmos (e.g. ὕλη as ἀσχημάτιστος at *Somn.* 2.45, cf. Alcinous *Did.* 8, 163.3).[18]

10. *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 307

λέγει δὲ ἑξῆς· « ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγίνετο ὁ ἥλιος πρὸς δυσμαῖς, φλὸξ ἐγένετο » (Gen. 15, 17), δηλῶν ὅτι ἀρετὴ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν ὀψίγονον καὶ μήν, ὡς ἔφασάν τινες, πρὸς αὐταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς βεβαιούμενον.

3 αὐταῖς, pap αυτοις

Cf. *Lg.* 770c6 ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου.

Although the phrase ὡς ἔφασάν τινες might be thought to indicate a citation, the allusion that Theiler (see above note 4) sees to the passage in the *Laws* is doubtful. The context there is about lawgiving, not virtue. In her commentary *ad loc.* Harl argues that the expression is proverbial and gives the excellent parallel at Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Phys.* 1.90 καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς, ὀψὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται. Harl's view is strengthened by the fact that Philo himself uses the same expression at

[18] For an extensive list of such terminology in Philo and Middle Platonism see Runia (1986) 160f.; see also De Vogel (1985) 13–17.

Somn. 2.147, to which four lines later (§148) he adds the Homeric phrase ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ.

11. *De fuga et inventione* 63

τοῦτό τις καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ θαυμασθέντων ἀνὴρ δόκιμος ἐφώνησε μεγαλειότερον ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ φάσκων· ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν — ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη — οὔτε ἐν θείοις αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖν· διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένθε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.

3 τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ coni. Wendland e Platone, τῷ θεῷ codd. et Turnebus Mangey
4 αὐτὰ G, ταῦτα H
7 τὸ om. H | ὁμοίωσις—γενέσθαι om. H, rest. Mangey

Cited text is *Tht.* 176a5–b1 with the following differences[19]:

	Plato	Philo
a5	ὦ Θεόδωρε	deleted
a6	τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ	τῷ θεῷ
a7	ἐν θεοῖς	ἐν θείοις
a8	περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	περιπολεῖν

Plato is effusively cited as evidence that evil haunts mortal life, far from the divine choir (§62 πορρωτάτω θείου χοροῦ διῳκισμένον, an allusion to *Phdr.* 247a7, but not signposted). Plato's name is not given, but the name of the dialogue is mentioned, surely an indication that the anonymity is a stylistic device in order to avoid the obvious and invite the participation of the reader (cf. above no. 9). Philo devotes a separate sentence to the introduction of the quotation, but does not use a technical term such as κατὰ λέξιν or ταῖς λέξεσιν to indicate that it is given verbatim.

As our table shows, the citation adheres rather closely to the Platonic text, but there are some very intriguing differences. The first is easily explicable: the vocative is irrelevant for Philo's context (we note, however, that Eusebius, who cites 173c3–177b7 in its entirety, does retain it). In the case of the third Wendland has retained the mss. reading. Colson LCL *ad loc.* alters his text to the Platonic reading and translates accordingly. In a note, however, he adds: 'Philo may have deliberately wished to avoid the thought of "gods"'.

[19] Philo's citation is regrettably not taken up in the Index testimoniorum of the new OCT.

This seems to me very plausible; in my view he should have followed the critical text. The second difference is much more difficult. It is possible that a scribe 'simplified' and 'theologized' Philo's text. But this seems to me not more likely than that Philo himself 'tampered' with it. Philo himself avoids a two principle doctrine, but does suggest in passages such as *Opif.* 8–9 and 22–23 that there is a passive object separate from and opposed to God which is the source of imperfection and evil.[20] If evils were not opposite to God the source of all goodness, then they would no longer be evil and so would disappear. In this case there would no longer be a distinction between God and his creation. Obviously this does not make better sense than the Platonic original, but it is also not total nonsense. Following Whittaker's methodology we should be very hesitant, I believe, to 'retro-correct' Philo from Plato. The fourth difference is also tricky. Here Wendland takes a conservative line and follows the Philonic mss. But the infinitive is not easy to construe (all the translators in fact render Plato's indicative). Perhaps Wendland takes it as an infinitive construction with φάσκων (cf. the way Clement builds the same quotation into his sentence at *Str.* 2.133.3). But this is surely forced, since ἀλλά at the beginning of the citation much more naturally introduces direct speech. The omission of ἐξ ἀνάγκης is perhaps occasioned by the fact that ἀνάγκη already occurs in the previous line.

12. *De fuga et inventione* 82

<u>παγκάλως τις τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῦτο συνδραμὼν ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι</u> θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. περὶ τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία τε καὶ κακία ἐναργής. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δεινότητες δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι.

3 καὶ om. H

4 ἡμῶν om. Turnebus | αὖ Wendland e Platone, εὖ mss., οὐ coni. Turn., legit Mangey in textu οὐ, prop. in adn. αὖ | ὅτι δικαιότατος om. H et Turn. Mangey | περὶ, παρὰ coni. Mangey in adn.

5 οὐδενία τε Wendland e Platone, οὐδὲν ἰᾶται G (lectio H obscura, corrector οὐδένειά τε)

7 ἄγνοια G, ἄνοια H et Mangey

[20] See further Runia (1986) 104, 144, 452ff.

9 φροντισταί H

Cited text is *Tht.* 176b8–c7 with the following differences (the deviations of the inferior ms. H can be ignored)[21]:

	Plato	Philo
c2	αὖ	εὖ
	περὶ τοῦτο (mss.)	περὶ τοῦτον
	περὶ τούτου (Iamb. Eus. Stob.)	
c6	τε δοκοῦσαι	δοκοῦσαι

A few pages later Philo continues his quotation from the *Theaetetus*, again praising its author without naming him. The use of the conjunction ὅτι gives the impression of a running text, but there can be no doubt that Philo means to cite verbatim. The rendering is for the most part faithful to the transmitted Platonic text. The differences are this time less interesting.

In the first case the reading of the mss. does seem rather forced. Philo only uses the phrase εὖ γένηται in the form εὖ σοι γένηται when he quotes Ex. 20:12 at *Det.* 52 and *Spec.* 2.261. So the retro-correction from the Platonic text may be conceded (confusion between these two little words is frequent in ancient texts, e.g. at Plato *Lg.* 891d2, where Burnet adopts Eusebius' εὖ against the αὖ of the mss.). The second difference is more intriguing because, as Colson recognized in his translation, the masculine τοῦτον can only refer back to θεός (this does not apply to both variants in the Platonic text, which more naturally refer to the process of becoming as just as possible). Colson is dubious about the correctness of the transmitted text, while the German translator follows Plato explicitly (the French commentator Starobinski-Safran equivocates).[22] It is very probable, however, that Philo has again theologized his Plato text, so Wendland's reticence is praiseworthy. (Note, too, that Philo would probably take the τούτου in l. 4 as also referring to God, cf. *Spec.* 1.345). The third difference is trivial. Finally perhaps a word should be said about the strange reading in ms. G, οὐδὲν ἴᾶται instead of οὐδενία τε.[23] This does not make very good sense and is surely best taken as a scribal error induced by a wrong word division. I see no

[21] This citation too is left out in the OCT.

[22] The identity of the translator is not given in vol. 6 of the German Philo translation edited by L. Cohn *et al.* As Schwartz (1983) 70ff. demonstrates, it was probably M. Pohlenz, but his name was suppressed for fear of Nazi reprisals in the benighted situation of Germany in 1938.

[23] And also perhaps in ms. H (note that the ms. tradition for this treatise is rather weak).

strong reason why Philo would have wished to alter the text, even if he elsewhere always uses the term οὐδένεια in a positive sense (i.e., man's nothingness over against God), and not in the sense of failure, as here. The corrector of ms. H, though probably retro-correcting from Plato, has used the usual Philonic form of the word, οὐδένεια.

13. *De vita Moysis* 2.2

φασὶ γάρ τινες οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ, μόνως ἂν οὕτω τὰς πόλεις ἐπιδοῦναι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν <ἢ> οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλοσοφήσωσιν ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν.

1 μόνως: μόνος Catena Barberini, μόνον FH¹P Turnebus, μόλις G
2 <ἢ> addidit Cohn e Platone | ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι FGHP Cat. Barb. et editores, φιλόσοφοί τε ceteri

Cf. Plato, *R.* 473c11–d6: ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα ... ταῖς πόλεσι.

As part of Philo's apologetic presentation of the Jewish lawgiver, he states that Plato's utopian wish in the *Republic* has already been more than fulfilled, for not only was he king and philosopher, but lawgiver, high-priest and prophet as well. The allusion goes no further than the key double phrase on kings and philosophers. Philo's application is influenced by the context. Because he has just discussed Moses' glorious role as king, i.e., leader of the Israelites, he is much more positive than Plato, who presents his thesis rather tentatively, expecting it to be overwhelmed by a wave of scorn (c7–8). We note the following: (i) Philo states the thesis positively (states will progress if ...), Plato negatively (no end to evils unless ...); (ii) Philo reverses the two parts, mentioning kings before philosophers (since Moses is already king); (iii) Plato's qualifying phrase on kings and dynasts, which can easily be taken as deprecatory, is omitted. The most difficult aspect of the text is what to do about the conjunctions <ἢ> ... ἤ. Cohn's editorial decisions can be questioned. The first <ἢ> has been imported from the Platonic text. It is not necessary in the Philonic context and can be dispensed with. The second ἢ is more difficult. The better class of mss.[24] and the citation in the *Catena* preserve the Platonic reading. The reading of at least seven other mss., however, is more consistent with the context, since Moses *is* both king and philosopher. It is possible that retro-correction has taken place from Plato to Philo, carried out by a

[24] According to Cohn-Wendland (1896-1915) 4.xx.

learned scribe.[25] On the other hand, Philo does record the form of the verbs correctly, so he may have wished to retain the Platonic phrasing. Cohn's reading is defensible but not certain.

14. *De specialibus legibus* 2.249

πάλιν δ' ὁ τὴν ἱερὰν ἑβδόμην βέβηλον ἀποφήνας τὸ γ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἧκον μέρος ὑπόδικος ἔστω θανάτου. τοὐναντίον γὰρ τοῖς βεβήλοις καὶ πράγμασι καὶ σώμασι καθαρσίων εὐπορητέον εἰς τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβολήν, ἐπειδὴ φθόνος, ὡς ἔφη τις, ἔξω θείου χοροῦ βαίνει. τὸ δὲ τολμᾶν τὰ καθωσιωμένα παρακόπτειν καὶ παραχαράττειν ὑπερβάλλουσαν ἀσέβειαν ἐμφαίνει.

Cf. Plato, *Phdr*. 247a7: φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται.

The Platonic phrase from the *Phaedrus* myth is a favourite of Philo's. It is also cited at *Prob*. 13 (see further the references given below, no. 16). Philo has replaced Plato's ἵσταται with βαίνει. In the context of this treatise the θεῖος χόρος refers to the Jews as members of the ἐκκλησία κυρίου (cf. the exegesis of Deut. 23:2 ff. at 1.319–45). The change of verb perhaps makes the quotation more dynamic, befitting the context of expulsion.

15. *Quod omnis probus sit* 8

πῶς δὲ οὐ παράλογα καὶ γέμοντα πολλῆς ἀναισχυντίας ἢ μανίας ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω ... πλουσίους μὲν ὀνομάζειν τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεεῖς, λυπρῶς καὶ ἀθλίως ἀποζῶντας, μόλις τὸ ἐφήμερον ἐκπορίζοντας, ἐν εὐθηνίᾳ κοινῇ λιμὸν ἐξαίρετον ἔχοντας, ἀρετῆς αὔρᾳ, καθάπερ ἀέρι φασὶ τοὺς τέττιγας, τρεφομένους, πένητας δὲ τοὺς ἀργύρῳ καὶ χρυσῷ καὶ πλήθει κτημάτων καὶ προσόδων καὶ ἄλλων ἀμυθήτων ἀγαθῶν ἀφθονίᾳ περιρρεομένους κτλ.

5 ἀέρος A, ἀέρι om. QT, secundum Cohn coni. Mangey δρόσῳ, sed non inveni

Cf. Plato, *Phdr*. 259c2–5.

On this literary allusion see further under no. 17 (*Contempl*. 35).

16. *Quod omnis probus sit* 13

ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἱερώτατον Πλάτωνα φθόνος ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται, θειότατον δὲ καὶ κοινωνικώτατον σοφία, συγκλείει μὲν οὐδέποτε τὸ ἑαυτῆς φροντιστήριον, ἀναπεπταμένη δὲ ἀεὶ δέχεται τοὺς

[25] In Byzantium a strong link was seen between Plato and Philo, epitomized in the well-known proverb, ἢ Πλάτων φιλωνίζει ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει; cf. Runia (1993) 4, 208, 313.

ποτίμων διψῶντας λόγων, οἷς ἀκράτου διδασκαλίας ἄφθονον ἐπαντλοῦσα νᾶμα μεθύειν τὴν νηφάλιον ἀναπείθει μέθην.

1 δὲ, γὰρ coni. Cohn | ἱερώτατον M Mangey in adn. Cohn, λιγυρώτατον ceteri Turnebus vulg.
2 δὲ M, τε ceteri et Turnebus, om. Mangey | κοινότατον coni. Turn.
3 ἀναπεπταμένη H^2, ἀναπεπταμένως MQT, ἀναπεπταμένω GAH^1P, ἀναπεπταμένοις F | ἀεὶ M, om. ceteri et Turn. | δέχεται mss., εἰσδέχεται coni. Mangey
4 ποτίμοις διψῶντας λόγοις F

Cf. Plato, *Phdr.* 247a7: φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται.

Philo here uses the same quotation as at *Spec.* 2.249. The divine choir is now the company of philosophers and wise men, who are prepared to share what they know. The Platonic tag is here quoted with total accuracy, except that the conjunction is deleted. The citation causes Philo to make somewhat of a jump in the train of his thought. First we read that ἐπιστήμη is man's ἴδιον κτῆμα (§12). But σοφία is a most divine thing. Those who share in it form a divine choir, i.e., its possession causes one to *transcend* the human realm. For allusions to this phrase elsewhere in Philo see further references collected by Colson LCL 5.584, Petit (1974) 146. The epithet given to Plato in the edited text is most striking indeed. As Petit (1974) 145 notes, it is elsewhere reserved for Moses (about 20 examples), with the single exception in this same treatise at §2, where he speaks of the τῶν Πυθαγορείων θίασος. No doubt the special character of the treatise as one of the so-called philosophical treatises is determinative. But it is to be agreed with Colson LCL 9.16 that the majority reading of the mss. λιγυρώτατον, as *lectio difficilior*, should be given very serious consideration.[26]

17. *De vita contemplativa* 35

ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ διὰ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὑπομιμνήσκονται τροφῆς, οἷς πλείων ὁ πόθος ἐπιστήμης ἐνίδρυται· τινὲς δὲ οὕτως ἐνευφραίνονται καὶ τρυφῶσιν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἑστιώμενοι πλουσίως καὶ ἀφθόνως τὰ δόγματα χορηγούσης, ὡς καὶ πρὸς διπλασίονα χρόνον ἀντέχειν καὶ μόλις δι' ἓξ ἡμερῶν ἀπογεύεσθαι τροφῆς ἀναγκαίας, ἐθισθέντες ὥσπερ φασὶ τὸ τῶν τεττίγων γένος ἀέρι τρέφεσθαι, τῆς ᾠδῆς, ὥς γε οἶμαι, τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐξευμαριζούσης.

[26] Compare the critique of Plato's style given by Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Dem.* 5–8, cited at Dörrie-Baltes (1990) 135, who argues that when he uses his ἰσχνὴ φράσις, it is ἡδεῖα and διαυγής. The examples he uses are taken from the *Phaedrus*.

Cf. Plato, *Phdr.* 259c2–5: ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκεῖνο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς ᾄδειν, ἕως ἂν τελευτήσῃ κτλ.

Philo twice makes an allusion to this well-known Platonic passage, both times indicating the reference with an impersonal φασί. At *Prob.* 8 (see above no. 15) the allusion is brief and not very to the point: it is meant to illustrate the paradox of the virtuous who are rich, though in fact they have so little that they feed off the air. Plato nowhere mentions air, and the point is that the cicadas need neither food nor drink. The allusion in *Contempl.* is more relevant. The Therapeutae lead such ascetic lives that during the six days of the week they resemble Plato's cicadas. Here too they feed off air, but Philo adds that their singing compensates for the lack (of food and drink). The words τὸ τῶν τεττίγων γένος are taken literally from Plato (τῶν is additional). ᾠδή is found at *Phdr.* 259b8, but with reference to the appearance of the Muses, not the singing of the cicadas.

The remaining six Platonic citations, all referring to Plato's cosmological dialogue, the *Timaeus*, are found in *De aeternitate mundi*, the Philonic treatise with the most direct references to Plato.[27] He is mentioned by name no less than seven times. Even today doubts continue about the treatise's authenticity.[28] To my mind, however, countless indications point to Philonic authorship.[29] Our treatment of these fascinating texts will have to be severely restrictive.

18. *De aeternitate mundi* 13

γενητὸν δὲ καὶ ἄφθαρτόν φασιν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Τιμαίῳ δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τῆς θεοπρεποῦς ἐκκλησίας, ἐν ᾗ λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς νεωτέρους θεοὺς

[27] The treatise was edited in separate critical editions by Bernays (1876) and Cumont (1891).

[28] Nineteenth-century doubts were dispelled by the excellent prolegomena of Cumont (1891), who especially argued against the views of Bernays (1883). New doubts have been raised through the use of computer analysis; see Skarsten (1991), reporting on the results of his Norwegian dissertation (1987). Because Philo makes so much use of source material in this treatise, however, detailed linguistic comparisons may well come up with misleading results.

[29] See my detailed analysis in Runia (1981). The exordium, which adapts two passages from the *Timaeus*, is especially redolent with Philonic language. Nearly every phrase can be paralleled with other passsages in his works; see further Runia (1986) 88–90, 123–126.

ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου καὶ ἡγεμόνος· θεοὶ θεῶν, <ὧν> ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ. δι' ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστε οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι γε μὴν λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων, οἷς ὅτε ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε.

1 γενητὸν ME, γεννητὸν UHP | δέ, τε M | ἐν Τιμαίῳ in margine M, non in textu
3 θεοὶ θεῶν Turnebus e Platone, θεὸς θεῶν mss. | <ὧν> add. Turn. e Platone
4 <ἃ> ἄλυτα coni. Colson | ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος Cohn, ἐμοῦ μὴ θέλοντος MHP et Turn. Bernays Cumont, ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος U et Mangey
5 δὴ δεθέν Turn. e Platone, μὴ δεθέν mss. | τό γε, τότε U
6 δι' ἃ U (et Plato), διὸ MHP
7 οὔτι γε μήν, οὔτι μὲν δή Plato
10 ἐκείνων MU, ἐκείνω H, ἐκείνου P | συνεδεῖσθε Turn. e Platone, συνέδησθε HP, συνδέδεσθε M et Bernays

Cited text is *Ti.* 41a7–b6, with the following main differences[30]:

	Plato	Philo
a7	θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν	θεὸς θεῶν (mss.)
	δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα	desunt
a8	δὴ δεθέν	μὴ δεθέν (mss.)
b3	οὔτι μὲν δή	οὔτι γε μήν

Philo reports that the well-known text from the *Timaeus* is used as a proof-text in order to indicate Plato's *doxa* on the createdness and indestructibility of the cosmos (the mixed view already announced in §7) and then himself proceeds to cite it. The verb λέγεται introduces a direct quotation. There can be no doubt that Philo wishes to reproduce Plato's text. Nevertheless once again the differences are intriguing.

The opening words of the Platonic text are notoriously difficult to construe. Philo's version in the mss. is ungrammatical as it stands, and so needs to be emended. It is easiest to take the opening words θεὸς θεῶν in the mss. as a scribal error and adopt the Platonic text. θεοί are then the gods addressed. A parallel case is found in the mss. of Stobaeus at *Ecl.* 1.181.7, where both ὧν and ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα are read. Wachsmuth has no hesitation in changing the singular θεός to the plural θεοί. In my dissertation, however, I noted that the

[30] I ignore differences of spelling, crasis etc.

expression θεὸς θεῶν is not only Pentateuchal (Deut. 5:6, 10:17), but also Philonic (*Spec.* 1.20) and even Platonic (cf. *Crit.* 121b7).[31] So I speculated whether Philo may not have read θεὸς θεῶν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, <ἃ> ἄλυτα κτλ. This would certainly be a case of tampering with the *Timaeus*, to use Dillon's phrase, evidently for the purpose of bringing Plato closer to monotheism. Two arguments against this suggestion are: (i) the words πρὸς τοὺς νεωτέρους θεούς go well with an initial vocative; (ii) the singular is found in none of the many patristic citations of this text.[32] Turnebus' retro-correction from Plato in the *editio princeps* is the easiest option, but not necessarily in my view the right one. Also worth considering is Colson's interpretation θεοί, θεῶν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, <ἃ> ἄλυτα κτλ. The difficulty here is that the words δημιουργὸς and πατήρ seem the wrong way around.[33]

The omission of the words δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα found in the Platonic mss. is shared by the entire indirect tradition prior to Philoponus. For a discussion of this puzzling fact, which might indicate that they are a later gloss, the reader is referred to Dillon's analysis.[34]

Cohn is precipitate in reading the minority Platonic reading ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος back into Philo, going against the practice of all previous editors. In both the Platonic mss. and the indirect tradition there is much uncertainty between ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος and ἐμοῦ μὴ θέλοντος. Burnet cites Philo for ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος, which is odd because this reading was nowhere found in either the mss. or the editions of Philo up to that time. Cohn then cites it from the Platonic ms. A to justify his reading.[35] It is best to follow Bernays and Cumont, who print the majority reading of the mss.

The reading τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ δεθὲν in the mss. must be wrong because of the parallelism with τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν, which Philo cannot have missed. Turnebus' retro-correction is fully justified.

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[31] Runia (1986) 234.

[32] See Athenagoras *Leg.* 6.2, Clem. Alex. *Str.* 5.102.5, Origen *c.Cels.* 6.10, Ps. Justin *Coh. ad Gr.* 20.2, 22.3, Eus. *PE* 11.32.4 etc.

[33] They are found reversed in Clement, *Str.* 5.102.5. On the issue of biological and technological metaphor here see the essay of Plutarch at *Mor.* 1000e, Riedweg (1994) 93ff.

[34] Dillon (1989) 70–71.

[35] At Runia (1986) 234 I stated that the Platonic edition cited the corrected Philonic text for support. The difficulty here is that Burnet's edition of the *Timaeus* is dated to 1905, Cohn's edition of *Aet.* to 1915. The easiest solution is to suspect Burnet of carelessness in not distinguishing in his all too brief apparatus between ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος and ἐμοῦ μὴ θέλοντος.

The reading οὔτι γε μὴν instead of Plato's οὔτι μὲν δή is doubly awkward, because of the repetition of the particle combination from two lines earlier and the double γε. Perhaps it is a case of scribal dittography.

19. *De aeternitate mundi* 25–6

μαρτύρια δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν Τιμαίῳ περὶ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἄνοσον εἶναι καὶ μὴ φθαρησόμενον τάδε· τῶν δὲ δὴ τεττάρων ἓν ὅλον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σύστασις· ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς συνέστησεν αὐτὸν ὁ συνιστάς, μέρος οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔξωθεν ὑπολιπών, τάδε διανοηθείς· πρῶτον μέν, ἵνα ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῷον, τέλειον ἐκ τελείων μερῶν, εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕν, ἅτε οὐχ ὑπολελειμμένων ἐξ ὧν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον γένοιτ' ἄν· ἔτι δέ, ἵνα ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον ᾖ, κατανοῶν ὡς συστάτῳ σώματι θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα δυνάμεις ἰσχυρὰς ἔχει περιιστάμενα ἔξωθεν καὶ προσπίπτοντα ἀκαίρως λυπεῖ καὶ νόσους καὶ γῆρας ἐπάγοντα φθίνειν ποιεῖ. διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε θεὸς ὅλον ἐξ ὅλων ἁπάντων τέλειον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον αὐτὸν ἐτεκτήνατο. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παρὰ Πλάτωνος πρὸς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν τοῦ κόσμου μαρτύριον εἰλήφθω, τὸ δ' ἀγένητον παρὰ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας.

2 τάδε, εἶναι M et Turnebus | ἕκαστον om. M | ὅλον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν transp. UE
8 ὑπολελειμμένων M, ὑπολελειμμένον UE | τοιοῦτον UE et Plato, τοιοῦτο MHP Turn. Mangey
9 ἀγήρων HP, ἀγήρω MUE | ὡς συστάτῳ Cumont et Cohn e Platone (Bernays ὡς συστατῷ), ὡς τὰ τῶ mss. Turn. Mangey
10 ἰσχυρὰς ἔχει transp. UE
11 λυπεῖ mss. et editores recc., λύει e Platone Turn. Mangey
12 διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν E
13 ἁπάντων om. E | ἀγήρων P, ἀγείρων H, ἀγήρω MUE

Cited text is *Ti.* 32c5-33b1, with the following main differences:

Plato	Philo
33a3 ὡς συστάτῳ	ὡς τὰ τῶ (mss.)
33a5 λύει	λυπεῖ
γῆράς τε	καὶ γῆρας
33a6 διὰ δὴ τὴν αἰτίαν	διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν
33a7 ἕνα (or ἓν) ὅλον	θεὸς ὅλον
ὅλων ἐξ ἁπάντων	ἐξ ὅλων ἁπάντων

Philo's first of four proofs of the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the cosmos (§20–27) is generally regarded as indebted—in one

way or another—to Aristotle's lost *De philosophia* (= fr. 19a Ross).[36] At its close he adds as a proof-text—note the double use of the term μαρτύριον—the above citation from the *Timaeus*, the longest in our collection. The words τάδε before the citation and τοῦτο after it clearly indicate a verbatim quotation. Consisting as it does of 112 words, it seems too long to quote from memory (unless Philo had truly phenomenal powers of recall). The differences between the texts are really rather limited.[37]

The reading of the Philonic mss. κατανοῶν ὡς τὰ τῷ σώματι θερμὰ makes so little sense that the retro-correction made by Bernays and followed by other editors since then is quite plausible. It should be noted, however, that the readings of the Platonic mss. at this point are rather obscure (ξυνίστας τῶι *vel sim.*) and that Burnet's reading is only found in Proclus.[38] In fact Philo's defective reading might be taken as support for this solution (but Burnet does not refer to it).

The second discrepancy is a most interesting case. I know of no other citation of the text that uses the verb λυπεῖ, but, as Bernays pointed out, it fits in very well with Plato's meaning, and might even be preferred. Remarkably in the *princeps* of Platonic mss., *Parisinus gr.* 1807 (= A), we read λύπας.[39] This suggests that Philo's reading may represent an ancient variant. The editors have all rightly resisted the temptation to retro-correction.

The next two variants are of little importance. It is difficult to see a deliberate reason for the changes. They may represent carelessness in the writing out of the text.

The insertion of a reference to God (i.e., the demiurge in the Platonic context) is not found elsewhere. The most plausible explanation is that after the phrase διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε a subject is expected (someone has to do the thinking) and that the theologically minded Philo inserted θεός as subject, either because he thought it was needed, or even without thinking. He perhaps recalled the λογισμὸς θεοῦ at *Ti.* 34a8.

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[36] On these arguments see Runia (1986) 191–198, with further references to the literature. On 196 I argue, following Pepin (1964) 265, Effe (1970) 10, 18, and Mansfeld (1979) 141, that Philo rather than Aristotle probably added the verbatim quotation from the *Timaeus*.

[37] For earlier discussions see Bernays (1883) 66, Colson LCL 9.527f., Runia (1986) 184f.

[38] As pointed out by Colson, but he fails to record that the accepted text *is* found in the indirect tradition.

[39] On the complicated reading of the ms. see Jonkers (1989) 137. The same reading is also found in P, which Burnet regarded as independent of A—wrongly, according to Jonkers 35.

As Burnet's apparatus informs us, Philo's 'deviant' order at 33a7 is found elsewhere in the indirect tradition, in Proclus, Philoponus and Calcidius.

20. *De aeternitate mundi* 38

<u>διὸ καὶ Πλάτων εὖ</u> ἀπῄει τε γὰρ <u>φησίν</u> οὐδὲν οὐδὲ προσῄει αὐτῷ ποθεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦν. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον καὶ πάντ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν· ἡγήσατο γὰρ αὐτὸ ὁ συνθεὶς αὔταρκες ὂν ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προσδεὲς <ἄλλων>.

1 εὖ ἀπῄει τε γὰρ om. E | ἀπῄει τε M, ἀπίητε H, ἄπιτε U | οὐδὲν οὐδὲ M, οὐδὲν οὔτε cett. | προσῄει M, προσείη UPE, προσίη H
2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦν om. UE | αὐτὸς ... παρέχων ... πάσχων mss. et Turnebus Mangey, corr. e Platone Bernays | γὰρ om. L et Turn. rest. Mangey
3 φθίσιν, φύσιν E
4 ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν ἀρίστης leg. E | αὐτὸ HPE, ex αὐτοῦ corr. M, αὐτὸς U
5 ὄν, ἦν HP | ἄλλων add. e Platone Cohn

Cited text is *Ti.* 33c6–d3. The differences are rather limited[40]:

Plato	Philo
c7 προσῄειν	προσῄει
c7-d1 αὐτὸ παρέχον πάσχον	αὐτὸς παρέχων πάσχων (mss.)
d3 ἄλλων	omittunt mss.

Philo closes his third proof with a further appeal to Plato.[41] This time there is no separate introduction of the quotation with a phrase ending in a semicolon, but Philo places the verb φησίν inside the citation. Again, however, the citation appears to aim at being verbatim.

The first difference can be neglected, since Philo's reading is also found in the Platonic ms. F and Stobaeus. In the case of the second Bernays argues that the pronoun and participles should be changed to the neuter on account of the neuters in the final sentence (αὔταρκες ὂν ἄμεινον, προσδεὲς). This is plausible but perhaps not wholly compelling, since their subject is the cosmos, to which Philo had referred in the masculine (ὁ κόσμος, αὐτόν) in the previous sentence. The transition to the neuter in the final sentence is abrupt but not entirely impossible. In the case of the final difference it is to be agreed with Bernays and Cumont that, in light of the unanimous evidence of the mss., the word should not be supplied from Plato. The

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[40] Discussed by Bernays (1883) 67, Colson LCL 9.528.

[41] I argue, (1986) 192, against the mainstream of scholarly opinion, that this proof should not be separated from the other three and attributed to a different (non-Aristotelian) source.

retro-correction of Mangey and Cohn (also adopted by Colson) is thus unjustified.

21. *De aeternitate mundi* 52

μεγίστην μέντοι παρέχεται πίστιν εἰς ἀιδιότητα καὶ ὁ χρόνος. εἰ γὰρ ἀγένητος ὁ χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἀγένητος. διὰ τί; ὅτι, ᾗ φησιν ὁ μέγας Πλάτων, ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες μῆνές τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι χρόνον ἔδειξαν. ἀμήχανον δέ τι τούτων συστῆναι δίχα ἡλίου κινήσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ περιφορᾶς·

2 ἀγένητος (bis) M, ἀγέννητος cett.

Cf. Plato, *Ti.* 37e1 ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, 39c1–5.

This time we have no more than a loose paraphrase of Plato's account of the origin of time, which is measured by the motions of the heavenly bodies. Philo deliberately preserves the same order of the measurements of time as given in 37e1 (in 39c1–5 the order is nearly the same, except the night precedes day). The expression χρόνον or χρόνου φύσιν (ἀνα)δεικνύναι is not Platonic, but is found elsewhere in Philo, e.g. at *Aet.* 19, *Leg.* 1.2. Indeed at *Spec.* 1.90 the text is very similar to what we find here (ἡμέρας δὲ καὶ νύκτας μῆνάς τε καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ συνόλως χρόνον τίς ἀνέδειξεν ὅτι μὴ σελήνης καὶ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων αἱ ἐναρμόνιοι ... περιφοραί;) but the Platonic allusion is not specifically indicated. The epithet used of Plato here, μέγας, is elsewhere used by Philo of the prophet Moses (*Opif.* 12, *Plant.* 118, *Mos.* 2.211, *Spec.* 2.51).

22. *De aeternitate mundi* 141

ἡ δὲ Ἀτλαντὶς νῆσος, ἅμα Λιβύης καὶ Ἀσίας μείζων, ᾗ φησιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων, ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ καὶ νυκτὶ σεισμῶν ἐξαισίων καὶ κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων δῦσα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐξαίφνης ἠφανίσθη, γενομένη πέλαγος, οὐ πλωτόν, ἀλλὰ βαραθρῶδες.

1 Ἀτλαντὶς, ἄντλα τις H
4 πλωτόν, πλωτῶν P, πλωτῷ H

Cf. Plato *Ti.* 24e6–7 ἡ δὲ νῆσος ἅμα Λιβύης ἦν καὶ Ἀσίας μείζων, 25c6–d6 ὑστέρῳ δὲ χρόνῳ σεισμῶν ἐξαισίων καὶ κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων, μιᾶς ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς χαλεπῆς ἐπελθούσης ... ἥ τε Ἀτλαντὶς νῆσος ὡσαύτως κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης δῦσα ἠφανίσθη· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἄπορον καὶ ἀδιερεύνητον γέγονεν τοὐκεῖ πέλαγος, πηλοῦ κάρτα βραχέος ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, ὃν ἡ νῆσος ἱζομένη παρέσχετο.

In the final section of the incompletely preserved work (§117–49), Philo present four arguments against the indestructibility of the cosmos refuted by Theophrastus.[42] In the second argument *contra* Philo appeals to the story of Atlantis.[43] The formula ᾗ φησιν is the same as in the previous text at §52. Here too it introduces a paraphrase, but this time one that adheres rather closely to Plato's text and incorporates a number of Platonic phrases with varying degrees of accuracy. It cannot, however, be regarded as a literal citation, as the quotation marks of the editors suggest. The main text paraphrased is 25c6–d6. The paraphrase is built up as follows:

(i) The phrase ἥ (τε) Ἀτλαντὶς νῆσος is brought forward as subject, and further qualified with the descriptive phrase at 24e6.

(ii) Plato's temporal phrase ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ is replaced by the indication that the disaster happened in the course of a single day and night (dative case instead of genitive, as in ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ; note ἡμέρα and μία reversed). The reason is obvious enough: Philo uses the story as an example, so he is not interested in a sequence of events.

(iii) The following phrase up to γενομένων follows Plato exactly.

(iv) δῦσα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης involves another reversal of word order compared with Plato, no doubt in the interest of dramatizing the event. This comes out even more clearly in Philo's addition of ἐξαίφνης, a famous Platonic term, to be sure (e.g. *R.* 515c6, *Smp.* 210e4, *Ep.* 7. 341c), but not found in the *Timaeus* at all.

(v) Philo's final six words compress the much lengthier final part of the period at d3–6 in Plato. οὐ πλωτόν is a nautically appropriate variant for ἄπορον. βαραθρῶδες ('like a pit' or 'full of clefts'), however, is a rather puzzling replacement for Plato's shoals of mud. It is relevant to note that the words κάρτα βραχέος at 25d5 are highly disputed in the mss. I think it likely that Philo read κάρτα βαθέος with ms. A, which, as Cornford (1937) 336 remarked, makes dubious sense, but at least explains Philo's paraphrase (there is also a slight resemblance in sound).

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[42] = fr. F184 FHS&G. An enormous body of secondary literature has accumulated on this section; the most recent study is Kidd (1996).

[43] It is a moot point whether it is Theophrastus or Philo who appeals to Plato; in Runia (1986) 84–85 I argue that it is a Philonic addition. See also the parallel columns of original and paraphrase presented at 84.

23. *De aeternitate mundi* 146

ἡ δ' ἱστορία τίς; φθοραὶ τῶν κατὰ γῆν, οὐκ ἀθρόων ἁπάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν πλείστων, δυσὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις αἰτίαις ἀνατίθενται, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἀλέκτοις φοραῖς· κατασκήπτειν δ' ἑκατέραν ἐν μέρει φασὶν ἐν πάνυ μακραῖς ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδοις. Cf. also §149: κατὰ δὴ τοὺς λεχθέντας τρόπους δίχα μυρίων ἄλλων βραχυτέρων φθειρομένου τοῦ πλείστου μέρους ἀνθρώπων.

3 ἀλέκτοις, ἀλήκτοις P et coni. Turnebus in appendice
4 μακραῖς UE, μικραῖς MH

Cf. *Ti.* 22c1–3 πολλαὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγόνασιν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔσονται, πυρὶ μὲν καὶ ὕδατι μέγισται, μυρίοις δὲ ἄλλοις ἕτεραι βραχύτεραι; also 22d2 διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων.

For the refutation of the final argument Philo turns to the theme of periodically recurring natural disasters. φασίν is of course the vaguest of references, but there can be no doubt that he has the celebrated passage *Ti.* 22b–23c in mind.[44] This is made clear at the outset. Philo's opening sentence clearly alludes to the beginning of Plato's explanation of the comparative youth of Greek culture. His paraphrase alters and expands Plato's words in order to increase their generality. Plato speaks of mankind, Philo alters to the destruction of much of the earth. Fire and water are described as causes and an indication is given of how the damage takes place. From other passages in Philo, notably at *Abr.* 42–5 and *Mos.* 2.54–6, we know that he identifies Plato's descriptions with the biblical accounts of Noah's flood and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. It is likely that this perceived parallelism has influenced the wording of the paraphrase. The element of periodicity is added from Plato's later statement at 22d2. In the remainder of the passage §147–9 Philo continues to makes verbal allusions to the Platonic account. These allusions will not be dealt with here,[45] except to observe that in §149 Philo returns to Plato's sentence at 22c1–3 and in a kind of ring-composition mentions both the minor disasters and the specific destruction of mankind, both of which were overlooked in the opening sentence in §146.

III Some conclusions

It has been an interesting, if limited, exercise. It would be worthwhile to advance a further step and compare Philo's citations with

[44] On Philo's further allusions to this passage see Runia (1986) 74–77.

[45] See the brief analysis at Runia (1986) 82.

the practice of other authors in the Platonist and other traditions, but space forbids. The chief findings of our study can be briefly summarized as follows.

1. We encountered a great deal of *variation* in the extent and method of citation. One might divide the citations into the following categories[46]:

brief allusion: nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 17;
erudite brief quotation: nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16;
extended paraphrase: nos. 22, 23;
verbatim quotations: nos. 11, 12, 18, 19, 20.

In the case of a brief allusion only a word or two is taken over from the Platonic text. The erudite brief quotations are longer, involving a phrase or a short sentence which is quoted with greater or lesser accuracy. Extended paraphrases are rare. The final category is distinguished by the length of the citation, which would appear to be too long to be cited from memory. In these five cases Philo demarcates the quotation in his sentence structure, although this does not always involve the use of a colon (e.g. in no. 12), and in no. 18 he even interpolates a verb of saying in the quotation itself. The range from a fleeting word (e.g. no. 15) to a lengthy passage of more than a hundred words (no. 19) indicates how varied and flexible the ancient method of citation was. In only seven of the texts is Plato referred to by name (nos. 2, 3, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22). In the case of the shorter citations Philo generally makes use of an anonymous phrase to draw the reader's attention to the fact that he is alluding to or quoting a Platonic text. Only in the cases of an extended paraphrase (no. 22) and of verbatim citations (nos. 11, 18, 19) is a reference given to the title of a Platonic work. Twice this occurs (nos. 11, 19) without the name of the author, a practice which we may ascribe to Philo's desire to avoid the obvious. Finally we note that on three occasions Philo uses complimentary epithets to indicate his respect for the ancient philosopher (nos. 11, 16, 21). In the last two cases the epithets (ἱερώτατος, μέγας) involved are generally reserved for Moses.[47]

2. In general terms it can be said that Philo's citations *adhere reasonably closely* to the original Platonic text such as we can reconstruct it. There is a marked difference between the first three categories above, in which Philo feels free to make all manner of changes,

[46] No. 10 not included because it is dubious whether Plato is referred to.

[47] Provided we do not read λιγυρώτατον in no. 16.

and the final one, in which he is necessarily more restricted. Whittaker's methodology proved especially valuable for the first two categories, where it was observed that Philo alters the Platonic text in numerous ways, for which it is usually possible to give a rationale, but not always. We note the following: inversion of word order (nos. 1, 13, and also 22), substitution of verbs (nos. 2, 14), modernization of terminology (no. 4), replacement and *variatio* (nos. 2, 5, 7, 14), improvement (nos. 6, 7), deletions (nos. 3, 7, 13), adaptation in the context (no. 14). In the case of the extended paraphrases Philo is sometimes so free that one can only identify the Platonic words and phrases within his own sentence structure. The final category of the verbatim quotations has to be separated from the other three.[48] Philo himself in all but one case makes a clear distinction between where his own introductory words break off and those of Plato begin (and also where his own words resume).[49] These quotations adhere rather closely, even impressively, to the Platonic text, and have been used by Plato's editors as evidence for particular variant readings in the tradition. Here too, however, Whittaker's distrust of the accuracy of the indirect tradition is valuable, because it alerts us to the small changes that do occur in the quotations, which we have to explain, and which can only increase our wariness when we think of using these quotations for text-critical purposes.

3. Can it be concluded that Philo *tampers* with his Platonic material, to use Whittaker's and Dillon's suggestive term?[50] Though most changes are relatively innocent, there is one category that is clearly exceptional. In five cases (nos. 7, 11, 12, 18, 19—all but the first of these are quotations) modifications of the text can be traced back to theological considerations. These texts are in some cases (esp. the θεὸς θεῶν in no. 18) not easy to interpret. Given the overwhelming presence of the God of Israel in Philo's works, however, we must surely suspect a personal contribution of the author himself. Various explanations can be given. One might appeal to an unconscious process, e.g. in the change to περὶ τοῦτον in no. 12 and the sudden appearance in no. 19 of θεός as subject of the sentence. In other cases we might suspect a more deliberate intervention. If it occurs in a quotation, then one might rightly speak of 'tampering',

[48] Whittaker makes the distinction at (1989) 64, but it does not play a significant role in his argument. Philo's evidence is illuminating in this regard.

[49] I.e. except no. 20 (φησί interrupts text); the use of ὅτι in no. 12 is standard.

[50] See above at n. 13.

since the words of Plato are expressly cited. There is, however, an extra consideration. In a most interesting article Yehoshua Amir has recently drawn attention to the deliberate monotheistic alteration of pagan texts in the Hellenistic-Jewish tradition.[51] As Philo's predecessor Aristobulus fr. 4 claims (quoted at Eusebius *PE* 13.12.7), if we cite the opening line of Aratus' poem as ἐκ θεοῦ ἀρχώμεσθα (instead of ἐκ Διός), we are not citing what the poet wrote, but what he *should have written*, since it is our duty to speak about God as one ought (καθῶς δεῖ). It is possible that Philo has been influenced by this practice when quoting Plato as well.[52]

4. In six or seven of our texts (nos. 6, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, perhaps also 13), the phenomenon of *retro-correction* occurred, i.e., the Philonic text was altered in order to conform with the received Platonic text. In one or two cases (e.g. δὴ δεθέν in no. 13) such emendation is mandatory. On the whole the more recent editors of Philo, Cohn-Wendland and Colson, have shown admirable restraint or perhaps have even been too conservative (e.g. in the case of περιπολεῖν in no. 11). Nevertheless there still remain a number of passages where retro-correction is dubious and it is better to retain the transmitted Philonic text (e.g. in no. 11, 18). These are not open and shut cases, but involve the application of fine-tuned philological judgment. Here too we can draw our inspiration from the example given us by the great philologist, to whom this little offering is dedicated as a token of gratitude and deep respect.

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[51] Amir (1993); cf. also valuable comments at Riedweg (1994) 164.

[52] Amir only discusses poetic material: Hesiod at *Ebr*. 150, Sophocles at *Prob*. 19, Solon at *Opif*. 104 (but here the singular seems to have been in his arithmological source).

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16

NOUVELLES OBSERVATIONS SUR LE MANUSCRIT *PARISINUS GRAECUS* 1807

H. D. SAFFREY

Un bon nombre des savants qui ont eu à éditer des textes philosophiques grecs anciens, ont rencontré sur leur chemin la « Collection philosophique », cet ensemble de manuscrits très anciens qui sont issus du même centre de copie, comme l'avait déjà remarqué T.W. Allen en 1893,[1] il y a plus d'un siècle. Le Prof. John Whittaker est l'un d'eux, et pour lui cette rencontre a été double. Il a surtout eu à faire au *Parisinus graecus* 1962 qui est l'un des livres de la « Collection philosophique »[2] et qui contient, outre les *Dissertations* de Maxime de Tyr, l'*Enseignement des doctrines de Platon* par Alcinoos, dont J. Whittaker a été l'éditeur dans la Collection des Universités de France.[3] Et il a retrouvé une trace de ce même manuscrit en étudiant le *Vindobonensis philosophicus graecus* 314, copié en 925 par Jean Grammaticos, sur le manuscrit aujourd'hui perdu de la bibliothèque d'Aréthas qui l'avait annoté probablement avant 907, scholies qu'Aréthas a en partie empruntées à celles du *Paris. gr.* 1962 que donc il a dû avoir en mains.[4] Connaissant l'intérêt de John

[1] Cf. T.W. Allen, « A Group of Ninth-century Greek Manuscripts », *Journal of Philology* 21 (1893) 48–65.

[2] Cf. J. Whittaker, « *Parisinus graecus* 1962 and the Writings of Albinus », *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 320–354 et 450–456, et « *Parisinus graecus* 1962 and Janus Lascaris », *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 239–244.

[3] Cf. *Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon.* Introduction, texte établi et commenté par John Whittaker, et traduit par Pierre Louis (Paris 1990). Voir aussi *Maximus Tyrius. Dissertationes*, ed. M.B. Trapp (Stutgardiae et Lipsiae 1994). Ainsi nous disposons d'un texte critique pour tout le contenu de ce manuscrit *Paris. gr.* 1962.

[4] Cf. J. Whittaker, « Arethas and the "Collection philosophique" »,

Whittaker pour la « Collection philosophique »,[5] je voudrais lui offrir quelques observations nouvelles sur un autre manuscrit de la « Collection philosophique », habituellement considéré comme le plus représentatif de cette Collection, le *Parisinus graecus* 1807, connu sous le sigle A, qui contient les tétralogies VIII (*Clitophon*, *République*, *Timée*, *Critias*) et IX (*Minos*, *Lois*, *Épinomis*, *Lettres*) des *Dialogues* de Platon, avec les *Définitions* et les *Spuria*.

Jusqu'à récemment, l'unique description de ce manuscrit était celle d'Henri Omont que l'on doit qualifier d'extrêmement sommaire.[6] Depuis peu nous disposons d'une analyse codicologique approfondie par Lidia Perria,[7] mais il reste encore à dire sur l'histoire cachée de ce manuscrit. On date en général les manuscrits de la « Collection philosophique » du troisième quart du IXe siècle. Le nom du copiste est inconnu, mais son écriture est célébrée comme une minuscule très régulière, d'une forme carrée ou rectangulaire, posée verticalement sur la ligne. Le copiste est soigneux, il se corrige lui-même parfois. C'est ce même copiste qui a aussi écrit cinq autres manuscrits qui forment le premier noyau de la « Collection philosophique », à savoir: Heidelberg, *Palat. gr.* 398 (Strabon), *Paris. gr.* 1962 (Maxime de Tyr et Alcinoos), *Laur.* 80, 9 + *Vat. gr.* 2197 (Proclus, *In Remp.*), *Paris. Suppl. gr.* 921 (Proclus, *In Tim.*), *Marc. gr.* 246 (Damascius). C'est lui encore, ou peut-être un premier correcteur, qui, dans le manuscrit de Platon, a recopié, dans une petite majuscule, les scholies anciennes

Paleografia e codicologia greca, a cura di D. Harlfinger e G. Prato (Alessandria 1991) 513–521.

[5] Sur la « Collection philosophique » voir en dernier lieu B.L. Fonkitch, « *Scriptoria* bizantini. Risultati e prospettive della ricerca », *Rivista di Studi bizantini e neoellenici*, N.S. 17-19 (1980–82) 73–118 (voir 93-99); L.G. Westerink, *Damascius. Traité des Premiers Principes*, I (Paris 1986) lxxiii–lxxx, et « Das Rätsel des untergründigen Neuplatonismus », dans *ΦΙΛΟΦΡΟΝΗΜΑ. Festschrift für Martin Sicherl* (Paderborn 1990) 105–123.

[6] Cf. H. Omont, *Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris 1888) 145–146. Pour être juste, il faut ajouter qu'Omont a ensuite publié un Fac-Similé en phototypie du *Platonis Codex Parisinus* A (Paris 1908) avec une Introduction substantielle.

[7] Cf. Lidia Perria, « Scrittura e ornamentazione nei codici della "Collezione filosofica" », *Rivista di Studi bizantini e neoellenici*, N.S. 28 (1991) 45–111 (voir 56–62), et « L'interpunzione nei manoscritti della "collezione filosofica" », dans *Paleografia e codicologia greca* 199–209. Voir aussi A.C. Clark, *The Descent of Manuscripts* (Oxford 1918) 386–395 et Aubrey Diller, « Notes on the History of some Manuscripts of Plato », dans *Studies in Greek Manuscript Tradition* (Amsterdam 1983) 251–252.

publiées par Greene.[8] Au siècle suivant, le Xe, un autre correcteur est venu combler les lacunes du manuscrit A, on désigne sa main par le sigle A^3. Au même moment peut-être, le manuscrit A a été partiellement copié, et cette copie est conservée dans le *Vaticanus graecus* 1 qui contient, de Platon, les *Lois*, l'*Épinomis* et les *Lettres*, les *Définitions* et les *Spuria*. Toutefois, dans les *Lois*, la copie ne commence qu'au livre V, 746b8, avec les mots: μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν. Cet apographe de A, qui est désigné par le sigle O, est daté de 930–960. Il faut donc que les deux manuscrits A et O se soient trouvés ensemble, probablement à Constantinople, au moment de la copie du *Vaticanus*.[9]

Examinons maintenant une première particularité du manuscrit de Paris qui doit être interprétée de la façon que voici. À la fin du texte des *Spuria* platoniciens, au folio 344v, on peut lire une note manuscrite qui est la suivante: ὠρθώθη ἡ βίβλος αὕτη ὑπὸ Κωνσταντίου μητροπολίτου Ἱεραπόλεως τοῦ καὶ ὠνησαμένου, ce qui se traduit: « Le livre que voici a été corrigé par Constantin, métropolite de Hiérapolis, qui l'a aussi acheté ». Ce Constantin est bien un métropolite de Hiérapolis, probablement Hiérapolis en Euphratène, c'est-à-dire Mabug (aujourd'hui el-Manbedsch en Syrie), qui n'est pas un inconnu. Grâce à une savante note du Père des Places dans le premier tome de son édition des *Lois* de Platon,[10] nous apprenons que la chronologie de ce Constantin est fixée par sa collaboration avec Nersès de Lambron,[11] évêque de Tarse en Cilicie (1153–1198). Ce Nersès était un personnage bien intéressant. Sa passion pour la vie monastique lui faisait visiter les monastères, même les monastères latins établis par les Croisés en Syrie dans les environs d'Antioche. C'était en 1179. Nersès avait trouvé les *Dialogues* de S. Grégoire le Grand, et il en fit une traduction en arménien à partir d'une traduction grecque due au pape Zacharie (VIIIe siècle), qui existait dans le monastère de Béthias, avec l'aide d'un moine nommé Guillaume. Dans ce même monastère de Béthias, il a encore découvert un exemplaire du *Commentaire sur l'Apocalypse* par Athanase de

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[8] Cf. W.C. Greene, *Scholia Platonica* (Haverfordiae 1938).

[9] Sur ce manuscrit et sa descendance multiple, cf. L.A. Post, *The Vatican Plato and its Relations* (Middletown 1934).

[10] Cf. *Platon. Oeuvres complètes*, XI.1: *Les Lois*, livres I–II, Texte établi et traduit par É. des Places (Paris 1951) ccx n. 2, que je reproduis intégralement.

[11] Sur ce Nersès de Lambron, cf. *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, XI (Paris 1982) col. 122–134 (B.L. Zekiyan) et *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* 9 (New York 1987) *s.v.* Nersès Lambronac'i (Krikor H. Maksoudian).

Césarée de Cappadoce. Depuis longtemps il cherchait à comprendre l'*Apocalypse*, il était plein de joie. Il prit avec lui le livre et l'emporta à Hromklay, le siège du patriarchat arménien. C'est là qu'il le traduisit en arménien avec l'aide de Constantin, métropolite de Hiérapolis. Il dit: « Nous commençâmes, avec l'aide de Dieu, lui à traduire et moi à écrire ». Autrement dit, Constantin traduisait du grec en arménien et Nersès écrivait sous sa dictée.[12] Ensemble ils ont aussi traduit en arménien, en 1179, le *Traité des cinq patriarchats* de Nil Doxopatrès, composé en 1142–1143.[13] La conclusion que l'on doit tirer de ces informations est d'abord que ce Constantin, métropolite de Hiérapolis, a vécu à la fin du XIIe siècle, qu'il s'est employé à favoriser les relations entre l'Église arménienne et celle de Constantinople en collaborant à des traductions d'ouvrages théologiques ou historiques grecs en arménien, qu'il pouvait donc posséder les manuscrits sur lesquels il travaillait, et que, puisqu'il était un savant, il est bien naturel qu'il ait voulu faire l'acquisition d'un manuscrit de Platon s'il en avait la possibilité. En même temps, nous constatons que le manuscrit de Platon, *Paris. gr.* 1807, était alors, non pas conservé dans l'une des grandes bibliothèques, l'impériale ou la patriarchale, mais plutôt se trouvait entre les mains de quelqu'un, qui avait le droit et le désir de le vendre; c'était peut-être un collègue de Constantin dans l'épiscopat, résidant comme lui quelquefois dans la Capitale byzantine. En admettant que la « Collection philosophique » ait eu au départ une existence en tant que collection, nous sommes obligés d'admettre que, au XIIe siècle déjà, un manuscrit au moins de cette collection, le *Paris. gr.* 1807, avait une existence indépendante.[14] Il fut vendu par son propriétaire et acheté par Constantin de Hiérapolis.

Si l'on se souvient que notre Nersès de Lambron a été non seulement un intermédiaire actif des relations entre son Église et celle de Constantinople, mais aussi a cherché à établir des liens avec l'Église de Rome, on ne sera pas trop surpris de la deuxième particularité du manuscrit de Paris que nous devons rapporter

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[12] Cf. A.S. Mat'erosyan, *Colophons des manuscrits arméniens des Ve-XIIe siècles* (Érevan 1988) 226–229, nn° 244 et 245. Je dois cette référence et des traductions de ces colophons à M. Jean-Pierre Mahé, que je remercie particulièrement.

[13] Cf. *Codices Armeni Bibliothecae Vaticanae* ... rec. E. Tisserant, (Rome 1927) 212. Ce sont les foll. 284–287 du *Vat. Arm.* 3. Sur Nil Doxopatrès, cf. V. Laurent, « L'oeuvre géographique du moine sicilien Nil Doxopatris », *Échos d'Orient* 36 (1937) 5–30.

[14] À moins que Constantin ait pu faire l'achat de plusieurs manuscrits de la « Collection philosophique » ensemble.

maintenant. Car si Constantin de Hiérapolis a été ce collaborateur intime de Nersès que nous avons dit, c'est sans doute parce qu'il partageait son esprit oecuménique. La date de la mort de Nersès (1198) n'est pas loin de celle de la prise de Constantinople par les Latins (1204), et nous savons que, passées les horreurs de la conquête, des relations convenables s'étaient établies non sans difficultés entre les autorités religieuses grecques et latines.[15] Les Latins étaient entrés en possession des trésors de la Capitale, et petit à petit les contacts ont dû devenir de plus en plus cordiaux. On ne peut donc pas s'étonner vraiment si des religieux latins, les Dominicains, une fois décidé l'envoi de missionnaires au Proche-Orient et la fondation d'une Province de Grèce au Chapitre Généralissime de 1228, se sont mis à la recherche des documents anciens sur la science et la philosophie grecque.[16]

À Paris, l'université avait inscrit Aristote à son programme des études depuis que l'on disposait de traductions latines de l'Aristote grec d'abord, arabe ensuite, grec de nouveau. Mais les universitaires étaient toujours anxieux de perfectionner leurs outils de travail et, en particulier, leur *Aristoteles latinus.* De son côté, la Province de Grèce avait déjà fondé plusieurs couvents, à Constantinople (il disparaîtra en 1261 avec la reprise de Constantinople par les Grecs), à Thèbes en Béotie,[17] célèbre par l'industrie de la soie, et à Andravida en Élide.

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[15] Cf. J. Longnon, *L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris 1949) 206: « La paix régnait entre clercs et laïques depuis le concordat de 1223. Et l'on comptait dans le haut clergé latin des hommes éminents, dont certains profitaient de leur présence en Grèce pour renouer la tradition humaniste des grands métropolites grecs, Eustathe et Michel Coniate »; et A. Bon, *La Morée franque* (BEFAR 213) (Paris 1969) 89–102, en particulier 91: « C'est seulement au bout de près de vingt ans, après un conflit assez grave entre le Saint-Siège et le prince d'Achaïe, que l'organisation ecclésiastique arriva à une certaine stabilité, vers 1222-1223 ». Pour l'église Sainte-Sophie d'Andravida, qui appartenait aux Dominicains, *ibid.* 547–553.

[16] Sur cette mission cf. B. Altaner, *Die Dominikanermissionen des 13. Jahrhunderts.* Breslauer Studien zur hist. Theologie, Bd. 3 (Habelschwerdt 1924) 9–19, et R. Loenertz, « Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la Province dominicaine de Grèce (1474–1669) », *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 14 (1944) 72–115, les documents publiés sont tous très postérieurs à la période qui nous intéresse, mais l'introduction générale est une mise en place de la perspective historique.

[17] M. Grabmann, *Guglielmo di Moerbeke O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele.* Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae XI (Roma 1946) 36, a mentionné une lettre pontificale envoyée au prieur du couvent de Thèbes le 12 novembre 1253, qui donc implique une date antérieure pour la fondation de ce couvent.

Dès le début, le personnel de ces couvents venait de la Province de France. Le frère Pierre de Sézanne, prieur du couvent de Constantinople, faisait partie, avec le titre de nonce, de la mission envoyée en 1234 par le pape Grégoire IX au patriarche grec, Germain II, en résidence à Nicée.[18] C'est lui aussi qui devait, avec le frère André de Longjumeau, apporter en France la Couronne d'épines en 1238.[19] Il y eut bientôt des évêques dominicains. En 1268, le Provincial de Grèce, le frère Pierre de Conflans, devenait archevêque de Corinthe,[20] dix ans plus tard, en 1278, le frère Guillaume de Moerbeke devait lui succéder. Ces religieux étaient donc en position d'apporter leur pierre au progrès des connaissances occidentales relatives à la philosophie grecque ancienne. Il suffisait que l'un d'eux fût un esprit curieux et laborieux pour que la chose se produisît. Cela arriva avec le frère Guillaume de Moerbeke qui semble avoir été formé dès les débuts de sa vie dominicaine pour la mission en Grèce où il a dû être envoyé dans les années cinquante du XIIIe siècle.[21] Nous le trouvons en 1260 en pleine activité de traducteur, puisque cette année-là, il achève le 24 avril, à Nicée, une traduction du commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur les *Météorologiques* d'Aristote et le 23 décembre, à Thèbes, celle du traité *Des parties des animaux* du même Aristote.[22] C'est dans ces mêmes années que Madame Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem veut dater la première rédaction de la révision-traduction de la *Métaphysique*.[23] On sait que cette révision-traduction de la *Métaphysique* a été faite sur le célèbre manuscrit aristo-

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[18] Cf. J. Golubovich, « Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum seu Relatio Apocrisariorum Gregorii IX de gestis Nicaeae in Bithynia et Nymphaeae in Lydia, 1234 », *Archivum Franciscanum historicum* 12 (1919) 418–465.

[19] Cf. Jacques Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Paris 1996) 140–146.

[20] Cf. A. Birkenmajer, « Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Mittelalterlichen Philosophie », *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Philosophie des Mittelalters* XX, 5 (Münster 1922) 65–67. Les archéologues américains qui ont commencé à fouiller la Corinthe Franque, ont déjà découvert un complexe religieux sur l'exacte nature duquel il est encore trop tôt pour se prononcer, cf. *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 133–191; 62 (1993) 1–52; 63 (1994) 1–56; 64 (1995) 1–60.

[21] C'est aussi l'avis de M. Clagett, *Archimedes in the Middle Ages*, II. The Translations from the Greek by William of Moerbeke (Philadelphia 1976) 5.

[22] Cf. W. Vanhamel, « Biobibliographie de Guillaume de Moerbeke », *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort (1286)* (Leuven 1989) 309–310.

[23] Cf. *Aristoteles latinus* XXV 3.1, *Metaphysica* lib. I-XIV, *recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden 1995) 253–254.

télicien,[24] datant du milieu du IXe siècle, le *Vindobonensis phil. gr.* 100. Rien de plus vraisemblable que ce soit à Nicée, la capitale de l'empire byzantin et centre d'études aristotéliciennes dans ces années-là (Nicéphore Blemmydès, Théodore II Lascaris[25]), qu'un tel manuscrit si précieux ait pu se trouver. Et c'est probablement parce qu'il savait que ce manuscrit pourrait être mis à sa disposition que Moerbeke fit le voyage de Nicée. Un manuscrit de Cambridge, Bibl. *Dom. Petri* 22, au fol. 240^r, conserve une note selon laquelle la traduction du livre IX de la *Métaphysique* aurait été faite à Nicée.[26] Même s'il ne porte pas son ex-libris, ce manuscrit est resté à l'usage de Guillaume de Moerbeke pendant un certain nombre d'années. Il l'a utilisé non seulement pour sa première rédaction de la *Métaphysique*, de la *Physique* et des *Météorologiques*, mais encore pour les deuxièmes rédactions des deux premiers textes, qui datent de son séjour italien à Viterbe.

L'identification du *Vindobonensis phil. gr.* 100, comme le manuscrit grec sur lequel Moerbeke a revu et traduit en latin les textes d'Aristote, repose non seulement sur des critères philologiques, mais aussi sur des traces matérielles portées par le traducteur lui-même: deux notes latines interlinéaires, de nombreux signes de paragraphes, dans le texte ou en marge, en forme de potence ou de pied de mouche, des repères qui ressemblent à notre point d'exclamation incliné sur la droite.[27] Ces mêmes signes se

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[24] Cf. *ibid.* 165–205; J. Irigoin, « L'Aristote de Vienne », *Jahrbuch d. österr. byzant. Gesellsch.* 6 (1957) 5–10; H. Hunger, *Katalog der Griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek*, 1 (Wien 1961) 208–209.

[25] L'*Épitomé* de Nicéphore Blemmydès, composé en 1260 dans le royaume de Nicée, utilise, outre les textes grecs d'Aristote, les commentaires de Simplicius sur la *Physique* et le *De caelo*, ainsi que celui d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur les *Météorologiques*, cf. W. Lackner, « Zum Lehrbuch der Physik des Nikephoros Blemmydes », *Byz. Forsch.* 4 (1972) 157–169. D'autre part, des notes autographes de l'empereur Théodore II Lascaris, ont été identifiées dans le manuscrit *Ambr.* M 46 sup., qui contient la *Physique* d'Aristote, cf. G. Prato, « Un autografo di Teodoro II Lascaris, imperatore di Nicea? », *Jahrb. d. österr. byzant. Gesellsch.* 30 (1981) 249–258, et *id.*, « La produzione libraria in area greco-orientale nel periodo del regno latino di Costantinopoli (1204–1261) », *Scrittura e civiltà* 5 (1981) 105–147.

[26] Cf. *Aristoteles latinus* XXV 3.1, 9.

[27] Cf. G. Vuillemin-Diem, « La traduction de la Métaphysique d'Aristote par Guillaume de Moerbeke et son exemplaire grec: Vind. phil. gr. 100 (J) », *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung* II (Berlin 1987) 434–486 (voir 471–472).

retrouvent dans le manuscrit latin d'Archimède qui est un autographe de Moerbeke, l'*Ottobonianus lat.* 1850. Enfin, au fol. 137ᵛ du *Vindobonensis*, une longue note en grec, écrite entièrement de la main de Moerbeke, présente une liste des oeuvres d'Hippocrate, copiée directement de la table contenue dans le manuscrit *Vat. gr.* 276, manuscrit hippocratique du XIIe siècle, qui se trouvait déjà en Sicile au milieu du XIIIe siècle et devait appartenir plus tard à la fameuse bibliothèque de Boniface VIII.[28] Cette annotation confirme que ce manuscrit *Vindobonensis* a été à l'usage personnel de Moerbeke et que ce dernier l'avait emporté avec lui en Italie.

Que l'on veuille ou non rattacher ce manuscrit aristotélicien à la « Collection philosophique », J. Irigoin a reconnu que c'est la même main qui a porté, en petites onciales, les scholies marginales anciennes qui glosent le texte d'Aristote et celui de Platon dans le *Parisinus gr.* 1807 et ceux contenus dans quelques autres manuscrits de la « Collection philosophique ». Une relation, quelle qu'elle soit, entre la « Collection philosophique » et le *Vind. phil. gr.* 100 est donc indubitable. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'utilisation extensive du *Vind. phil. gr.* 100 par Guillaume de Moerbeke a dû être le premier contact de ce savant avec un manuscrit d'une si grande qualité, dont l'excellence ne pouvait que l'inciter à rechercher d'autres documents semblables pour ses travaux.

Nous savons que Moerbeke a pleinement réussi dans cette recherche. En 1961, Lotte Labowsky publiait sa belle découverte de la marque de possession par Guillaume de Moerbeke dans le manuscrit *Marcianus gr.* 258, contenant les oeuvres dites mineures d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise,[29] dont le *De fato*, traduit en latin par Moerbeke, et offrant dans ses marges des annotations autographes et tous les signes caractéristiques du traducteur.[30] Guillaume de

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[28] Cf. G. Vuillemin-Diem, « La liste des oeuvres d'Hippocrate dans le *Vindobonensis phil. gr.* 100: un autographe de Guillaume de Moerbeke », *Guillaume de Moerbeke*, 135–183.

[29] Cf. L. Labowsky, « William of Moerbeke's Manuscript of Alexander of Aphrodisias », *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 5 (1961) 155–162; cette importante découverte n'a pourtant pas été enregistrée par E. Mioni, *Codices Graeci Manuscripti Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum*, I (Rome 1981) 373–374.

[30] Les « points d'exclamation inclinés vers la droite » caractéristiques de Moerbeke, se trouvent à plusieurs reprises dans les marges du *De fato*, en des lieux problématiques du texte, cf. G. Vuillemin-Diem, « La liste des oeuvres d'Hippocrate ... » 148 n. 40 et planche I. La plupart de ces notes se trouvent entre les ff. 40ʳ et 184ʳ, qui contiennent les *Quaestiones*, lib. I, et le *De anima*, lib. I–II. En général, il s'agit de mots isolés, qui traduisent un mot du texte grec, p. ex. f. 40ʳ *rubrum* = ξανθόν,

Moerbeke a donc lu attentivement ce manuscrit. C'est aussi ce manuscrit qui contient le bref traité sur le temps par Zacharias de Chalcédoine, un élève, ami et correspondant de Photius.[31] Le *Marc. gr.* 258 est un livre de la « Collection philosophique », probablement rapporté en Europe occidentale par Moerbeke lui-même. On ne sait plus rien de son histoire avant qu'il soit acquis par le cardinal Bessarion.

Il y a encore deux autres manuscrits de la « Collection philosophique », qui ont été très probablement en relation avec Guillaume de Moerbeke ou avec son entourage immédiat: les manuscrits de Venise *Marciani graeci* 196 (Olympiodore, Damascius), et 226 (Simplicius).[32]

Le *Marc. gr.* 196, qui est l'archétype de toute la tradition et son seul témoin jusqu'au XVe siècle, présente de nombreuses annotations latines analogues à celles rencontrées dans le manuscrit d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Ces notes sont de deux sortes: une vingtaine sont simplement la traduction latine d'un mot grec du texte, les autres, 24 environ, reproduisent en marge le nom *Aristotiles* partout où il est nommé par Olympiodore. D'autre part, on sait qu'une scholie grecque ancienne sur la fin de la *Métaphysique* de Théophraste, a été rapportée par erreur au début de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote, faisant croire ainsi qu'il fallait attribuer le premier livre de la *Métaphysique* non à Aristote mais à Théophraste. Moerbeke a trouvé cette note et l'a traduite, mais il a ajouté une remarque qui ne peut s'expliquer que par la connaissance d'une citation d'Olympiodore qui se trouve, en effet, tout au début du commentaire sur le *Premier Alcibiade*. Comme ce témoignage est unique et puisqu'au XIIIe siècle il était conservé dans ce seul manuscrit grec, il faut bien que le lecteur latin qui a ajouté cette remarque l'ait tirée du manuscrit grec *Marc. gr.* 196 contenant cet ouvrage d'Olympiodore.[33] Moerbeke ou quelque *socius* qu'il pouvait avoir à son service, a donc aussi connu ce livre de la « Collection philosophique ».

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ou f. 96ʳ *facile* = ῥαδίως, mais il y a aussi une note plus longue, f. 101ʳ *terminus corporis terminati superficies, superficiei terminus color*, où l'on reconnaît l'écriture de Moerbeke. L'identification de son écriture grecque est encore plus évidente pour les quelques mots grecs recopiés en marge, p. ex. f. 40ʳ διαφανόν. Ces notes mériteraient une étude spéciale. Communication par lettre de Madame G. Vuillemin-Diem.

[31] Ce traité a été édité et commenté par K. Oehler, *ByzZ* 50 (1957) 31–38.

[32] Cf. *Aristoteles latinus*, XXV 3.1, 318–325, et lettre du 28 août 1995.

[33] Cf. *Aristoteles latinus*, XXV 3.1, 308–325.

Quant au *Marc. gr.* 226 qui contient le commentaire de Simplicius sur les livres V à VIII de la *Physique* d'Aristote, il n'offre aucune note marginale en latin. Toutefois il présente une fois, au fol. 76^{r}, le signe de distinction d'un paragraphe en forme de potence, souvent utilisé par Guillaume de Moerbeke. Il semble marquer la fin d'un passage problématique, un doublet dans le texte d'Aristote, et le début d'un résumé du livre V.[34] Or Moerbeke qui avait traduit ce passage dans sa première rédaction, l'a éliminé de la deuxième, peut-être à l'instigation de ce qu'il avait lu dans Simplicius. D'autre part, les marges du *Marc. gr.* 226 présentent un certain nombre de croix, toutes semblables et de la même main, mais on observe que ces croix se réfèrent toujours au texte d'Aristote cité en lemmes ou dans le commentaire par Simplicius. On en déduit que le lecteur qui a porté ces croix s'intéressait seulement au texte d'Aristote et non pas à celui de Simplicius. Or l'on sait que Moerbeke, dans une deuxième rédaction de sa traduction latine de la *Physique* a utilisé, à partir du livre V, une autre source que le *Vindobonensis*; il est tentant de penser qu'il aurait pu trouver aussi dans le Commentaire de Simplicius une aide bienvenue pour faire des vérifications sur le texte aristotélicien dans le but de parfaire sa propre traduction. Les croix marginales pourraient être les signes de sa recherche. Cette hypothèse mériterait une étude approfondie. Il arrive que, dans cette deuxième rédaction, le texte aristotélicien traduit par Moerbeke soit conforme à celui cité par Simplicius.[35] Toutes ces coïncidences sont troublantes.

L'ensemble de ces observations nous obligent à admettre que des Latins du XIIIe siècle, lisant couramment le grec, ont eu accès à plus d'un manuscrit appartenant à la «Collection philosophique». Force est aussi de constater que ces lecteurs latins s'identifient à Guillaume de Moerbeke et à son entourage immédiat. Ils les ont découverts en Orient et ont dû en rapporter certains en Occident. Et

[34] Il y a en quelque sorte deux doublets. Le premier qui a été reconnu par Ross dans son édition tient les lignes $231^{a}5$–17 pour un doublet des lignes $230^{b}10$–28 auxquelles elles n'ajoutent rien. D'autre part à la fin de ce passage, à la ligne $231^{a}17$, le *Vindobonensis* a encore recopié les lignes $230^{b}29$–$231^{a}4$, qui sont la conclusion du livre V, et introduit ainsi un second doublet. Simplicius, dans son commentaire, 917–920 (Diels), a signalé ces accidents du texte et reconnu ces doublets. Le début du passage litigieux est signalé par une croix au fol. 75^{r} du *Marc. gr.* 226. Renseignements dus à Madame G. Vuillemin-Diem, par lettre.

[35] Cf. J. Brams et G. Vuillemin-Diem, « Moerbekes doppelte Redaktion der Physica Vetus », *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 18 (1986) 268.

voici une nouvelle attestation qu'ils ont aussi eu en mains le plus célèbre de ces manuscrits, le Platon de Paris, connu sous le sigle A.

En effet, si l'on ouvre le manuscrit *Paris. gr.* 1807 au feuillet 128^r dans le texte du *Timée*, on lit très clairement, écrit à la mine de plomb, dans la marge supérieure, les mots: *finis translationis.* Or cette indication correspond exactement au passage du *Timée* 53c4 où se termine justement la traduction latine de Calcidius, la seule traduction connue des Latins à cette époque-là. La main qui a inscrit cette note est indubitablement du XIIIe siècle, par conséquent, ce ne peut être que la main d'un lecteur latin médiéval. En même temps, cette note est accompagnée d'un large pied de mouche, signe que l'on ne rencontre jamais, à ma connaissance, dans les manuscrits grecs annotés par des Grecs. De plus, ces mêmes pieds de mouche, tracés à la mine de plomb, se rencontrent encore quatre fois dans les marges du *Timée*: au fol. 119^v = *Tim.* 27c1 (la prière préalable); au fol. 121^r = *Tim.* 31b4 (la fabrication du monde); au fol. 122^v = *Tim.* 40e4 (la généalogie des dieux et le discours du démiurge aux jeunes dieux); au fol. 124^r = *Tim.* 44d3 (la fabrication du corps humain). En ce dernier lieu une main qui pourrait être celle d'un lecteur médiéval a ajouté en grec: ἀρχὴ ποιήσεως ἀνθρώπου.[36] Ces signes ne peuvent marquer que l'intérêt d'un lecteur latin à ces passages du *Timée*, qui certainement étaient dignes de retenir l'attention d'un savant déjà familiarisé avec l'enseignement de Platon sur ces matières par le *Commentaire* de Calcidius.[37] Car de deux choses l'une, ou bien il allait reconnaître quelque partie du dialogue qui n'était pas expliquée par Calcidius, ou bien il pourrait mieux comprendre, par un accès direct au texte de Platon, les explications du commentateur. Or nous constatons que c'est ce qui a pu arriver, puisque Calcidius ne commence son commentaire qu'avec le sujet de la naissance du monde (*de genitura mundi*), puis de l'origine de l'âme (*de ortu animae*), puis de l'origine de l'espèce humaine (*de ortu generis humani*). Au sujet de la prière initiale, Calcidius ne dit rien. Nous observons donc que le lecteur latin de notre *Paris gr.* 1807 a parfaitement reconnu trois sujets évidemment très importants traités par

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[36] La formulation très brève de cette scholie et l'absence de l'article devant le premier génitif, sont peut-être un signe que son auteur n'était pas un grec.

[37] Ce commentaire a été magistralement publié par J.H. Waszink, *Plato Latinus vol. IV, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (Londres 1962; 1975^2). Le même signe (pied de mouche) se trouve aussi dans le manuscrit d'Archimède latin, *Vat. Ottob. lat.* 1850, autographe de Moerbeke, cf. M. Clagett, *op.cit.* (*supra*, n. 21) 74 n. 3 (« a paragraph or section sign, always in red ink »).

Calcidius, puisqu'il s'agit de la création du monde et de l'homme, et de plus il a découvert un sujet nouveau, la prière, non moins important pour lui. Une nouvelle observation s'impose alors. Nous savons que Guillaume de Moerbeke a précisément traduit du commentaire de Proclus sur le *Timée* le passage du livre II où il explique cet enseignement de Platon sur la prière.[38] Nous savons aussi qu'il existait dans la « Collection philosophique » un exemplaire de ce *Commentaire* de Proclus, dont il ne reste plus que onze feuillets palimpsestes dans le manuscrit *Paris. suppl. gr.* 921. On ne peut pas exclure non plus que Moerbeke ait eu connaissance de ce manuscrit à un moment où il était complet et qu'il l'ait utilisé pour sa traduction. Dans ce cas, il aurait encore connu un autre manuscrit de la « Collection philosophique ». Enfin ne serait-ce pas en lisant le manuscrit platonicien de Paris que Moerbeke aurait eu pour la première fois l'attention attirée sur ce sujet de la prière chez Platon et chez Proclus? Si l'on pouvait répondre affirmativement à cette question, on devrait affirmer en même temps que Moerbeke a eu en mains le *Paris. gr.* 1807. Ce serait probablement trop beau. Sur deux mots seulement, qui constituent la note relevée au feuillet 128^{r} du *Paris. gr.* 1807, on peut difficilement identifier une écriture. Pourtant jusqu'à maintenant, rien ne s'oppose à cette identification, et toutes les coïncidences que nous venons de rappeler, inclinent dans ce sens. Il faut attendre. Mais l'éventualité que le *Paris. gr.* 1807 soit venu en Occident avec Moerbeke dès la fin du XIIIe siècle, n'est pas à exclure.

Dans ce cas, cette histoire du manuscrit *Paris. gr.* 1807 peut encore expliquer le fait étrange qu'il soit parvenu entre les mains de Pétrarque vers le milieu du XIVe siècle, alors qu'il séjournait à Vaucluse. On sait que, dans une lettre à Nicolas Sygeros,[39] écrite de Milan le 10 janvier 1354, Pétrarque le remerciait pour l'envoi d'un manuscrit grec d'Homère[40] et il ajoutait: *Erat michi domi, dictu mirum, ab occasu veniens olim Plato, philosophorum princeps, ut nosti ... Nunc tandem tuo munere philosophorum principi poetarum graius princeps accessit.* Si l'on se souvient que cette lettre a été écrite de

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[38] La traduction moerbekienne de ce fragment a été publiée par C. Steel dans *Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon*, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, II (Leuven 1985) 561–587.

[39] Cf. Francesco Petrarca, *Le Familiari*, ed. critica per cura di Vittorio Rossi, III (Firenze 1937) 277.81–88. Il s'agit de *Fam.* XVIII.2. Sur ce Platon de Pétrarque, cf. P. de Nolhac, *Pétrarque et l'humanisme*, II (Paris 1907) 133–134.

[40] Cf. E.H. Wilkins, *Petrarch's Eight Years in Milan* (Cambridge MA 1958) 51.

Milan et que le manuscrit de Platon était resté à Vaucluse, on peut, je crois, traduire cette phrase de la façon suivante: « J'avais à la maison, chose admirable à dire, un Platon, le prince des philosophes, comme tu le sais, qui viendra un jour, à la première occasion ... Maintenant enfin, grâce à ton cadeau, le prince des poètes grecs a rejoint le prince des philosophes ». Mais Pétrarque ne savait pas le grec. Il disait de son manuscrit d'Homère: *Homerus tuus apud me mutus, imo vero ego apud illum surdus sum. Gaudeo tamen vel aspectu solo et sepe illum amplexus ac suspirans dico: O magne vir, quam cupide te audirem !* « Pour moi, ton Homère est muet, ou plutôt c'est moi qui suis sourd pour lui. Cependant sa seule vue me réjouit, et souvent je l'embrasse et je soupire en disant: Toi, grand homme, comme j'aimerais t'entendre! » De son manuscrit de Platon, Pétrarque pouvait dire la même chose. Il ne pouvait le lire. Or Aubrey Diller[41] a montré, avec des arguments qui semblent probants, que ce manuscrit de Platon ne peut être que le *Paris. gr.* 1807. En effet, après la mort de Pétrarque en 1374 à Arqua, ses livres passèrent à Francesco da Carrara, puis aux Visconti. Élisabeth Pellegrin[42] a reconnu le manuscrit conservé à Paris dans le Platon grec de cette bibliothèque, mentionné dans les inventaires de 1426 et de 1459. C'est donc que le manuscrit *Paris. gr.* 1807 était bien le Platon de Pétrarque. La suite est alors toute claire. Pour la première fois peut-être, notre manuscrit de Platon est de nouveau copié à Milan par Giorgio Valla dans les années soixante-dix ou quatre-vingts du XVe siècle[43] et par Georges Hermonyme dans ces mêmes années.[44] Il est entré aussi dans la bibliothèque de Janus Lascaris où il était catalogué *N° primo della prima cassa.* Lascaris y a porté une annotation au fol. 119^{v}[45] et son sigle fameux Λ^{σ}. Lascaris était à Milan dans l'année 1499–1500. On connaît bien le sort final de cette

[41] Cf. A. Diller, « Petrarch's Greek Codex of Plato », *CP* 59 (1964) 271–272, reproduit dans *Studies in Greek Manuscript Tradition* 349–351.

[42] Cf. É. Pellegrin, *La bibliothèque des Visconti et des Sforza, ducs de Milan, au XVe siècle* (Paris 1955) 98 (= A 120, dans l'inventaire de 1426) et 310 (= B 463, dans l'inventaire de 1459), *ibid.*, Supplément (Florence 1969) 57, et « Manuscrits de Pétrarque dans les bibliothèques de France », III, *Italia Medioevale e Umanistica* 7 (1964) 487–488.

[43] C'est le manuscrit Modène 89, cf. Post, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 9) 71.

[44] C'est le manuscrit Leiden, *Voss. gr.* fol. 74, cf. Post, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 9) 88.

[45] Cf. W.C. Greene, *Scholia platonica* 288 (la scholie reproduit celle sur le *Gorgias*, *ibid.* 168), et Anna Pontani, « Per la biografia di Giano Lascaris », *Dotti bizantini e libri greci nell'Italia del secolo XV* (Napoli 1992) 426–427.

bibliothèque qui, de Janus Lascaris, passe successivement entre les mains du cardinal Ridolfi, puis, en 1550, de Pierre Strozzi et enfin, entre 1560 et 1568,[46] aux mains de sa parente, la reine Catherine de Médicis, et, en 1594, il est classé dans la bibliothèque des rois de France. Pour finir, ce précieux manuscrit qui a été relié en maroquin rouge, aux armes accolées de France et de Navarre, entourées des colliers des Ordres de Saint-Michel et du Saint-Esprit, avec le chiffre répété de Henri IV et la date de 1602, est l'un des joyaux de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France.[47]

[46] Cf. R. Baladié, « Contribution à l'histoire de la collection Ridolfi : la date de son arrivée en France », *Scriptorium* 29 (1975) 76–83.

[47] Je remercie Madame Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem qui m'a sauvé de plusieurs erreurs et m'a généreusement communiqué ses nombreuses observations sur les manuscrits de Venise.

Parisinus graecus 1807, f. 128r

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